Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s7: Debates on the Theory of Knowledge
Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s7
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Debates on the Theory of Knowledge
c8.s7.1
*Vyāpti* is a universal relation to be known only through *anumāna*. This proposition of Dharmakīrti poses a problem. If we hold *vyāpti* to be known through *anumāna* and again, *anumāna* to be known through *vyāpti* this leads to *anavasthā* (infinite regress) — forming an unending chain of *vyāptis* and *anumānas*. The Naiyāyikas of Gautamīya tradition had an easy solution for avoid this trap — they held *vyāpti* as dependent on perception. In Dharmakīrti’s conceptual framework, this is impossible, because of his insistence on the presence of probans in all the similar cases (*sapakṣas*) and one cannot observe all the *sapakṣas* in a given life. To Dharmakīrti, an inference should result in both positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya* and *vyatireka vyāptis*). The Naiyāyika does not consider it essential. Dharmakīrti asks the Naiyāyika if there is any *kevalānvayī hetu* — the cause that goes only with the positive concomitance. The Naiyāyikas succeeded in breaking the Dharmakīrtian framework of inferential knowledge by devising an instance of *kevalānvayī hetu*- *adṛṣṭa*; which is perceived by God. In forming the *vyatireka vyāpti* of this concomitance, it is not possible to cite an instance, therefore here the *hetu* (*adṛṣṭa*) does not have a *vipakṣa*.
c8.s7.2
Dharmakīrti begs to differ from his *paramaguru* (grand-teacher) Diṅnāga in his concept of *pratyakṣa* to an extent. Diṅnāga has accepted the objects appearing in illusion or hallucination as perceived. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, reserves the sphere of perception only for the objects of veridical perception.
c8.s7.3
The orthodox Naiyāyikas believed that *pratyakṣa* is of two types — *laukika* (this-worldly) and *alaukika* (other-worldly). Both Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti naturally stood against the *alaukika pratyakṣa* as it does not fit in the theory of *svalakṣaṇa* — a *svalakṣaṇa* cannot be judged in terms of *laukika* (this-worldly) or *alaukika* (other-worldly).
c8.s7.4
Nyāya is opposed to the theory of *śabdānuvedha* there can be no cognition without the verbal knowledge. If *nirvikalpa jñāna* is accepted, a distinction between perception and the verbalization of perceptual state is maintained. A child has the knowledge of the deep structures of language whereas what he learns later on is its surface structure.⁵⁰
c8.s7.5
Dharmakīrti rules out the possibility of accepting other *pramāṇas* proposed in Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and rest of the systems. He rejects *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) as a *pramāṇa*. The Mīmāṁsakas believe that *anupalabdhi* is a *pramāṇa* leading to the cognition of *abhāva* (absence). Any *pravṛtti* (inclination) is generated by *buddhi* (intelligence) after visualization of something that is *bhāva* (existent). A non-existent will not lead to *pravṛtti*, therefore *anupalabdhi* is not a *pramāṇa*. For Dharmakīrti *anupalabdhi* is just a type of probans. In his brilliant analysis of the apprehension of “non-apprehension” Dharmakīrti has given the concept of *ekajñānasaṁsarga* (co-cognizibility). The apprehension of *abhāva* (non-existence) in one place involves the apprehension of a co-cognizable object on the same place.⁵¹ In difference to both Mīmāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas again, he denies *abhāva* as a separate category. Determination of an object cannot prove the non-existence of another; hence absence cannot be proved by ignorance.
c8.s7.6
Udayana proposed the reality of negation. Abhāva came to accepted as an additional ontological category in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Out of his concern with making the theory of *anumāna* perfectly precise, Dharmakīrti dared to disapprove the postulation of Diṅnāga here also (like in the sphere of *pratyakṣa*). Diṅnāga proposed three essential categories for the validity of an *anumāna* — *pakṣa*, *sādhya* and *hetu*. But he also allowed *dṛṣṭānta* to be included for establishing an *anumāna* in a convincing way. Dharmakīrti stood against this practical consideration. *Dṛṣṭānta* not being an essential component has to be discarded from the structure of *anumāna*.
c8.s7.7
The orthodox Naiyāyikas tried to solve the problem in a different way — they opined that *vyāpti* can be grasped without establishing the causal relation, and since it is impossible to observe all the cases of *tadutpatti* in past and presence, Dharmakīrti’s concept of *tadutpatti* is not acceptable to them. Similarly they also rejected Dharmakīrti’s idea of *tādātmya* (common reference), as the essential condition of *vyāpti* can be fulfilled without it. They shifted Dharmakīrti’s frame of inductive reasoning to intuitive reasoning.⁵²
c8.s7.8
Ratnakīrti introduced the two-truth doctrines as key to the nature of the discussion as inference is trafficking with illusory universals (*sāmanya*), the proof of the mind-streams of others, whilst empirically valid in relative truth (*saṁvṛti-satya*), does not hold ultimate metaphysical certainty in absolute truth (*paramārtha satya*).