Shringaraprakasha 3.p2.7

3.p2.7

te hi svamātrābhiraparyavasitaviṣayanirbhāsābhiḥ antastatvādibhiriva bahirarthanibandhanāmarthakriyāṃ sādhayanti | na tadarthaṃ darśanābhiniveśāvasmākaṃ ārāddanīyasmutsārayanti pratyayavyaktayo hi parākṛtavākyārthasaṃsasparśābāhyārthavat tīsu tāsvarthakriyāsu yathāsāmarthyamupajāyamānāḥ pratītāśaṅkāviṣayaparigamanādyavasthāsu tadā sāmarthyakriyā sāmarthya kimarthamanyapadārtharūpamabhyupeyata ityatra cūrṇāvirodhaṃ darśayati | idaṃ kiloktaṃ bhāṣyekṛdabhihito bhāvaḥ kriyāya samavāyaṃ gacchati, pāko vartata iti; tiṅabhihitastu na gacchati| 3.62. na hi bhavati pacati paṭhatīti ātrā'yaṃ samādhiḥ ; yathā kriyopanyastā tathābhūtā samavāyaṃ na gacchati, viśeṣayossamavāyo nāsti, sāmānyayorastyeva | asti sa me rocate, asi tvamīśiṣe, nāsti rame, bhavati pacati karotīti | tajñaitacchakyate vaktum| yatrānyā ca kriyā bhavati yatra tu khalu saiva sā kriyā tatra kathaṃ ? yathā--bhavedapi bhavet, syādapi syāditi | asti ca loke evaṃbhūtaḥ pra3yogaḥ | api bhavedetaddevadattasyāpi sa divassyādyatredaṃ bhavediti devadattasya ca loke evaṃbhūtaḥ prayogaḥ | api bhavedetaddevadattasyāpi sa divassyādyatredaṃ bhavediti devadattasya ca vartamānakālāṃ sattāmavināśaṃ prārthayamāna etatprayuṅkte ; api bhavedetat bhaveddevadatta iti | atrāpyanatvamasti kutassādhanabhedātkālabhedāñca hi kasyātra bhavaterbhavatassādhanassādhavassārvakālaśca pratyayaḥ | api bhavedityatra yo bhavati tatra devadattasattā na prakṛtyarthaḥ| kiṃ tarhi pratyayārthaḥ prārthanaiva liṅiti sravakālatvaṃ kālaviśeṣasyānāśritatvāt |

For they achieve practical efficacy—which seems grounded on external objects as if through inner principles and the like—by appearances whose objects are not definitively resolved beyond themselves. We need not push aside our adherence to philosophical doctrines for that purpose; for particular cognitions, untouched by the meaning of sentences and possessing external-like objects, arising according to capacity in various purposeful actions in states such as the pursuit of perceived doubt-objects—why then should the form of another word-meaning be accepted in regard to the capacity for action? On this point he shows that there is no contradiction with the grammatical commentary (*cūrṇi*). Indeed, this has been stated in the *Mahābhāṣya*: an action expressed by a nominal primary suffix (*kṛt*) enters into combination with an action, as in "cooking exists"; but an action expressed by a finite verb ending (*tiṅ*) does not so enter. For one does not say "he becomes, he cooks, he recites". Here this is the resolution: as an action is thus presented, it does not enter into combination in such a manner; there is no combination of two particular [actions], but there is certainly one of two general [actions]: "it exists, it pleases me", "you exist, you rule", "it is not, I enjoy", "it becomes, he cooks, he acts". That indeed cannot be denied. Where there is one action and another, [that is fine]; but how is it where the very same action is repeated? As in: "it might be, it might be", "it could be, it could be". And such usage does exist in the world: "might it happen that this day could also be Devadatta's, on which this would happen!" And in the world such usage is made for Devadatta; one who prays for Devadatta's ongoing present existence and non-destruction employs this: "might this be, might Devadatta be!" Here too there is difference; why? Because of a difference in means and a difference in time. For which [root] *bhū* here is the means accomplished and the affix omni-temporal? In "might it be", the occurrence that takes place there is not the base-meaning of Devadatta's existence. What then? The affix-meaning is prayer alone, which is the optative (*liṅ*); thus it is omni-temporal because it does not depend on a specific time.