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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c7.s2: Caraka on the Theory of Vāda

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c7.s2

Language
English

Caraka on the Theory of Vāda

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The discussions on the theory of *vāda* and cultivation of the methodology related to it was not confined to Nyāya system of philosophy alone, nor was it the prerogative of philosophers only. Theory and practice of *vāda* were taken up by authors in the field of other disciplines like Āyurveda, Arthaśāstra and Dharmaśāstra also. Each text defines it own parameters of the theoretical discussion.

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The extensive treatment of the concept of *vāda* and its techniques by Caraka in his *Caraka Saṁhitā* has led a modern scholar of philosophy like S.N. Dasgupta to suggest that in Indian philosophy “dialectic emerged from discussions of Āyurveda physicians”. E.A. Solomon rightly disagrees with this view. To quote her:

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We may not so far as to give all the credit to the Āyurveda-physicians, but we can certainly say that we have evidence that the school of Yājñika-Mīmāṁsakas and the medical school through their discussions and disputes contributed considerably to the field of logic and dialectic.³²

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According to Caraka, the whole discourse in his text is delivered through four sections/segments: *tantra* (text), *sthāna* (section), *adhyāya* (chapters) and *praśna* (queries and their answers) by the *pravaktṛs* (spokesmen/proponents) of this *śāstra*. The themes are to be explained in brief and in detail through the five stages of *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya* and *nigamana*, so that the discussion is made comprehensible for all the three types of disciples — brilliant, average and dull.³³ Caraka has also given the model of questions and answers that can proceed between a *guru* and his *śiṣya* of this *śāstra*.³⁴ He has used the term *sambhāṣā* (conversation) instead of *kathā* (discussion). Themes for discussions or questions between two *vaidyas* have also been defined by Caraka. They comprise of a group of eight categories — *tantra* (treatise or the text), *tantrārtha* (contents of the text), *sthāna* (sections in the text), *sthānārtha* (contents of the sections), *adhyāya* (chapters), *adhyāyārtha* (contents of the chapters), *praśna* (topics) and *praśnārtha* (contents of the topics).³⁵

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Through the theory of *vāda*, Caraka has reformulated the epistemology for Āyurveda. He has also developed a theory of *vāda* as applicable to his discipline and calls it *bhiṣagvāda* (debates between the physicians).³⁶ He also gives a clear directive to his fellow physicians — all the discussions or dialogues that they carry with their colleagues should pertain to Āyurveda only and not to other disciplines.³⁷ Here, *pratyakṣa* (perception) is not cited as the first valid means of knowledge, it is *āptopadeśa* which is the first *pramāṇa*.³⁸ The concept of *āpta* also differs. *Āptas* to Caraka are the knowledgeable ones who have perfect memory of the *śāstra* and can give a discourse on it in an unambiguous way without any partiality and prejudice.³⁹

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Debates between the practitioners of Āyurveda were assiduously cultivated and were regarded as essential for a healthy growth of the discipline itself. Caraka regards the employment of debating techniques to defeat the designs of the pseudo-*vaidyas*. He equates such *vaidyas* to wolves terrorizing poor folks who are like weak animals. The knowledgeable *vaidya* should assert himself as an *āpta* (authority on the subject) so that he appears as a wolf for dispelling the appearances of the ignorant one. A *vaidya* knowing nothing but boasting of his expertise should be confronted with eight questions pertaining to the fundamentals of the discipline. In the course of the debate his adversary who is feigning to be a great *vaidya* then is exposed like a *babhru* or *nakula* (mongoose) covered by his woollen hair. The knowledgeable *vaidya* should carry on a hostile debate to such a fake practitioner. A *vaidya* should face the challenge in the debate and should not tolerate pedantry and misconstrued notions. A debate is necessary for revelation of true knowledge in the field of Āyurveda. A true *vaidya* would carry *sadvāda* (fair debate) and would put an end to *Asadvāda* (unfair debate). Through the real debate, the *āpta* (authentic expert) is recognized. *Ānāptas* (non-authorities) start boasting of their knowledge and become rude out of hypocrisy. They are actually *dūṣakas* (revilers) of the *śāstra*. One should avoid them and approach the real *vaidyas* to arrive at true knowledge of the *śāstra*.⁴⁰

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After describing the pedagogy and methods of teaching Āyurveda in chap. IV (VIII in some other editions) of Vimānasthāna in his text, Caraka discusses the theory of debate in detail. The debate between physicians encourages the pursuit of knowledge and its advancement provides expertise, improves the art of oratory, illuminates fame, provides opportunity to remove doubts with reference to what was listened earlier by listening to it again with the removal of the doubts; it inculcates decisiveness and introduces new ideas hitherto unknown. Sometimes the teacher reveals the secrets of his discipline before a disciple with whom he may be pleased, but he also reveals these secrets in the course of a discussion with an opponent out of the desire of winning the debate. Therefore the experts recommend that a physician should enter into debates only with those physicians who are adept in their field.

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The debate is of two types from the point of view of purpose — *sandhāya saṁbhāṣā* (friendly debate) and *vigrāhya saṁbhāṣā* (hostile debate). The former is conducted with a spirit of coordination. The latter is aggressive and involves disputes. Caraka has also used the term *anuloma saṁbhāṣā* for the friendly debate.⁴¹

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The friendly debate is held with a learned and knowledgeable *vaidya* who is able to express himself well and is prompt in responding; is not irritable and jealous; is ready to be convinced and able to convince others; can take pains in carrying out the discussion and is endearing in speech. In the course of a discussion being carried out with such a *vaidya*, one should talk to him without reservations, should ask him questions without hesitation and upon his raising any query, should tell him in an elaborate manner. He should not be detracted by the fear of defeat in the debate, should not rejoice at winning a debate, should not boast before others, should not be obsessed with his own stand, should not explain things which are unknown, should be perfectly convincing with humility and maintain restraint. This is the way *anuloma sambhāṣās* (friendly discussions are conducted).

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On the other hand, one should enter into a hostile debate with a fake physician, considering himself superior to his adversary. Before proceeding to make rejoinders, he should examine the difference between his speech and the speech of the opponent, difference between himself and the other one, and also the qualities of the juries. Proper examination gives an understanding when one should initiate the discussion and when he should wind it up. Hence the experts recommend proper examination. When making such an examination, one should also examine the merits and demerits of the speaker in a proper way, viz. — his knowledge, understanding, retention, brilliance and eloquence — these are the merits. The demerits are — irritability, lack of skill, cowardice, lack of retention and unawareness. One should compare the advantages and disadvantages in respect of these merits and demerits.⁴²

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In accordance with these merits or demerits, the opponent may be of three types — superior, inferior or equal.⁴³

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The assembly of experts or juries is of two types — learned or ignorant. From other point of view, it is of three types — friendly, neutral and prejudiced. Before a prejudiced assembly, even if it is a congregation of learned and knowledgeable ones, one should not carry discussion. But if the assembly consists of friendly or neutral persons, one should carry on discussion with his opponent whether he is ignorant or knowledgeable one. In discussions with such an opponent, a *vaidya* is advised to use long incomprehensible sentences loaded with aphorisms, to ridicule the opponent again and again with movements of hands before the gathering and not allow him to speak and while using difficult words and seeing the opponent at the loss of words, he should say why are you not speaking now? Or should tell him, in an assertive way, that your propositions do not stand. He should tease him by saying:

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You should learn for one more year, it seems that you have not learned under an able *guru*. The opponent even when defeated for once only, should be taken as defeated and should not be entertained again. Some say that this very method can be applied for discussions with a superior one, but Caraka recommends that confrontation with a superior *vaidya* is not desirable.⁴⁴

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A hostile debate with a person who is inferior in knowledge or with the one who may be a peer can be conducted before a friendly assembly. If the assembly consists of neutral persons, who are attentive, prompt in listening, and equipped with knowledge, comprehension and retention; are able to respond through speech and give a rejoinder; one should carefully weigh the merits as well as the strong and weak points of the opponent. If he finds the opponent superior, he should avoid debate without apparently exhibiting the discontinuance. But where he finds the opponent inferior, he should overpower him there (on the weak points). And these are the means to subdue the inferior opponents quickly — he should overpower the opponent having no knowledge of the text by long citations from the text; the opponent weak in comprehension by producing long and difficult sentences; the opponent weak in retention of the sentences by cluster of sentences making complicated structure; the unintelligent opponent by speaking a sentence with more than one meanings; the opponent lacking in power of speech by intercepting when he has uttered half of the sentence; the unskilled opponent by putting him in an embarrassing situation; the irritant opponent by teasing; if the opponent is a coward then by terrorizing him; if he is not attentive, then by controlling him. Thus by these means one should subdue an inferior opponent quickly.⁴⁵

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In a hostile debate, one should always stick to logic. A position once adopted should not be relinquished. One should keep the fact in mind that the hostile debate sometimes creates enmity in some persons. If a person really gets angry in the hostile debate, he can cross limits in action and speech. The experts do not recommend real quarrel in the assembly of noble persons.⁴⁶

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Prior to the start of the debate, one can do some planning. If the assembly of judges is friendly, he should get such a topic selected in which he is well-versed, or that which may be difficult for his opponent. Or the opponent can be assigned the uneasy side of the theme of the debate. After making these arrangements, he should say these are learned experts, it is improper for us to say anything in their presence, the assembly of learned juries itself will decide the norms and guidelines as they deem fit and desire to decide. Having said this he should sit quiet.

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The norms for winning or losing a debate can be like this — the debaters will use such and such terms, they will not use such and such terms, and either of them speaking in such and such way will be declared defeated and so on.⁴⁷

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After this Caraka produces a long list of technical terms with which the participants in a debate should be well-acquainted.⁴⁸ Out of the forty categories cited by him, the following are in addition to the ones defined by Gautama: *drava*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya*, *sthāpanā*, *pratiṣṭhāpanā*, *uttara*, *aitihya*, *aupamya*, *jijñāsā*, *vyavasāya*, *arthaprāpti*, *sambhava*, *anuyojya*, *ananuyojya*, *anuyoga*, *pratyanuyoga*, *vākyadoṣa* and *vākyapraśaṁsā*. *Siddhānta* is included in sixteen *padārthas* (universal categories) of *Nyāyadarśana*. Some of his terms like *atītakāla*, *upalambha*, *parihāra*, *pratijñāhāni*, *abhyanujñā*, *hetvantara* and *arthāntara* cited here by Caraka are included in the *nigrahasthānas* and whereas some others may fall under the *hetvābhāsas* (fallacies). He has used the term *ahetu* for fallacious reason and has defined here three types of *ahetus*: *prakaraṇasama*, *saṁśayasama* and *varṇyasama*.

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Six out of this whole gamut — *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* — relate to universal categories of Vaiśeṣika philosophy and Caraka has described them at the very outset of his text (in Sūtrasthāna) in the context of the cosmogony.⁴⁹

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He follows Vaiśeṣika closely here, but differs with Gautama to a considerable extent. It is Caraka who actually understands the term *vāda* in the sense of a formal or proper debate, where one party differs with the other and each adopts a position as per their system of thought or discipline. Instead of grouping *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* as types of *kathā* (discussion) Caraka defines these two as types of *vāda*.⁵⁰

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Caraka has added two more categories — *sthāpanā* and *pratiṣṭhāpanā* — after *pratijñā* (proposition). The statement of probandum is *pratijñā*. *Sthāpanā* involves the other four categories of the five-member syllogism for substantiating the *pratijñā*. *Pratiṣṭhāpanā* is the counter-proposition reversing the proposition of the opponent. Caraka has reformulated the concept of *hetu* (probans). That which leads to the attainment of the probandum is *hetu*, and it is a resultant of four *pramāṇas* — *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aitihya* and *upamāna*.⁵¹ There is slight difference in his concept of *dṛṣṭānta*, *upanaya* and *nigamana* also. A *dṛṣṭānta* should be intelligible to fools and scholars alike, and *upanaya* as well as *nigamana* are to be seen in the context of *sthāpanā* and *pratiṣṭhāpanā*.⁵² *Uttara* is a rejoinder. If the proponent explains *hetu* on the basis of similarities, the opponent would explain the same on the basis of dissimilarities. For example, if a patient is suffering from *śītavyādhi* (flu), the proponent would say that the causes of this disease are contact with chill air in winter. The opponent would reply — the same causes, i.e. the contact with chill air, etc. would function as favourable when one is suffering from heat.⁵³ In Gautama’s system, this category is incorporated in the treatment on *jāti*.

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Caraka’s concepts of *siddhānta*, *aupamya*, *saṁśaya* and *prayojana* are very much in affinity with their counterparts in Nyāya,⁵⁴ while his *savyabhicāra* is treated as a *hetvābhāsa* in Nyāya. His treatment of *śabda*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* also follows the Nyāya system.⁵⁵ He defines *aitihya* as *āptopadeśa* (advice from ancient reliable source).⁵⁶ This is treated as a category separate from *śabda-pramāṇa*, because *śabda-* *pramāṇa* to Caraka lies in the statements of reliable physicians. *Jijñāsā* is a typical category in Caraka’s discourse. It is like diagnosis. The advice given after examining a patient is *jijñāsā*.⁵⁷ *Vyavasāya* is decision.⁵⁸ *Arthaprāpti* (implication) is like the *arthāpatti* in Māmāṁsā, *sambhava* (origination), *anuyojya* (questionable statement), *ananuyojya* (unquestionable statement), *anuyoga* (question) and *pratyanuyoga* (counter-question) are other categories, according to Caraka, to be utilized in debate.⁵⁹

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He has discussed five *vākya-doṣas* (blemishes of a sentence) — *nyūna* (laconic), *adhika* (having excess of words, etc.), *anarthaka* (senseless), *apārthaka* (misleading) and *viruddha* (contradictory). The reversal of these yields five *vākyaprasaṁśās* — *anyūna*, *anadhika*, *arthavat*, *anapārthaka* and *avirudddha*. Caraka perhaps is indebted to Sulabhā’s categorizations of good and bad conversations as discussed in *Mahābhārata*.

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*Chala* has been defined by Caraka as mere verbosity full of deceit and pseudo-meanings. Examples are given from Āyurvedic debates. He defines two types of *chala* only – *vāk-chala* and *sāmānya-chala*, and omits *upacāra-chala*.⁶⁰ The categories like *atītakāla* are repeated here and they are taken up as *nigrahasthānas* also. Caraka has used the term *ahetu* for *hetvābhāsa*. *Ahetu* is of three types — *prakaraṇasama*, *saṁśayasama* and *varṇyasama*. *Upālambha* is remonstration. *Parihāra* is retribution of the defect. *Pratijñāhāni* and *abhyanujñā* are also defined as *nigrahasthas* in *Nyāyasūtra*. *Hetvantara* is referred to a defective cause instead of the cause in the context. *Arthāntara* is digression.

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Caraka defines *nigrahasthāna* as the occasion of defeat. He cites the following *nigrahasthānas* — *triḥ abhihitasya aparijñānam* (inability to understand even when a proposition is repeated thrice), *ananuyojyānuyogaḥ* (asking a question not to be asked), *anuyojyasya ananuyogaḥ* (not asking a question that ought to have been asked), *pratijñāhaniḥ* (loss of statement), *abhyanujñā*, *kālātītavacana*, *ahetu*, *nyūna*, *adhika*, *vyartha*, *punarukta*, *viruddha*, *hetvantara* and *arthāntara*.⁶¹

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In the terminology of Dharmakīrti, *sandhāya saṁbhāṣā* (friendly debate) and *vigrāhya saṁbhāṣā* (hostile debate) are known as *tattvabubhutsuvāda* (debate with the desire to seek the truth) and *vijigīṣuvāda* (debate with the desire for winning).

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