Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s5.14

c8.s5.14

Śaṅkara refutes Vijñānavādin, Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika together on one ground — they are not based on the knowledge of *Brahman* as revealed from the Śruti.³⁵ In fact, he corners the Sāṁkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vijñānavādin and Cārvāka for their realist, dualist and materialistic views. At the very outset of his *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, he gives a resume of various prima-facie views and takes together all of them.³⁶ The Vaiśeṣika's concept of *ātman* appears equally absurd to him as he would regard the *ātman* as *acetana* (inanimate) and *dravya* (substance).³⁷ Neither view of *vijñāna* is acceptable as it is momentary.³⁸