Kavyalankarasarasamgraha 7.69

7.69

ityevamādāvapi rāmādīnāṃ śabdānāmasādhāraṇarūpatayā rājyabhraṃśavanavāsasītāharaṇapitṛmaraṇādayo duḥkhaikahetavaḥ svārthasahacāriṇo vastumātrarūpā vyaṅgyadharmāstatpariṇatarūpatayā svārthasya pratītistadvetubhūtatvātparyāyoktālaṅkārasaṃsparśitaiva /
na khalu pade paryāyoktena bhavitavyamitīyaṃ rājñāmājñā sūtrakāravacanaṃ vā /
lakṣaṇayogādvi vibhaktarūpatāvasthāpyate /
atra ca paryāyoktalakṣaṇaṃ vidyate /
vācyavācakavyāpāraśūnyasyāvagamanātmanaḥ prakārasya sadbhāvāt /
tena kathaṃ paryāyoktatā na syāt /
evamanyatrāpi vastumātre pratīyamāne paryāyoktatā vācyā /
tasmānna vastumātre pratīyamāne tadabhivyaktihetuḥ kāvyadharmo dhvanirnāmārthāntaram //

In verses such as this as well, because the words like "Rāma" have an extraordinary nature, their suggested properties consisting purely of facts—such as the loss of the kingdom, living in the forest, the abduction of Sītā, the death of his father, and so forth, which are the sole causes of grief and accompany the word's own primary sense—cause the apprehension of that primary sense as transformed by them; because it is the cause of this [apprehension], it certainly shares in the ornament of periphrasis. For indeed there is no king's decree or statement of a sūtra-maker that periphrasis must not exist in a single word. A differentiated nature is established by connection with the definition. And here the definition of periphrasis is present, because there exists a mode that consists of apprehension devoid of the operation of the expressed and expressive senses. Therefore, why should it not be periphrasis? In this manner, elsewhere too, when a mere fact is apprehended, periphrasis is to be asserted. Therefore, when a mere fact is apprehended, the poetic property that is the cause of its manifestation is not a distinct entity called suggestion.