仁王經疏 1.10

1.10

Question: If so, why is the second wheel of signlessness called implicit? Answer: In fact, it fully teaches the three kinds of lack of intrinsic nature, and in principle there is no shallowness or depth; yet through a concealed manner, it says that all phenomena lack intrinsic nature and so on, without distinguishing and matching them to the three lacks of intrinsic nature. The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and others extensively illuminate the three kinds of lack of intrinsic nature. Therefore, in the approach of the third Dharma-wheel, the four characters 'lack of intrinsic nature' (niḥsvabhāvatā) are added, the intention being to clarify that there is distinctly the principle of the three lacks of intrinsic nature. It is on this basis that they are called explicit or implicit in meaning; it is not on account of shallowness or depth in principle that they are called explicit or implicit. If we explain this in detail, as in the tenth fascicle of the Guang bai lun (Śataśāstra-vaipulya-ṭīkā), there are the explanations of three masters: First, the followers of the Yogācāra establish the existence of the other-dependent nature; second, the Bodhisattva Bhāviveka asserts the emptiness of the other-dependent nature; third, the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla refutes both attachments. Hence, that treatise states: "First, the followers of the Yogācāra established their tenet by means of reasoning, saying: 'The entity of the phenomena grasped by conceptual construction is non-existent, but the entity of the phenomena produced by causes and conditions is existent. Dependent on this, one experiences karmic fruition and transmigrates in the three realms of existence; or one cultivates preparatory application and realizes the three bodhis,' and so forth at length. To corroborate this meaning, they cited a sūtra verse: 'The imagined is non-existent, / the other-dependent nature exists; / false conceptualization is destroyed / in accordance with the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation.' Second, Bhāviveka interpreted this sūtra, saying: 'Names are the imagined nature, and meanings/objects are the other-dependent nature. Since names are not existent with respect to their meanings/objects, they are non-existent; since meanings/objects are not non-existent according to worldly convention, they exist. One cannot cite this to prove that the other-dependent exists.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra refuted his interpretation of the sūtra. The text has three sections: first, a general statement that it is unreasoned; next, a specific display of four fallacies; and finally, a concluding refutation showing that it contradicts the sūtra. First, in the general refutation they say: 'This interpretation is not so, because its meaning is contradictory.' Next, as for the four fallacies: (1) If names are non-existent because they are not existent with respect to their meanings/objects, then since meanings/objects are also non-existent with respect to names, how could they exist? (2) Furthermore, the names established for those meanings/objects are already born of causes and conditions; thus, like the meanings/objects, they should exist. (3) If the nature of the signifier falsely grasped is non-existent, how could the nature of the signified falsely grasped be existent? (4) If names have the capacity to designate in accordance with convention, and yet you do not accept them to be of the other-dependent nature, then since meanings/objects are also only conventionally designated as having capacity, why do you not accept them to be of the imagined nature? Finally, concluding with conventional designation, they say: 'The conventional designation of signifier and signified must either both be non-existent together, or both be equally existent. Now, as the sūtra states that one is existent and one is non-existent, what you say does not accord with the meaning of the sūtra.' Next, Bhāviveka, to prove his own meaning, further cited a sūtra, saying: 'By establishing these various names, / they express those various phenomena. / None of them exist in their own nature, / because the true nature of phenomena is entirely like this.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra refuted this sūtra [citation], saying: 'The intention of the sūtra is not to say that names are non-existent with respect to meanings/objects; it only says that the true nature of the signified phenomena is non-existent, demonstrating that the true nature of all phenomena cannot be expressed. What is expressed by nominal designations is in all cases a universal characteristic; the specific characteristics of all phenomena completely transcend nominal designation. Specific characteristics are not non-existent, whereas universal characteristics are not existent. Here, it briefly states that the nature of the signified is non-existent, but it does not mean that the nature of the signifier is genuinely existent. Therefore, the verse only utters the words "those do not exist"; otherwise, it should have said "these do not exist in their nature".' Next, Bhāviveka, to prove that the other-dependent nature is non-existent, further cited a brief verse spoken in a sūtra: 'Not the least phenomenon is produced, / nor is the least phenomenon destroyed. / Pure vision contemplates all phenomena / as neither existent nor non-existent.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra again refuted this statement: 'The intention of this verse is to clarify that the intrinsic nature and differences of the imagined nature—both signifier and signified—are fundamentally empty in their entity. Pure vision, which is free of grasping and without production or destruction, contemplates all worldly phenomena produced by causes and conditions as neither non-existent nor existent. Therefore, this does not prove that the other-dependent is non-existent.' Next, the Bodhisattva Bhāviveka cited a sūtra to substantiate that the other-dependent nature is empty, where a sūtra states: 'Phenomena arise from conditions; / conditions and phenomena are both non-existent. / One who is able to know correctly in this way / is said to comprehend conditioned arising. / If a phenomenon is produced from conditions, / this phenomenon has no intrinsic nature at all; / if a phenomenon has no intrinsic nature at all, / this phenomenon is not produced from conditions.' Next, the followers of the Yogācāra reconciled those sūtras, saying: 'Although these two sūtras say that phenomena produced from conditions lack intrinsic nature, they are not contradictory. For phenomena produced from conditions are of two kinds: first, the imagined nature; second, the other-dependent nature. Here, the intention is to clarify that the intrinsic nature of the imagined nature does not exist; it does not speak of the other-dependent. If one were to say that the other-dependent completely lacks intrinsic nature, one would then repudiate both defiled and pure phenomena as non-existent, which is called the wrongly grasped emptiness, harming both oneself and others.' Next, Bhāviveka said: 'Who could ever put a stop to this false conceptualization? When one attains right view, it will naturally be eliminated.' Third, the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla refuted both attachments to emptiness and existence, establishing the Middle Way wherein the other-dependent nature is neither empty nor existent. Thus he further states: 'Classes such as these, following their different views, divide the sacred words and form many factions, mutually raising disputes and each clinging to one extreme. Since they cannot eliminate the dust and defilement of evil views, how could they ever accord with the pure, sublime purport of the Mahāyāna spoken by the Buddhas, the World-Honoured Ones? Failing to comprehend the true principle and following their own clinging sentiments, approving of themselves and deprecating others, they are truly to be feared! One should abandon attachment to the two extremes of emptiness and existence, and awaken to the non-dual Middle Way of the Mahāyāna.'" It is extensively explained like that.