Shringaraprakasha 3.p2

3.54. Furthermore, a meaning that is somehow resorted to does not transcend being a qualifier, either through coreferentiality or as a limit. For instance, in "Go, Devadatta," because [the vocative] is a qualifier of the addressed and forms a single sentence, the loss of accent is seen by [the rule] "and of the vocative." If it is claimed, "It will occur because of being the agent," how is it in "Devadatta goes"? For Devadatta is not the agent of the action of going, nor is it a specifier of the syntactic role, nor is it an external qualifier through being another word, as in "he cooks well." Rather, being positioned facing the action, it acquires the status of an external qualifier, as in "he cooks five times." What, then, is the difference between an external and an internal qualifier of an action? There is this difference: an internal qualifier of an action attains objecthood and neuter gender; for an external one, however, its own gender [persists], and objecthood is not fixed. And having held this, it has been said: / "And whatever word in the vocative case is a qualifier of that action; / in 'let me go, Devadatta,' when it is thus, there is a loss of accent." / 3.55. [Objection:] But the status of a single sentence of a vocative word with a finite verb is appropriate, for an address exists with its verbal word implied. For it is employed for facing: "Devadatta, be facing [me]!" There, because the meaning is completed with just this much, "Devadatta," the vocative word is a single sentence; that becoming-facing is an activity toward another action. But others have said: / "That which has interdependent parts upon division, whose words have no mutual expectancy with other [words], / which possesses primary and secondary actions, and has a single meaning, is called a sentence." / 3.56. And for one who speaks thus, the intention is that a sentence is a collection of words having the stated definition; and "Devadatta" is not a collection of words. Now, if it has the status of a collection because of the implication "be facing [me]," even so, because it has expectancy, it is not a sentence; for no one enjoins mere facing-forward alone.

What, then? Having enjoined an attitude of turning toward [the speaker], does it enjoin [the person] in another action? Furthermore, you admit a relation with an action that is merely supplied mentally—‘Turn toward [me]!’—yet you do not admit one with an action that is actually expressed—‘Go!’; oh, what impartiality! Moreover, there is an injunction even in the [statement] ‘Turn toward [me]!’, because it is impossible to enjoin someone who is not turned toward [one]. If another action is supplied to cause him to turn toward [one], there would be an infinite regress; and out of fear of that, one must accept an injunction inherently containing the act of turning toward [one]. And that is just the same in ‘Go!’ and so on; so enough of excessive discussion. If an addressed [vocative] did not form a single sentence with a verb-form ending in a tiṅ, the author of the sūtras would not have said: ‘A preceding vocative is treated as non-existent’ (Pāṇini 8.1.72). Here, the purpose of its being treated as non-existent is this: lest unaccentedness and the like occur. But unaccentedness and the like would not occur simply because they do not belong to the same sentence; what is the need for the status of being treated as non-existent? And the author of the Vārttika does not think this [either]; for he too recites the purposes of the status of being treated as non-existent: ‘The purpose in treating it as non-existent is for the vocative, the substitutes of yuṣmad and asmad, and the unaccentedness of the tiṅ.’ Granted that, whether through co-referentiality or syntactic difference, verb-forms adopted in any way whatsoever may possess the status of a qualifier, an indicator, an instrumental condition, or a limit with respect to another verb-form, and aggregation too may be justified in the very same way. But the relation of that which is to be accomplished and the means of accomplishment is not tenable, because two entities of contradictory natures cannot be denoted by a word of single form. As in ‘This is a stick; bring the fruits with this’, here, by the form ‘this is a stick’, one is able to adopt the meaning of ‘stick’ which includes the action of existing. And this word ‘with this’, denoting the universal of the thing merely in the form of an instrument, adopts it by perception, not in any other form; but the cognition refers to the stick because of context. So here too, ‘he cooks’, ‘he runs’, and so on denote an action that has become something to be accomplished; and that that very action, having become accomplished and assumed the status of a means of accomplishment, should be expressed in this very same form is impossible.

It is not impossible, because its being a means of accomplishment is precisely by its being something to be accomplished. For in whatever way the state of being accomplished is an action's established form not to be designated as ‘this’, precisely through that does it attain the status of a means of accomplishment, not through another form, because of the absence of [any such other form]; and the verbal affix, when [an action] exists as something to be accomplished, denotes it in the status of an agent: ‘he cooks’, ‘it comes to be’. [Objection:] Now, what existence is there other than, and distinct from, the state of being to be accomplished of the action ‘he cooks’, or what agency is there over and above it, by which the relation of what is to be accomplished and the means of accomplishment could be conceivable? [Answer:] It is replied: this relation to syntactic roles that belongs to it, its being the object of the operation of syntactic roles, does not repudiate the syntactic roles like a hare’s horn. It is capable of being accomplished, and experiences fulfillment from them; that form of it which is its very state of being accomplished, characterized by its relation to syntactic roles, is called ‘existence’. Cooking brings about the existence of the action; it attains completion from the syntactic roles; the meaning is that it makes the syntactic roles active. As for that qualifying form of it which has the character of sacrifice and so forth, namely the form of cooking denoted by the single word ‘he cooks’ and not common to anything else, through that it becomes an agent. Thus, having become an agent through what is not common to anything else, it comes to be in the form of what is to be accomplished; it exists in the form of action: ‘he cooks’, ‘it comes to be’—the meaning is that it attains the state of being accomplished. Or rather, by means of those operations such as placing [the pot] on the fire and the like, which consist of actual application, it arrives at the form of the action of becoming. Its agency, in the form of the one that becomes, is in the form of softening which is the result; through that, ‘he cooks, it comes to be’ has this meaning: cooking comes to be in the form of placing [the pot] on the fire and so on; that is to say, placing [the pot] on the fire and the like have begun for it. Or, the status of the one that becomes is in the form of placing [the pot] on the fire and so on, while the status of the action of becoming is in the form of cooking; through that, the meaning is: placing [the pot] on the fire and the like come to be in the form of cooking; that is to say, softening has arisen. Or, its having the form of becoming is through the intellect. Or else, agency is through its universal form, and having the form of becoming is through its particular form; thus the status of a syntactic role in an action is tenable.

[Objection:] But was it not said that the verbal affix is not capable of expressing this [action] in the status of an agent without denoting it as accomplished, and consequently, if it is denoted as accomplished, there is again a contradiction? [Answer:] It is not so. That which is the inherent, personal form of the action of cooking, characterized by the state of being to be accomplished—in that very form is it spoken of by the verbal affix as having attained agency. If it is asked: whence is the appearance of accomplishedness? [we reply:] the verbal affix, setting out to convey it in the status of an agent, makes it understood as accomplished; but it is not that, as in ‘it pains’, the very meaning of the verbal root characterized by sickness attains the status of an agent due to resting on another agent; rather, its agency is only in its form as something to be accomplished. Nor does the attainment of accomplishedness, being cognized as agency, appear as accomplishedness; likewise, the action also is not denoted as accomplished by the verbal affix. Capacities of diverse forms, having conflicting and non-conflicting natures, make worldly discourse function. Therefore, one expressive word for this nature of all words relies on a functioning of capacity consisting of the accomplished, while another [relies on another]. Thus, an entity endowed with the capacities of being accomplished and being to be accomplished, when denoted by two words, is not contradictory, because it is endowed with multiple capacities. By ‘he cooks’, that very entity is understood as something to be accomplished; the verbal affix in ‘it comes to be’ denotes it solely as something to be accomplished. Or rather, an entity is devoid of all capacities because it is free from all conceptual differentiations. But words themselves, by their own power, being the causes of the generation of manifold cognitions, implant capacity [in it]; they bring it within the range of ordinary usage as if it were possessed of capacity. Therefore, because the capacities of being accomplished and being to be accomplished are bestowed solely by the two words, that entity, even though its nature is completely free of conceptual constructions, is taught in the relation of that which is accomplished and that which is to be accomplished. By one word, ‘he cooks’, it is expressed as endowed with the capacity of being to be accomplished that has been implanted [in it], whereas by the other, that very entity is manifested by superimposing another capacity; thus there is no contradiction. Or else, is there not an additional meaning of a word arising not from its form as a word, but rather from its form as a sentence? Just as, at the time of the word ‘man’, ‘man’ is spoken of as distinct—

When, however, [the word "man"] is used in proximity to a qualifier, as in "the king's man", then there is cognition of the qualified entity 'man', not of man [in isolation]; thus an additional property appears at the time of the sentence. In the same way, agency does not arise solely from the single word-form in "he cooks". When there is proximity to another word, "it becomes", then, in relation to the latter, it is the means [to the action]; at the time of the unseen sentence, a differentiation of the person alone arises. And just as, by virtue of treatment as an uncombined unit, designations such as the initial single-vowel constituent of a root apply even to an undivided verbal root in forms such as "he went", so too, by positing a conceptual difference, designations such as action and syntactic role apply even though the meaning expressed by the finite verb is differentiated. Consequently, even in "he cooks", there is at no time another action of becoming different from it, nor is there any other agent that could be a cause for contradiction. Rather, that very [action] shines forth through treatment as an uncombined unit, exhibiting the character of the action of becoming and agency. By this, even in instances such as "look, the deer runs", there is no contradiction in a single meaning having two properties due to a difference of purview, even between being accomplished and to be accomplished. Just as in "the king's man's man", 'man' becomes the principal entity, and the qualifier 'the king's', deviating from its own meaning, lapses into subordination; likewise, in "[the deer] runs", the running, without abandoning its character of being something to be accomplished predominantly in relation to the agent, the deer, enters into subordination and instrumentality with respect to seeing; thus there is no contradiction whatsoever. Or this is the meaning: this form, "this is the means, this is what is to be accomplished", is merely conceptual, just as in a single word, "this is the base-meaning, this is the affix-meaning", that meaning is indeed singular. It must be grasped either as unqualified or qualified in specific sentences, as in: "he shaves", "he heaps", "he urinates", "he rubs". There, in "he shaves the boy", the root *muṇḍi-* expresses the cutting of hair. Its grammatical derivation, however, is "he makes [him] bald"; the word "bald" establishes a specification of general activity. The affix *ṇic* is derived when there is a specification of doing, not for mere doing.

Others, however, understand words such as *muṇḍa* as expressive of hair-cutting and the like, as has been said. Alternatively, *muṇḍa* and the rest are verbal roots. And in the meaning "he heaps" as in "he shaves", the word *kūṭa* indicates 'he makes' or a particular [act]; but the root *kūṭi-* itself takes on an undivided target of reference that specifies an action such as breaking. Likewise, "he makes urine" is "he urinates"; "he makes discussion" is "he discusses". When 'doing' is specified by 'urine' or by 'discussion', flowing or talking is taken up as a particular [action]. And that very particular flowing or particular talking is sometimes taken up with its division of reference lost, as: *mūtrayati* in the sense of emission of urine, *carcayati* in the sense of discussing. Thus, in "look, the deer runs", to say "this is the means-word here, this is the goal-word here" is a mere supposition. This is the reality here: there is neither running, nor seeing, nor the deer [separately]. What then? It is a single particular running that has the deer as its agent and is the object of seeing; since there is a single meaning there, this is a single sentence, and thus two finite verbs may occur in one sentence. And hence, even in "he cooks, he acts", just as in "he does cooking", a relationship in terms of goal and means does indeed exist, so there is no contradiction. Still others do not accept [this], because no external real entity is possible. This world is entirely devoid of real entities; therefore, conceptual cognitions alone are the ground for generating such practical conventions. For conceptual cognitions alone, presenting the form of what is accomplished and what is to be accomplished, proceed from linguistic sound. Consequently, this worldly convention—which resembles a magical illusion and is endowed with conceptual forms brought about by varied cognitions arising from their own intrinsic power—proceeds; thus there is no other entity whose accomplished state could incur contradiction with the definition of what is to be accomplished. To explain: some consider cognition differentiated into forms to be the action.

For they achieve practical efficacy—which seems grounded on external objects as if through inner principles and the like—by appearances whose objects are not definitively resolved beyond themselves. We need not push aside our adherence to philosophical doctrines for that purpose; for particular cognitions, untouched by the meaning of sentences and possessing external-like objects, arising according to capacity in various purposeful actions in states such as the pursuit of perceived doubt-objects—why then should the form of another word-meaning be accepted in regard to the capacity for action? On this point he shows that there is no contradiction with the grammatical commentary (*cūrṇi*). Indeed, this has been stated in the *Mahābhāṣya*: an action expressed by a nominal primary suffix (*kṛt*) enters into combination with an action, as in "cooking exists"; but an action expressed by a finite verb ending (*tiṅ*) does not so enter. For one does not say "he becomes, he cooks, he recites". Here this is the resolution: as an action is thus presented, it does not enter into combination in such a manner; there is no combination of two particular [actions], but there is certainly one of two general [actions]: "it exists, it pleases me", "you exist, you rule", "it is not, I enjoy", "it becomes, he cooks, he acts". That indeed cannot be denied. Where there is one action and another, [that is fine]; but how is it where the very same action is repeated? As in: "it might be, it might be", "it could be, it could be". And such usage does exist in the world: "might it happen that this day could also be Devadatta's, on which this would happen!" And in the world such usage is made for Devadatta; one who prays for Devadatta's ongoing present existence and non-destruction employs this: "might this be, might Devadatta be!" Here too there is difference; why? Because of a difference in means and a difference in time. For which [root] *bhū* here is the means accomplished and the affix omni-temporal? In "might it be", the occurrence that takes place there is not the base-meaning of Devadatta's existence. What then? The affix-meaning is prayer alone, which is the optative (*liṅ*); thus it is omni-temporal because it does not depend on a specific time.

For another [view], the affix belonging to the present tense has an external means of realization. Its external means of realization is a substance, as in 'by Devadatta'—this is the meaning—while Devadatta's existence is the meaning of the morphological base. What, then, is the meaning of the affix? It is solicitation itself; because the optative conveys all times, since a specific grammatical tense is not subordinated. For another [view], the affix belonging to the present tense has an external means of realization. Its external means of realization is the substance 'Devadatta'—this is the meaning—while Devadatta's existence is the meaning of the morphological base; but the present existence belonging to Devadatta is solicited, so no specific grammatical tense is designated. In grammatical treatise, the optative resides in the present tense from its very nature; likewise, the affix -tavya and others will denote the future, as in 'the mat is to be made' (kartavyaḥ kaṭaḥ). And because entities are established by their intrinsic nature, the governing rule on grammatical tenses is rejected in the Mahābhāṣya. Thus even in 'syāt' ('it might be'), natural manifoldness is understood through differences in means of realization and grammatical tense. Objection: Are not forms like 'asti' also indeclinables? And since they have the form of finite verbs, qualifying the syntactic roles, will they not fail to deviate from grammatical tense, person, and number? [Answer:] In 'bhavatu gacchāmy aham' ('Be it so, I go'), there is deviation of person. In 'bhavatu tayaiva maṇḍūkāḥ pacyantām' ('Be it so, let the frogs be cooked by her'), there is deviation of number. In 'bhavatu nāma drakṣyasi' ('Be it so indeed, you will see'), there is deviation of grammatical tense and person. In 'bhavatu bhaviṣyanti jīvato dhānāḥ' ('Be it so, the grains will exist for one who lives'), there is deviation of grammatical tense and number. In 'asty agamāma ghoṣāt' ('It is that we came from the settlement'), there is deviation of grammatical tense, person, and number. And such a turn of phrase exists in worldly usage; for people use it, as in 'asti gacchāmo vayam' ('It is that we go'), and so forth. There, the singular 'asti' is observed. Therefore, we consider that agency belongs to the verb 'gami' ('to go') itself resting upon singular unity, not upon the plurality resting on 'vayam' ('we'). Thus, because specific actions are connected through a general action as agent, there is a relation of end and means between the two. Even with a specific action, a connection as object is sometimes observed:

'paśya dhāvati' ('Look, he runs'), 'paśyāma udāhriyante' ('We see they are cited'), 'manye yāsyasi' ('I think you will go'), 'smarasi vatsyāmaḥ' ('You remember we shall live'), 'na marṣayāmi yajayiṣyati' ('I will not tolerate that he will perform sacrifice'), 'āśaṃse yukto'dhīyīya' ('I hope that, diligent, I may study'). And the condition of being an instrument and the like does not belong to finite verbs, as in 'pacati paṭhati' ('he cooks, he reads'); but here a connection indeed exists, because of reference by a pronoun. Nor is there a split of sentence here, because it is not apprehended at all. For sentence-split is accepted there [only where] that, being referred to, is delineated by a blinded intellect. And here no sentence-split possessing such delineation is perceived in the intellect; therefore, there is only single-sentenceness. For this very reason, in 'abhijānāsi devadatta yat kāśmīreṣu vatsyāmaḥ, tatraudanaṃ bhokṣyāmahe' ('Do you remember, Devadatta, that we were going to live in Kashmir, there we would eat boiled rice?'), under Pāṇini 3.2.114 ('vibhāṣā sākāṅkṣe'), mutual expectancy is established because of reference by a pronoun. Because of being connected by 'tatra' ('there'), the option of the present and imperfect proceeds. But in 'sa svapity eṣa budhyate' ('that one sleeps, this one awakes'), 'so'stamayaty ayam udeti' ('that one sets, this one rises'), there is either a relation of indicator and indicated between the two verbs mutually, or by all [verbs] together a certain specific time is indicated; therefore, because of having a single purpose, there is indeed single-sentenceness. As in: 'The night-lotuses bloom, the day-lotuses sleep; / the cart plunges into the sky, the host of mothers departs.' In 'hantīti palāyate' ('He flees because [the other] strikes') and the like, however, the causal relation is already established, so it is not explicitly illuminated; otherwise, it would follow even in 'pacati paṭhati' ('he cooks, he reads'), producing something unprecedented. These, namely the relation of limit and that which possesses the limit in 'yāvat' ('as long as') and the like, and 'ca' ('and') and others in collective grouping and the like, have already been explained. Thus, in the view of the author of the Sūtras and the author of the Bhāṣya, there is a connection of the action 'asti' with another action. But the author of the Vārttikas, for the purpose of the substitute forms of 'yuṣmad' and 'asmad', loss of accent, and the like, defines a sentence differently from worldly usage as a technical definition: 'a sentence is a finite verb along with indeclinables and qualifiers of syntactic roles, having a single finite verb.' And worldly usage is not established by that, so it is disregarded. As it is said: 'What is technical in the grammatical treatise for the sake of the regulation of loss of accent and the like, / that, having parts possessing mutual expectancy, is not all of identical definition.'

By this has been explained the mutual connection of actions standing even within a single sentence fabricated out of multiple sentences having different or identical speakers. Where there are different speakers, it is as in: 'Is she well? She lives. I ask about her wellness; it has been told she lives. / Yet again you tell me that very thing! Should I tell of her as dead, who still breathes?' Where there is an identical speaker, it is as in: 'When the lord of the night shines reflected in the pure water-self, / the moonlight indeed resolves into a form of nectar, an ultimate reality. / That fierce light shines long in heaven; therein is the divine Puruṣa, / having known whom, all the knots of worldly existence are severed once more.' An intermediate sentence that is a limb of an extended composition is an episodic section. It is threefold: contextual, invented, and incidental. Among these, the contextual is twofold: an integral limb and a descriptive passage. Of these two, an integral limb is as in: 'Then, bearing a deerskin and an aṣāḍha staff, bold of speech, blazing as it were with Brahmanic splendor, / a certain ascetic with matted hair entered the penance grove, like the first stage of life embodied,' up to: '"Either I shall go from here," saying thus, exhausted by fatigue, her bark-garment broken across her breasts, / assuming his true form with a smile, the god whose banner is the lord of bulls held her fast.' For here, from: 'Pārvatī went forward to greet him with worship preceded by deep respect due to a guest; / for even in those of equal mind, great reverential actions occur toward distinguished bodies,' up to the end of the episodic section, its nature as the body of the story is understood. A descriptive passage is as in: 'An unmade adornment of her slender frame, a cause of intoxication uncalled by the name of wine, / an arrow of Kāma distinct from flowers: then she attained the age beyond childhood,' up to: 'With an assemblage of all objects of comparison placed properly in each spot, / she was fashioned by the Creator with effort, as if out of a desire to see beauty gathered into a single place.'

For here, from the meaning of the section [of verses] beginning: / 'Like a painting brought out by a brush, or a lotus blooming in the sun's rays, / her body, uniformly beautiful, took distinct shape with fresh youth' / —is understood [the subject matter] consisting in the description of Pārvatī's form, youth, grace, and so on. / The invented [prakaraṇa] is of two kinds: having a basis in reality [sābhāsa] and without a basis in reality [nirābhāsa]. / Of these two, that with a basis in reality is as follows: / 'A son was born to Diti, brilliant as the sun, an unsuitable place for fear arising from adversaries, / whom they call Hiraṇyakaśipu, the slayer of Hari whose name means Indra' / —beginning with this, up to: / 'Having assumed another persona like an actor by taking a pretext as circumstance demanded, / with his true nature concealed under the name Śiśupāla, he is now perceived as another even by his enemies.' / For here, the meaning of the section beginning: / 'Then, desiring through battle to relieve the itch born of pride, / once more with the gods, he became the demon named Rāvaṇa, fully adorned, who breached the protection of heaven' / —though invented, appears as if real because it is impossible to find [such details] in the Purāṇas. / The one without a basis in reality is as follows: / 'Then, seeing the Kirāta king's trivial deed in battle, his wrath increased; / he deliberated, his reasoning refined, as if examining reasons for a long time' / —beginning with this, up to: / 'And this power of mine, having surpassed the renown of irresistible great warriors of mighty armies, / loses its strength in ignoble fighting, like the sun's splendor in the presence of the moon' / —up to this point. / For here, the meaning of the section beginning: / 'With the line of their temples darkened by trickling rut-fluid, mounted by brave men, / resilient, ignorant of battles here, the elephants advance, as if uprooting a mountain's height' / —having no basis in reality in the description of the battle between the ascetic and the Kirāta, is narrated by the skilled poet by means of poetry. / The adventitious [prakaraṇa] is of two kinds: with a seed [sabīja] and without a seed [nirbīja]. / Of the two, that with a seed is as follows: / 'Then, its entrance into the water previously indicated by bees circling above, / its spotless temple-walls with their rut-fluid washed clean, a wild elephant emerged from the river'

—beginning with this, up to: / 'Thus, when by destiny the two arrived at friendship whose cause was inconceivable on the journey, / one went to the regions of Caitraratha, and the other to Vidarbha, delightful with good government.' / For here: / 'Therefore, receive from me the weapon of the Gandharvas, whose spells are distinguished by application and withdrawal, / called Prasvāpana, by which the wielder incurs no killing of foes and has victory in hand' / —is the seed. / Ahead of which, the result is found: / 'Then, the prince, handsome as Kāma and worthy of affection, having attained the Gandharva weapon Prasvāpana / from Priyaṃvada, with the ease born of sleep dispelled, discharged it against the kings.' / That without a seed is as follows: / 'There, brown as an evening cloud, a demon named Virādha / stood blocking Rāma's path, like an eclipse obscuring the moon' / —beginning with this, up to: / 'Having crushed him, lest he defile the ground beforehand / with his impure stench, the two descendants of Kakutstha buried him in the earth.' / For here, from the failure to find a result ahead for the meaning of the section beginning: / 'Between the two of them, that parcher of the worlds abducted the princess of Mithilā, / as a drought cuts off rain between the months of Śrāvaṇa and Bhādrapada' / —the adventitious [prakaraṇa] is understood to be without a seed. / This same prakaraṇa has been described in three ways according to the meaning. / Now it is explained in three ways according to verbal expression as well: a single sentence, multiple sentences, and a single-multiple sentence. / There, the single sentence is of two kinds: connected [to a subsequent result] and unconnected. / Of the two, that with a connection is as follows: / 'With his agony removed by the great herb brought by Hanumān, / he once again taught the women of Laṅkā how to lament, with his arrows.' / That without a connection is as follows: / 'Having taken leave of the Himālaya, they reached Śiva again; / and having reported to him the accomplished purpose, they flew into the sky with his permission.' / The multiple-sentence [prakaraṇa] is of two kinds: summarized at the beginning and summarized at the end. / Of the two, that summarized at the beginning is as follows: / 'At that moment, the activities of the city's graceful women, eager to see Śiva, / were thus situated on the rows of palace roofs, with other tasks abandoned:'

beginning with that, up to:
“The windows, their interiors occupied by the faces of those full of intense curiosity, fragrant with the scent of wine,
with their darting eyes like bees, became as if adorned with lotuses.”
That concluded at the end is as follows:
Beginning with:
“Rightly was this difficult austerity endured for his sake by the delicate Aparṇā;
a woman who would obtain even his servitude would have achieved her purpose, what then of sharing his bed?”
up to:
“Hearing these words, pleasant to the ear, spoken by the women of Auṣadhiprastha,
the Three-eyed God, showered with parched grains pulverized by armlets, arrived at the Himālaya's dwelling.”

A single-multiple sentence is of two kinds: connected by pronouns, and connected by case-inflections.
Of the two, that connected by pronouns is as follows:
Beginning with:
“In the northern direction is the king of mountains, divine in nature, named the Himālaya;”
up to:
“Seeing that he was the source of sacrificial materials and possessed substance capable of supporting the earth,
Brahmā himself, having allotted him a share of sacrifice, ordained his sovereignty over the mountains.”
That connected by case-inflections is as follows:
Beginning with:
“Then, as if dampening with the excellence of her form his ascetic vigor, almost fully ripe for liberation,
the daughter of the Mountain King was seen, accompanied by two forest-deities;”
up to:
“Ever warding off with a play-lotus the bee lingering near her bimba-fruit lip,
its thirst intensified by her fragrant breath, her gaze trembling in alarm.”
By this, the exception to this is also explained, as in:
Beginning with:
[corrupt Prakrit lines],
up to:
[corrupt Prakrit lines],
ending with the conclusion of the canto. 3.68.

Objection: A collection of phonemes is a word, a collection of words is a sentence, and a collection of sentences is a topic, so they say.
Then how can it be said that a single sentence is a topic, or that an intermediate sentence is a topic?