Shringaraprakasha 6
English (machine translation) 6
- Language
- English
Contents
- 6.p1 — 55 parts
6.p1.1
Sixth: The illumination of the fourfold group beginning with inflectional meaning.
6.1. Inflectional meaning is threefold: number, syntactic role, and the residual relation. Among these, number consists of singularity, duality, and plurality residing in the relation of syntactic roles. It is of six kinds: conventional, intentional, conditional, technical, optional, and residual.
Among these, conventional is, for example: *āpaḥ* ('waters'), *dārāḥ* ('wife'), *lājāḥ* ('fried grain'), *dvayam* ('a pair'), *anekam* ('many'), *niyutam* ('a hundred thousand'). Here, the plural or singular exists purely from lexical convention; hence it is conventional.
Intentional is, for example: *rodasī* / *rodasyau* ('the two worlds'), *kabarī* / *kabaryaḥ* ('braid' / 'braids'), *stanau* / *stanāḥ* ('breasts'), *viśākhā* / *viśākhe* / *viśākhāḥ* ('Viśākhā' in singular, dual, or plural), *dṛk* / *dṛśau* / *dṛśaḥ* ('eye' / 'two eyes' / 'eyes'), *jagat* / *jagatī* / *jaganti* ('world' / 'two worlds' / 'worlds'). Here, singularity, duality, and plurality arise from the speaker's intention; hence it is intentional.
Conditional is, for example: *vṛkṣaḥ* ('tree'), *śobhanaḥ* ('beautiful'), *dampatī* ('husband and wife'), *pitarau* ('parents'), *akṣāḥ* ('dice'), *gabhastayaḥ* ('rays'). Here it is conditional because of the actual existence of an external condition [in the entity].
Technical is, for example: *mārdaṅgikapāṇavikam* ('players of mṛdaṅga and paṇava'), *puruṣau* ('two men'), *khalatikam* ('baldness'), *vanāni* ('forests'), *godau* ('two givers of cows'), *grāmaḥ* ('village'), *tiṣyapunarvasū* ('Tiṣya and Punarvasu'), *tārakaḥ* ('star'), *pañcālāḥ janapadaḥ* ('the Pañcāla country'), *sa cāhaṃ ca pacāvaḥ* ('he and I cook'). Here it is technical because singularity, etc., are technically stipulated in places where duality, plurality, etc., exist.
Optional is, for example: *aśvabaḍabam* / *aśvabaḍabau* ('horse and mare'), *plakṣanyagrodham* / *plakṣanyagrodhāḥ* ('Plakṣa and Nyagrodha trees'), *pūrvaphalgunyau* / *pūrvāḥ phalgunyaḥ* ('the Pūrva-phālgunī stars'). Here it is optional because singularity, duality, and plurality depend on grammatical option.
Residual is, for example: *ekaḥ* ('one'), *dvau* ('two'), *bahavaḥ* ('many'), *ubhau* ('both'), *dvitrāḥ* ('two or three'), *ardhatṛtīyāḥ* ('two and a half'). Here it is residual because the affixes *su*, etc., are added to express a remainder of the number already expressed by *eka* ('one'), etc. As it is said:
'In the case of "one", [the word itself] is taught as the cause for inflected forms; but the inflection applies to the singularity belonging to the possessor of that [number].'
6.2. The syntactic role has been stated previously to be of six kinds. It unfolds separately into six types according to its expressibility by the accusative and following cases. Among these, the object is expressible by the accusative: *kaṭaṃ karoti* ('he makes a mat'); expressible by the instrumental: *mātrā sañjānīte* ('he recognizes through the mother');
6.p1.2
expressible by the dative: *na tvā śune manye* ('I do not value you at a dog'); expressible by the ablative: *pari trigartebhyo vṛṣṭo devaḥ* ('the god rained excluding Trigarta'); expressible by the genitive: *mātuḥ smarati* ('he remembers his mother'); expressible by the locative: *adhītī vyākaraṇe* ('learned in grammar').
The agent is expressible by the accusative: *gamayati grāmaṃ devadattam* ('he causes Devadatta to go to the village'); expressible by the instrumental: *caitreṇa kṛtam* ('done by Caitra'); expressible by the dative: *mūtrāya kalpate yavāguḥ* ('barley gruel leads to urine'); expressible by the ablative: *upādhyāyād adhīte* ('he studies from the teacher'); expressible by the genitive: *vyāsasya kṛtiḥ* ('the composition of Vyāsa'); expressible by the locative: *brāhmaṇeṣu bhuñjāneṣu vṛṣalā āsate* ('while the Brahmins are eating, the outcasts sit').
The instrument is expressible by the accusative: *akṣān dīvyati* ('he plays dice'); expressible by the instrumental: *dātreṇa lunāti* ('he reaps with a sickle'); expressible by the dative: *śatāya parikrītaḥ* ('hired for a hundred'); expressible by the ablative: *stokān muktaḥ* ('released by a little'); expressible by the genitive: *sarpiṣo jānīte* ('he acts by means of ghee'); expressible by the locative: *akṣeṣu dīvyati* ('he plays with dice').
The recipient is expressible by the accusative: *devadattam abhyasūyati* ('he is jealous of Devadatta'); expressible by the instrumental: *dāsyā samprayacchate* ('he bestows by means of a maidservant'); expressible by the dative: *devāya dadāti* ('he gives to god'); expressible by the ablative: *guror ārabhya gāḥ prayacchati* ('beginning with the guru, he distributes cows'); expressible by the genitive: *ghnataḥ pṛṣṭhaṃ dadāti* ('he turns his back to the striker'); expressible by the locative: *puṣpeṣu spṛhayati* ('he yearns for flowers').
The point of departure is expressible by the accusative: *arjunaṃ yoddhāraḥ* ('fighters [withdrawing] from Arjuna'); expressible by the instrumental: *dhanuṣā vidhyati* ('he pierces [releasing] from the bow'); expressible by the dative: *śraddhāyai nidā gṛhṇate* ('they receive pledge out of confidence'); expressible by the ablative: *grāmād āgacchati* ('he comes from the village'); expressible by the genitive: *kṛṣṇā gavāṃ sampannakṣīratamā* ('of cows, the black one is richest in milk'); expressible by the locative: *bhukta odanaḥ kaṃsapātryām* ('boiled rice was eaten from a bronze bowl').
The locus is expressible by the accusative: *grāmam adhivasati* ('he inhabits the village'); expressible by the instrumental: *samena dhāvati* ('he runs along level ground'); expressible by the dative: *yuddhāya sannahyati* ('he gears up for battle'); expressible by the ablative: *krośād budhyati* ('he perceives from a league away'); expressible by the genitive: *gavām īśvaraḥ* ('the lord over cows'); expressible by the locative: *tīrthe upavasati* ('he fasts at a sacred place').
The residual relation, which goes beyond the syntactic role, is a specific relation preceded by action and syntactic roles. It is threefold: distinct from what has been expressed, distinct from syntactic roles, and non-intention of syntactic roles. Among these, in the case of distinctness from what has been expressed, it is dependent on different related entities or dependent on identical related entities.
6.p1.3
Between the two, the first is like 'the king's man' (rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ), as in: / 'Touch your husband's crest of the moon with this,' playfully said by her friend; / after she had colored her feet and given a blessing, she silently struck her with a garland. / The second is like 'Rāhu's head' (rāhoḥ śiraḥ), as in: / The face of the fawn-eyed woman, veiled by the weight of a circular cluster of peacock feathers serving as an umbrella, / shone like the orb on the moon when about to attack Rāhu with its face. / In other than syntactic roles, it is either with an expressed action or without an expressed action. Between the two, the first is 'he dwells for the sake of food' (annasya hetoḥ), as in: / 'Sovereignty over the world under a single umbrella, fresh youth, and this radiant body: / seeking to abandon much for the sake of little, you seem to me bewildered in judgment.' / The second is 'equal to a brahmin' (brāhmaṇasya tulyaḥ), as in: / 'By family, radiance, fresh youth, and those diverse virtues in which modesty is chief, / choose this man who is your equal; let the jewel unite with gold.' / When a syntactic role is intended to be expressed, it depends either on a substance or on an action. Between the two, the first is 'the good man takes pleasure in his own wealth' (sādhoḥ svaṃ dhanaṃ rocate), as in: / 'Given by her beloved, infused with overwhelming passion, filled with exquisite flavor, / the wine from his mouth was relished by the lovely woman, and its established name was truly realized.' / The second is 'one should not eat of beans' (na māṣāṇām aśnīyāt), as in: / 'Stop that young celibate, friend, whose upper and lower lips are trembling again with a desire to speak; / not only he who disparages the great, but also he who listens to him incurs sin.' (6.3) / But specific relations such as association, purpose, cause, characteristic mark, governing word, and address have been explained in the section on supplementary elements; therefore they are not elaborated here. [Objection:] Now, since a relation is preceded by action and syntactic role, even the residual relation is subsumed under syntactic roles alone; and number and capacity belong to case-inflections. In that case, when the nominal stem denotes the word-meaning as a universal, its relation to a case-inflection denoting number and syntactic role is not tenable. For conjunction with number and capacity is impossible for a universal.
6.p1.4
It is answered: through the necessary connection of the universal [with the individual], the individual indicated [by the base] will, in conjunction with number, have a relation characterized by inherence in a single object. It is not so. Just as morphological bases, being unable due to infinity and deviation to express the individual endowed with difference, express the undivided and non-deviating universal, so too case-endings, being unable due to infinity and deviation to express capacity and number as differentiated by the difference of their substrates, [cannot express them individually]; therefore, because of the absence of a relation between the universal of capacity or number and its substrate, the juxtaposition of morphological base and affix would be entirely invalid. It is not invalid, because it is accounted for by inherence along with inhering in a single object. How, again, can there be a relation between number and substance when both are expressed through the expression of universals? Just as in the case of [two things] directly expressed: just as two meanings expressed by a linguistic sound, turning over in the mind, become mutually connected, so also two meanings apprehended from what is expressed by a linguistic sound will undergo a mutual connection. Does this number or capacity necessarily qualify the universal? He says: no. For the singular number heard in 'he wipes the vessel' does not convey the number of oneness as an auxiliary factor of the action. Nor does the direct hearing of the accusative in 'he offers parched grain' express the objective capacity of the parched grain in the offering action. Rather, just as in 'he plays with dice', it employs the parched grain as the most effective instrument in the sacrificial act, from an objective nature concealed by general relationship. But in some cases, through the direct hearing of the case-ending in its own form, the auxiliary status of capacities such as number and objecthood in actions is understood, as in 'he should sacrifice an animal' or 'he threshes the rice'. Why, then, are number and capacity intended to be conveyed only in some places even though both are directly mentioned by the revealed sound? Regarding number, it is stated: an entity that is fit to be designated as 'this' or 'that', being an existent thing, cannot be expressed by words without number; for words express an existent thing only when endowed with number.
6.p1.5
Therefore, since the mentioning of number is an invariable concomitant, number is not intended to be expressed in the mention of an entity, as in: “a Brahmin should not be killed” (brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ). And likewise, without the universal too, since a mere thing is indistinct, its denotation with distinction is impossible. Therefore, the mentioning of the universal being an invariable concomitant, the non-intention to express the universal as well would follow. Another says: where number is denoted by number-words such as “one” and so forth, there it is necessarily intended to be expressed as an auxiliary part of the ritual act, as in: “he gives one cow” (ekāṃ gāṃ dadāti), “he digs with two” (dvābhyāṃ khanati), “he immolates three animals” (trīn paśūn ālabhate); for being understood from the form of words such as “one”, it cannot be unintended to be expressed. But elsewhere, being aimed solely at the grammatical correctness of the word, it is not intended to be expressed by singulars and the like, as in: “a cow is not to be touched with the foot” (gauḥ padā na spraṣṭavyā). This too is not so, because even when a word such as “both” is used, non-intention is observed, as in: “he whose both oblations suffer injury…” (yasya ubhayaṃ havir ārtim ārcchat) and so on. Others hold: based on the implicit indicator “in expressing a universal optionally in the singular…” [Pāṇini 1.2.58], both the singular and the plural are not intended to be expressed, but the dual is intended to be expressed, as in: “there are two Sārasvatas” (sārasvatau bhavataḥ). That too is incorrect, because non-intention is observed even for the dual, as in: “if these two should be sick, this medicine should be given”; because that medicine, even when given to one, is capable of pacifying disorders of wind and so forth. If so, then where a universal is enjoined as subordinate to another, there number is intended to be expressed; but where it is restated for the sake of receiving its own consecration, there it is not intended to be expressed, as in: “he should sacrifice with an animal” (paśunā yajeta), “he cleanses the cup” (grahaṃ sammārṣṭi). Both of these cannot be understood merely by examples, so the reasoning must be stated. That is stated as follows: in “he should sacrifice with an animal”, the sacrifice has predominance because of having a fruit; the animal is its auxiliary part; and an auxiliary part is that which serves the principal. The service to the principal is accomplished by just one animal, so a second is not taken. For if one were to assume that as many animals as one has, that many he takes…
6.p1.6
Because the sacrificial rite under discussion is completed by a single animal, other sacrificial rites are performed lest the rest be useless. [Otherwise,] an unprincipled [action like] the sacrifice would be impelled by a subordinate substance. Nor is it the rule that a subordinate factor impels the principal. Moreover, in statements such as “one should immolate an animal” or “one should sacrifice with an animal”, this is an originative statement (utpatti-vākya) meant to make known the instrumental status of the animal, which was not known as a subordinate factor of the action. In that case, because the meaning is to be ascertained from the perception of the linguistic sound, whatever meaning the linguistic sound expresses, precisely that meaning is adopted as conforming to it. In linguistic sound, just as the universal belongs to the morphological base through positive and negative concomitance, so number is determined as expressed by the case-ending. And if the meaning of the linguistic sound were not completed, or the action were not accomplished without taking a second animal, then even a second might be taken. But because the universal of animalness is completed in every individual without distinction, and the action of the sacrifice is accomplished by a single animal-offering, a second is not taken. Nor is there any number found in an originative statement that conflicts with the number in “one should sacrifice with an animal”, in deference to which this [singular number] would be abandoned; for this itself is the originative statement for the animal. Therefore, because it is stated by the linguistic sound and there is no contradiction with any other number, number is intended to be expressed in “one should sacrifice with an animal” and so forth. In “he wipes the cup”, however, it is not intended to be expressed. For in statements such as “nine cups belong to Prajāpati”, the plural number found in the originative statement of the cups concerns the principal, since the cups are being enjoined there. But in “he wipes the cup”, the singular number concerns a subordinate factor, because the wiping is what is being enjoined, and the word “cup” serves to supply its locus. And it is not correct that a number belonging to the principal should be sublated by the number of a subordinate factor. [Objection:] Now, by virtue of the originative statement, many cups are indeed understood; and from this singular number in “the cup”, one cup would be wiped. What would be sublated here?
6.p1.7
[Reply:] If so, then in the injunctive statement, those [cups] whose subordinate status was already known are introduced into memory merely by the word “the cup” in order to enjoin an unprecedented wiping. And the recollection of the cup, arising by the power of direct experience, presents precisely those things that were experienced; therefore, it does not remind one of only one cup, but reminds one indeed of the cups [as previously experienced]. Nor would the singular case-ending in the presence of multiple cups remind one of only one, just as in the case of the ladles and the like; for he who has experienced many has surely also experienced one. This is true; nevertheless, that difference in number, even though understood, is incapable of restricting the action to one because it is not enjoined with respect to the action, [and] the sentence concludes [without enjoining it]. Nor is there another word by which it could be enjoined for one [cup alone]. Nor can a single word enjoin both—the unknown wiping and the connection of what is already known with oneness—because of the difference in operation. [Opponent:] Then the wiping is enjoined as qualified by the cup and oneness. [Reply:] The operation would not be split; but the fact is not so, because wiping is for the sake of the cup, since it serves its purpose. And the specific case-ending shows its primacy. Therefore, the number is not enjoined. [Opponent:] If so, how here, in “he ties the brindled cow”, is the quality ‘brindled’ enjoined? For here too the subordination of the cow, and [the subordination] of that brindled [cow], would mean a split in operation. If you say that the connection between quality and substance is expressed directly by the scriptural text and is the object of the action, so there is no fault here, [we reply:] the same applies to “the cup”. The direct statement itself expresses the subordinate role of the number and of the substance that is its locus with respect to the action. Similarly, in “one should yoke the chestnut [horse]”, there is an adoption of both the universal and the quality expressed by a single word. If so, then when operating for its own purpose, because the difference in number cannot be enjoined, the number is not intended to be expressed, as in “he wipes the cup”. Here, because the wiping is for the sake of the cup, the cups are the principal, and the wiping is their subordinate factor.
6.p1.8
In “one should sacrifice with an animal”, “one should yoke the chestnut [horse]”, “he ties the brindled cow”, and the like, however, because the animals and the like are subordinate factors existing for the sake of acts like sacrifice, what is enjoined is precisely what is qualified, possessing number and possessing qualities; thus both number and quality are intended to be expressed. The practice of the Teacher [Pāṇini] also indicates this very point: in the principal, number is not intended to be expressed, but in a subordinate factor, it is intended to be expressed. To explain: in the rule “of those having the same form, one remains” (sarūpāṇāmekaśeṣaḥ), when the word ‘remainder’ (śeṣa) is taken in an objective sense, the substance expressed by the word ‘remainder’ has primacy, because it undergoes cultivation which is expressed by the explanation of its correctness. Therefore, because what operates for its own sake has its number unintended, the use of the word ‘one’ is made: “one remains”. This is the indicatory sign that the number of the principal is not intended to be expressed. Likewise, in “a word ending in a case-affix is compounded with a word ending in a case-affix”, because number is admitted [as a subordinate factor], a compound of many does not occur, as in mahatkaṣṭaṃ śritaḥ (“undergone great hardship”). For here it is explained that an aggregate delimited by a particular arrangement of parts of such a kind is correct. Therefore, in the procedure of importing refinement to the aggregate through the means of referring to the parts, the aggregate is the principal; the parts that operate toward it operate by adopting the specific numbers mentioned. But where another effort is initiated, there [a compound] takes place even of many, as in “time-words with a measure”; by virtue of the plural number, [we get] dvyahnajātaḥ (“born two days ago”). And as in the rules for bahuvrīhi and dvandva, by the explicit mention of ‘many’ (aneka), [we get] mattabahumātaṅgaṃ vanam (“a forest with many wild elephants”) and dhavakhadirapalāśāḥ (“dhava, khadira, and palāśa trees”). Sometimes, however, even in a subordinate factor number is not intended to be expressed, where by its non-intention the achievement of another principal takes place. As in “the object is what is most desired by the agent” (karturīpsitatamaṃ karma). For here, if the agent, introduced to delimit the desire that delimits the designation of ‘object’ (karman) being enjoined for what is most desired, were understood as adhering to the singular number, then a thing desired by many would be excluded from connection with the designation ‘object’.
6.p1.9
Therefore, in order to set aside the obstruction of the primary element's preparation, the agent is resorted to as an undifferentiated general class, whose particular number is not intended. But surely this is only the objective—the accomplishment of another primary element; therefore, the justification for [such] absence of intention must be stated. This is stated [as follows]:
Because the word denoting the most desired object (īpsitatama) is based on a generality, when relations present themselves without distinction, the mention of the agent (kartṛ) is made in order to eliminate other means of action (sādhana). Having exhausted its function merely in precluding the opposite of what is grasped, it is incapable of adopting a distinction of number. (6.4)
Again, capacity (śakti), being enjoined by an inflectional suffix upon a secondary or primary entity possessing number, merely conforms to the speaker's intention (vivakṣā). And thus, just as animals and the like possess number, so cups and the like possess the status of means (sādhanabhāva) in ritual actions without their number being meant. How, then, is the number residing in the animal and the like understood as an instrument of action, given that the nominal stem's meaning (prātipadikārtha) has the status of an instrument belonging to a relatum either directly or indirectly, while number is enjoined by the case suffix? For there is no direct mutual relation between number and instrumenthood. If so, then the individual entity is connected first of all with number; but once it has acquired an enhancement through its connection with number, it connects with instrumenthood. This instrumenthood, falling upon the qualified entity, conveys that even the qualifier is an instrument of action—just as in the phrase 'he won while equipped with a weapon.' From what, however, does this relation between number and instrumenthood arise, when they are grounded in a single word with an unbroken syntactic function? For it is not the case that without attaining contact with number, it is unable to attain instrumenthood. If so, then the individual is connected with both number and instrumenthood; the verbal inflection (ākhyātavibhakti) assigns to actions that very [individual] whose nature is enhanced by the two. As that qualified entity experiences connection with the action, the qualifier too is understood as connected with the action. But isn't the case-meaning (vibhaktyartha) the syntactic role (kāraka)—such as object or instrument—and that is simply the substance possessing capacity, because its operation is undertaken for the accomplishment of the action?
6.p1.10
And when that [substance] is already expressed by the nominal stem itself, what is expressed by the case suffix? We reply: capacity (śakti). For substance is of two kinds: concrete entity (sattvabhūta) and non-concrete entity (asattvabhūta). Of these two, that which is concrete is the substrate of capacity and number, such as the referent of 'tree' and the like; that which is non-concrete is not their substrate, such as the referent of an indeclinable. Both of these are expressed by the nominal stem purely without limitation; but the limiting conditions dependent upon them, consisting in capacities, numbers, and relations, are expressed by the case suffix. But against this it is objected:
'An effect, arising from the thing's own nature assisted by auxiliaries, is by no means capable of establishing another capacity that is beyond the senses.' (6.5)
For if a capacity is posited, it must either be eternal, like the intrinsic nature of the word-meaning, or it must be an effect. In that regard, if it were eternal, there would follow the constant production of the effect. If dependence on auxiliaries is admitted, let it belong to the intrinsic nature itself; what is the use of capacity? If, on the other hand, it is an effect, then if it is an effect merely of the intrinsic nature of the word-meaning, the effect would be produced at all times because the capacity would always be produced; but if it is the effect of the whole causal complex, let that effect simply be the effect itself! What is the use of an intermediate capacity? If it be said that no effect is produced from an incapable factor (kāraka), then capacity itself is an effect, and positing another capacity for its production leads to infinite regress; otherwise, one's own premise is contradicted. He replies: the unseen is posited for the sake of establishing what is seen; the positing of another capacity would only be exhausted in constructing a series of capacities; a single capacity is posited so that there may be no frustration of the effects of causal factors. Whence then an infinite regress? It is not so, because it is established otherwise: if the true nature of things were obstructed in actions, then the assumption of a capacity over and above that would be proper; but individual things, being unobstructed, produce effects simply upon obtaining auxiliaries; why then this useless positing of capacity? (6.6) But surely, without capacity, a causal factor would not even be a causal factor, because the reality of an entity would be obstructed in its actions.
6.p1.11
For color-form alone is seen, not taste and the like; the organ of vision sees, not that of taste and the like; taste alone is tasted, not color-form and the like; the tongue alone tastes, not the eye and the like; water alone removes thirst, not fire; fire alone dispels cold, not water. For if there were no restriction, since the intrinsic nature of things is without distinction, every effect would arise from everything. Consequently, the tongue too would see like the eye; taste too would be seen like color-form; the eye too would taste like the tongue; color-form too would be tasted like taste; fire too would quench thirst like water; water too would dispel cold like fire; and just as sesame seeds are taken by one desiring oil, so sand too would be taken; or just as an axe is raised by one intending to cut down a tree, so a shoe or the like would also be raised. Furthermore, when poison and fire are prevented from their effects of killing and burning by mantras, if capacity is denied, what is the explanation for their failure to produce their respective effects? Or what is the justification when the eye and the ear fail to produce their own effects of seeing and hearing due to illness and the like? For neither their intrinsic natures nor their auxiliaries are obstructed by mantras or illnesses, since they are still perceived in their proper form; but their capacities are obstructed, so that the non-production of effects is explicable even when their intrinsic nature and auxiliaries are present. Therefore, just as other imperceptible things are posited by you—such as the unseen factor (adṛṣṭa) inferred from effects like pleasure, the mental impression (saṃskāra) that is the cause of recollection based on enhanced cognition, or momentum (vega) produced by a particular motion and serving to generate further motion—in the same way let an imperceptible capacity that causes the distinction of the effect be posited! This is untenable; because the obstruction of action and the like are established even without capacity. Tasting and the like have distinct natures from color-form and the like solely by virtue of their fixed natures inherited from their own causal lineage; how could these [factors], not being of such a nature, accomplish an effective action that is to be accomplished by color-form and the like? And this must necessarily be accepted;
6.p1.12
This is because the same objection applies even if one posits capacities: how are these capacities confined to fixed substrates, and why do they not pervade everything as a single capacity? If [you reply] that it is due to an excellence in the intrinsic nature of the word-meaning, then the diversity of effects will be established from that very source alone. Moreover, when the substrate differs, how can there be a difference in capacities? Or, from whatever cause capacities acquire difference in form, from that very difference in the form of the substrate the difference of effects is established; what is the use of positing different capacities? If [you ask]: how is it in the case of individuals of equal form that bring about unequal effects? As for instance: moonstones ooze by the rays of the moon, but sun-stones do not; hailstones melt by the rays of the sun, but pearls do not; internal fiery light sees, but external light does not; the prāṇa wind breathes in a living being, but the vyāna wind does not; the space of the ear hears, but the space of the mouth does not; a learned man is entitled to rituals, but an unlearned man is not—even though they belong to the same genus, the restriction of unseen destiny and differences of contact with other substances determine the difference in effect. How is it in the case of those very individuals of meaning, identical in nature, that bring about diverse effects? As for instance: that very same fire burns, illuminates, and dispels cold; the very same water floods and removes fatigue. Such an excellence of form belongs to fire or water, just as an action's suitability to the speed of conjunction or the speed of disjunction [belongs to action], or just as righteousness is the cause of pleasure, knowledge, and liberation. But as for the restriction of material causes, we do not invent any novel causal relation among entities; rather, we conduct ourselves by following what is established. There, through positive and negative concomitance, or from the usage of elders, we understand that sesame seeds or an axe alone are the cause of producing oil or felling a tree. Therefore, one who desires that [result] takes up that very [cause], and not sand, sandals, and so on. Nor does the effect arise constantly even when the intrinsic nature of the sesame seeds or the axe is present, because the presence of auxiliary conditions, which is also required just like the intrinsic nature, cannot obtain at all times. And within the group of auxiliary conditions, righteousness and the like also fall;
6.p1.13
and when the production of an effect depends on that, how could everything arise from everything? The positing of righteousness and the like, however, is unavoidable on the strength of effects such as the variety of the world. Moreover, even when poison and fire are present, the non-production of their effect due to the application of a mantra is also not caused by the obstruction of a capacity; rather, it is caused by the intervention of a different totality of causal factors. If it is asked: what has been done by the mantra that intervened? Nothing has been done; however, a different causal totality has been brought about. For a certain causal totality is the cause of a certain effect. If you say: the intrinsic form remains just as it was, then why would poison, even when not eaten, not kill? There, its contact and the like must also be expected. The absence of a mantra should also be expected; just like righteousness at the time of an ordeal, an intervening mantra also impedes the effect. Or, even on the view of capacity, what is the function of the mantra? For by the mantra, is there destruction of the capacity or its obstruction? First, it is not destruction, because the effect is seen again once the mantra is removed. Let the obstruction be of the intrinsic form itself! 6.7. If you ask: what happened to the intrinsic form? Then what happened to the capacity either? If you say: indifference toward the effect, that is equal in the other case too. The intrinsic form certainly exists, because it is seen; the capacity also exists, because it is inferred from the subsequent perception of the effect. By this, the dilemma regarding the destruction or obstruction of the capacity of seeing and hearing in the eye and ear through disease and the like is also explained. Furthermore, an operation is also accepted by you like a supersensible capacity. And since the effect is accounted for by positing either one alone, why incur the heaviness of positing both? If you say: even what is capable is not a causal factor when it is not operating, how could it be known to be capable? If you say: from the perception of the effect, then the effect will be established from the operation alone. I do not see the felling of a tree even when a sandal or the like is operating! Then [the operation] is perceptible, not supersensible, since one knows its state of operating even prior to the perception of the effect. For an operation that is inferable from an effect would never be known without the effect.
6.p1.14
Since an effect arising from something else cannot establish both, this is impossible. If it is said, "[It arises] from a capacity," in response it is said: When you repeatedly say "essential nature, essential nature," what indeed is this thing called "essential nature"? First of all, it is not a substance, because of the distinction in the expression "the essential nature of the substance." What then is it? It cannot be denied that it is the property that differentiates it from things of the same class and things of a different class. Indeed, you yourselves express this with an abstract affix, as "reality of the thing" (arthatattva) or "reality of being" (bhāvatattva). And that is remembered in the rule regarding the expression of a quality: "The affixes tva and tal occur in the expression of that quality by the presence of which a word is applied to a substance." "Quality," "property," "capacity," "producing an effect," and "power" mean the same thing. / Whether it is distinct from the substance or the very self of the substance, it is conceived as having the status of an instrument by resorting to difference. // 6.8 // For how could the distinct instruments such as the instrument [proper], whose forms are mutually exclusive, not become confused when arriving at the state of being a single substance? Or, if they are not confused, how is their identity with a single substance appropriate? Therefore, their going beyond being an instrument, while having a single substance as their substratum, produces their difference from the substance. Furthermore: / Let it be determined from the rule on avyayībhāva in the sense of a case-ending: the meaning of the case-ending is different from the substance; it is expressed by an indeclinable. // For an indeclinable that occurs in the sense of a case-ending is compounded with the subsequent word. And if by the phrase "meaning of a case-ending" the substance consisting of being, the locus of the capacity, were meant, it would not be expressed by an indeclinable, which does not express being. And because that meaning is already expressed by the nominal stem alone, an indeclinable expressing that [case-meaning] enters into a compound with the subsequent word. And by this it is determined that the case-ending expresses a capacity that is distinct from the substance. What is appropriate for your position as well is stated: they do not consider capacity to be anything other than the essential nature of the substance, from the expressible nature of the syntactic role, etc., arising from the essential nature. However, individual entities are not capable of producing the effect [on their own], because of the undesirable consequence that an effect would arise from anything at all.
6.p1.15
However, we do not recognize a fixed essential nature handed down through a chain of its own causes. If [it is argued that] capacity is an excellence of word-meaning arising from qualities of the cause, its classification into eternal and non-eternal is inapplicable; for its being co-extensive with the substance, it is eternal or non-eternal just like the substance, and the production of an effect does not occur at all times because capacity awakens only at the time of action. And unseen fate, specific accessories, and the like are causes for the awakening of capacity, which even we do not reject. But since in the rule of a material cause positive and negative concomitance are rooted solely in a capacity to be inferred from observing effects even throughout a hundred usages of the elders—because positive and negative concomitance are stated even by the elders—the alternative that there is destruction or obstruction [of capacity] by mantras and the like is indeed ruled out once the essential nature is established as capacity. Operation, however, being expressible only by a verbal root, is supersensible and not real; therefore, through both of them, causality is understood in that very manner. Capacity, postulated from the impossibility otherwise of observing the effect, is far more reasonable as supersensible. 6.9. The meaning of an integrated grammatical form is threefold: not a word-meaning, a single word-meaning, and multiple word-meanings. Among them, [the meaning which is] not a word-meaning is threefold: pertaining to the meaning of a verbal root and an affix, pertaining to the meaning of an affix and an affix, and pertaining to the meaning of a nominal stem and an affix. Among those, that pertaining to the meaning of a verbal root and an affix is of two kinds: having the form of an action, and having the form of a syntactic role. Between the two, that having the form of an action is, for example: kartum icchati (‘desires to do’) -> cikīrṣati; kurvantaṃ prayuṅkte (‘causes someone doing [it] to act’) -> kārayati; atyarthaṃ punaḥ punar vā pacati (‘cooks excessively or again and again’) -> pāpacyate. That having the form of a syntactic role is, for example: pākaṃ karoti (‘does cooking’) -> pacati; pākena kriyate (‘is done by cooking’) -> pacyate; pācakaḥ (‘cook’); paktavyam (‘to be cooked’). That pertaining to the meaning of an affix and an affix is of two kinds: permanent and based on the speaker's intention. Between the two, the permanent is, for example: kṛtrimaṃ, sāṃrāviṇam, vyāvakrośī, bhidā, ābhijityaḥ, kauñjāyanyaḥ. That based on the speaker's intention is, for example: cikīrṣuḥ, kāraṇā, gārgyāyaṇaḥ, kalyāṇineyaḥ, mālāyāḥ, kumāryāḥ. That pertaining to the meaning of a nominal stem and an affix is of two kinds: having the form of an individual entity, and having the form of a capacity.
6.p1.16
Between the two, that having the form of an individual entity is, for example: ajā, kumāraḥ, brahmabandhuḥ, vṛkṣaḥ, vṛkṣau, vṛkṣāḥ. That having the form of a capacity is, for example: vṛkṣam, vṛkṣeṇa, vṛkṣāya, vṛkṣāt, vṛkṣe, vṛkṣasya. A single word-meaning is threefold: having the form of a concrete entity, having the form of an abstract entity, and having the form of an action. Among them, that having the form of a concrete entity is of two kinds: meaning existing as a substance, and meaning not existing as a substance. Between the two, the meaning existing as a substance is, for example: aupagavaḥ, chāndasaḥ, lākṣikaḥ, yauṣmakaḥ. And the meaning not existing as a substance is, for example: āstikaḥ, upatyakā, prakaṭam, tatratyaḥ. That having the form of an abstract entity is also of two kinds just as before. Between the two, the meaning existing as a substance is, for example: agnivat, pañcakṛtvaḥ, sarvadā, bahuśaḥ. The meaning not existing as a substance is, for example: natarām, prāhatarām, pacatitarām, pacatirūpam. That having the form of an action is of two kinds: compressed and uncompressed. Between the two, the compressed is, for example: ātmanaḥ putram icchati (‘desires a son for oneself’) -> putrīyati; śyena iva ācarati (‘acts like a falcon’) -> śyenāyate; abhṛśo bhṛśo bhavati (‘what was not intense becomes intense’) -> bhṛśāyate; senayā abhiyāti (‘advances with an army’) -> abhiṣeṇayati. The uncompressed is, for example: kaṃsavadham ācaṣṭe (‘relates the killing of Kaṃsa’) -> kaṃsaṃ ghātayati; rātrivivāsam ācaṣṭe (‘relates the dawning of night’) -> rātriṃ vivāsayati; puṣyacandrayogaṃ jānāti (‘knows the conjunction of Puṣya and the Moon’) -> puṣyeṇa candraṃ yojayati; ujjayinyāḥ prasthito māhiṣmatyāṃ sūryodgamaṃ prāpnoti (‘having set out from Ujjayinī, arrives at Māhiṣmatī at sunrise’) -> māhiṣmatyāṃ sūryam udgamayati. Multiple word-meanings are threefold: based on a single word-meaning, based on both word-meanings, and based on another word-meaning. There, that based on a single word-meaning is of two kinds: based on the prior word-meaning, and based on the posterior word-meaning. Between the two, that based on the prior word-meaning is, for example: upakumbham, puruṣavyāghraḥ, gomatallikā, pūrvakāyaḥ, rājadantaḥ, prāptajīvikaḥ.
6.p1.17
That based on the posterior word-meaning is, for example: rājapuruṣaḥ, yūpadāru, kaṣṭaśritaḥ, śvalebhyaḥ, dvyahnajātaḥ, prāptajīvikaḥ. That based on the posterior word-meaning is of two kinds: coreferential and non-coreferential. Between the two, the coreferential is, for example: nīlotpalam, agnistokaḥ, puruṣottamaḥ, sarvaśvetaḥ, saptarṣayaḥ, khañjakuṇḍaḥ. The non-coreferential is, for example: dhavakhadirau, aśvabaḍabau, dadhipayasī, dhavakhadirapalāśāḥ, kākolūkam, gavāśvam. That based on another word-meaning is of two kinds: having that quality and not having that quality. Between the two, that having that quality is, for example: unmattagaṅgam, śastrīśyāmā, sahasrākṣaḥ, śūlapāṇiḥ, dvitrāḥ, ardhatṛtīyāḥ. That not having that quality is, for example: ūḍharathaḥ, citraguḥ, dakṣiṇapūrvā, uṣṭramukhaḥ, guḍapriyaḥ, priyaguḍaḥ. 6.8. Now, when those who explain an integrated grammatical form say, ‘An integrated grammatical form is the expression of another meaning,’ what indeed is its meaning? Is it the expression of another word’s meaning, or is it an expression for the sake of another meaning? Either way there is no fault. For when the view is adopted that a single word makes multiple meanings understood, then, in the condition of an integrated grammatical form, that subordinate word takes up as the expressible entity the selfsame meaning that was understood in the state of an analytical sentence as expressible by another word. This, because of the obstruction to the expressive capacity in the state of separated words, is called, in an integrated grammatical form, the expression of another meaning. When, on the other hand, the view is that a single word makes multiple meanings understood, then those subordinate words in the scope of an integrated grammatical form take up that very meaning which was previously understood, for the sake of another meaning. On this view, it is clearly an expression for the sake of another meaning. In that case, there are two alternatives: either the subordinate words take up another meaning having abandoned the well-known semantic relation, or, while the primary meaning remains, they express another meaning. For both are indeed seen elsewhere.
6.p1.18
Just as curd is removed from a curd-jar and milk is deposited, but water remains together with the sand, etc., in a sand-jar—so he says: For those who say that complex formation is the expression of another's meaning, does complex formation abandon its own meaning (jahatsvārthā), or does it not abandon its own meaning (ajahatsvārthā)? What follows from this? If it abandons its own meaning, when it is said, "Bring the king's man (rājapuruṣa)," the bringing of a mere man would follow; and in "Bring the descendant of Upagu (aupagava)," [the bringing of] a mere descendant [would follow]. Now, if it does not abandon its own meaning: when both maintain their distinct individual meanings, a dual ending would follow by the rule "the dual occurs when there are two." Thus, because faults are observed in both [views], neither is comprehended. On this point, the view of some is: Subordinate words enter into another meaning through the abandonment of the meaning they had taken up; for it is impossible for a word that is not subordinate to another, whose previous meaning is being adhered to, to express another meaning. Therefore, while expressing another meaning, it must abandon the semantic entity it had taken up. So he says: Which complex formation is proper? [The answer is:] It is the one that abandons its own meaning. But is it proper that there should be a complex formation that abandons its own meaning? Indeed, it is proper. For so it is seen: in the world, this man, engaging in another's work, abandons his own work. For example, a carpenter engaging in the king's work abandons his own work. And likewise, the word "king" occurring in the sense of "man," and "Upagu" occurring in the sense of "descendant," would abandon their own meanings. // 6.9 // Objection: Just as a carpenter engaged in the king's work—such as collecting and delivering treasure—abandons his own activity such as cutting and squaring wood, because it is impossible to perform the king's work without abandoning his own activity; likewise, if the subordinate word, engaged in another meaning such as conveying another sense, were to abandon the meaning previously taken up—such as being a qualifier—because it is impossible to express another's meaning without abandoning its own meaning, then in the cited examples the bringing of a mere man and a mere descendant would follow. This is not a fault.
6.p1.19
Even if the subordinate words enter into their own meaning, nevertheless, having imparted a variation of form to the principal [word]—a cause for an enhancement of the grasped meaning—they abandon their own meaning at a subsequent time. Therefore, at that time, even when the meaning of the subordinate word has ceased, the meaning of the word "man," conformed to that variation of form, is understood as qualified indeed. For the special properties imparted by a cause that bestows an enhancement do not persist only during the time of the presence of that cause; rather, they persist even when the cause is separated. In that regard, just as a fever produced by the internal bodily heat aroused by the scorching rays of the autumn sun is not cured merely by avoiding the touch of sunlight; or just as the particular qualities of color, taste, smell, and touch produced by contact with blazing heat remain as long as the substratum lasts, even when the heat is removed far away; so the enhancement of the principal form imparted by the meaning of the subordinate word becomes the cause of delimiting the particular [meaning] to be conveyed, even when that [subordinate] meaning has disappeared. Or, for one who has comprehended that the subordinate word-form possesses the capacity to express a specific meaning, the delimitation of that meaning—whose birth is brought about by the operation of the mental impression imparted by that ascertainment—proceeds even when the word-form has abandoned its meaning, because the intellect is captivated by the similarity of form and has not noticed the abandonment of meaning. Therefore, it is the principal alone that has that specific property imparted to it. Objection: If, through the power of habit from observing usage of that very word-form, one understands that very meaning, what abandonment of its own meaning is there? For word-meanings are not arranged inside that word-form like specialized tools in a leather bag. What then? They are inferable from seeing the form of the word. Since it is just so here as well, what is lost of its own meaning? This is not so; even when its own meaning has ceased, meanings are understood from connection. For example: "a ghee-jar," "an oil-jar." Even when the ghee or the oil has been poured out, the ghee or the oil becomes a qualifier of the jar in these cases: "This is a ghee-jar," "an oil-jar." This is an explanation of the topic.
6.p1.20
In that context, whatever and however much measure of meaning [there is], that particularity is indeed an accessory [that remains]; when baked in the fire of becoming, grass and a brush are not washed away. Just as [one speaks of] 'a jasmine-box' or 'a campaka-box': even when the flowers are removed, designations are understood such as 'this is a jasmine-box' or 'this is a campaka-box', due to the persistence of the particular fragrance imparted by contact with them. So here too, through syntactic connection, the meaning of the subordinate word, even when abandoned, will serve as a qualifier. Or alternatively, even if it abandons its own meaning, this word 'king' does not abandon it completely. Only a certain portion of its own meaning is lost. How does it abandon its own meaning due to conflict? Therefore, it would abandon only so much meaning as conflicts with its utility for the principal meaning. Thus it is said: that own-meaning which conflicts with the other-meaning is what it abandons. For there is no example of the abandonment of an own-meaning that is useful for the principal meaning. A carpenter engaged in royal work does not abandon the royal work itself; nor does he abandon coughing, laughing, or scratching. And this meaning—namely, being a qualifier—does not conflict with the other-meaning. Therefore it will not abandon it. 6.10. Objection: Subordinate words are engaged in the operation of delimiting the principal meaning. It is said that they do not abandon their status as qualifiers which benefit the principal. And precisely this is the meaning of the subordinate word-meanings: that they cause the principal to be understood as having acquired a differentiation of form. For instance, in 'a man of the king' (rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ), the meaning 'man' is understood as having a distinction imparted by the relation to a specific master, in 'king's man' (rājapuruṣa). And the subordinate word cannot impart a differentiation of form to the principal without being a word-meaning; so its own meaning is not disregarded at all. Why then is it said that complex formation is an abandonment of own-meaning? The opinion is this: the independence of a word lies in the comprehension of its own excellence; from the abandonment of that comes the loss of its own meaning. And if the subordinate word does not benefit the principal through its own meaning, its very form would be lost; for being subordinate is caused by benefiting another, and the use of the subordinate word would become pointless.
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- Śṛṅgāraprakāśa — Bhoja, Sanskrit