大方廣佛華嚴經疏 2.4

2.4

第二敘西域者，即今性相二宗元出彼方，故名西域。謂那爛陀寺同時有二大德：一名戒賢、二名智光。戒賢遠承彌勒、無著，近踵護法、難陀，依《深密》等經、《瑜伽》等論立三種教，以法相大乘而為了義，即唐三藏之所宗師。謂佛初於鹿苑，轉四諦小乘法輪，說諸有為法皆從緣生，以破外道自性因等；又緣生無我，翻外有我，然猶未說法無我理，即四《阿含》等是。第二時中，雖依遍計所執而說諸法自性皆空，翻彼小乘，然於依他圓成猶未說有，即諸部《般若》等經。第三時中，就大乘正理，具說三性三無性等，方為盡理，即《解深密經》等。是故於彼三時，初墮有邊、次墮空邊，俱非了義；後時具說遍計性空、餘二為有，契會中道，方為了義。此依《深密》所判。二智光論師，遠承文殊、龍樹，近稟青目、清辯，依《般若》等經、《中觀》等論，亦立三時教，以明無相大乘為真了義。謂佛初鹿苑說小，明心境俱有。次於中時，為彼中根說法相大乘境空心有唯識道理，以根猶劣，未能全入平等真空。故後第三時，為上根說無相大乘，辯心境俱空、平等一味，為真了義。又初漸破外道自性等故，說因緣生法決定是有；次漸破小乘緣生實有之執故，說依他似有，以彼怖畏此真空故，由存假名而接引之；後時方就究竟而說緣生即空、平等一味。此三次第，如智光論師《般若燈論》釋中引《大乘妙智經》說。然此二三時，並不能斷一代時教，以各有據、互相違故，各別為於一類機故。《深密經》意，為於一類餐般若者，聞平等空，撥無因果，不了空有無二，故第三時為其分析於一法上空有之義。其《妙智經》則以一類聞說三性迷唯識者，未能忘心觀緣起者，定謂似有，故令總忘心境即事而真。得斯意者則不相違。然欲會二宗須知二宗立義有多差別，略敘數條：一者一乘三乘別、二一性五性別、三唯心真妄別、四真如隨緣凝然別、五三性空有即離別、六生佛不增不減別、七二諦空有即離別、八四相一時前後別、九能所斷證即離別、十佛身無為有為別。且初二義者，由性有五，一不同故，令乘有三。一權實，如法相宗意，以一乘為權、三乘為實，故《深密》三時教中，初皆不成、次一向成，是為若過若不及皆非了義，第三時中有性者成、無性不成方為了義，故云「普為發趣一切乘者」。又初二卷中，皆云「一乘是密意說」，故知是權。又《勝鬘經》以一乘為方便故。《大般若》五百九十三中，善勇猛菩薩言：「唯願世尊哀愍我等，為具宣說如來境智。若有情類於聲聞乘性決定者，聞此法已，速能證得自無漏地。於獨覺乘性決定者，聞此法已，速依自乘而得出離。於無上乘性決定者，聞此法已，速證無上正等菩提。若有情類，雖未已入正性離生，而於三乘性不定者，聞此法已，皆發無上正等覺心。」《深密》第二大意同此。又云「一切趣寂聲聞種性補特伽羅，雖蒙諸佛施設種種勇猛加行方便化導，終不能令當坐道場證阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。」又《十輪》第九亦說「三乘各定差別，皆以性定五故。」故《楞伽》中「佛告大慧：有五種種性，一聲聞乘性、二辟支佛乘性、三如來乘性、四不定乘性、五者無性。」《大莊嚴論》及《瑜伽論》皆同此說。《善戒》、《地持》雖但說二種性：一有種性、二無種性，亦云「無種性人無種性故，雖復勤行精進，終不能得無上菩提，但以人天善根而成熟之。」無性《瑜伽》亦同此說。若法性宗意，則以三乘是權、一乘為實。《法華經》云「十方佛土中，唯有一乘法，無二亦無三，除佛方便說。」又云「初以三乘引導眾生，然後但以大乘而度脫之。」以性唯一故，故云「諸佛兩足尊，知法常無性。」又第三云「一相一味，究竟涅槃，常寂滅相。」《涅槃》亦云「佛性者名為一乘。師子吼者名決定說，決定宣說一切眾生皆有佛性。凡是有心，定當作佛。」三十三又云「一切眾生同有佛性，皆同一乘、一解脫、一因一果、同一甘露，一切當得常樂我淨，是名一味。」又《法華》第三云「我滅度後復有弟子，不聞是經，不知不覺菩薩所行，自於所得功德生滅度想，當入涅槃。我於餘國作佛，更有異名，是人雖生滅度之想入於涅槃，而於彼土求佛智慧，得聞是經，唯以佛乘而得滅度」等。《智論》九十五亦同此說，明知趣寂決定迴心。《法華論》中四聲聞內，決定及增上慢此二根未熟故，菩薩與記方便令發心。既云未熟，明必當熟。方便令發，即菩提心。不可不順己宗，判為論錯。《入楞伽》第二第四第七，皆同說二乘無實涅槃，但是三昧力故，後必當得無上菩提。《法華論》中意亦同此，皆是假說涅槃，故云三昧。《勝鬘》亦云「言諸二乘得涅槃者，是佛方便。」又《無上依經》、《寶性》、《佛性》二論皆說：入滅二乘，於三界外更受變易。《密嚴經》中「二乘畢無，灰斷永滅。」如是經論，其文非一，永寂聲聞必無明矣。《涅槃》第九〈菩薩品〉中，廣明闡提斷善不能發心。當文即云「彼一闡提雖有佛性，而為無量罪垢所纏，不能得出，如蠶處繭。」此則有而非無。又云「或有佛性，一闡提有，善根人無」等，則知無有無種性人。況前引《楞伽》五性，自迷其文。彼經第五性云「五者無性，謂一闡提。此有二種：一者焚燒一切善根，即謗菩薩藏。二者憐愍一切眾生界，即是菩薩。若有眾生不入涅槃，我亦不入。大慧白言：此二何者常不入涅槃？佛言：菩薩常不入涅槃，非焚燒一切善根者，以知諸法本來涅槃，不捨一切諸眾生故。」此意則明菩薩入而不入。既云菩薩常不入，非闡提者，則明闡提後必入矣。況經自云「復以如來神力故，或時善根生」耶。《莊嚴》第五，無性亦有二種：一是時邊、二者畢竟時邊。謂暫時之無，即前闡提，畢竟謂永無，即大悲菩薩。是知前來所引《大般若》、《深密》等經，皆是未說《法華》之前，就其長時云定性、無性，非永定、永無。諸論隨佛方便成立，故云定無耳。故《寶性》、《佛性》等論皆說：以一闡提謗大乘因，依無量時說無佛性，非謂究竟無清淨性。若謂《法華》是第二時教，為引不定二乘，故說一切悉皆成佛，而猶未說定性不成，故名密意非了義者，何以自判《法華》為第三時教？誰敢判於《法華》為不了耶？《妙智經》中及梁《攝論》成立正法中，皆以一乘居三乘後，故真諦三藏《部異執記》云「三十八年後，說《解節經》」等。《無量義》云「四十年後，說《法華經》」，明知《法華》居後，故經云「臨欲終時」。若不信《法華》居後，《涅槃》臨終居然可信，豈不亦以一乘一性破三五耶？若以《般若》為第二時、《法華》為第三時，於理即通。復自違《深密》第三時中，普為發趣一切乘者，以《法華》破三故。明知《深密》三時，不能定斷一切聖教，以未居最後故，且約顯一類義，故分三耳。義如前說。若將《法華》望之，應有四時，以一乘教破前三乘故。若謂佛性有二：一者理性、二者行性，理性定有、行性或無。斯言可爾，故《涅槃》云「或有佛性，善根人有、闡提人無」，即是行性。「或有佛性，二人俱有」，即是理性。然《涅槃》依於理性明其等有，故云「凡是有心，定當作佛」，不言凡是有行定當作佛。若謂理性定有，容趣寂不成，則違教理。是知闡提不作佛者，以作佛非闡提故，乃抑揚當時耳。若謂《法華》入滅後信一乘，即是變化權聲聞者，權必化實，無實化誰？又豈不誤於一類怯弱好滅眾生？是知趣寂皆是《法華》前意耳。又《勝鬘經》云「若如來隨彼所欲而方便說，即是一乘、無有二乘，二乘入於一乘，一乘者即第一義乘。」此意明隨欲方便而說二乘，明知即是一乘，無有二矣。不曉此意，將上方便連下一乘而讀之，輒斷一乘以為方便，惑之甚矣。又彼經中廣破二乘云無涅槃，又云「此經斷一切疑，決定了義入一乘道。」豈說一乘以為方便？設有方便之言，尚在《法華》之前，況復無耶。《法華》云「此經難信難解，佛現在世猶多怨嫉，況滅度後。」誠哉斯言。若信執三乘五性、不信一乘一性者，深為可愍。故《百喻經》第二中，王改聚落五由旬為三由旬喻，以喻方便於一說三。後人但信於三、不信於一，即其事也。上約二宗各別所據，則互相違反。若會釋者，亦不相違。謂就機則三、約法則一，新熏則五、本有無二。若入理雙拂，則三一兩亡；若約佛化儀，則能三能一。是故競執是非，達無違諍。《大集》五部雖異，不離法界；《涅槃》各說身因，佛許無非正說。餘義，次下當會。古今違順竟。

Second, concerning the account of the Western Regions: that is to say, the two traditions of Nature (xing) and Characteristics (xiang) originally arose in that region, hence it is termed the Western Regions. At Nālandā Monastery, there were simultaneously two great virtues: the first was named Śīlabhadra, and the second was named Jñānaprabha. Śīlabhadra remotely succeeded Maitreya and Asaṅga, and recently followed Dharmapāla and Nanda. Relying on sūtras such as the Saṃdhinirmocana and treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi, he established a three-period teaching, taking the Mahāyāna of Dharma-characteristics to be definitive; he is precisely the master revered by the Tang Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang]. He held that the Buddha first turned the Hīnayāna wheel of the Dharma of the Four Noble Truths in the Deer Park, stating that all conditioned phenomena arise from conditions, in order to refute the heterodox teachings on intrinsic nature as cause, and so forth; furthermore, that conditioned arising is selfless, overturning the heterodox notion of a self, yet he did not yet explain the principle of the selflessness of dharmas: this refers to the four Āgamas and the like. In the second period, although he spoke of the intrinsic nature of all dharmas as empty based on the imagined nature (parikalpita) to overturn that Hīnayāna, he had not yet spoken of existence regarding the dependent (paratantra) and the consummate (pariniṣpanna) natures: this refers to the various Prajñāpāramitā sūtras and the like. In the third period, with respect to the correct principle of the Mahāyāna, he fully explained the three natures and three non-natures, only then exhausting the principle: this refers to the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and the like. Therefore, among those three periods, the first falls into the extreme of existence, and the next falls into the extreme of emptiness; neither is definitive. The later period fully explains the emptiness of the imagined nature and the existence of the other two, tallying with the middle way, and only then is definitive. This is the classification according to the Saṃdhinirmocana.

The second, the treatise master Jñānaprabha, remotely succeeded Mañjuśrī and Nāgārjuna, and recently received the transmission of Āryadeva and Bhāviveka. Relying on sūtras such as the Prajñāpāramitā and treatises such as the Madhyamaka, he likewise established a three-period teaching, taking the signless Mahāyāna to be the truly definitive. He held that the Buddha first taught the small [vehicle] in the Deer Park, clarifying that both mind and objects exist. Next, in the intermediate period, for the sake of those of middling faculties, he taught the Mahāyāna of Dharma-characteristics with the principle of consciousness-only—that objects are empty while mind exists—because their faculties were still inferior and they were unable to enter fully into the equal, true emptiness. Therefore, later in the third period, for the sake of those of superior faculties, he taught the signless Mahāyāna, expounding that both mind and objects are empty and of an equal, single flavor, taking this to be truly definitive. Furthermore, at first, in order to gradually refute the intrinsic nature of the heterodox and so forth, he stated that dharmas born of causes and conditions are definitively existent; next, in order to gradually refute the Hīnayāna grasping at the real existence of what is conditionally arisen, he stated that the dependent exists as an appearance, guiding them by retaining conventional designations because they feared this true emptiness; only in the later period, with respect to the ultimate, did he state that conditioned arising is itself emptiness, of an equal, single flavor. These three stages are as stated in Treatise Master Jñānaprabha's commentary on the Prajñāpradīpa-śāstra, citing the Mahāyāna-sūkṣmajñāna-sūtra.

However, neither of these two three-period schemas can determine all the teachings of the Buddha's lifetime, because each has its own basis and they contradict one another, each being addressed to a distinct class of capacities. The intention of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra was for the sake of a class of persons fed on Prajñā who, hearing of equal emptiness, repudiated cause and effect and did not understand that emptiness and existence are not two; therefore, in the third period, it analyzed for them the meaning of emptiness and existence with respect to a single dharma. That Sūkṣmajñāna-sūtra, on the other hand, was for a class who, hearing the three natures taught, were confused about consciousness-only and could not forget the mind to contemplate dependent arising, definitively deeming it to exist as an appearance; therefore, it led them to forget mind and objects entirely, seeing that phenomena are themselves the real. If one grasps these intentions, they do not contradict one another.

However, if one wishes to harmonize the two traditions, one must recognize that their established tenets contain many differences, briefly recounted in several points: first, the difference between the One Vehicle and the Three Vehicles; second, the difference between one nature and five natures; third, the difference between true and false in mind-only; fourth, the difference between tathatā following conditions versus remaining immutable; fifth, the difference between whether the three natures are identical to or separate from emptiness and existence; sixth, the difference between whether sentient beings and Buddhas increase or decrease; seventh, the difference between whether the two truths are identical to or separate from emptiness and existence; eighth, the difference between whether the four characteristics are simultaneous or sequential; ninth, the difference between whether the active and the passive in severing and realizing are identical or separate; tenth, the difference between whether the Buddha body is unconditioned or conditioned.

Now, regarding the first two points: because natures are five, being not one and the same, the vehicles are made to be three. Regarding the provisional and the real: according to the Dharma-characteristics tradition, the One Vehicle is provisional and the Three Vehicles are real; thus, among the teachings of the three periods in the Saṃdhinirmocana, in the first period none attain [buddhahood], in the next period all uniformly attain it—which are neither definitive because of either going too far or falling short—and in the third period, those with the nature attain it while those without the nature do not, which alone is definitive; hence it says: 'universally for those who set out upon all vehicles.' Furthermore, in both of the first two fascicles, it says: 'the One Vehicle is an intentional teaching'; hence we know it is provisional. Also, the Śrīmālā-sūtra takes the One Vehicle as an expedient means. In fascicle 593 of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, Bodhisattva Śūra speaks: 'We pray only that the Bhagavat have pity on us and fully expound the realm and wisdom of the Tathāgata. If there are sentient beings whose nature is determined for the Śrāvakayāna, having heard this Dharma, they will swiftly be able to realize their own undefiled stage. If they are determined for the Pratyekabuddhayāna, having heard this Dharma, they will swiftly rely on their own vehicle to achieve deliverance. If they are determined for the Unsurpassable Vehicle, having heard this Dharma, they will swiftly realize unsurpassable, complete, perfect bodhi. If there are sentient beings who, though not yet having entered the certitude of ultimate reality, are undetermined in their nature among the three vehicles, having heard this Dharma, they will all generate the mind of unsurpassable, complete, perfect enlightenment.' The general meaning of the second [chapter] of the Saṃdhinirmocana is the same as this. It also says: 'All pudgalas of the gotra of śrāvakas inclined toward tranquility, though the Buddhas establish various heroic applications and expedient means to guide and convert them, can ultimately never be caused to sit upon the bodhimanda and realize anuttarā samyaksambodhi.' Furthermore, fascicle 9 of the Daśacakra-sūtra also states: 'The three vehicles each have determined distinctions, all because the natures are determined as five.' Thus in the Laṅkāvatāra: 'The Buddha told Mahāmati: There are five kinds of gotras: first, the Śrāvakayāna gotra; second, the Pratyekabuddhayāna gotra; third, the Tathāgatayāna gotra; fourth, the undetermined gotra; and fifth, those without gotra.' Both the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Yogācārabhūmi share this statement. Although the Bodhisattvabhūmi (Shan jie) and Bodhisattvabhūmi (Dichi) speak of only two gotras—first, having a gotra, and second, lacking a gotra—they also say: 'Because a person without a gotra lacks a gotra, even though they vigorously cultivate energetic effort, they can ultimately never attain unsurpassable bodhi, but are merely matured through the wholesome roots of humans and devas.' The Yogācārabhūmi commentary by Asvabhāva also shares this statement.

According to the Dharma-nature tradition, the three vehicles are provisional and the One Vehicle is real. The Lotus Sūtra says: 'In the Buddha lands of the ten directions, there is only the Dharma of the One Vehicle, neither two nor three, except for the Buddha's expedient explanations.' It also says: 'At first I guided sentient beings with the three vehicles, and later I deliver them only with the Great Vehicle.' Because the nature is only one, it says: 'The Buddhas, the most honored among two-legged beings, know that dharmas are ever devoid of nature.' Furthermore, the third fascicle says: 'A single characteristic and a single flavor, ultimate nirvāṇa, the mark of constant extinction.' The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra also says: 'Buddha-nature is named the One Vehicle. The lion's roar is called the definitive teaching, definitively declaring that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature. All who possess a mind will definitively attain buddhahood.' Fascicle 33 also says: 'All sentient beings equally possess Buddha-nature, all share the same One Vehicle, the same single liberation, the same single cause and single fruit, the same single ambrosia; all shall attain the permanent, bliss, self, and purity: this is called the single flavor.' Furthermore, the third fascicle of the Lotus Sūtra says: 'After my extinction, there will be disciples who do not hear this sūtra, who neither know nor perceive the practices of a bodhisattva, and who, generating the notion of extinction with regard to the merits they have attained, will enter nirvāṇa. When I become a Buddha in another land with a different name, though these people generate the notion of extinction and enter nirvāṇa, they will seek the Buddha's wisdom in that land, succeed in hearing this sūtra, and attain extinction solely by means of the Buddha Vehicle,' and so on. Fascicle 95 of the Dazhidulun also shares this statement, making it clear that those inclined toward tranquility definitively turn their minds. Among the four kinds of śrāvakas in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa, regarding the determined ones and those of overweening pride, because these two faculties are not yet mature, the bodhisattva confers prophecies and expediently causes them to generate the mind. Since it says they are 'not yet mature,' it is clear they must become mature in the future. Expediently causing them to generate it refers to the bodhicitta. One must not judge the treatise to be mistaken merely because it does not accord with one's own school. Fascicles 2, 4, and 7 of the Laṅkāvatāra all uniformly state that the two vehicles have no real nirvāṇa, but merely abide by the power of samādhi, and will definitely attain unsurpassable bodhi later. The intent in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa is also the same: all are conventional designations of nirvāṇa, hence referred to as samādhi. The Śrīmālā-sūtra also says: 'That which is said about the two vehicles attaining nirvāṇa is the Buddha's expedient means.' Furthermore, the Anunatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa-sūtra, the Ratnagotravibhāga, and the Buddhagotranirdeśa all state: the two vehicles that enter extinction take on transformation bodies beyond the triple world. In the Ghanavyūha-sūtra: 'The two vehicles are completely devoid of [real attainment], and are by ash-reduction forever extinguished.' Such sūtras and treatises are not few in text; it is completely clear that there are definitively no śrāvakas in eternal tranquility. In fascicle 9 of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, the 'Bodhisattva Chapter,' it extensively clarifies that icchantikas sever wholesome roots and cannot generate the mind. The text itself states: 'Although that icchantika has the Buddha-nature, being bound by immeasurable defilements of sin, he cannot escape, like a silkworm in a cocoon.' This shows it is existent, not non-existent. It also says: 'There is a Buddha-nature that an icchantika has and a person with wholesome roots lacks,' and so forth; thus we know there is no person who lacks the nature. Moreover, the five natures of the Laṅkāvatāra cited earlier have been misunderstood in their own text. Regarding the fifth nature, that sūtra states: 'Fifth is the lack of nature, which refers to an icchantika. Of this there are two kinds: first, one who incinerates all wholesome roots, namely one who slanders the bodhisattva piṭaka. Second, one who has compassion for all realms of sentient beings, who is a bodhisattva. [Vowing:] If there are sentient beings who do not enter nirvāṇa, I also will not enter. Mahāmati addressed the Buddha: Which of these two eternally does not enter nirvāṇa? The Buddha said: The bodhisattva eternally does not enter nirvāṇa, not the one who incinerates all wholesome roots, because he knows that all dharmas are originally nirvāṇa and does not abandon all sentient beings.' This intent clarifies that the bodhisattva enters and yet does not enter. Since it says the bodhisattva eternally does not enter, and not the icchantika, it clearly shows that the icchantika will definitely enter later. How much more so when the sūtra itself says: 'Furthermore, by the supernatural power of the Tathāgata, sometimes wholesome roots will arise'!

In fascicle 5 of the Sūtrālaṃkāra, the lack of nature is also of two kinds: first, temporal; second, ultimate. 'Temporal' refers to temporary absence, which is the aforementioned icchantika; 'ultimate' refers to eternal absence, which is the bodhisattva of great compassion. Hence we know that the texts previously cited from the Mahāprajñāpāramitā, Saṃdhinirmocana, and other sūtras all belong to the period prior to the preaching of the Lotus Sūtra; speaking of determined natures and lack of nature with respect to a vast duration of time, they did not mean eternally determined or eternally lacking. The treatises established this in accordance with the Buddha's expedient means, hence they merely spoke of 'definitively lacking.' Therefore, treatises such as the Ratnagotravibhāga and Buddhagotranirdeśa all state: based on an icchantika's slandering of the cause of the Great Vehicle, with reliance on an immeasurable time it is said they lack Buddha-nature, not meaning that they ultimately lack the pure nature. If one asserts that the Lotus Sūtra is a teaching of the second period, and that to guide undetermined adherents of the two vehicles it spoke of all attaining buddhahood while not yet stating that those of determined nature do not attain it—hence calling it an intentional teaching and not definitive—why do they themselves classify the Lotus Sūtra as a teaching of the third period? Who would dare classify the Lotus Sūtra as non-definitive? In the Sūkṣmajñāna-sūtra and in the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's establishment of the true Dharma, both place the One Vehicle after the three vehicles; thus Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha's Commentary on the Nikāyabheda says: 'After thirty-eight years, he preached the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra,' and so forth. The Anantanirdeśa-sūtra says: 'After forty years, he preached the Lotus Sūtra,' making it clear that the Lotus Sūtra comes after, hence the sūtra says: 'When near the time of death.' If one does not believe that the Lotus Sūtra comes after, the Mahāparinirvāṇa at the brink of death is readily credible: does it not also refute the three [vehicles] and five [natures] with the one vehicle and one nature? If one takes the Prajñāpāramitā as the second period and the Lotus Sūtra as the third period, it is logically consistent. Yet they contradict the Saṃdhinirmocana's third period of 'universally for those who set out upon all vehicles,' because the Lotus Sūtra refutes the three. It is clear that the three periods of the Saṃdhinirmocana cannot definitively determine all sacred teachings, because it did not come last; it only distinguished three periods to highlight a specific class of meaning, as explained above. If viewed from the perspective of the Lotus Sūtra, there should be four periods, because the teaching of the One Vehicle refutes the preceding three vehicles.

If one asserts that Buddha-nature is of two kinds—first, the nature of noumenon; second, the nature of practice—where the nature of noumenon is definitively existent while the nature of practice may be absent: these words are plausible. Thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'There is a Buddha-nature that a person of wholesome roots has and an icchantika lacks,' which is the nature of practice; 'There is a Buddha-nature that both persons possess,' which is the nature of noumenon. However, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra explains their equal possession based on the nature of noumenon, hence saying: 'All who possess a mind will definitively attain buddhahood'; it does not say that all who possess practice will definitively attain buddhahood. If one asserts that the nature of noumenon is definitively existent yet allows that those inclined toward tranquility do not attain buddhahood, this contradicts both doctrine and reason. We know that an icchantika does not attain buddhahood only because, upon attaining buddhahood, one is no longer an icchantika; this was merely a temporary censure and praise. If one asserts that those who believe in the One Vehicle after entering extinction in the Lotus Sūtra are transformed, provisional śrāvakas, the provisional must transform the real—if there is no real, whom would they transform? Furthermore, would this not mislead a class of timid sentient beings who delight in extinction? We know that the concept of those inclined toward tranquility represents the intent prior to the Lotus Sūtra.

Furthermore, the Śrīmālā-sūtra says: 'If the Tathāgata expediently teaches in accordance with what they desire, that is the One Vehicle, and there are no two vehicles; the two vehicles enter into the One Vehicle, and the One Vehicle is the Supreme Vehicle.' The intent here clarifies that when he expediently taught the two vehicles in accordance with their desires, this was clearly known to be the One Vehicle itself, and there were no two. Not understanding this intention, some read the word 'expedient' above in continuity with 'One Vehicle' below, hastily judging the One Vehicle to be an expedient means: this is an extreme delusion! Moreover, that sūtra extensively refutes the two vehicles, stating that they have no nirvāṇa, and says: 'This sūtra cuts off all doubts; it is definitively definitive, entering the path of the One Vehicle.' How could it say that the One Vehicle is an expedient means? Even if there were words of expedient means, they would still precede the Lotus Sūtra, so how much less when there are none! The Lotus Sūtra says: 'This sūtra is difficult to believe and difficult to understand; even when the Buddha was present in the world there was much enmity and jealousy, how much more after his extinction!' How true are these words! If one faithfully grasps the three vehicles and five natures, and disbelieves the One Vehicle and single nature, it is deeply lamentable. Thus, in the second fascicle of the Śatāvadāna-sūtra, the parable of the king changing a settlement of five yojanas to three yojanas is used as a metaphor for expediently speaking of three based on the one. That later people only believe in the three and do not believe in the one is precisely this state of affairs.

The above represents mutual contradiction when viewed from what the two schools separately rely upon. But if harmonized and explained, they do not contradict each other either: with respect to capacities there are three, while with respect to Dharma there is one; in terms of newly perfumed there are five, while originally existent there are not two. If entering noumenon with both swept away, then both three and one are extinguished; if based on the Buddha's pedagogical form, then he can be three and can be one. Therefore, while people contend and cling to right and wrong, when one penetrates [the truth] there is no dispute. The five divisions of the Mahāsaṃnipāta, though different, do not depart from the dharmadhātu; in the Mahāparinirvāṇa, when each explains the cause of the body, the Buddha affirms that none is not a correct teaching. The remaining points will be harmonized below. The section on ancient and modern agreements and disagreements is concluded.