Shringaraprakasha 5.p2.20

5.p2.20

nāpi rūparūpilakṣaṇassambandho bhaviṣyatīti vaktavyam, rūpārthasya nirūpayitumaśakyatvāt | kimayaṃ rūpaśabdaśśuklādigumavacanassvabāvavacano vā | śuklādivacanatve nīrūpāṇāṃ pavanamanaḥ prabhṛtīnāṃ dravyāṇāṃ sāmānyaśūnyātā syāt |ākāraḥvacanatve'pyavasanniveśarahitānāṃ teṣāmeva sāmānyavacanaṃ prāpnoti | svabhāvavacanatve tu jātijātimatoravyatireka eva bhavet | ’bhāti hi vibhedena svabhāvo na svabhāvinaḥ | śabdātiriktataiveyaṃ na tu vastavatiriktatā ||’ api ceyaṃ jātiḥ , sarvasarvagatāpi syātpiṇḍasarvagatāpi vā | sarvasarvagatve'syāḥ karkādāvapi gomatiḥ || aśvadhīśśābaleyādāvuṣṭrabuddhirgajādiṣu | padārthasaṅkaraścaivamatyantāya prasajyate || athābhivyaktisāmarthyaniyamānnaiṣa saṅkaraḥ | hitakarkādipiṇḍānāṃ gotvābhivyaktikauśalam || maivaṃ khaṇḍādyabhivyaktamapi gotvanamanaṃśakam | sravatraiva pratīyeta na vā sarvagaṃta bhavet || tadaṃśagrahaṇe tasya na hi kaścinniyāmakaḥ | dīpavadvyañjakaḥ piṇḍo na tu taṃ piṇḍavṛtti tat || sarvatrāgṛhyamāṇaṃ ca sarvatrāstīti ko vadet | sarvasarvagataṃ tatra na gotvamupapadyate || piṇḍasarvagatatve tu kāmametadadūṣaṇam | kintu naivādya jātāyāṃ gavi gopratyayo bhavete || piṇḍenāsīdasañjāte jātirjāte'pi vidyate | saṃkrāmati na cānyasmātpiṇḍādanyatra niṣkriyā || āyāntyapi na tatpiṇḍamapoñjhitapurātanam | na cāṃśairvartate ceti keyaṃ vyasanasantatiḥ || 5.36. tasmādapoharūpamalīkameva sānānyaṃ, na paramārthasaditi | tataśca tadabhāvāttadvata'nupapattiriti | atrocyate | kiṃ jātyāderbāhyasya śabdārthasyābhāvādapohe pakṣarātaḥ, uta pratītibaleneti |

Nor should it be said that there will be a relation defined as property-and-bearer, because the meaning of ‘property’ cannot be determined. Does this word ‘property’ denote a quality like whiteness, or does it denote an essential nature? If it denotes whiteness and the like, formless substances such as wind, mind, and so on would be devoid of a universal. Even if it denotes spatial shape, for those very [substances] that lack spatial arrangement, the term ‘universal’ would improperly apply. But if it denotes essential nature, there would simply be non-difference between the universal and that which possesses the universal. For: ‘The essential nature of a possessor of an essential nature does not appear as different [from it]; / this [difference] is merely an excess of words, not an excess of reality.’ Moreover, this universal must either be omnipresent in everything, or omnipresent [only] in its individual bodies. If it is omnipresent in everything, then even in a white horse and the like there would be the idea of a cow; / there would be the idea of a horse in a spotted cow and the like, and the idea of a camel in elephants and so on; and thus an utter confusion of word-meanings would follow. / If [it is argued] that this confusion does not occur because of a restriction in the capacity for manifestation: / ‘Individual bodies like white horses and the like lack skill in manifesting cowness’— / Do not say so: cowness, even when manifested by an individual like a broken-horned cow, being partless, / would be perceived everywhere, or else it would not be omnipresent! / For in grasping a part of it, there is no determining factor; / like a lamp, the body is a manifester, but that [universal] does not exist [exclusively] in that body. / And who could say that what is not grasped everywhere exists everywhere? / Therefore, cowness omnipresent in everything is not tenable. / If it is omnipresent [only] in its own individual bodies, then let this objection indeed not apply; / but even then, in a cow just born today, no cognition of a cow could arise. / The universal was not with the body before it was born, yet it exists when it is born; / and being inactive, it does not migrate to it from another body. / Nor does it come to that body having abandoned an earlier one; / nor does it exist by parts—what is this succession of calamities! (5.36) / Therefore, the universal is merely fictitious, having the nature of exclusion, and not real in the ultimate sense. And consequently, because of its non-existence, that which possesses it is untenable. / To this it is replied: Is this devotion to the view of exclusion due to the non-existence of an external word-meaning such as a universal, or is it on the strength of experience?