The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus c10.43

c10.43

Similarly, as regards the relation of cause and effect, a *nexus* is sometimes fancied to be perceived, a power in the cause to produce the effect (शक्ति), or an ultimate form (जातिसौक्ष्म्य), which is supposed to be present whenever the effect (quality or substance) is produced (*cf.* Bacon's view of the "Forms" of Simple Qualities). All this is neither a matter of observation nor of legitimate hypothesis. There is nothing except the invariable time-relation (antecedence and sequence) between the cause and the effect. But the mere invariableness of an antecedent does not suffice to constitute it the cause of what succeeds; it must be an unconditional antecedent as well (अन्यथासिद्धिशून्यस्य नियतपूर्व्ववर्त्तिता, being the definition of कार्यकारणभाव). For example, the essential or adventitious accompaniments of an invariable antecedent may also be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, but only collateral and indirect. In other words, their antecedence is conditional on something else (न स्वातन्त्र्येण). The potter's stick is an unconditional invariable antecedent of the jar; but the colour of a stick, or its texture or size or any other accompaniment or accident which does not contribute to the work done (so far as we are considering it), is not an unconditional antecedent, and must not therefore be regarded as a cause. Similarly, the co-effects of the invariable antecedents, or what enters into the production of these co-effects, may themselves be invariable antecedents; but they are not unconditional, being themselves conditioned by those of the antecedents of which they are effects. For example, the sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably precedes the jar, but it is a co-effect, and Ákása (ether) as the substrate and Vayu (air) as the vehicle of the sound enter into the production of this co-effect; but these are not "unconditional" antecedents, and must therefore be rejected in an enumeration of conditions or causes of the jar. Again, the conditions of the conditions, the invariable antecedents of the invariable antecedents, are not unconditional. The potter's father is an invariable antecedent of the potter who is an invariable antecedent of the jar, but the potter's father does not stand in a causal relation to the potter's handiwork. In fact, the antecedence must not only be unconditionally invariable, but must also be immediate (अव्यवहितपूर्व्वकालावच्छेदेन कार्य्यदेशे सत्त्वम्). Finally, all seemingly invariable antecedents which may be dispensed with or left out are *ipso facto* not unconditional, and cannot therefore be regarded as causal conditions. In short, nothing that is unnecessary is unconditional. For this class, *vide* Visvanátha:—नियतावश्यकपूर्व्वभाविनः अवश्यक्लृप्तनियतपूर्व्ववर्त्तिन एव कार्य्यसम्भवे । तद्भिन्नम् (अतिरिक्तं) अन्यथासिद्धं—Visvanátha, Siddhánta-Muktávali, on Śloka 20. For example, it is the custom to point to spatial position or direction with the fingers; but finger-pointing, though invariably present, is not causally related to the perception of direction or spatial position, because we can imagine such perception without finger-pointing (अन्यथासिद्धतया अङ्गुल्या निर्देशस्य दिक्प्रत्ययत्वेन न स्वाभाविकः सम्बन्धः, Váchaspati, Tátparyyatíká, Chap. I., Áhnika 1, Sútra 5. This shows that the doctrine of अन्यथासिद्धिशून्य was long anterior to Gaṅgesa).