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Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s5: Debates on the Nature of Reality

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s5

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English

Debates on the Nature of Reality

c8.s5.1

The four schools of Buddhist philosophies have been mentioned in Chap. 2. The Sautrāntika (Representationism) and the Vaibhāṣika (Direct Realism) are the earliest. The other two schools, the Śūnyavāda and the Vijñānavāda attempt a liberal interpretation of the *buddha-vacanas* and they are more inclined towards metaphysical thinking. These two fall under the Mahāyāna (great vehicle), whereas the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika fall under the Hīnayāna (little vehicle).

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The difference between the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika lies in their view of cognition of external phenomena. The Vaibhāṣikas hold that all external things are known through perception. The Sautrāntikas argue that external things are known only through *anumāna* (inference). The Vaibhāṣika developed as a branch of Sarvāstivādin school under the Hīnayāna. They upheld the simultaneous existence of the past, present and future, the Sautrāntikas differed with them. The Sarvāstivādins also propounded the atomic theory of creation. Accordingly, the *paramāṇu* (atom) is the basic unit of the matter. It is imperceptible. A combination of seven *paramāṇus* makes an *aṇu* and an *aṇu* is perceptible. This theory of *paramāṇu* is criticized by the other Buddhists — the Vijñānavādins on one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system on the other. The proponents of *paramāṇu*-theory as per the tenets of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems hold that *paramāṇus* can exclude each other as they possess magnitude and actuality.²⁹ Both of these — the Sarvāsivādins and the theorists of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika — are contested by the Vijñānavādins who ask whether an atom is united with another atom partially or wholly, showing impossibility of both alternatives. An atom being indivisible cannot unite with another.

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Udayana utilizes the same logic to refute Vijñānavādin’s theory that the external reality is a manifestation of consciousness only. He asks whether the cognition is related to its contents partially or wholly. Since consciousness and cognition have no parts, partial relation is impossible. Vijñānavādin would challenge Naiyāyikas for the theory of difference between the *avayavin* (whole) and the *avayavas* (parts).

c8.s5.4

Regarding the aggregates (*skandhas*), bases (*āyatanas*) and elements, the Vaibhāṣikas believe that the word *skandha* means *rāśi*. It is an aggregate of the following:
• Past, present and future,
• the external and the internal,
• the gross or the subtle depending upon its status as resistant (*sapragraha*) or non-resistant (*apratigraha*),
• the inferior or the superior, and also depending upon whether it is sullied (*kliṣṭa*) or unsullied (*akliṣṭa*) with vices (*kleśas*), and
• the far or the near — depending upon whether it is past, present or future.

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These attributes belong to either the four aggregates, with the difference that gross consciousness is that of the five material sense-organs, whereas subtle consciousness is mind consciousness; or consciousness is gross or subtle, depending upon whether it belongs to the lower or higher stage.

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The Sautrāntikas reject the last three attributes; they stipulate that the third category — the gross form aggregate — is one which is perceived by the five material senses-organs, all other forms being subtle, and the fourth category — inferiority or superiority — depends on the form aggregate’s quality of being either pleasant or unpleasant; the last category — distance or proximity — depend on its being either in an invisible or visible place.³⁰

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In Buddhism, an individual existence is regarded as an aggregate, a stream of transient factors.³¹ In its earlier phase, the doctrine of momentariness was essentially a doctrine of the transience of psychic states without any permanent substratum. It did not mean in early phase the unqualified denial of all substances.³² There were debates within Buddhist sects on the concept of momentariness, as recorded in *Abhidharmakośa*. Finally, the momentariness came to be accepted at the level of experience.

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Nāgārjuna rejected the concept of *svabhāva* and emphasized the idea of *madhyamā pratipad* (the middle path). He also established the invariable relationship of the philosophy of Śūnyavāda with Buddha’s concept of *pratītyasamutpāda* (interdependent origination). *Nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* to him are the forms of one and the same reality.

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The essence of Mādhyamikaśāstra lies in shunning all standpoints.

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When one accepts any standpoint, one is captured by the cunning poisonous serpent of the impurities. Those, whose mind has shunned any standpoint, are not captured.³³

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The idealism in both the Mādhyamika and the Advaita Vedānta ultimately hinges upon some kind of mysticism, indirectly or directly subsisting on the Upaniṣadic philosophy. This becomes a basis for the accusations of indebtedness by the followers of each of these two systems, and this also remains a hidden ground for their affinity and their differences.

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The externalists attack the theory of momentariness. Haribhadra, who is otherwise keen to agree with his opponents in his *Śāstrārthavārtāsamuccaya*, has devoted largest space to the refutation of this theory. He revisits the theory by adding that instead of a substance being dissolved and reborn every moment, it is proper to say that the substance stays, only the *dharmas* as born every moment. Also, everything can be said to be momentary to motivate people for renunciation of the mundane world.³⁴ In this way, Haribhadra sends an ontological issue to the domain of ethics. He gives a rebuttal to the Śūnyavādin arguing that if everything is void, then the arguments given for this voidness are also void. The acceptance of Vijñānavāda would put an end to the possibility of liberation, because there is nothing beyond *vijñāna* according to it.

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Haribhadra also revises the Advaitin's position that at the *pārmārthika* level everything is *Brahman*. This can be said to inculcate the view of equanimity in a subsidiary sense and not in the primary sense.

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Śaṅkara refutes Vijñānavādin, Sāṁkhya and Vaiśeṣika together on one ground — they are not based on the knowledge of *Brahman* as revealed from the Śruti.³⁵ In fact, he corners the Sāṁkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Vijñānavādin and Cārvāka for their realist, dualist and materialistic views. At the very outset of his *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtra*, he gives a resume of various prima-facie views and takes together all of them.³⁶ The Vaiśeṣika's concept of *ātman* appears equally absurd to him as he would regard the *ātman* as *acetana* (inanimate) and *dravya* (substance).³⁷ Neither view of *vijñāna* is acceptable as it is momentary.³⁸

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Sāṁkhya becomes the chief combatant for Śaṅkara because it cites the Śruti (scriptures) and also takes recourse to arguments to support it. For Śaṅkara it is appropriating the scriptures for the categories which are validated by other *pramāṇas* (means of knowledge).³⁹

c8.s5.16

Arguing against the Naiyāyika for his dependence on arguments, Śaṅkara cites the maxim of the Upaniṣad — *naiṣā tarkeṇa matir āpaneyā* (the wisdom cannot be acquired through arguments).⁴⁰ He differs with Gauḍapāda on the latter's concept of the physical world as dream. Applying five-member syllogism of inference he shows the inconsistancy in Gauḍapāda's view. He uses the same argument to rebut the Vijñānavādin. The experience of physical world is different from the experience in the state of a dream. The dream is obliterated when a man is awakened; the empirical reality is not cancelled after self-realization.

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The followers of Rāmānuja refute the Advaitins on the score of their concept of *ajñāna*. How can the idea of the ignorance that has neither a subject nor an object be accepted? — they ask.⁴¹ There is no evidence of a cosmic illusion and the Anirvacanīyatāvāda (indescribability of cognition).

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They maintain the difference between *jīva* (individual soul) and *Paramātman* (Absolute Being) but also treat *jīvātman* at par with *Paramātman*. The world to them is of two types — sentient and non-sentient. The non-sentient is of three kinds — *bhogya* (object), *bhogopakaraṇa* (instrument) and *bhogāyatana* (site of fruition). Rāmānuja Darśana also differs from Śāṅkara-Vedānta by the way of holding *karman* as necessary.

c8.s5.19

I have already referred to the long history of scathing debates between the Advaitins and the Mādhvas (see Chap. 2). The Advaita Vedānta views world as *mithyā* (false) which is *anirvacanīya* (indescribable), and is not the locus of being-not-being (*sadasattva-anadhikaraṇarūpaṁ*). Here *sadasattva-anadhikaraṇarūpaṁ* signifies absolute absence of being and absolute absence of non-being. It is here that the Mādhvas apply their most pricking clinchers for goading the Advaitins by bringing out the impossibilities of the concept of absolute absence of being and absolute absence of non-being.

c8.s5.20

The *anirvacanīyatākhyāti* (indescribability of cognition) of the Advaitin has been vehemently opposed by the Mādhva philosophers Vyāsatīrtha and Jayatīrtha. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī not only defends Advaitin’s position, and but also raises fundamental objections on the view of reality in the Mādhva system. Vyāsatīrtha defines reality as that which is not the counter-positive of absolute negation. The question is how the perception of this negative entity is possible. Replying to Madhusūdana, Rāmārya in his *Taraṅgiṇī* says that it is not possible to perceive a negation, but it is possible to perceive an entity that has been negated. This rejoinder is further reviewed by the author of *Laghucandrikā*.

c8.s5.21

The Naiyāyika also questions the position of the Advaitin with reference to the status of world. He says that the negation of something, which is *alīka* (false) in itself, is not possible. The world therefore cannot be regarded as the locus of absolute negation, of non-being-as-characterized by being (*sattva-viśiṣṭa sattvābhāva*).⁴² The law of contradiction is also violated — the world cannot be taken as the locus of absolute absence of *sattva* (being) and *asattva* (non-being) simultaneously.

c8.s5.22

It was Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who could counter Vyāsatīrtha’s terrible triade of arguments against Śaṅkara’s concept of Reality. Vyāsatīrtha had shown fallacies including *ativyāpti* (wide extension) and *avyāpti* (narrow extension) in Śaṅkara’s concepts of *ajñāna* and the world as *vivarta* (illusory negation). According to him *ajñāna* cannot be the material cause of something that is illusory. A *bhāva* cannot create *abhāva*. Madhusūdana pointed out that Vyāsatīrtha misunderstood the concepts of *bhāva* and *abhāva* here. *Bhāva* to Śaṅkara is difference from negation and not the state of being. Again to Vyāsatīrtha’s objection that *ajñāna* having a different *jāti* (generality) that the so-called effect of it — the world — cannot really function as the cause, Madhusūdana gave a rebuttal by pointing out that complete similarity between the cause and effect is not feasible, there has to be some difference between them. With his subtle reasoning Madhusūdana could save the Advaitin’s stand, i.e. that *avidyā* can be adjusted as the material cause of illusory negation.⁴³

c8.s5.23

The Advaitin does not describe *sattva* (being) as the negation of *asattva* (not being). Therefore there is no contradiction. *Sattva* is the quality of not being cancelled (*abādhitatva*) and *asattva* is the character of not being present in any locus.

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*Brahman* is *sadrūpa* (being itself) only and neither *sat* or *asat*.

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The concepts of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) and *kṣaṇabhaṅga* (momentariness) stand in a sharp contrast to the absolutism of Vedānta on one hand and the idea of synthetic principles of *dravya* (substance) and *jāti* (universal) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems on the other. There is no place for a permanent and abiding substance in Buddhist world-view, where only reality is *svalakṣaṇa* (point instant). The Buddhists deny the status of reality to *jāti* (universal or generality) of Nyāya, for them any universal is a *vikalpa* (logical construct) only, comprised in the exclusion of a common counter-correlate. “A universal is in its very essence the exclusion of the other”, says Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārtika* (*sāmānyaṁ anyavyāvṛttilakṣaṇaṁ* — III.30). Kumārila had attacked the very foundation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and questioned the validity of grading the truth — *saṁvṛti satya* and *paramārtha-satya*. But to the Mādhyamika all phenomena remain indeterminate and indefinable.

c8.s5.26

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school advocated realism in the sense that it maintained difference between *dharma* (attribute, substrata) and *dharmin* (substance). Because of this, it came to be sharply divided not only with idealists like the adherents of the Mādhyamika and Yogācāra schools of Buddhist philosophy, but with Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta as well. Vedānta holds *dharmin* alone as real and all its *upādhis* (attributes) as *vivartas* (unreal effects). Contrary to this, the Diṅnāga–Dharmakīrti school regards only *dharmas* in the form of discrete moments — as real, *dharmin* — the substance is just a mental construct and unreal.

c8.s5.27

The categories mentioned by Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* and by Kaṇāda in his *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* form the idea of reality in both these schools. They are not ideal constructs. Vaiśeṣika's conceptual framework for reality is comprised of six categories — *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *sāmānya* (generality), *viśeṣa* (particularity) and *samavāya* (inherence). Later philosophers, i.e. Śivāditya, Śrīdhara, Udayana, etc. accepted the seventh additional category — *abhāva* (non-existence) — also. Śivāditya Miśra wrote a treatise — *Saptapadārthī* — on seven categories, where he firmly stood for accepting negation as the seventh category. The perception of reality undergoes a change with the introduction of *abhāva* as the seventh category, and the reality assumes a pluralistic dimension. Naiyāyika's concept of Reality is comprised in the gamut of sixteen categories mentioned earlier (see Chap. 1).

c8.s5.28

A shift in the concept of categories occurs in Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (CE 1500). In his *Padārthatattavanirūpaṇa*, he reduced the number by denying *abhāva* as a category. He was criticized by Veṇīdatta in his *Padārthamaṇḍana* who accepts only four positive categories.⁴⁴

c8.s5.29

It was Vātsyāyana who suggested that *abhāva* (non-existence) can become a *prameya* and can be used as a way to comprehend reality in his *bhāṣya* on *Nyāyasūtra* II.2.8. From a pile of marked and unmarked clothes, if somebody is asked to bring the clothes that are unmarked, the absence of mark becomes the means to locate the clothes asked for. In Navya-Nyāya, the category of *abhāva* assumed special significance, it was utilized to define the reality by positing the category of *pratiyogin* (couter-positive) which is invariably conspicuous by its absence. Kumārila stands on the opposite pole from Advaitavādin by viewing non-existence as a reality. But Prabhākara opposed Śabarasvāmin and Kumārila on one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the other by denying *abhāva* an entity and a *pramāṇa* means of knowledge. For Buddhist also, non-existence is not a reality, it is an inferential judgement.

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The Prabhākara school of Mīmāṁsā holds *sādṛśya* (similarity), *saṁkhyā* (number) and *śakti* (potency) also as categories. Udayana and other Naiyāyikas had to combat with them for the rejection of these.

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The Ārambhavāda as proposed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, visualizes the world as created out of the *paramāṇus* (atoms) serving as basic building blocks. Their concept of reality lies in its pluralistic view and diversity. In fact, there are two different theories of causation of the world — Ārabhyārambhakavāda (transitive causation) and Ārambhavāda (intransitive causation). Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana stand for the transitive causation and sharply criticize the former theory.

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The Pariṇāmavāda of the Sāṁkhya stands in sharp contrast to both the theories — Ārabhyārambhakavāda (transitive causation) and Ārambhavāda (intransitive causation) and also to the Vivartavāda of the Advaita Vedāntin. It views the physical world as a transformation of one single, unitary and all-pervasive substance, named as *prakṛti* (primordial matter). The universe is evolved out of this *prakṛti*. The Naiyāyikas like Udayana criticize the Sāṁkhya, questioning the possibility of diversity evolving out of singularity. They also point out the inner contradiction of *prakṛti* being *acetana* (insentient) but having the power of creation.

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The idea of multiplicity evolving out of unity is taken up in Vedānta also but with a different view of reality. The Bhāskara school of Vedānta, known as the school of Tridaṇḍins, advocates Brahmapariṇāmavāda, viz. the theory of the *Brahman* transforming itself into the multifarious world. He being the material cause, the phenomena are His real *vikāras* (modifications). *Brahman* in fact is an undifferentiated unitary mass of pure consciousness.

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On the concept of *paramāṇus* (atoms), the Vaiśeṣika is cornered by orthodox schools as well the Buddhist schools. The Vaiśeṣikas propound that the *paramāṇus* function as the basic building blocks for creating this world and their coalesceance creates larger and larger forms. Āryadeva and Śāntarakṣita argue that the no *yoga* (integration) between *paramāṇus* can create the universe. The *yoga* of *paramāṇus* can be of two types — complete and partial. If there is complete integration (*sarvātmanā yoga*) between two *paramāṇus*, it would not lead to any increase in the volume or quality nor would it create a larger form. If it is a partial integration, it would be multifarious, and hence will be impermanent.

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Sāṁkhya is attacked from all corners for its concept of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* and the world as *pariṇāma* (transformation). Haribhadra objects this postulation by saying that if *puruṣa* is *vibhu* and *nitya* (changeless and eternal), then there is no point in putting him in the stages of bondage and liberation. And if *prakṛti* is inanimate and eternal, then also it cannot transform itself to create the world. He then goes on to revise the Sāṁkhya concept of *prakṛti*, suggesting that it may be viewed as *karma-prakṛti*, which in Jaina ontology, is just a part of *pudgala-jagat*. In this way he does not find any problem in accepting the Prakṛtivāda of Sāṁkhya.⁴⁵

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The Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda (theory of momentariness) in the Diṅnāga–Dharmakīrti school presents the nominalist view of outer reality where the universe is in a constant flux. It proposes that every point-instant (*kṣaṇa*) stays just for a moment and vanishes to be replaced immediately by the other one, and this point-instant is reality. Reality for Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti lies in constant movement or change, it is always becoming and not being.

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There is no place for *jāti* (generality) in this system; the *svalakṣaṇa* (unique particular) is only reality. Whatever that is supposed to be *sāmānya lakṣaṇa* (universal) is unreal; it can be described linguistically, but then any such description ought to be fictional. The *svalakṣaṇa* functions as a reality from moment to moment. It is the *paramārthasat* (ultimate reality) and is *sarvato vyāvṛtta* (distinguished from everything else).

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Dharmakīrti employs a series of arguments in refutation of generality (*sāmānya* or *jāti*). These arguments fall into three categories — intuitive, metaphysical and logistic. Acceptance of the generality is beset with the “one–many” problem, i.e. generality is said to be present in one object and at the same time in many as well, and then it is *vyabhicāra* (defect of variance). The universal would share the multiple natures of the various particulars, that too would be at variance, therefore to Dharmakīrti it is a pseudo-entity. Describing *jāti* as a fiction, he says:

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It neither comes from somewhere nor it was there already, nor is it subsequently produced; nor does it have any parts. [And even when in other places] it does not leave the previous locus. Oh! It’s just one disaster after another!⁴⁶

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Any substance to be real must occupy just one location in time (*kāla*) and space (*deśa*) and have only a singular nature (*svabhāva*). It cannot be present in several distinct objects over different times and places, and possess the many natures of the various particulars. The proponents of *jāti* or *sāmānya* envisage manifold placements of one and single *jāti* once and always. The concept of *tiryag lakṣaṇa* (horizontal placements) as well as *ūrdhvatā lakṣaṇa* (vertical placements) for the universals is not admissible in a universe that functions as per the theory of *kṣaṇabhaṅga* or *kṣaṇikatva* (momentariness).

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In fact, Dharmakīrti utilizes the concept of inference to disapprove the idea of *jāti* (universal) as proposed by the orthodox Naiyāyikas on one hand, and to support the concept of *kṣaṇikatva* (momentariness) on the other. He devotes a major portion of his *Hetubindu* to prove the invariable concomitance *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam* (whatever that exists, is momentary) and also to the theory of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination). An effect is produced by a cause and subsequently functions as the cause for another effect, this chain of causality subsists in a series of *samartha kāraṇas* (capable causes).⁴⁷

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*Jāti* — the technical term for generality used by the Naiyāyika — also denotes caste and hierarchy in day-to-day language. Dharmakīrti and his followers like Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin attribute a link between *jāti* as generality and *jāti* as a caste hierarchy. The metaphysical categories in orthodox systems of philosophy were seen as foundations for social organizations and hierarchy under Brāhmanism, and any attempt at the disapproval of these provided impetus to the Buddhists for demolishing the organizational hierarchy of their opponents.

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