大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 33.26

33.26

疏「然無常等經論異說」，《淨名》、《涅槃》諸經皆說，下第三住當廣示之。今依《中邊》，蓋是一義耳。即第二論，彼論具有無常苦空無我。論云「無常三者，一無性無常，謂遍計所執，此常無故；二生滅無常，謂依他起，有起盡故；三垢淨無常，謂圓成實，位轉變故。苦三種者，一所取苦，謂遍計所執，是補特伽羅我執所取故；二事相苦，謂依他起，三苦相故；三和合苦，謂圓成實，苦相合故。空有三者，一無性空，謂遍計所執，此無理趣可說為有，由此非有說為空故；二異性空，謂依他起，以妄所執不如實有，非一切種性全無故；三自性空，謂圓成實，二空所顯為自性故。無我三者，一無相無我，謂遍計所執，此相本無故名無相，即此無相說為無我；二異相無我，謂依他起，此相雖有而不如彼遍計所執故名異相，即此異相說為無我；三自相無我，謂圓成實，無我所顯以為自相，即此自相說為無我。」彼論結云「如是所說無常苦空無我四種，如其次第，依根本真實各分三種。」釋曰：根本真實者，上論云「謂三自性所以名真實者，偈云『許於三自性，唯一常非有，一有而非真，一有無真實。』」釋曰：彼論具釋，如其次第。一常非有，即是遍計。一有非真，即是依他。一有無真實，即是圓成。釋此句云「唯圓成實亦有非有，唯有非有於此性中許為真實。」釋曰：論意云具有具無，有此非有，故為真實。其無字屬上，非是無真實也，意明二性皆依於此真實上立。今經無苦而有無相故，疏依三無我開三無相故。彼論釋無我之中皆有無相，又亦依此三種無相對於三苦，以論對疏，廣略可知。疏「然皆融攝」下，通妨，可知。

Regarding the commentary's statement: "However, impermanence and so forth are explained differently across sūtras and treatises": sūtras such as the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* all explain them; they will be explained extensively below under the third abidance. Here, drawing upon the *Madhyāntavibhāga* is simply one explanation. That is, in the second chapter of that treatise, it fully possesses impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self. The treatise states: "There are three kinds of impermanence: first, impermanence of non-nature, which refers to the imagined nature, because this is permanently nonexistent; second, impermanence of arising and ceasing, which refers to the dependent nature, because it has arising and perishing; third, impermanence of defilement and purity, which refers to the consummate nature, because its status transforms. There are three kinds of suffering: first, suffering of what is grasped, which refers to the imagined nature, because it is grasped by the pudgala-ātmadṛṣṭi; second, suffering of phenomenal aspects, which refers to the dependent nature, because it possesses the aspects of the three sufferings; third, suffering of conjunction, which refers to the consummate nature, because it is conjoined with the aspects of suffering. There are three kinds of emptiness: first, emptiness of non-nature, which refers to the imagined nature, because there is no principle by which this can be said to exist, and because it is said to be empty due to this nonexistence; second, emptiness of different nature, which refers to the dependent nature, because what is falsely conceptualized does not truly exist, yet it is not utterly devoid of all kinds of nature; third, emptiness of intrinsic nature, which refers to the consummate nature, because its intrinsic nature is revealed by the two emptinesses. There are three kinds of non-self: first, non-self of signlessness, which refers to the imagined nature, because this sign is originally nonexistent and therefore called signless, and this very signlessness is spoken of as non-self; second, non-self of distinct signs, which refers to the dependent nature, because although this sign exists, it is not like that imagined nature and therefore called distinct signs, and these very distinct signs are spoken of as non-self; third, non-self of intrinsic sign, which refers to the consummate nature, because what is revealed by non-self is taken as its intrinsic sign, and this very intrinsic sign is spoken of as non-self." That treatise concludes: "Thus, the four kinds—impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self—as explained, are each divided into three kinds according to their sequence, based on fundamental reality." The commentary explains: As for "fundamental reality," the treatise above states: "It refers to the three intrinsic natures. As for why they are called 'reality,' a verse states: 'Concerning the three intrinsic natures, it is accepted that one is permanently nonexistent, one exists but is not true, and one has both existence and nonexistence as reality.'" The commentary explains: That treatise explains this fully in corresponding sequence: "One is permanently nonexistent" is the imagined; "one exists but is not true" is the dependent; "one has both existence and nonexistence as reality" is the consummate. Explaining this line, it states: "Only the consummate both exists and does not exist; only existence and nonexistence are accepted as reality in this nature." The commentary explains: The meaning of the treatise is that it possesses both existence and nonexistence; having this nonexistence, it is therefore reality. The word "non-" belongs with what precedes it, not meaning "non-reality"; the point is to clarify that the other two natures are both established upon this reality. Now, since this sūtra lacks "suffering" but contains "signlessness," the commentary relies on the three non-selves to open up the three kinds of signlessness. In that treatise's explanation of non-self, signlessness is present in each; moreover, relying also on these three kinds of signlessness in correspondence to the three sufferings, when comparing the treatise with the commentary, their extensive and abbreviated formulations become clear. From the commentary's statement "However, all are interfused and subsumed" onwards, it resolves objections, which is readily understood.