Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s5.22

c8.s5.22

It was Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who could counter Vyāsatīrtha’s terrible triade of arguments against Śaṅkara’s concept of Reality. Vyāsatīrtha had shown fallacies including *ativyāpti* (wide extension) and *avyāpti* (narrow extension) in Śaṅkara’s concepts of *ajñāna* and the world as *vivarta* (illusory negation). According to him *ajñāna* cannot be the material cause of something that is illusory. A *bhāva* cannot create *abhāva*. Madhusūdana pointed out that Vyāsatīrtha misunderstood the concepts of *bhāva* and *abhāva* here. *Bhāva* to Śaṅkara is difference from negation and not the state of being. Again to Vyāsatīrtha’s objection that *ajñāna* having a different *jāti* (generality) that the so-called effect of it — the world — cannot really function as the cause, Madhusūdana gave a rebuttal by pointing out that complete similarity between the cause and effect is not feasible, there has to be some difference between them. With his subtle reasoning Madhusūdana could save the Advaitin’s stand, i.e. that *avidyā* can be adjusted as the material cause of illusory negation.⁴³