Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c8.s7.5

c8.s7.5

Dharmakīrti rules out the possibility of accepting other *pramāṇas* proposed in Nyāya, Mīmāṁsā and rest of the systems. He rejects *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) as a *pramāṇa*. The Mīmāṁsakas believe that *anupalabdhi* is a *pramāṇa* leading to the cognition of *abhāva* (absence). Any *pravṛtti* (inclination) is generated by *buddhi* (intelligence) after visualization of something that is *bhāva* (existent). A non-existent will not lead to *pravṛtti*, therefore *anupalabdhi* is not a *pramāṇa*. For Dharmakīrti *anupalabdhi* is just a type of probans. In his brilliant analysis of the apprehension of “non-apprehension” Dharmakīrti has given the concept of *ekajñānasaṁsarga* (co-cognizibility). The apprehension of *abhāva* (non-existence) in one place involves the apprehension of a co-cognizable object on the same place.⁵¹ In difference to both Mīmāṁsakas and Naiyāyikas again, he denies *abhāva* as a separate category. Determination of an object cannot prove the non-existence of another; hence absence cannot be proved by ignorance.