Shringaraprakasha 2.p1.19

2.p1.19

nanu ca śāropyāsthitaḥ kasmānna bhavati ? tyāgarūpaṃ prahātavye'pyarthe (prāpye) saṃsargadarśanam| āsthitaṃ karma yattatra ddairūpyaṃ bhajate kriyā|| 2.15 yathāṃ--panthānaṃ gacchati, gartamuttaratīti | śārastu prāpya eva ; yathā--ajāṃ nayati grāmaṃ, (grāmaṃ) vahati bhāram iti | nanvevaṃ grāmasya prāpyatā prāpnoti, nājādeḥ ; kaḥ punarāha na prāpnotīti ; kiṃntu akathitatvena tatra kriyāvyāpyatvenāddvitāyaiva, na pratyayāntaram--gāṃ dogdhi payaḥ, pauravaṃ gāṃ yācate iti | bahiraṅgabhedeṣu karaṇaṃ--bāhyaṃ, ābhyantaraṃ, bāhyābhyantaraṃ ca | teṣu bāhyaṃ yathā--supāṃ vyākhyānaḥ saupaḥ, sasāṭasya bhūṣaṇaṃ lalāṭikā | ābhyantaraṃ yathā--matasya karaṇaṃ matyaṃ, caturṇāṃ pūrāṇaścaturthaḥ iti| bāhyābhyantaraṃ yaātha--samidha ādhīyante'nena sāmidhenyo mantraḥ, (sa eva) hṛdayasya bandhanaḥ hṛdya iiti| saṃpradānam--dādatikarmāpyaṃ, karmamātrāpyaṃ, kriyāpyaṃ ca | samapradīyate bhojanādikakamasmai ityānvarthasaṃjñakaṃ dadātikarmāpyaṃ ; yathā--agrabhojanaṃ niyuktamasmai dīyate āgrabhojanikaḥ, pañcāsmai vṛddhirvā, āyo vā, śulkaṃvā, upadā vā dīyante pañcakaḥ puruṣaḥ iti| ’karmaṇā yamabhaipraiti sa saṃpradhānām’ (pā.1.4.33.) iti pāribhāṣikasaṃtrakaṃ karmamātrāpyaṃ ; yathā--rāṣṭriyo rājanyaḥ, kaliṃ kurvantayasmai kāleyaṃ gandhadravyaṃ iti | karmaśabdena kriyāyā apyabhidhānāt kriyayā'pi yamabhipraiti sa samapradatānamiti kriyāpyam ; yathā--alaṅkarmāsmai nirdiśyate alaṅkarmīṇaḥ anyūnaḥ, na ṣaḍakṣātakriyaṃ ca | teṣu ’dhruvamapāye'pādānam’ (pā.1.4.24.) iti nirdriṣṭaviṣayam ;

[Objection:] But why does [the secondary object in a causative or root like *nī*] not also become firmly based (*āsthita*)? / Even when the object is to be abandoned, the contact [with it] is seen in the form of relinquishment; / whichever object is firmly based, action assumes a twofold nature there. (2.15) / For instance: "he goes on the path", "he crosses the ditch". The other, however, is merely to be reached (*prāpya*), as in: "he leads the goat to the village", "he carries the burden to the village". / [Objection:] If that is so, then it follows that the village is what is to be reached, not the goat and the like. / Who indeed says it does not follow? But because it is not specifically mentioned (*akathita*), and because it is pervaded by the action, it takes only the accusative case (*dvitīyā*), not another affix—as in: "he milks milk from the cow", "he begs a cow from the Paurava". / Among the varieties of external [syntactic roles], the instrument (*karaṇa*) is external, internal, and external-internal. Among these, the external is, for example: "an explanation of case-endings (*sup*) is *saupaḥ*", "an ornament of the forehead is *lalāṭikā*". The internal is, for example: "the instrument of thought is *matyam*", "the completer of four is *caturthaḥ*". The external-internal is, for example: "the kindling sticks are placed by this, hence the hymn is *sāmidhenyaḥ*", "that which binds the heart is *hṛdyaḥ*". / The recipient (*saṃpradāna*) is: reached by the object of 'giving' (*dadāti-karmāpya*), reached merely by an object (*karmamātrāpya*), and reached by the action (*kriyāpya*). That which bears a meaningful name (*anvarthasaṃjñaka*) because food and the like is given to him is reached by the object of 'giving'—as in: "the foremost meal is appointed and given to him: *āgrabhojanikaḥ*", "five are given to him as interest, income, tax, or bribe: *pañcakaḥ puruṣaḥ*". That which has a technical name based on "that which one intends with the object is the recipient" (Pāṇini 1.4.32) is reached merely by an object—as in: "*rāṣṭriyaḥ rājanyaḥ*", "they cause discord for him: *kāleyam* aromatic substance". Because the word *karman* also expresses action, that which one intends also by the action is the recipient, and thus it is reached by the action—as in: "an adequate action is directed for him: *alaṅkarmīṇaḥ* (sufficient)" […]. Among these, "the fixed point in departure is the ablation (*apādāna*)" (Pāṇini 1.4.24) has a specified scope;