Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s5.25

c8.s5.25

The concepts of *pratītyasamutpāda* (dependent origination) and *kṣaṇabhaṅga* (momentariness) stand in a sharp contrast to the absolutism of Vedānta on one hand and the idea of synthetic principles of *dravya* (substance) and *jāti* (universal) in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems on the other. There is no place for a permanent and abiding substance in Buddhist world-view, where only reality is *svalakṣaṇa* (point instant). The Buddhists deny the status of reality to *jāti* (universal or generality) of Nyāya, for them any universal is a *vikalpa* (logical construct) only, comprised in the exclusion of a common counter-correlate. “A universal is in its very essence the exclusion of the other”, says Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārtika* (*sāmānyaṁ anyavyāvṛttilakṣaṇaṁ* — III.30). Kumārila had attacked the very foundation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and questioned the validity of grading the truth — *saṁvṛti satya* and *paramārtha-satya*. But to the Mādhyamika all phenomena remain indeterminate and indefinable.