Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s7.1

c8.s7.1

*Vyāpti* is a universal relation to be known only through *anumāna*. This proposition of Dharmakīrti poses a problem. If we hold *vyāpti* to be known through *anumāna* and again, *anumāna* to be known through *vyāpti* this leads to *anavasthā* (infinite regress) — forming an unending chain of *vyāptis* and *anumānas*. The Naiyāyikas of Gautamīya tradition had an easy solution for avoid this trap — they held *vyāpti* as dependent on perception. In Dharmakīrti’s conceptual framework, this is impossible, because of his insistence on the presence of probans in all the similar cases (*sapakṣas*) and one cannot observe all the *sapakṣas* in a given life. To Dharmakīrti, an inference should result in both positive and negative concomitances (*anvaya* and *vyatireka vyāptis*). The Naiyāyika does not consider it essential. Dharmakīrti asks the Naiyāyika if there is any *kevalānvayī hetu* — the cause that goes only with the positive concomitance. The Naiyāyikas succeeded in breaking the Dharmakīrtian framework of inferential knowledge by devising an instance of *kevalānvayī hetu*- *adṛṣṭa*; which is perceived by God. In forming the *vyatireka vyāpti* of this concomitance, it is not possible to cite an instance, therefore here the *hetu* (*adṛṣṭa*) does not have a *vipakṣa*.