Kavyalankarasarasamgraha 7: 6

Now begins the sixth section.

Self-comparison, poetic doubt, union of ornaments, the visionary,
as well as poetic illustration and poetic reason: these, others consider ornaments.

Here, because the particle iti is used for the purpose of introducing the definitions of ananvaya and the rest that are to be stated, it is not used for the purpose of referring to the intrinsic nature of ananvaya and the rest.
The meaning is: they know self-comparison and the other ornaments as having the definitions to be stated in this manner.
The meaning is: they know self-comparison and the other ornaments as having the definitions to be stated in this manner.
Therefore, being the object of the action of knowing, there is the accusative case in “self-comparison” (ananvayam) and so on.
In “kāvyadṛṣṭāntahetū ca”, the word “poetic” (kāvya) is connected separately with both words, “illustration” (dṛṣṭānta) and “reason” (hetu).
And the prior placement here of the word “illustration” is due to its being more venerable.
The greater venerability of illustration is because an illustration brings about conviction of the probativity of the reason, mostly through the pervasion mirrored in the illustration.

Poetic doubt (sasaṃdeha):

Speech that again expresses both truth and difference with a standard of comparison,
accompanied by doubt for the sake of praise, the wise call poetic doubt.

The syntactic connection is: the speech of the poet, or of a speaker devised by the poet, who states a difference preceded by a non-difference with the standard of comparison.
When, under the pretext of an expression containing doubt, identity—that is, the nature of it, or non-difference—of the subject of comparison with the standard of comparison is stated, and subsequently a difference of that subject of comparison from that standard of comparison is stated, then it is the ornament 'dubious' (sasaṃdeha).
Objection: If first a non-difference with the standard of comparison is expressed, and then again a statement of difference from it is made,
then it would result in [the wasted effort of] an elephant's bath [washing and immediately throwing dust on itself]. Anticiptating this, he said: 'for praise'.
The meaning is that this kind of expression is resorted to for the purpose of praise.
Its example:

“Is this mass of fame arising from the crushing of the hearts of all demons
in his hand? [If so,] how has it become a solid mass? //

Or is this a swan arrived through yearning for the navel-lotus? [No,] it is not restless.”
Thus did the naive folk doubt all around regarding his conch. //

'Naive' (ārjavaḥ) means foolish,
because of association with simplicity (ṛjutva).
Here, the conch is the subject of comparison.
The mass of fame and the swan are the standards of comparison.
And of both, non-difference was first stated under the guise of doubt: “Could this be a mass of fame?” and likewise “Is it a swan?” And then, a difference of the subject of comparison from the standard of comparison is described.
First, the description of difference from the mass of fame is: “How has it become a solid mass?”
A mass of fame indeed has the nature of spreading;
its solid massing, which is opposed to that, is seen here;
therefore, this is not a mass of fame.
And the statement of difference from the swan is: “It is not at all restless.”
For restlessness is indeed a property of a swan;
and here that is not perceived; therefore, it is not a swan at all.
And the purpose of such an expression here is praise: that the mass of fame has been placed in his own hand by the Lord, and likewise, that the Lord possesses that lotus of the navel, the ground of the world's origin, to which the arrival of a swan is easily imagined.

He states another variety of the dubious:

The composition producing in minds the luster of another ornament,
which takes the form of doubt even when there is no doubt, is named doubt (saṃdeha). //

'Luster' (chāyā) means beauty.
Where, even in the absence of doubt, there being a composition of doubt, a difference of the subject of comparison from the standard of comparison is not composed as before, but rather only a non-difference under the guise of doubt;
and the result of such a composition is the apprehension of beauty produced by another ornament.
As he says: 'producing in minds the luster of another ornament'.
That too is the ornament of doubt.

Its example:

“Is this a blue cloud upon Meru? Or smoke upon the fire of universal destruction?”—
thus is doubted that dark-hued one standing upon the king of birds in the sunlight. //

Here, both the blue cloud resting atop Meru and the smoke belonging to the fire of the cosmic end are the standards of comparison.
The Lord mounted on Garuḍa, whose body is dark, is the subject of comparison.
And with those two standards of comparison, under the guise of doubt, non-difference is established in the Lord: “Is this such a thing? Or is it such a thing?”
And no reason for difference of the subject of comparison from those two standards of comparison is stated here, as in the previous case.
And the result of such an expression is the suggestion of the ornament of simile:
that the Lord mounted on the son of Vinatā is similar to such a pair of standards of comparison.

Non-connection (ananvaya):

Where, through the intention to state dissimilarity [with anything else],
there is the status of both standard and subject of comparison for that very thing with itself,
they call that 'non-connection'. //

Where there is the relationship of standard and subject of comparison of that very thing with itself, and not with another entity, there, because of the absence of connection with another entity, the ornament is called 'non-connection'.
Objection: When there is a relation of resemblance, the subject of comparison belongs to the context, while the standard of comparison is outside the context—this being the definition of standard and subject of comparison, how can one and the same entity be both object and instrument in the act of comparison?
Anticipating this, he said: 'through the intention to state dissimilarity'.
Here the intended meaning is not the relationship of standard and subject of comparison, but, as in the reciprocal comparison (upameyopamā), the exclusion of any other standard of comparison; this is the meaning.
The word 'iti' here, because it serves to introduce the example to be stated, is not syntactically connected with the word 'ananvaya'.
Hence, the accusative 'ananvayam' [is used].

Its example:

“Whose speech is like his own speech, his pure action like his own action,
and his beauty, captivating the eyes of the world, like his own beauty.” //

Here, in order to convey the extraordinary nature of the three—speech, action, and beauty—due to their being incomparable, the relationship of standard and subject of comparison is composed with themselves alone.

Combination (saṃsṛṣṭi):

The coexistence of many ornaments, or of two,
independent of each other in a single locus, is called combination. //

When there is a composition in a single locus—either in the word alone, or in the sense alone—of many ornaments independent of each other, or of two such ornaments, the ornament is combination.
Where, however, there is mutual dependence, there the three commixtures (saṅkara)—the commixture of doubt, the commixture of expressing [two ornaments] by a single word, and the commixture of the favoured and the favourer—have been previously explained.
And where there is a composition of multiple ornaments resting upon the twofold basis characterized by word and sense, there too commixture of multiple ornaments residing in word and sense has been described.
Combination, however, is distinct from these.
Its example:

“For your sake, that Vaikuṇṭha, like the moon forsaking moonlight at dawn,
abandons, I think, even that goddess Śrī, a continuous shower of nectar. //

Therefore arise, O lotus-eyed one, and live in the house,
enjoying your youth with some supremely fortunate groom.” //

"Nirviśantī" means experiencing. / Here, in "Vaikuṇṭha abandons Śrī for your sake like the moon abandons moonlight at dawn," there is a simile. / In "a streamless shower of nectar," there is a metaphor. / For here, all properties pertaining to a shower of nectar are present in Lakṣmī; only the relation to a stream does not exist. Thus, by means of the exclusion of a single quality belonging to the standard of comparison, an imposition consisting in the affirmation of all the remaining qualities belonging to the standard of comparison is understood, just as in "This man is a handless elephant." / Therefore, in this verse, there is a combination of two ornaments: simile and metaphor, / because they depend purely on what is expressed and because they are independent of each other. / With regard to the verse beginning "taduttiṣṭha," however, taking recourse to the variety of simile consisting of a compounded simile in "kamalekṣaṇe" ("lotus-eyed"), and combining it with the previously mentioned pair of ornaments, one should see an indication of the direction for exemplifying a combination of many ornaments.

The vision-evoking ornament (bhāvika) [is now defined]:

Where past and future things, extraordinarily wondrous, / are seen as if before the eyes owing to the lucidity of words, that is the vision-evoking ornament.

Things characterized by present posterior non-existence are "past," such as Yudhiṣṭhira and others today. / Those, however, that are characterized by present prior non-existence are "future," such as the divine incarnation Kalki, the son of Viṣṇuyaśas, today. / When things, both past and future thus characterized, are seen as if before the eyes—becoming as though present because of being distinguished from present posterior and prior non-existence—that would be the ornament named the vision-evoking ornament. / The cause here is the lucidity of words and the extraordinary wondrousness of the things. / That has been stated: "owing to the lucidity of words" / and "extraordinarily wondrous." / Among these, the lucidity of words is that which produces immediate comprehension of meaning due to the composition of words well-known in the world, free from disjointed syntax. / For when that is present, that emotion which belongs to the poet,

being the substratum that portrays a distinguished object serving as a means to the four human goals mingled with aesthetic relishes such as the erotic, is directly perceived by connoisseurs, the listeners, as non-different from their own intention, through the poet himself, having the form of being mirrored in that very poem. / For in the case of listeners as well—connoisseurs whose inner self has been melted by the experience of such clear words—an impress of their own intention is transferred to it. / Therefore, that intention of the poet, and the past and future things made the object of it, are seen there by connoisseurs, the listeners, as if before the eyes, non-different from their own intention. / And just as lucidity residing in words is a cause in the manner stated immediately above, likewise extraordinary wondrousness residing in the sense, caused by the composition of extraordinary and elevated matters, should also be understood [as a cause]. / That has been stated by Bhāmaha when introducing the vision-evoking ornament: "Being an extraordinary, elevated, and wondrous matter, well-enacted representation in the story, / and lucidity of words: these are proclaimed as its causes."

"Well-enacted representation" means that what serves as a means to the four human goals is stated to be mingled with aesthetic relishes such as the erotic by means of dramatic acting and the like. / Therefore, the vision-evoking ornament should be understood as having such causes for its basis and consisting in the union of the two intentions of the poet and the listener.

For this very reason, since the intention belonging to the poet—ascertained as non-different from the listener's intention—is present here in a form flashing directly before [the mind], there is the designation "the vision-evoking ornament" (bhāvika): [that in which] an emotion (bhāva) exists, hence bhāvika. / As they say: "The poet's self, radiant with aesthetic relish, is reflected and shines forth in the clear mirror of word and sense / that is mature and endowed with sweetness and vigor. / Thereupon, his inner being melted by having thoroughly drunk the clear word and sense, / the listener, through likeness with it, attains the highest nourishment in the four human goals." / By "clear," the quality of perspicuity is meant. / By "mature," having ornaments [is meant]. / "Thoroughly drunk" means properly savored. / "Through likeness with it" means because of the ascertainment of the intention residing in the poet as non-different from one's own intention: this is the meaning. / Its example:

You cause pain and delight, O woman with uncollyriumed eyes, / having looked closely, with this form [of yours] that possesses the beauty of diverse ornaments.

Here, although her body is worthy of ornaments, pain [arises] from the abandonment of ornaments indicated by her having uncollyriumed eyes. / But delight [arises] because the beauty to be brought about by ornaments is visibly seen due to being filled with natural loveliness. / By this, the connection with ornaments, though past because it is characterized by present posterior non-existence, is composed by the poet as if directly before the eyes by virtue of that excellence of form which is wondrous. / And in that very way it brings about aesthetic delight for connoisseurs. / "nānābharaṇaśobhayā": she in whom the beauty of ornaments is to be seen (īkṣaṇīyā) constantly, with excellence and strikingness; this is a possessive compound (bahuvrīhi).

The poetic reason (kāvyahetu) [is now defined]:

When a single [thing] that is heard assumes the role of a cause / for recollection or direct experience elsewhere, that is called poetic reason (kāvyaliṅga).

Where a single thing, having been heard, causes recollection of or gives direct experience of another thing, there is the ornament named poetic reason (kāvyaliṅga). / Unlike the logical reasons well-known to dialecticians, which bring about distastefulness when composed with reference to worldly matters because they contain the tracing of presence in the subject and positive and negative concomitance, the poetic reason does not do so, because it is composed as abiding in an object that is excessively full of relish, striking a chord in the heart of all people. / Therefore, the word "poetic" is employed in "poetic reason." / It is certainly not a reason of the treatises of logic, but rather a poetic reason: this is conveyed by the inclusion of the word "poetic."

[Objection:] But how, through the inclusion of the word "poetic," is abiding in an object full of relish demonstrated for poetry? / [Reply:] Because poetry is full of relish. / Poetry, indeed, because its body consists of word and sense refined by qualities, is necessarily full of relish, and not lacking in relish. / To explain: the qualities of poetry are defined as sweetness, vigor, and perspicuity. / Among these, sweetness is delightfulness; vigor is compactness; while perspicuity is [comprehended] without interruption

[Now, clarity is] suitability for the manifestation of aesthetic relish without interruption.
Therefore, among these three qualities, clarity is primary.
Sweetness and vigor, however, situated in varying degrees in accordance with the suitability for the manifestation of respective aesthetic relishes, have their utility only within clarity.
And so poetry, situated with a body consisting of word and sense endowed with that quality having the nature of clarity—which is the cause of the immediate perception of aesthetic relishes, aided by sweetness and vigor situated in varying degrees in accordance with the respective aesthetic relish—is necessarily full of aesthetic relish, and never devoid of it.
If that is so, then since poetry has accomplished its purpose by means of qualities alone, ornaments would turn out to be useless there.
This is not so; for in poetry whose beauty has been produced by qualities, ornaments create an excess of beauty, just like worldly ornaments.
For just as worldly ornaments, when placed on the body of a young woman embellished by qualities, function as ornaments, the same should be understood regarding poetic ornaments.

Objection: Why is it not admitted that ornaments produce beauty like qualities even in poetry devoid of qualities?
Answer: Because that has not been observed elsewhere.
For ornaments placed in poetry devoid of qualities are certainly not observed to produce beauty, just like ornaments on an old woman.

To explain:
Ornaments placed on an old woman do not lose her beauty.
To explain: ornaments placed on an old woman do not produce beauty for her; on the contrary, their own charm is lost when they are placed on her.
Likewise, when poetic ornaments are placed in poetry devoid of qualities, there is an absence of their being the cause of poetic beauty and there is a loss of their own beauty.
As Bhaṭṭa Vāmana said:
“Poetry, like the beauty of a young woman, my friend, is relished when it possesses pure qualities; yet it is relished exceedingly / when affection is bestowed on it through continuous creations of genuine varieties of ornaments.

If speech is devoid of qualities, like the body of a woman bereft of youth, / even ornaments loved by people inevitably incur misfortune.”

The word *aṅga* is used in affectionate address.
The construction is: being relished because of its pure qualities, it is relished exceedingly when familiarity is created through continuous creations of genuine varieties of ornaments.
For this very reason ornaments are non-essential.
For poetry without qualities is truly non-poetry, but not [poetry] devoid of ornaments.
For poetry without qualities is truly non-poetry, but not [poetry] devoid of ornaments.
Because ornaments produce an excess of beauty in poetry whose beauty has been produced by qualities.
So it has been said:
“Qualities are properties that produce poetic beauty. / Ornaments are the causes of its excess. / The former are permanent.”
“The former” means qualities.
And in actual usage, poetry is seen to have its body of word and sense embellished solely by qualities even while devoid of ornament, as in the verse of the poet Amaruka overflowing with uncompounded aesthetic relish of love:
“When her beloved somehow regained his composure after a slip of the tongue, the woman, emaciated by separation, pretending not to have heard through a clever ruse, / with a glance turned askance in flurried agitation lest it reach the ears of her intolerant confidantes, then breathed a sigh of relief in the empty room.”

For here, no semantic ornament whatsoever is perceived.
Yet because of the presence of clarity augmented by sweetness and vigor, it possesses the nature of poetry.

Objection: But even here, the aesthetic relish of love-in-union, residing in the heroine, is composed, aided by its own concealment through the aesthetic relishes of love-in-separation caused by jealousy and love-in-separation caused by absence; and by virtue of its connection [with the verse], there will certainly be the ornament of 'possessing aesthetic relish' (*rasavat*).
To explain: in the phrase ‘when her beloved somehow regained his composure’, love-in-union, consisting in turning one's mind toward the beloved preceded by love-in-separation, is indicated.
In ‘after a slip of the tongue’, because the beloved had made a slip of name, the heroine's aesthetic relish of love-in-jealousy is composed.
And further, by the three lines beginning with ‘the woman, emaciated by separation’, after concealing the aesthetic relish of love-in-jealousy grounded in the heroine through the emotion of dissimulation, the completion of the sentence-sense is effected through love-in-union indicated by the blossoming of the mind.
To explain: by the line beginning with ‘the woman, emaciated by separation’, the anger residing in the heroine is shown having been concealed.
By the line beginning with ‘intolerant confidantes’, fearing that the slip of name might reach the ears of the confidantes as a cause of love-in-separation, through a turning of her glance, when the house was seen to be devoid of friends, what was rejoiced by the heroine—by the depiction of that, the sense of the sentence was accomplished through love-in-union.
Thus, because of the depiction of love-in-union which secured its footing through the sublation of love-in-separation, there is the ornament of *rasavat*.
So how can absence of ornament be stated here?
It is answered:
There is indeed no relation of ornament and ornamented between poetry and aesthetic relishes, but rather a relation of soul and body.
For aesthetic relishes exist as the soul of poetry, and word and sense as its body.
For just as a body animated by a soul is designated as ‘living’, so poetry animated by aesthetic relish is designated as having a living form.
Therefore, aesthetic relishes exist as the soul with respect to word and sense, which are the body of poetry, and not as ornaments.
And the manifestation of aesthetic relish is brought about by that quality having the nature of clarity, which is appropriately augmented by sweetness and vigor situated in varying degrees.
Therefore, here, the fact that love-in-union, aided by love-in-separation, exists as the soul of poetry possessing qualities, and not as an ornament toward poetry, makes it appropriate to say: ‘poetry possessing qualities is seen even without ornament’.
The same is to be said regarding other aesthetic relishes, emotions, semblances of aesthetic relishes and emotions, and their pacifications.
As they have said:
“Since poetry presided over by aesthetic relish and so on is described as having a living form, / therefore, it is established that aesthetic relish and so on are the soul of poetry.”

[...]

As for the fact that aesthetic relish and so on were previously stated to be ornaments, that was done without intending such distinctions.
Thus, poetry is certainly full of aesthetic relish because its body consists of word and sense embellished by qualities.
If so, in that which is devoid of aesthetic relish due to being devoid of qualities—

[it would follow that] grammar and the like, or the works of Bharata and the like, would not obtain the designation of poetry, / and therefore what Bhāmaha stated would be contradicted: “And it is divided into four kinds again: relating past deeds of gods and the like, an invented subject-matter, / based on arts, and based on treatises.”

For here, by the word ‘based on arts’ works like Bharata’s are meant, / and by the word ‘based on treatises’ works like grammar [are meant]. / Therefore, it must be explained: how does the designation ‘poetry’ apply there? / It is replied: / In the primary function, poetry is solely a body of word and sense refined by qualities. / But in mere speech whose body of word and sense is devoid of qualities, the use of the word ‘poetry’ will occur metaphorically through resemblance to poetry. / And it is said: “This word ‘poetry’ applies to word and sense refined by qualities and ornaments; figuratively, however, it is understood here as designating mere word and sense.” / ‘Figuratively’ means metaphorically. / Thus, through its having a body of word and sense refined by qualities, poetry possesses aesthetic relish. / The poetic reason qualified by that

resides only in entities possessing aesthetic relish, and does not reside in mere objects devoid of relish like a logical reason in a treatise; thus it is established. / And among logicians, there is a two-fold view regarding the function of the reason: / Some logicians, indeed, consider the function of the reason to be merely the recollection of the pervader, such as fire, which was experienced at the time of grasping the pervasion, by persons whose latent impressions are awakened by seeing the reason such as smoke, which is the pervaded. / Others, however, say that through the capacity of the sign, an experience of the sign-bearer itself is produced, because the connection of fire and the like with a particular property such as the mountain, which was not apprehended before, is to be ascertained only now by the efficacy of the operation of the reason like smoke. / This is what is meant by ‘of memory or of experience’. / Its example:

“This luster of the radiance of your emaciated limbs, somewhat dim, / reveals the sites where ornaments were placed, and torments me.”

Here, with respect to the radiance, i.e., brilliance, of the limbs other than the neck and so forth which served as the places for placing ornaments, that dim, dirty luster, i.e., beauty, is the sign; and through its efficacy, a past connection with ornaments in the areas where ornaments were placed is inferred. / Therefore, that is poetic reason.

Poetic exemplar:

“The distinct exhibition of a reflection of an intended matter, / devoid of words such as ‘like’ (yathā, iva), is called an exemplar by the wise.”

Where a reflection, i.e., a similar entity, of an intended matter—one intended to be expressed as the subject at hand—is exhibited with clarity, there is the ornament named poetic exemplar.

Objection: In passages like: “When Hari drops a rutting elephant with a single blow in anger, / how much hesitation is there in battles with deer?”, even in indirect commendation there is an exhibition of the reflection of an intended matter. / For instance, here Lord Rāma's effortless action in slaying Mārīca is exhibited as reflected in the lion cub embarking upon killing deer. / Hence, the contingency arises of being an exemplar here as well. / [Reply:] This is not so; / because the word ‘distinct’ was adopted for this very reason. / For here, since the original is inferred only from the reflection, there is no exhibition of a reflection of the intended matter in a distinct manner. / But where the intended matter is grasped by its own explicit mention and its reflection is exhibited, there exemplar-hood exists. / Hence there is no overextension. / Since such a form is possible even in simile and the like, to refute that it is said: “devoid of words such as ‘like’”. / By the mention of ‘and the like’ (ādi), common property is also comprehended here. / Its example:

“Moreover, what is the use of speaking much here? Go, obtain your husband; / failing to reach the ocean, do great rivers ever pause?”

Here, the attainment of the ocean by the great rivers is clearly composed as a reflection of the attainment of the husband by the goddess. / Therefore it is an exemplar.

Thus, these forty-one ornaments have been set forth by means of six sections comprising [respectively] an octad, a hexad, a triad, a heptad, an hendecad, and a hexad.

Objection: In a poem where there is the presence of an essence which delights the hearts of connoisseurs, is predominant, and has the sole nature of being cognized as untouched by the operation of its own explicit words, a poetic property named suggestion, which is the cause of revealing such an essence, which constitutes the very life of poetry, and whose nature is a variety of suggestiveness, has been stated by some connoisseurs. / Why is that not taught here? / It is replied: / Because of its inclusion within these very ornaments. / To explain: The entity whose nature is solely suggested has been declared by them to be of three kinds, through the division into mere fact, ornament, and aesthetic relish and the like. / Among these, mere fact is cognized as follows:

“He who, by the forceful command of the impact of his discus, / made the love-festival of Rāhu's wives—deprived of the untamed play of embracing—consist only of kissing.”

[End of verse]

For here, the action of making characterized as the instrument, whose object is the state of consisting only of kissing in the love-festival of Rāhu’s wives, and whose instrument is the forceful command of the impact of the discus, is denoted. / And that [action],

being of such a kind, because it is an effect and is unintelligible without a cause, implies a cause characterized as the decapitation of Rāhu which produces such unpleasantness—[a cause] not of the nature of an ornament, nor of the nature of aesthetic relish and the like, but rather of the nature of a mere fact. / Therefore, here there is the cognizedness of a mere fact of such a kind, untouched by the operation of the word; and since the poetic property known as suggesting that object has the nature of bringing about an understanding devoid of the operation of the expressed sense and the denoter, it touches upon the ornament of periphrasis. So it is said: / “Periphrasis is when by another…” and so forth.

Objection: By the word ‘periphrasis’, a suggested fact is denoted because it is stated by another manner; / and that which is suggested here

Because it is principal, it is proper to speak of it as the object to be ornamented, but not as the cause of ornamentation. Therefore, how can it be designated an ornament? To this it is replied: Even the principal element serves as a means of ornamenting qualities because it is the cause of their beauty. For in common worldly usage the designation is seen: "The servants are the masters' ornament." Therefore, here too, even though what is apprehended is principal, the designation "ornament" is not contradictory, because it most effectively accomplishes the beauty of the expressed sense which has become its subordinate quality. Or rather, in relation to the heroic relish that is understood as existing in Lord Vāsudeva, its ornamentation exists because it is subordinated in the primary sense. In this manner it should be applied to subsequent cases as well, as far as possible.

"The clouds are glossy, anointing the sky with dark luster, and the cranes flutter; / the breezes spray mist; sweet are the joyful cries of the clouds' friends. / Let them be, as they please! I am Rāma, with a thoroughly hardened heart, and I endure everything. / But how will Vaidehī fare? Alas, alas, my queen, be brave!"

In verses such as this as well, because the words like "Rāma" have an extraordinary nature, their suggested properties consisting purely of facts—such as the loss of the kingdom, living in the forest, the abduction of Sītā, the death of his father, and so forth, which are the sole causes of grief and accompany the word's own primary sense—cause the apprehension of that primary sense as transformed by them; because it is the cause of this [apprehension], it certainly shares in the ornament of periphrasis. For indeed there is no king's decree or statement of a sūtra-maker that periphrasis must not exist in a single word. A differentiated nature is established by connection with the definition. And here the definition of periphrasis is present, because there exists a mode that consists of apprehension devoid of the operation of the expressed and expressive senses. Therefore, why should it not be periphrasis? In this manner, elsewhere too, when a mere fact is apprehended, periphrasis is to be asserted. Therefore, when a mere fact is apprehended, the poetic property that is the cause of its manifestation is not a distinct entity called suggestion.