Shringaraprakasha 5.p2.21
Śṛṅgāraprakāśa 5.p2.21
- Language
- Sanskrit
5.p2.21
na taivatpratītibalena, pratīteranugatākārakaॉviṣayatvenāpohaparipanthitvāt | nāpi jāterasattvaṃ pratyakṣeṇa, svalakṣamavadāveditasvarūpatvāt | ādyameva hi vijñānamarthasaṃsparśi cākṣuṣam | na datuttarabhāvīti kimidaṃ rājaśāsanam || tadevāstu pramāṇaṃ vā tenāpi tvadhigamyate | vyāvṛttaṃ vastuno rūpaṃ nānugāmīti kā pramā || bhavedyadi viśeṣaikaviṣayaṃ nirvikalpakam | sāmānyādhyavasāyo'yamakasmātkathamudbhavet || nacaitacchābdarūpam | yataḥ, paśyatyanugataṃ rūpamavijñāte'pi vācake | dākṣiṇātya ivākasmātpaśyannuṣṭraparamparām || api ca śābaleyapiṇḍamavalokitavataḥ kālāntare kālāntare bāhuleyapiṇḍaṃ paśyataśśābaleyapiṇḍamasmaraṇamutpadyate | tatsāmānayābhāve na ghaṭate | na hyanyasmindṛṣṭe'nyasmaraṇanimittaṃ kiñcidasti | tayoranugatarūpābhyupagame tadupapadyate nānyatheti | kiñca vyaktyantaradraśane'pi sa evāyaṃ gauriti pratyabhijñāyate | tadapyanugatarūpāgrahaṇe na yujyate | na ca vyaktibhedasya, pratyakṣasiddhatvāt | yatra ca laghutaraparimāmatalamudgādipracayasannidhāne'vīcchinnasvalakṣaṇagrahaṇaṃ nāsti | tatrānuvṛttameva rūpamindriyeṇa gṛhyate | tasmādviśeṣavatsāmānyāpahvavona yuktaḥ | tasmātpūrvākṣasampāte tulāyatvagamyate | nānātvaṃ ceti sāmānyabhedau dvāvapi vāstavau || sāmānyamidamityevamtha tatrānupagrahaḥ | vyāvṛttamidamityevaṃ kiṃvā biddhissvalakṣaṇā || samānavṛttisāpekṣaṃ na ca sāmānyavanedanam | tatra sannihitatvāt vyaktivannānupagrahaḥ || samānavṛttyapekṣatvātsāmānyasyānupagrahe | viśeṣo'pi ca māgrāhi vyāvṛttiṃ sa hyarekṣate ||
Nor [is the non-existence of the universal established] on the strength of experience, because experience has a continuous form as its object, thereby obstructing [the Buddhist theory of] exclusion (apoha). Nor is the non-existence of the universal [established] by perception, since its own nature is made known just like that of the particular. / For why should this be a royal edict: that only the initial ocular cognition touches an object, / and not the one that occurs subsequently? / Or let that very one be the valid cognition: but what proof is there that by it too / only the excluded form of an entity is cognized, and not the continuous one? / If indeterminate perception were to have only the specific particular as its object, / how could this ascertainment of the universal arise all of a sudden? / And this is not of the nature of verbal [cognition]. For: / One sees the continuous form even when the verbal signifier is unknown, / just as a southerner, all of a sudden, sees a succession of camels. / Moreover, in one who has looked at a brindled individual, when seeing a hornless individual at another time, the recollection of the brindled individual arises. That is not possible in the absence of a universal. For when something else is seen, there is no cause for recollecting another thing. When an enduring continuous form in both is admitted, that is intelligible, not otherwise. Furthermore, even on seeing another individual, it is recognized: “This is that very same cow.” That too is not tenable without grasping a continuous form; nor [can it be denied] because of the difference between individuals, since that is established by perception. And where there is an accumulation of very light-measured sesamum, kidney beans, etc., in close proximity, an unbroken grasping of the particular is not present; there, only the continuous form is grasped by the sense organ. Therefore, the denial of the universal, just like that of the particular, is improper. Therefore: / Upon the first fall of the eye, equivalence is cognized, / as well as multiplicity; thus both the universal and difference are real. / If it is said: “There is no apprehension there in the form 'this is a universal'”, / then is there an awareness of the particular in the form “this is excluded”? / Nor does the awareness of the universal depend on [knowing its] occurrence in similar instances; / because of its presence right there, it is not unapprehended, just like the individual. / If the universal were unapprehended because of depending on [occurrence in] similar instances, / then the particular also should not be grasped, for it indeed depends on exclusion.
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation
Linked texts (1)
- Nyāyamañjarī — Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Sanskrit