Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s5.20

c8.s5.20

The *anirvacanīyatākhyāti* (indescribability of cognition) of the Advaitin has been vehemently opposed by the Mādhva philosophers Vyāsatīrtha and Jayatīrtha. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī not only defends Advaitin’s position, and but also raises fundamental objections on the view of reality in the Mādhva system. Vyāsatīrtha defines reality as that which is not the counter-positive of absolute negation. The question is how the perception of this negative entity is possible. Replying to Madhusūdana, Rāmārya in his *Taraṅgiṇī* says that it is not possible to perceive a negation, but it is possible to perceive an entity that has been negated. This rejoinder is further reviewed by the author of *Laghucandrikā*.