Shringaraprakasha 3.p2.6

3.p2.6

anye punaḥ keśacchedanādivacanānmuṇḍādīnadhyavasyānti yathoktam | athavā muṇḍādayo dhātavaḥ | muṇḍayatīti caitasminnarthe kuṭayatīti kuḍaśabdena hi karoti, viśeṣo va lakṣyate ; kiṃtu chidādiviśeṣamavalakṣyamāṇoddeśavibhāgaṃ kūṭirevopādette | evaṃ mūtraṃ karotīti mūtrayati, carcāṃ karotīti carcayati | mūtrema carcayā vā karotau viśeṃṣyamāṇe kṣaraṇaṃ paribhāṣaṇaṃ vā viśeṣeṇopādīyate | sa eva ca kadācit kṣaraṇaviśeṣaḥ paribhāṣaṇāviśeṣo vā naṣṭoddeśavibhāgaḥ upādīyate, yathā mūtrastravaṇe mūtrayati, carcaparibhāṣaṇe carcayatīti | 3.61. evaṃ paśya mṛgo dhāvatīti idamatra sādhanapadamidamatra sādhyapadamiti utprekṣaiṣā | idaṃ tvathetatvaṃ nātra saraṇaṃ na darśanaṃ na mṛgaḥ | kiṃ tarhi mṛgakartṛko dṛśikarmasaraṇaviśeṣo'yaṃ tatraikārthatvādekamevedaṃ vākyamityasti dvayostiṅantayorekāsmin vākye | tataśca pacati karotītyādāvapi pākaṃ karotītivat sādhyasādhanabhāvena saṃbandho'styeveti na kaścidvirodhaḥ | anye purnana manyante kasyacidapi bāhyasya vasatvātmano'saṃbhavāt| bhāvabhūtavastuśṛnyamevedaṃ jagat, tato buddhīnāmeva tathābhūtavyavahāropajanananibandhantavam | buddhaya eva hi siddhasādhaayatārūpamupadarśayantyaḥ śabdātpravartanti | tataśca snamahimollasitanānāvidhabiddhisamupanītabhedanakālpanikākāraparigato'yaṃ māyendrajālasadṛśo vyavahāraḥ pravartata iti na kaścidaparaṃ vastu yasya siddhasya sādhyalakṣaṇavirodhāpattiḥ | tathāhi ; buddhimākārabhedavatīmeke kriyāṃ manyante |

Others, however, understand words such as *muṇḍa* as expressive of hair-cutting and the like, as has been said. Alternatively, *muṇḍa* and the rest are verbal roots. And in the meaning "he heaps" as in "he shaves", the word *kūṭa* indicates 'he makes' or a particular [act]; but the root *kūṭi-* itself takes on an undivided target of reference that specifies an action such as breaking. Likewise, "he makes urine" is "he urinates"; "he makes discussion" is "he discusses". When 'doing' is specified by 'urine' or by 'discussion', flowing or talking is taken up as a particular [action]. And that very particular flowing or particular talking is sometimes taken up with its division of reference lost, as: *mūtrayati* in the sense of emission of urine, *carcayati* in the sense of discussing. Thus, in "look, the deer runs", to say "this is the means-word here, this is the goal-word here" is a mere supposition. This is the reality here: there is neither running, nor seeing, nor the deer [separately]. What then? It is a single particular running that has the deer as its agent and is the object of seeing; since there is a single meaning there, this is a single sentence, and thus two finite verbs may occur in one sentence. And hence, even in "he cooks, he acts", just as in "he does cooking", a relationship in terms of goal and means does indeed exist, so there is no contradiction. Still others do not accept [this], because no external real entity is possible. This world is entirely devoid of real entities; therefore, conceptual cognitions alone are the ground for generating such practical conventions. For conceptual cognitions alone, presenting the form of what is accomplished and what is to be accomplished, proceed from linguistic sound. Consequently, this worldly convention—which resembles a magical illusion and is endowed with conceptual forms brought about by varied cognitions arising from their own intrinsic power—proceeds; thus there is no other entity whose accomplished state could incur contradiction with the definition of what is to be accomplished. To explain: some consider cognition differentiated into forms to be the action.