Shringaraprakasha 8.p1.19

8.p1.19

atra jagājjigīṣayā cakrīkṛtakāmakodaṇḍānukāriṇi mukhe vibuddhe'pi locanotpaladvayasyaiva prakāśamānatvātkusumasāyakasya dvāveva bāṇau na trayo na pañceti sajjitatilake traya eva na dvau na pañceti kṛtakarṇotpale pañcaiva na dvau na traya iti parisaṅkhyātenārthena śeṣaṃ niṣidhyate| yatraikāvadhāraṇenānyatparākriyate sā niyamanaiṣedhikī | yathā-- teñciajīāteñce amaggaṇāsā ajassadhanuiṭhṭhī | diṭṭiakuvalaaviloaṇā ṇaso jaai kaṃdappo || atra jyāmārgaṇadhanuryaṣṭīnāmanyatra bhedenopalambhātkandarpaviṣayepi tadbhedo'nuvṛttaḥ kuvalayavilocanādṛṣṭestenatena saṃsthānena tattatkāryakaraṇātsaiva sarvātmiketyavadhāraṇaṃ nivartyate, etena niyamasadṛśaphalo vinigraho'pi vyākhyātaḥ | yathā--- bhavatu samadanā rataye tilakavatī cārucampaka cchāyā | ghanacandanadhavalakucā kāntā tava vidviṣā maṭavī || ādigrahaṇādasambhavaniyamo viśeṣe pratyakṣaśrutirityādayo gṛhyante, tayorasambhavaniyamo yathā---- hāro thaṇāṇasavaṇā ṇa kuṇḍalāmehalā ṇiaṃbassa | acchoṇaaṇo vibhave vimaṇḍaṇaṃ kajjalasalāā || viśeṣapratyakṣaśrutiryathā---- iyaṃ gehe lakṣmīriya mamṛtavartirnayanayo rasāvasyāḥ sparśo vapuṣi bahulaścandanarasaḥ | ayaṃ bāhuḥ kaṇṭhe śiśiramasṛṇo mauktikarasaḥ kimasyā na preyo yadi paramasahyastu virahaḥ || 8.17. yeyamudbhatasambandhavyatirekeṇa patapadārthānāmitaretaraṃ pratyākāṃkṣāsannidhiyogyatāpekṣiṇī vyapekṣetyapucyate | kā punariyamākāṃkṣā nāma ? pratipatturjijñāsā | sā kathaṃ padārthānāmupapadyate ? kāraṇe kāryopacārāt |

Here, although her face, resembling Kāma’s bow bent into a circle out of a desire to conquer the world, has awakened, only the two blue lotuses of her eyes are visible; therefore, the Flower-Arrowed One has only two arrows, not three and not five; when the mark on her forehead (tilaka) is adorned, he has only three, not two and not five; when the blue lotus is placed on her ear, he has only five, not two and not three—thus by the specified meaning the rest is excluded. Where another is eliminated by the determination of one, that is an exclusive prohibition (niyama). As in: / ‘These are the bowstring, these are the arrows, this is the bow-staff... Kāma triumphs...’ // Here, because the bowstring, arrows, and staff of the bow are observed elsewhere in differentiation, that distinction is followed even in the domain of Kāma; but because that very gaze of the lotus-eyed woman performs each respective function through each respective posture, the restrictive determination that she alone constitutes all of them is set aside. By this, censure whose result resembles restriction is also explained. As in: / ‘Let there be, full of passion, for your pleasure, a beloved endowed with a tilaka, with the beauty of lovely campaka blossoms, her breasts white with thick sandalwood paste; / let the forest of your enemies be [likewise]...’ // By the mention of “and so on”, the restriction of impossibility, direct hearing of a specific detail, and so forth are included. Among them, restriction of impossibility is as follows: / ‘The pearl necklace is not an ornament for the breasts, nor are earrings for the ears, nor is a girdle for the hips; / when clear eyes have wealth, an anointing stick of collyrium is no decoration.’ // Direct hearing of a specific detail is as follows: / ‘She is the goddess of fortune in the house, she is an ambrosial salve for the eyes; / this touch of hers on the body is abundant sandalwood juice; / this arm around the neck is cool and smooth like pearl essence; / what of hers is not dear, if only separation were not utterly unbearable?’ // That mutual dependence between word-meanings with respect to one another, apart from a manifested connection, requiring expectancy, proximity, and semantic fitness, is called mutual expectancy (vyapekṣā). What, then, is this ‘expectancy’? It is the desire of the hearer to know. How does that apply to word-meanings? By metaphorical transfer of the effect to the cause.