金剛般若疏 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.2 — 4 parts
3.4 — 5 parts

Regarding "Subhūti said to the Buddha, 'Could there be sentient beings...'": below this is the second section, which clarifies the meaning of faithful acceptance of prajñā. As for why faithful acceptance is explained: above, prajñā was explained as the teaching that is able to address [beings]; here, faithful acceptance is explained as the capacity that is addressed. This is precisely the correspondence between capacity and teaching. If the capacity were not the capacity for the teaching, this teaching would not correspond to the capacity; if the teaching were not the teaching for the capacity, this capacity would not receive the teaching. Because the capacity here is the capacity for the teaching, this capacity receives the teaching and gains benefit; because the teaching is the teaching for the capacity, it is not expounded in vain. For this reason, capacity and teaching correspond to each other. Furthermore, the Buddha expounds prajñā through various approaches; above, he has already finished expounding prajñā through the approach of cause and effect; now, he expounds prajñā through the approach of faithful acceptance. Because one completely awakens to non-reliance and non-attainment, it is called faithful acceptance. Expounding this faith of non-reliance and non-attainment is precisely expounding the meaning of prajñā. Within this approach, there are two parts of questions and answers: first is precisely Subhūti raising the question. The reason he asks: above, the clarification of the cause and the determination of the effect were already complete and exhaustive, and therefore he now asks about people who faithfully accept [it]. However, the cause is a cause of non-apprehension, and the effect is an effect of non-apprehension. The cause being a cause of non-apprehension means that although one practices the myriad practices, in truth there is nothing practiced; the effect being an effect of non-apprehension means that although one attains bodhi, in truth there is nothing attained. This matter is difficult to believe. If there were truly myriad practices to be practiced and truly a Buddha-effect to be attained, believing it would be easy; if there were truly no myriad practices to be practiced and truly no Buddha-effect to be attained, completely believing it would also be easy; if one were to say that the conventional truth inherently has cause and effect while the ultimate truth inherently lacks cause and effect, with existence and non-existence taking separate tracks, believing it would also be easy. Now, neither is the case: although one cultivates the myriad practices, one does not see a bodhisattva able to practice, nor does one see myriad practices that can be practiced; relying on nothing, one cultivates the myriad practices and delivers sentient beings. This matter is rare, and therefore difficult to believe. It is like planting a tree in empty space: not relying on the ground, yet through irrigation and cultivation it produces flowers and fruit. This matter is difficult; therefore, he now asks to clarify whether there are those who have faith. If one were to say that the Buddha's body is the same as that of the two vehicles, being a conditioned dharma of arising and ceasing, it would also be easy to believe; if one were to say that the Buddha's body is an eternally abiding dharma, solidly remaining in the final thought of the vajra[-samādhi], this would also be easy to believe; if one were to say that the response body is inherently impermanent while the dharmakāya is inherently permanent, this would also be easy to believe. Now it is made clear that although the Tathāgata arises, he is ultimately unarisen; although he ceases, he is ultimately unceasing. Although there is neither arising nor ceasing, through the skillful means of arising and ceasing he benefits sentient beings. This matter is rare, and therefore difficult to believe; hence he asks. Question: Does this ask about faith in the present, or does it ask about faith in the future? Answer: Sentient beings of the present have deep and thick merit and wisdom, being fully endowed with the "three abundances"; receiving the path at Jetavana, upon hearing they will certainly generate faith; therefore he does not ask about the present. But after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, in the final five hundred years entering the semblance Dharma, sentient beings at this time have meager merit and dull faculties; although they search the sūtra texts, they cannot penetrate and understand them, so upon hearing they do not generate faith. The Da zhidu lun, explaining the text of the chapter on faith and revilement, says: "Five hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, there will be five hundred sects all grasping the Buddha's words without knowing the Buddha's intention was for liberation; so hearing ultimate emptiness will be like a knife wounding their hearts." Hence we know that in the future those able to believe will be few; thus we know he asks about the future era. Furthermore, this adduces the existence of faith in the future to illustrate by comparison the present: the future is an evil age, where outwardly one does not encounter a Buddha and inwardly one has meager merit and dull faculties, yet they still believe in prajñā; how much more so should people of the present age not generate faith upon hearing it? From "The Buddha told Subhūti" below, this second chapter clarifies the Tathāgata's answer. In the text there are two parts: first, an answer refuting non-existence; second, an answer clarifying that there is faith. "Do not say such a thing" is precisely the answer refuting non-existence. [Meaning:] "Do not say that there are people of faithful acceptance only in the present, and say that [none] will give rise to faithful acceptance in the future;" hence he says, "Do not say such a thing." From "In the final five hundred years after the Tathāgata's passing" below, this is the second, an answer clarifying that there is faith. In the text there are broadly seven distinctions: first, clarifying the time of faith; second, clarifying the persons able to believe; third, clarifying the dharma that is believed; fourth, directly presenting the faithful mind; fifth, clarifying the source of faith; sixth, clarifying the benefit of faith; seventh, broadly explaining the meaning of faith. This is the first. Regarding the "final five hundred years": someone says, "The five hundred years of the correct Dharma are the initial five hundred; the next five hundred years of the semblance Dharma are the middle five hundred; the next five hundred years after the semblance Dharma are named the final five hundred. Now adducing the very last five hundred, this is the time when the semblance Dharma is about to perish and decay, yet there are still those who believe in prajñā; how much more so could the preceding two periods of five hundred years lack people of faith?" We say now that this is not so: regarding the "final five hundred years," it is as the Da zhidu lun explains: after the five hundred years. In the first five hundred years, those who attained the path were many and those who did not were few, hence it is called the correct Dharma. In the next five hundred years, those who attained the path were few and those who did not were many, hence it is called the semblance Dharma. When the correct Dharma has already perished and one subsequently enters the semblance Dharma, it is named the final five hundred years. Although here many do not believe, like the case of the five hundred sects, nevertheless there are still people of faithful acceptance; hence the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: "After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, this prajñāpāramitā will spread from the south to the north." Among them, the fourfold assembly must certainly have those who faithfully uphold and even make offerings to it. Another explanation says: One thousand years after the Buddha's passing, to sever doubts it is said: "Because the first five hundred years were the correct Dharma, upon hearing there was faith; because the final five hundred years are the semblance Dharma, upon hearing there is no faith." If that were so, in the final five hundred years no one would believe in prajñā; hence the Buddha now answers that in the final five hundred years there are also those who believe, and one should not say there are none who believe. At this time there are also those who faithfully uphold and even make offerings to it. From "there will be those who keep the precepts and cultivate merit" below, this is the second, clarifying that there are persons able to believe. Master Kumārajīva's translation of the sūtra clarifies only two kinds of persons: first, precept-keepers; second, merit-cultivators. Precept-keepers are mostly renunciant bodhisattvas; merit-cultivators are mostly lay bodhisattvas. The Da zhidu lun says: "For renunciant bodhisattvas, śīla is foremost; for lay bodhisattvas, dāna is foremost." Therefore, the present text clarifies only two persons. However, these two persons completely span both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. If they are the two persons of the Hīnayāna with apprehension, then they do not believe in prajñā; hence the text below says: "If they delight in inferior dharmas, they cannot listen to, accept, read, or recite this sūtra." If they are the two persons of the Mahāyāna who delight in non-apprehension, then they believe in this dharma; hence the text below says: "This sūtra is spoken for those of the Great Vehicle, spoken for those of the Supreme Vehicle." If it were the commentary's version of the sūtra, there would be three persons.

3.2.2

The treatise says: "Because it is not empty, it possesses reality; the bodhisattva is complete in the three virtues." The third is precisely a person of wisdom. The previous two persons are designated as possessing faith from hearing; as for the person of wisdom, this is faith through realization. Furthermore, because a person capable of faith is already an exceptional person, [the sūtra] cites the two kinds of goodness—cessation and practice—which are esteemed by ordinary sentiments, in order to praise and extol them so that [others] may accept it with faith. Upholding precepts is the goodness of cessation, and cultivating merit is the goodness of practice. These two encompass all goodness entirely, so that "none of the evils are committed, and all goods are put into practice"; therefore, it cites these two to encompass all people. Below "in these verses and phrases," the third part clarifies the Dharma that is believed, namely the aforementioned Dharma gate of cause and effect, which is designated as "verses and phrases." Below "can generate faith," this fourth part directly explains generating faith in the sūtra. "Regarding this as true" refers to the true faith of non-apprehension. If it is faith involving apprehension, although it differs from the unbelief of the Hīnayāna, if viewed from the perspective of faith of non-apprehension, it still constitutes non-faith. Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra contains a chapter on faith and slander; it intends to clarify that faith involving apprehension turns out to be slander. Now this is the correct faith in the dharmatā of non-apprehension, which is why it says "regarding this as true"; it also means believing that prajñā is the dharmatā of phenomena, and thus it is said to "regard this as true." Below "one should know that this person," this fifth part clarifies the origin of such faith. Why is it that, upon hearing the sūtra, they are definitely able to believe? It is precisely because they have planted causes and accumulated them for a long time that they are able to accept it with faith. Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "Only after having generated bodhicitta under as many Tathāgatas as the sands of the Hiraṇyavatī River can one then refrain from slandering this sūtra in an evil age." Here it is also like this: having long planted [causes] under the three [periods], they are able to believe without slandering. The text has two clauses: the preceding clause clarifies that they have not encountered merely a few Buddhas; below "because," the second clause clarifies that they have encountered many Buddhas. Below "hearing these verses and phrases, even giving rise to a single thought of pure faith," the sixth section clarifies the benefits gained through faith. In all, there are two benefits: first, externally, being known and seen by all Buddhas; second, internally, attaining boundless merit. Now, the benefit of faith in prajñā is difficult to measure; here, citing faith for a single thought still attains boundless merit, so faith from beginning to end is all the more difficult to describe. The Tathāgata possesses distant perception, knowing both faith and slander; yet the reason he single-mindedly cites people of faith here roughly has three meanings: First, this sūtra is the mother of all Buddhas and is protected by the Buddhas; therefore, if one generates aspiration toward it, one is recorded by the Buddha. Hence the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "The Buddha constantly observes this sūtra scroll with the Buddha eye, and if someone receives and upholds it, they are protected and kept in mind by the Buddha." To be acknowledged and recorded by the Tathāgata—leaving aside the worldly realm where one would already rejoice at being recognized and befriended by a heavenly king or noble personage—how much more so to be intimately cherished by the Tathāgata! Second, this merit is equal to empty space; how could those of lower bhūmis know it? Only the Buddha fully plumbs its limits and depths. Third, the Buddha has no deceitful words, and his words are certainly trustworthy; now, clarifying that faith yields abundant merit, that merit is certainly known to be vast. Question: For what reason is it called "knowing and seeing"? Answer: The treatise says: "The Tathāgata knows through the power of the cognition of vows, not through inferential cognition. It is seen by the Buddha eye, not by the fleshy eye." Furthermore, the Buddha knows that this person is practicing the cause of bodhi, and sees that this person will attain the fruit of bodhi; thus it is called "knowing and seeing." Below "Why is this?", this is the seventh part, an extensive explanation of the meaning of pure faith. If following the treatise master's explanation, what came before broadly clarified the faith of the three kinds of persons, whereas this specifically explains the faith of the third, the person of wisdom. Now it is clarified that these words broadly connect to the preceding explanation that one who has faith attains boundless virtue and merit; here it explains the reason why it is boundless, which is precisely because having attained faith in non-arising, one's merit is boundless. Yet faith in non-arising itself comprises two kinds: first, faith from hearing; second, faith through realization. Within this explanation, there are three parts. Why are there broadly three divisions? First, clarifying attainment; second, clarifying loss; third, exhorting to abandon loss and follow attainment. This is the first. It naturally has two clauses: the first clause clarifies the emptiness of sentient beings, and the next clause clarifies the emptiness of all dharmas. Why are these two emptinesses clarified to explain the meaning of faith? The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Knowing that sentient beings and dharmas do not arise is called the forbearance of the non-arising of dharmas." Although one liberates sentient beings, sentient beings are ultimately unapprehendable, which is the absence of sentient beings. Although one practices the myriad practices, all dharmas are ultimately unapprehendable; this is the forbearance of the non-arising of dharmas. Therefore, it now explains these two emptinesses as the pure faith of non-arising. Furthermore, because of the emptiness of sentient beings, there is no affliction of result; because of the emptiness of all dharmas, there is no affliction of cause. Why is this? Because phenomena assemble to constitute the person. Dharmas are the cause and the person is the result; when the two afflictions of cause and result are both abandoned, one's merit is boundless. Furthermore, because of the absence of a view of a person, one transcends the bhūmi of ordinary people. Ordinary people cling to a self and do not know non-self; now, explaining non-self, one departs from the bhūmi of ordinary people. Furthermore, because of knowing the emptiness of dharmas, one departs from the bhūmi of the two vehicles. Persons of the two vehicles only attain the non-self of persons, and do not attain the non-self of dharmas. Furthermore, through the absence of a person, one is freed from the affliction obstacle; through the absence of dharmas, one is freed from the cognitive obstacle. Transcending the ordinary and surpassing the noble, both obstacles are completely exhausted; therefore, one's merit is boundless. In departing from the view of a person, there are fully sixteen absences; here, for brevity, it merely mentions the absence of four. Generating the thought of "self" and "mine" within the five aggregates is called "self." Existing continuously without break or severance in the world is called "sentient being." Conceiving that there is a continuous single faculty of life, still having a self, is called "living soul," and also called "person." Non-Buddhists conceive that there is a spiritual self that dies here and is born there, wandering through the six destinies; thus it is called "life-span." "No lakṣaṇa of dharmas and no lakṣaṇa of non-dharmas": the second clause clarifies the emptiness of dharmas. Although one does not see a self, one still sees the dharmas of the five aggregates; thus it now clarifies that there is also no lakṣaṇa of dharmas. Since the dharmas of the five aggregates are absent, the fundamental absence of the five aggregates is called "non-dharma"; the illness of emptiness is also empty, hence it says "no lakṣaṇa of non-dharmas." This should correspond to the three stages in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: first, not seeing a self is the emptiness of sentient beings; next, not seeing dharmas is called the emptiness of dharmas; not seeing non-dharmas is also called the illness of emptiness being empty. Why are these three emptinesses clarified? The view of self is the root of all fetters, which is why it clarifies the view of self. Next, the view of existence and the view of non-existence are again the roots of annihilation and eternity, which deeply diverge from the Way; hence it clarifies the view of existence and non-existence. Some say: cultivating goodness and departing from evil takes goodness as dharma and evil as non-dharma. Others say: expelling existence by means of emptiness takes emptiness as dharma and existence as non-dharma.

3.2.3

If one relies on the treatise and the [translated] sūtra, within the emptiness of persons there are four propositions, and within the emptiness of dharmas there are also four propositions. Therefore the treatise verse says, 'Relying on the distinction of eight and eight meanings.' The eight and eight meanings mean that four regarding persons and four regarding dharmas are called one eight, and refuting the four regarding persons and refuting the four regarding dharmas—not [falling into] these eight illnesses—constitute another eight; hence it says 'eight and eight.' The four regarding dharmas are: first, the lakṣaṇa of dharmas; second, the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas; third, lakṣaṇa; fourth, non-lakṣaṇa. These four are illnesses. Question: When non-Buddhists impute a self, that may well be an illness, but now when we see dharmas arising as existing and ceasing as non-existing, why is that called an illness? Answer: One who asks this question has not yet read the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises. Refuting the first proposition, the lakṣaṇa of dharmas, by speaking of the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas [means that] dharmas such as the aggregates, realms, and sense fields are unobtainable; therefore it says there is no lakṣaṇa of dharmas. Refuting the second proposition by speaking of not having no lakṣaṇa of dharmas [is because] confused people, hearing that the aggregates, sense fields, and realms are deceptive and therefore empty, then claim that the dharmatā of all dharmas is also empty. As the Great Sūtra [Nirvāṇa Sūtra] says, 'Having heard that saṃsāra is deceptive, they claim that nirvāṇa is also deceptive.' To refute this clinging [it teaches that] saṃsāra is inherently deceptive and empty, while dharmatā-nirvāṇa is not empty; hence it says, 'What is empty is the twenty-five states of existence; what is not empty is Mahāparinirvāṇa.' Refuting the third proposition by speaking of marklessness [is because] confused people say: if the dharmatā of nirvāṇa cannot be empty, it must be the same as existence; if it cannot be existent, it must be empty. Therefore it now says that nirvāṇa cannot be said to still be a mark of existence or non-existence. That the dharmatā of nirvāṇa cannot be spoken of as a mark of existence or non-existence refutes the fourth proposition. Confused people, having heard that dharmatā cannot be existent or non-existent, [think that] it should be inexpressible. Therefore it now explains that although it transcends existence and non-existence, for the sake of sentient beings, through non-speaking it is spoken. How could it be said to be inexpressible? It is only that the older translation's text is concise, merely saying 'neither non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas.' Below '[What is the reason? ] If the mind grasps lakṣaṇas', this is the second [section], explaining the fault in contrast to attainment, which is also adducing the fault to reveal the attainment. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining the imputation of persons as a fault; next, explaining the imputation of dharmas as a fault. The present fault is the first. If the mind grasps lakṣaṇas, it grasps the lakṣaṇas of sentient beings, which is the same as non-Buddhists imputing an ātman or person; therefore it is a fault. Below 'If it grasps the lakṣaṇas of dharmas', this second [part] explains that imputing dharmas is a fault. Within this there are two parts: first, explaining that viewing dharmas is a fault; next, explaining that viewing non-dharmas is a fault. Question: If imputing dharmas is a fault, one should say that one is attached to the lakṣaṇas of dharmas; for what reason does imputing dharmas as a fault mean being attached to the lakṣaṇa of an ātman? Answer: In principle, it should indeed be so: imputing persons leads to attachment to persons, and imputing dharmas leads to attachment to dharmas. Now, in order to reveal the gravity of this fault and affliction, one who imputes dharmas not only gives rise to views of dharmas, but also reverts to giving rise to views of an ātman, because dharmas are the causal condition for an ātman. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says, 'When charcoal and ashes are not extinguished, the conception of a tree arises again.' Furthermore, the Sarvāstivādins [hold that] grasping all existent marks is not an illness, but grasping the mark of an ātman is an illness. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra says, 'Having the two truths is not an illness; grasping an ātman or person is the only illness.' Now it is clarified that this is not so: as long as one gives rise to a thought or stirs the mind, the fault is the same as [grasping] an ātman or person. Why is this? Below 'If it grasps the non-lakṣaṇa of dharmas', this second [part] explains that attachment to non-dharmas is also a fault. Having heard that imputing dharmas is a fault, some people then suppose that non-existence of dharmas is attainment. Therefore it now says that if one imputes non-dharmas, this is also a fault. Why is this? Imputing non-dharmas inevitably gives rise to views of dharmas; if there are views of dharmas, then there are views of an ātman. Moreover, if there were no ātman, there would be nothing imputed; because there is something imputed, one knows there is an ātman. Therefore, imputing non-dharmas also entails attachment to an ātman. Below 'Therefore one should not grasp non-dharmas', this third section exhorts relinquishing faults and following attainment. This text has two parts: first, directly exhorting the relinquishing of faults; second, adducing proof. This is the first, exhorting the relinquishing of faults. Since dharmas and non-dharmas must themselves be relinquished, how could views of ātman and person not be relinquished? Therefore, bringing up dharmas to illustrate persons, it only exhorts the relinquishing of dharmas and does not exhort the relinquishing of persons. By this meaning, below 'The Tathāgata constantly teaches', the second part adduces proof. In the Āgama sūtras, the Buddha spoke the raft parable for the monks: for example, a person pursued by bandits takes grass to make a raft to cross over to the other shore. Having reached the other shore, he then abandons the raft. Initially he takes the raft to cross the river; having reached the other shore, both the river and the raft are abandoned. The meaning of the parable is that initially one abandons evil through good, and later both good and evil are doubly abandoned. Initially one abandons persons through dharmas and abandons existence through emptiness; next, persons and dharmas are both eliminated, and emptiness and existence are both doubly purified. Saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, and the ten thousand goods are all like this. If one relies on the treatise and the [translated] sūtra, the general idea is roughly the same, though the text differs slightly; the treatise sūtra also has three 'What is the reason?', which agrees in meaning with the older sūtra. The third 'What is the reason?' says 'one should neither grasp dharmas nor not grasp dharmas'; this clarifies the meaning of principle and teaching. Because realizing principle means forgetting the teaching, and seeing the moon means relinquishing the finger, it says 'one should not grasp dharmas.' Yet, relying on teaching to awaken to principle, and by means of the finger seeing the moon, it says 'nor not grasp dharmas.' Just as upon reaching the shore one abandons the raft, 'one should not grasp.' Because the raft was for crossing the river, 'one does not not grasp the raft.' Question: The raft parable is from a Hīnayāna sūtra; how can it serve as proof for the Mahāyāna? Answer: The raft in the lesser [vehicle] is called lesser; in the great [vehicle] it is called great. Furthermore, it adduces the lesser to illustrate the greater: if in the Hīnayāna Dharma both are already explained as abandoned, how much more so in the Mahāyāna? Just as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā quotes the Kātyāyanāvavāda, where even Hīnayāna abandons existence and non-existence, how much more so the Mahāyāna? 'Dharmas should still be relinquished, how much more so non-dharmas': it clarifies that existence is what ordinary feelings settle into, yet it still must be relinquished; non-existence is not what the six senses confront, so how could one cling to it? Below 'Subhūti! What do you think?', this text appears for two reasons: first, it appears to verify faith. Above, faith without reliance and without apprehension was explained, up to relinquishing both dharmas and non-dharmas; now it clarifies that all āryas and sages make this same awakening, so one knows that this Dharma can be believed and accepted. Second, it appears in order to resolve doubts according to the treatise. The treatise master, up to this section, resolves three doubts in total: first, adducing that the dharmakāya is not conditioned to resolve the doubt of examining the cause through the fruit; next, the section on those with faith doubly resolves doubts regarding cause and fruit, which assumed that when the Dharma approach of cause and fruit is taught, no one would believe—the above explanation that there are those with faith resolves this doubt. Now, this section of the sūtra resolves examining the fruit through the fruit; the doubt [related to] the previous section that the dharmakāya is not conditioned stated that the lakṣaṇas of arising, abiding, and ceasing are not the unconditioned dharmakāya, and therefore one cannot see the Tathāgata's dharmakāya by means of these three lakṣaṇas.

3.2.4

The doubter says: "If one says that the three lakṣaṇas are not the Buddha, then Śākyamuni would also not have attained bodhi and would not expound the Dharma for beings; yet now, beneath the king of trees, Śākyamuni truly realized bodhi, went to Mṛgadāva, and expounded the Dharma for beings. If that is so, then his birth in the royal palace would be real, and his extinction between the twin trees would be real, and one should not say that the three lakṣaṇas are not the Buddha." Now, this doubt is refuted directly. In the text there are two parts: first, the Buddha raises the doubts of the assembly to question Subhūti; second, Subhūti respectfully replies to refute the assembly's doubts. Now this is the first: the Buddha's question. "What do you think?" and so forth: Do you say that the Buddha truly attained bodhi beneath the king of trees? That he dwelt in the world for fifty years and truly expounded the Dharma for [beings]? In Subhūti's reply there are broadly two distinctions: first, he directly refutes the doubt concerning real realization and real exposition; second, he further refutes another doubt. This is the first. Subhūti says: There is no real attainment of bodhi, and there is no real exposition of the Dharma. The verse of the treatise says: "The nirmāṇa is not the true Buddha, nor is it the expounder of the Dharma." This explains that there are three kinds of Buddhas: first, the dharmakāya Buddha, which takes the correct Dharma as its body; second, the saṃbhogakāya Buddha, which is the arising of the fruit in recompense for the cause when the cultivation of causes is complete, hence called the recompense Buddha; third, the nirmāṇakāya Buddha. Now, in saying that there is no real realization and no real exposition, Śākyamuni is precisely the nirmāṇakāya Buddha, not the true Buddha; that is, his realization was a manifested realization and his exposition was a manifested exposition, not a real realization and not a real exposition. By analogy with what preceded, Śākyamuni's birth was an apparition birth and his extinction was an apparition extinction, not a real birth and real extinction. Therefore, the Tathāgata's body is unconditioned. Thus it says: "There is no fixed dharma called bodhi, nor is there any fixed dharma that the Tathāgata can expound." "Why? The Dharma expounded by the Tathāgata..." and so forth: below this is the second, refuting the doubt concerning no exposition. When deluded people hear above that Śākyamuni is a nirmāṇakāya Buddha without real realization and without real exposition, they then claim that there is no manifested exposition and no manifested realization. Therefore it is now clarified that although there is no real realization, there is manifested realization; although there is no real exposition, there is manifested exposition. Thus "the Dharma expounded by the Tathāgata" means the manifested exposition. The preceding refuted the doubt concerning real exposition; this now refutes the doubt concerning the absence of manifested exposition. "Cannot be grasped and cannot be expounded": this phrase further refutes a doubt. When deluded people hear that there is a manifested exposition, they then claim that there is a dharma that can be expounded; if the Buddha has an exposition, then the listener must have a grasping. Because there is an exposition, language is uninterrupted; because the listener has a grasping, mental activities are not extinguished. Now, because language is extinguished, it cannot be expounded; because mental activities are extinguished, it cannot be grasped. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The prajñāpāramitā is the true dharma, non-perverted; when the contemplation of conceptual marks is eliminated, the dharma of language is also extinguished." This is precisely the meaning. "Is neither dharma nor non-dharma": this phrase establishes the meaning above of being ungraspable and unexpoundable. The dharmatā of all dharmas is neither existent nor non-existent: because it is not existent, it is not a dharma; because it is not non-existent, it is not a non-dharma. Since it is apart from both existence and non-existence, how could it be expounded? Since it is apart from both existence and non-existence, how could it be grasped? This is just as explained in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa and the Kāruṇikarājā: the one who expounds the Dharma neither speaks nor demonstrates; the listener neither hears nor attains. "All noble ones and sages are distinguished by the unconditioned dharma": the reason this statement appears is to establish the preceding meaning of neither dharma nor non-dharma, neither existence nor non-existence. Because all noble ones and sages personally realize the unconditioned, and the unconditioned has neither existence nor non-existence, one must therefore know that the dharmatā of all dharmas is neither existent nor non-existent—how could it be grasped or expounded? The treatise says: "The reason why the Buddha can expound the unconditioned dharma of dharmatā is solely because he has personally realized the unconditioned dharma." Therefore, the unconditioned is the cause of exposition. Furthermore, what all the sages have realized cannot even be expounded—how could the listener grasp it? Here, not only is the Buddha mentioned, but the many sages are also broadly cited, because the intent is to verify that all noble ones and sages equally realize this Dharma, so one must know that this Dharma can definitely be accepted in faith. Question: Why does it say that all noble ones and sages are distinguished by the unconditioned? Answer: This is again to resolve a doubt. Since it is said that they equally realize the unconditioned, then the sages would have no difference, and there would be no stages of the ten bhūmis or degrees of depth among the four fruits. Therefore it is now clarified that although they equally realize the unconditioned, what they realize is not the same; thus there are differences among the three classes of sages. The three birds escaping the net and the three beasts crossing the river—where soaring into the sky has near and far, and wading the water has shallow and deep—are precisely instances of this. Question: The three Buddhas are an explanation of the Dilun masters; why do you now use this doctrine? Answer: One who asks this does not have a comprehensive perspective. Now, as one master explains, not a single hair can be apprehended, and all are meanings, just as the Viśeṣacintābrahmaparipṛcchā says: "All dharmas are correct, all dharmas are erroneous." If one has a mind of apprehension, not only are three Buddhas unattainable, but even one Buddha or two Buddhas are entirely prapañca. If, with a mind of realization free from apprehension, one speaks in accordance with conditions of one Buddha, two Buddhas, three Buddhas, ten Buddhas, up to immeasurable Buddhas, all are completely unimpeded. Why rigidly hold to two bodies and doubt three Buddhas? Question: Why must three Buddhas be posited? Answer: Essentially, the meaning has three aspects: because there is the dharma Buddha, there is the recompense Buddha; because there is the recompense Buddha, there is the manifested Buddha. The dharma Buddha is the Buddha-nature; relying necessarily on the Buddha-nature, the cultivation of causes is fulfilled, bringing about the recompense body. These two are personal virtues; then, transforming sentient beings is the virtue of transforming others, so there is the manifested Buddha.

3.3

From "Subhūti, what do you think? If a person filled three thousand great thousandfold worlds with the seven jewels and gave them as dāna" downward: this is the third [section], the portal of comparing measures to demonstrate superiority, praising and extolling, and exhorting practice. If distinguished in terms of merit and wisdom: previously prajñā was explained from the approach of wisdom; now prajñā is explained from the approach of virtue. Prajñā itself has never been either merit or wisdom, yet for the sake of sentient beings it is explained under the names of merit and wisdom. Furthermore, previously prajñā was explained in terms of non-reliance and non-attainment; now prajñā is explained in terms of praise and extolment. Furthermore, previously the essence of prajñā was clarified; now the function of prajñā is clarified, because its ability to generate boundless virtue when accepted and upheld is precisely its function. Within this approach it opens into three distinctions: first, adducing external dāna to compare measures; second, adducing internal dāna to compare measures; third, adducing Śākyamuni's past causes to compare measures. Within adducing external dāna to compare measures, it further opens into two: first, directly adducing external dāna to compare measures; second, explaining the intent of the superiority and inferiority of the compared measures. Within directly comparing measures, it again opens into two: first, directly adducing two kinds of material dāna to compare measures and extol; second, distinguishing the title of the sūtra. In the first, it also opens into two: first, directly adducing two kinds of dāna to compare measures against accepting and upholding a single four-line verse of prajñā; second, praising and extolling prajñā as honored in every place and revered in every person. Within the first, adducing two kinds of dāna to compare measures against a four-line verse, it opens into two distinctions: first, adducing dāna of the seven jewels filling three thousand worlds to compare measures against a four-line verse; second, adducing dāna of the seven jewels filling worlds as many as the sands of the Ganges to compare measures against a four-line verse. In the first chapter it again opens into two distinctions: first, directly adducing material dāna to compare measures; second, explaining the meaning of the comparison of measures. Now it is the first. Question: For what reason does this text follow? Answer: The intent of this text's coming has both distant and proximate [reasons]. What is called distant is like the several meanings just mentioned. What is called proximate is that the commentary's sequential arising states: "If the dharmatā of all phenomena cannot be grasped or spoken of, while letters can be grasped and spoken of, then accepting and upholding [them] should be without virtue." To resolve this doubt, it clarifies that although letters can be grasped and spoken of, through these letters one comes to awaken to prajñā; this is awakening to the unspoken by means of what is spoken. Therefore the merit of one who accepts and upholds it is boundless; hence the comparison of measures. The text divides into two: first, directly adducing material dāna; second, comparing measures against prajñā. Within adducing material dāna, it naturally opens into two: first, the Buddha's question; second, Subhūti's answer. [The answer] opens into two distinctions: first, directly answering; next, discerning in the answer. The direct answer is as in the text. Aniruddha gave a single meal in dāna and constantly enjoyed peace and happiness for ninety-one kalpas; how much more so when dāna is made with the wondrous jewels of a great thousandfold [world]—how could its merit not be abundant? Question: Is there really [anyone who] gives the wondrous jewels of a great thousandfold [world] in dāna, or not? Answer: One may say it is real, and one may also say it is a hypothetical statement. Speaking of it as real: a wheel-turning sage king presides over the four continents and is able to make dāna with the wondrous jewels filling the four continents; the Great Brahmā King rules over the great thousandfold world and is able to make dāna with the wondrous jewels of the great thousandfold [world]; thus we know it can be real. Speaking of it as a hypothesis: if there is no such occurrence, speaking hypothetically as if it existed, it still does not equal accepting and upholding prajñā. Because the Buddha wishes to lead people to revere prajñā, even though there is no such occurrence, he explains it hypothetically. "Why is this? This merit is not merit": from this downward is the second, discerning in the answer. Some say: merit is worldly truth, and "not merit" is ultimate truth; clarifying that this merit is illusory and false, which is identical to the real; "is called merit that is abundant" means that it is called abundant because of worldly truth. All dharmas do not go beyond the two truths, so it is clarified in terms of the two truths. We now consider that this explanation seems to lack sequence; here it is an explanation of the meaning of merit being abundant—for what reason would it clarify the two truths? Others say: this is merit, not merit; the non-merit merit is the merit of prajñā. However, within prajñā there are material dāna and Dharma dāna. In prajñā, material dāna and Dharma dāna in reality have no superiority or inferiority; but the person who receives material dāna enjoys wealth and happiness for a single lifetime, yet cannot eradicate the suffering of the bad destinies in the future; the person who receives Dharma dāna is able to eradicate the retribution of the three bad destinies, and in the future be born in good families among gods and humans, even attaining Buddhahood. Therefore material dāna does not equal Dharma dāna. We now consider that regarding the recipient, it is indeed so, but here the measure is compared regarding the person who is capable of giving, not compared regarding the recipient; hence it is not the same as this explanation. It is simply that the dānas are different: material dāna with apprehension does not equal Dharma dāna with non-apprehension; this is a mutual contrast. There is naturally material dāna with non-apprehension that surpasses Dharma dāna with apprehension, and there are naturally material and Dharma [dāna] with non-apprehension that surpass material and Dharma [dāna] with apprehension. Question: What about material dāna with non-apprehension? The same question is asked regarding Dharma dāna with non-apprehension and material dāna with apprehension. Answer: When matter and Dharma are non-dual, then material dāna with non-apprehension and Dharma dāna with non-apprehension have no superiority or inferiority; yet within the meaning of superiority and inferiority without superiority or inferiority, Dharma dāna is superior and material dāna is inferior. Dharma dāna with apprehension also surpasses material dāna with apprehension; such is the general standard. Now, relying on the commentary's explanation, the commentary states: "Merit does not tend toward bodhi." This distinguishes that although the merit of dāna is abundant, it is defiled merit. "That is, not merit" means it is not undefiled merit of non-apprehension. "Is called merit": the commentary's sūtra text repeats the words "merit, merit." The intention is briefly to distinguish that merit generally has two kinds: first, defiled merit; second, undefiled merit. Therefore it repeats the words "merit, merit." Question: Subhūti should only have answered the Buddha by clarifying that the merit of dāna is abundant; for what reason does he suddenly distinguish merit between defiled and undefiled? Answer: Subhūti understood the Buddha's intent: the Buddha's intent was to clarify that although the merit of dāna is abundant, it is defiled; therefore he answered the Buddha, "According to what I understand, when the merit of dāna is abundant, this is only that defiled merit is abundant, not undefiled." From "The Buddha said" downward: second, directly adducing material dāna to compare measures against Dharma dāna. Within this there are two: first, clarifying that upholding the sūtra surpasses dāna; second, explaining why it is superior. Now it is the first. Question: What is called a four-line verse? Some say: the two four-line verses later in this sūtra are precisely this matter. We now consider that this person grasps the words of the sūtra but does not grasp the intent of the sūtra. If one takes the later verses as the four-line verses, then from the beginning of the sūtra up to here would not be verses, and those who accept and uphold it would have no merit. Moreover, when the Buddha spoke the sūtra, by this point the later two verses did not yet exist; how could he retroactively compare measures? Some say: the essential four-line verses of all Mahāyāna sūtras, like the four lines of the Snowy Mountains and so on, are precisely this matter. This is also not so. Here we are directly discussing prajñā, not involving other sūtras. Some say: whatever speech accomplishes a single meaning is a verse; hence a verse (gāthā) is called "exhausting the meaning," taking the exhaustion [of meaning] to be called a verse. We now consider that this also is not so. The sūtra specifically clarifies a four-line verse; now to say that its meaning is exhausted, why must it strictly be four lines? A single line naturally can also exhaust the meaning. If it is a distinct verse (gāthā), then the lines are fixed and the syllables are unfixed; if it is a general verse, then the syllables are fixed and the lines are unfixed. As for distinct verses having fixed lines and unfixed syllables: they must require four lines, hence the lines are fixed, while having five syllables, four, seven, six, and so forth, hence the syllables are unfixed. As for general verses having fixed syllables: they must fulfill thirty-two syllables. Their lines being unfixed means that thirty-two syllables may be unfixed as one, three, or four lines. Now, since it says "four lines," it is a distinct verse; how could one explain it with the general? Some say: thirty-two syllables are called a verse (śloka). This is also not so; that is merely the method of counting sūtras in foreign countries, not concerning a four-line verse. Some say: whatever in sūtras and treatises can reveal the Way is all called a verse. This is also not so. Now it strictly says "a four-line verse"; how could one broadly take words that reveal the Way? Why must revealing the Way be four lines? Some say: the four lines of nominal designation, such as a single nominal existence being neither definitively existent nor definitively non-existent, neither both existent and non-existent nor neither existent nor non-existent; one may also say that nominal existence is precisely non-existence, up to nominal existence having never been existent or non-existent; hence these four lines of nominal designation are called a verse. We now consider that previously there was no such explanation either; this is merely a broad-ranging discourse. Some say: the previous "cannot be grasped and cannot be spoken, neither dharma nor non-dharma" is a single four-line verse. We now consider this also is not so. If only this were the verse, the rest would not be verses. Some say: the previous answer to Subhūti's four-line question is the four-line verse. This is also not so. The previous was an answer to four lines; what does it have to do with a verse? Now in conventional usage four lines are taken as one verse, and the Buddha, following conventional usage, also took four lines as one verse, clarifying that this is merely a statement adducing the lesser to illustrate the greater. Since a single four-line [verse] is the very least in words, if one can accept and uphold a single four-line [verse], its merit is boundless; how much more so a passage, a chapter, a fascicle, or the whole work? Therefore one must grasp the intent of the sūtra and not cling to the words. From "Why is this?" downward: this is the second, explaining why it is superior. The supreme person and the ultimate dharma are born from this sūtra; therefore when upholding the sūtra, its merit is superior. The commentary states: "Two are able to tend toward bodhi," which are accepting and upholding the four lines and expounding the four lines. As for "the so-called Buddha-dharmas are not Buddha-dharmas": some say that this dispels attachment; having just clarified the person and dharma of generating the ultimate fruition, fearing that beings would cling, it must be dispelled as empty. We now consider this is not so. Previously, when clarifying "is not merit," one should also have feared generating attachment in beings, and so it had to be dispelled. Some say: "Buddha-dharmas are not Buddha-dharmas" is of the type of middle and nominal designation. This is also not so; it is feared to be like a jade cup without a base. Now, relying on the commentary's explanation, it establishes the meaning above of the abundance of merit from upholding the sūtra. The verse says: "Only the Buddha-dharmas alone / Have merit that accomplishes the supreme essence." What are called Buddha-dharmas are the dharmas of unexcelled bodhi belonging only to the Buddha. "That is, not Buddha-dharmas" means that aside from the Buddha, the two vehicles and bodhisattvas do not possess this dharma; hence it says "that is, not Buddha-dharmas." Because the Buddha alone possesses it, this dharma is supreme. Now the merit of upholding the sūtra can generate the supreme dharma; therefore the merit of upholding the sūtra is the most superior.

3.4.1

From “Subhūti, what do you think? Can a srotāpanna think like this?” onward, this is the second [section]: explaining the meaning of the comparative appraisal. Within this section, there are two major divisions: first, adducing the causes and fruits of the Hīnayāna to explain the meaning of the comparative appraisal; second, adducing the causes and fruits of the Mahāyāna to explain the meaning of the comparative appraisal. In each of these two sections, there are two divisions. The two in the first section are: first, adducing the causes of the Hīnayāna to establish the meaning of the comparative appraisal; second, adducing the fruits of the Hīnayāna to establish the meaning of the comparative appraisal. Here is the first.

Question: Why are the meanings of the Great and Small Vehicles adduced to establish the comparative appraisal?
Answer: The preceding section stated: what the Tathāgata has spoken cannot be grasped and cannot be spoken, up to all worthy and noble ones being differentiated through their awakening to the unconditioned dharmatā. Now, the import of these words is to illuminate the meaning of awakening to the dharmatā as non-reliance and non-apprehension; because of awakening to non-reliance and non-apprehension, there necessarily are the differences among the worthy and noble ones of the Great and Small Vehicles. The doubter says: If dharmas cannot be grasped, cannot be spoken, and are non-reliance and non-apprehension, how is it that the Hīnayāna obtains the four fruits and the Mahāyāna realizes and attains buddhahood? Since both the Great and Small Vehicles involve realization and attainment, one knows it is not non-reliance and non-apprehension; since both the Great and Small Vehicles are said to have realization and attainment, one knows it is not the meaning of being unspeakable. Now, in order to resolve this doubt, it is clarified that although the Great and Small Vehicles have realization and attainment, in reality there is nothing attained; although there is something spoken, in reality there is nothing spoken. Therefore, one should know that it is without grasping and without speaking, without reliance and without apprehension. Hence, the Great and Small Vehicles are adduced to explain the aforementioned [teachings] of being ungraspable and unspeakable, up to all being differentiated through the unconditioned dharma.

Question: How does this establish the comparative appraisal above?
Answer: If dharmas were graspable, speakable, reliant, and apprehended, then accepting and upholding them would have no merit; it is precisely because prajñā is without grasping and without speaking that, when one accepts and upholds it, its blessings are boundless.

Question: The text below in this sūtra says, “[This sūtra] is spoken for those of the Great Vehicle; if one delights in inferior teachings, one cannot hear and accept it.” The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: “Prajñā is the teaching of bodhisattvas; it does not belong to the two vehicles.” Why now do you cite the Hīnayāna to corroborate and establish this?
Answer: This is adducing the lesser to illustrate the greater, clarifying that if even practitioners of the Hīnayāna awaken to non-reliance, non-apprehension, non-grasping, and non-speaking, how could bodhisattvas not have faith in the teaching of non-apprehension? Just as the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra cites Śreṇika as proof: when listeners heard that all dharmas are ultimately empty, they did not believe or accept it; thus it cited Śreṇika, a person of the Hīnayāna, who still had faith in the emptiness of dharmas—how could practitioners of the Mahāyāna now, in the teaching of signlessness, not have faith in emptiness? Furthermore, what is present here are the three vehicles of non-apprehension, which are the skillful means and function of prajñā; these are the great and the small, not the small of apprehension. Furthermore, [the Buddha] wishes to guide those who study the Hīnayāna to enter the Great Teaching; even if one wishes to practice the Hīnayāna, one must also study this teaching. As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: “Devaputras! If you wish to abide in the fruit of a srotāpanna, you must also not depart from this forbearance.”

Question: If so, then this teaching is common to the three vehicles?
Answer: Just as there are three grades of those who contemplate the middle way: through contemplation with inferior wisdom, one attains śrāvaka bodhi; through contemplation with middling wisdom, one attains pratyekabuddha bodhi; through contemplation with superior wisdom, one attains buddha bodhi.

Question: Why are four fruits established in the śrāvaka teaching, while ten bhūmis are opened in the bodhisattva teaching?
The master said: One must now open this path, as this path has long been blocked. Now we clarify that unimpeded and universal adaptability fully captures the skillful means of the sage: wishing to rescue and guide sentient beings, the Great and Small are opened according to their faculties and dispositions. However, when speaking ultimately of the gate of the Path, it has never been great or small; that it is now made into great and small is entirely an expedient of opening the great and the small in response to faculties and conditions. Yet the difference between the great and the small is due to there being both common and distinct aspects. If discussed generally, both the great and the small can be called bhūmis, and both the great and the small can be called fruits. Thus, in the ten bhūmis shared by the three vehicles, the bhūmi of the eight people and the bhūmi of seeing are the fruit of a srotāpanna; the bhūmi of attenuation is the fruit of a sakṛdāgāmin; the bhūmi of freedom from desire is the fruit of an anāgāmin; the bhūmi of what has been accomplished is the fruit of an arhat; and in the bodhisattva teaching, the bhūmi of what has been accomplished belongs to the buddha bhūmi. From this, one knows that both the great and the small can be called bhūmis. And that both the great and the small are called fruits: since the Hīnayāna is called the four fruits, the bodhisattva's ten bhūmis are also called the ten fruits; hence the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says, “Dharmas with existence are the bodhisattva's path; dharmas without existence are the bodhisattva's fruit.”

If discussed according to their distinctions, the opening of the great and the small differs: their fruits and bhūmis are distinct; the Hīnayāna is termed cause and fruit, whereas the bodhisattva is termed the ten bhūmis. The reason the bodhisattva is termed 'bhūmi' (ground) is that it supremely upholds and is vast and universal, able to give birth and bring to completion; because it possesses these numerous meanings, it is given the name 'bhūmi'. The śrāvaka lacks these various meanings, hence it is not called a bhūmi. The person of the śrāvaka reviles old age, sickness, and death, and wishes to enter the remainderless [nirvāṇa], hence they sever and eliminate afflictions; frequently realizing rest and respite to fulfill the longing of their heart, they are given the designation 'fruit'. The bodhisattva does not have these matters, hence it is not called a fruit. Yet there is also the sense of their mutual application, and the matter is always universally applicable. How is this known? For instance, all three kinds are vehicles, all three kinds are paths, all three kinds are bhūmis, and all three kinds are noble ones; so how could 'bhūmi' not be universally applicable? Thus one knows that one meaning is merely cited according to context.

Question: According to the Hīnayāna doctrine, afflictions are only explained as [severed by] seeing the truths and [severed by] cultivation. Since the initial fruit is established upon severing the afflictions of seeing the truths in the three realms, severing the afflictions of cultivation should likewise establish only one fruit. If so, there should only be two fruits; how can there be four fruits? If severing the afflictions of cultivation in the three realms establishes three fruits, then [severing] the afflictions of seeing the truths in the three realms should also establish three fruits. Furthermore, if determined according to realms: since there are three realms, severing the afflictions of the three realms should have three fruits; why does severing the afflictions of the desire realm establish two fruits, while severing the afflictions of the upper two realms establishes one fruit? If determined according to calm and distraction: the desire realm is already a distracted realm, so severing the afflictions of the desire realm should establish one fruit; the upper two realms are already calm realms, so severing the afflictions of the two realms should also establish one fruit. For what reason now are causes and fruits not established according to these meanings?
Answer: These are provisional designations established through the Tathāgata's skillful means, without fixed lakṣaṇas; discussed generally, it is fully as questioned. But that it is not so now is because severing the afflictions of seeing the truths in the three realms brings one out beyond the three lower destinies to become a noble one; hence the person of the initial fruit is established. The dust of the evil destinies having settled and the eighty-eight heads of the serpent having died, with respect to severing the afflictions of cultivation in the three realms three further fruits are established: severing the afflictions of cultivation in the desire realm establishes two fruits, and severing the afflictions of cultivation in the upper two realms establishes the arhat. Why is this? The desire realm is a realm of suffering and difficulty; since this is difficult to cross over, severing the afflictions of the desire realm establishes two fruits. The upper two realms are not realms of suffering and difficulty, and already have the foundation of liberation, so their afflictions are easily severed; hence severing the afflictions of the upper two realms establishes the fruit of an arhat.

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金剛般若疏 — Classical Chinese