大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 33.27

33.27

疏「然此唯識略有二分」者，以《唯識》第二四師不同，謂安慧唯立一自證分；二難陀立二，謂相見二分；三陳那立三，加自證分；四護法立四，於前三上加證自證分。依彼論宗，即以四分而為正義。故今疏云略有二分，以諸經論及彼論文多說二故，謂離二取相等故。而論文有三：初明立二、二明立三、三明立四。而安慧一分，於二分中破之傍出。初立二分，論云「然有漏識自體生時，皆似所緣能緣相現。彼相應法應知亦爾，似所緣相說名相分，似能緣相說名見分。」釋曰：謂依他二分，似遍計所執二分。又以小乘相分名行相，能取所緣故；見分名事，是心心所自體相故。今似其心外之境，名似所緣。是心外法，此中無故，所變相分為所緣耳。若明相分未是顛倒，向心外取方為倒耳。又言見者，是能緣境，義通心心所，非推求義。推求義者，唯慧能故。次破安慧唯立自證分。論云「若心心所無所緣相，應不能緣自所緣境。」釋曰：謂緣色之心應不能緣色。論「或應一一能緣一切。」釋曰：謂隨一識等，能緣一切境。以眼識無所緣而能緣於色，餘識無色緣亦應能緣色。既餘不能緣一切，明知無所緣者，是義不然。此中正義，緣自境時，心上必有帶境之相，如鏡面上似面相生。次破無能緣。論云「若心心所無能緣相，應不能緣，如虛空等。」釋曰：同於虛空不能緣故。論云「或虛空等亦是能緣。」釋曰：此反難云，謂心心所法無能緣而能緣所緣，此虛空等無能緣亦應緣所緣。論云「故心心所必有二相，如契經說。一切唯有覺，所覺義皆無。能覺所覺分，各自然而轉。」釋曰：此即《厚嚴經》，上半明無外境，下半明有見相二分。各各自從因緣所生，名自然而轉。下結正義。論云「達無離識所緣境者，則所變相分是所緣，見分名自行相。相見所依自體名事，即自證分。」釋曰：此中雖是立二分家義，已有三故。次論云「若無此者，應不自憶心心所法，如不曾更境必不能憶故。」釋曰：此明有自證分。意云：相離於見，無別自體，但二功能，故應別有一所依體。若無自證，應不自憶心心所法，如不曾更境必不能憶。謂如見分不更相分之境則不能憶，要曾更之方能憶之。若無自證，已滅心心所則不能憶，以曾不為自證緣故。則如見分不曾更境則不能憶，今能憶之，明先有自證已曾緣故，如於見分憶曾更境故。次下立三分。論云「然心心所一一生時，以理推徵各有三分，所量、能量、量果別故，相見必有所依體故。」釋曰：所量是相分，能量是見分，量果是自證分。自證分與相見為所依故。如《集量論》伽陀中說「似境相所量，一能取相、二自證、三即能量及果，此三體無別。」釋曰：所量如絹，能量如尺，量果如解數智。果是何義？成滿因義。言無別體者，同一識故，則離心無境。次立四分。論云「又心心所若細分別，應有四分。三分如前，第四證自證分。此若無者，誰證第三？心分既同，應皆證故。」釋曰：見分是心分，須有自證分；自證是心分，應有第四證。論云「又自證分應無有果，諸能量者皆有果故。」釋曰：見分是能量，須有自證果。自證量見分，須有第四果。恐彼救云：却用見分為第三果，故次論云「不應見分是第三果，見分或時非量攝故，由此見分不證第三。證自體者，必現量故。」釋曰：意明見分通於三量。三量者，謂現量、比量、非量。即明見緣相時，或量非量，不可非量法為現量果。或見緣相，是於比量。及緣自證，復是現量故。自證是心體，得與比量非量而為果；見分非心體，不得與自證而為其量果，故不得見分證於第三。證自體者必現量故，第三四分既是現量，故得相證，無無窮失矣。意云：若以見分為能量，但用三分亦得足矣。若以見分為所量，必須第四為量果。若通作喻者，絹如所量，尺如能量，智為量果即自證分。若尺為所使，智為能使，何物用智？即是於人，如證自證分。人能用智，智能使人，故能更證。亦如明鏡，鏡像為相，鏡明為見。鏡面如自證，鏡背如證自證。面依於背，背復依面，故得互證。亦可以銅為證自證，鏡依於銅，銅依於鏡。此上四分，即護法之後方有此義。論如是四分，或攝為三，第四攝入自證分故，果體一故。論或攝為二，後三俱是能緣性，故《攝論》為二，亦攝入見故。論或攝為一，體無別故，如《入楞伽》伽陀中說「由自心執著，心似外境轉。彼所見非有，是故說唯心。」如是處處說唯一心，此一心言亦攝心所故。識行相即是了別，了別即是識之見分。釋曰：此上論文釋偈了字雖開合不同，今但略舉相見二分，故彼論初便立二分，處處多說相及見故。若了相分唯心所變，此非顛倒，謂相為外，心外取故是名顛倒。故上釋云：依他二分似於遍計相見二分。今約遍計，故成顛倒。上之四分，文則似橫法相之要，故以引耳。

Regarding the commentary's statement: "However, this consciousness-only has briefly two divisions": this is because in the second fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, four masters differ. That is, Sthiramati posits only a single self-witnessing division (*svasaṃvittibhāga*); second, Nanda posits two, namely the objective division (*nimittabhāga*) and the subjective seeing division (*darśanabhāga*); third, Dignāga posits three, adding the self-witnessing division; fourth, Dharmapāla posits four, adding the division that witnesses the self-witnessing (*svasaṃvittisaṃvittibhāga*) to the preceding three. Relying on the tenets of that treatise, the four divisions constitute the definitive view. Therefore, the present commentary says there are briefly two divisions, because various sūtras, treatises, and passages in that treatise mostly speak of two, referring to the freedom from the signs of the two graspings, and so on. The treatise's text has three parts: first, explaining the positing of two; second, explaining the positing of three; third, explaining the positing of four. Sthiramati's single division is refuted collaterally in the discussion of the two divisions. First, in positing the two divisions, the treatise states: "However, when defiled consciousness itself arises, it all appears resembling the object of cognition (*ālambana*) and the cognitive subject. One should know that its associated dharmas are also like this. Resembling the sign of the object of cognition is called the objective division; resembling the sign of the cognitive subject is called the seeing division." The commentary explains: This means that the two dependent divisions resemble the two imagined divisions. Furthermore, in the Hīnayāna, the objective division is called the cognitive aspect (*ākāra*), because it grasps the object of cognition; the seeing division is called the entity (*vastu*), because it is the intrinsic nature of mind and mental factors. Here, because it resembles an object external to the mind, it is called resembling the object of cognition. Because external dharmas do not exist here, the objective division transformed [by consciousness] is merely the object of cognition. If one understands that the objective division is not yet an error, grasping outward beyond the mind is what constitutes error. Furthermore, "seeing" means being able to cognize the object; its meaning applies to both mind and mental factors, and is not the meaning of discursive investigation. Discursive investigation is capable only by prajñā. Next, it refutes Sthiramati's positing of only the self-witnessing division. The treatise states: "If mind and mental factors lacked the sign of an object of cognition, they should not be able to cognize their own objects of cognition." The commentary explains: This means the mind cognizing form should not be able to cognize form. The treatise states: "Or each should be able to cognize everything." The commentary explains: This means that any single consciousness, etc., would be able to cognize all objects. If the eye-consciousness, lacking an object of cognition, could still cognize form, then other consciousnesses lacking form as an object should also be able to cognize form. Since the others cannot cognize everything, we clearly know that asserting the absence of an object of cognition is not correct. The definitive view here is that when cognizing its own object, there must be an aspect on the mind bearing the object, just as an image resembling a face arises on the surface of a mirror. Next, it refutes the absence of a cognitive subject. The treatise states: "If mind and mental factors lacked the sign of a cognitive subject, they should not be able to cognize, like empty space and so forth." The commentary explains: Because, being the same as empty space, they would be unable to cognize. The treatise states: "Or empty space and so forth would also be cognitive subjects." The commentary explains: This is a counter-objection: if dharmas of mind and mental factors lacked a cognitive subject yet could cognize objects of cognition, then empty space and so forth, lacking a cognitive subject, should also cognize objects of cognition. The treatise states: "Therefore, mind and mental factors must possess two signs, as the sūtra states: 'Everything is consciousness alone; the objects cognized do not exist at all. The division of the cognizer and the division of the cognized each turn spontaneously according to their own nature.'" The commentary explains: This is the *Ghanavyūha-sūtra*. The first half clarifies that there are no external objects; the second half clarifies that there are the two divisions of seeing and objective image. Each arising from its own causes and conditions is called turning spontaneously according to its own nature. Below, it concludes with the definitive view. The treatise states: "For one who realizes that there is no object of cognition separate from consciousness, the transformed objective division is the object of cognition, and the seeing division is called its own cognitive aspect. The entity upon which the objective and seeing divisions rely is called the thing (*vastu*), which is the self-witnessing division." The commentary explains: Although this is the position of those who posit two divisions, it already contains three. Next, the treatise states: "If this did not exist, one should not be able to remember dharmas of mind and mental factors, just as one is certainly unable to remember an object that has never been experienced." The commentary explains: This clarifies the existence of the self-witnessing division. The meaning is: the objective division, separate from the seeing division, has no distinct substance, but is merely two functions; hence, there must be a distinct relying entity. If there were no self-witnessing, one should not remember dharmas of mind and mental factors, just as one certainly cannot remember an object never experienced. For example, if the seeing division has not experienced the object of the objective division, it cannot remember it; it must have experienced it to be able to remember it. If there were no self-witnessing, one could not remember already-ceased minds and mental factors, because they were never cognized by self-witnessing. That would be like the seeing division being unable to remember an unexperienced object; now, since one can remember them, it is clear that self-witnessing previously cognized them, just as the seeing division remembers an experienced object. Next below, it posits three divisions. The treatise states: "However, when each mind and mental factor arises, examined through reason, each has three divisions, because the measured (*prameya*), the measurer (*pramāṇa*), and the fruit of measurement (*pramāṇaphala*) are distinct, and because the objective and seeing divisions must have an entity upon which they rely." The commentary explains: The measured is the objective division; the measurer is the seeing division; the fruit of measurement is the self-witnessing division. This is because the self-witnessing division serves as the basis for the objective and seeing divisions. As stated in a verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: "That which resembles the object is the measured; the aspect of grasping is the first, self-witnessing is the second, and the third is the measurer and the fruit; these three have no distinct substance." The commentary explains: The measured is like silk; the measurer is like a ruler; the fruit of measurement is like the knowledge understanding the measurement. What is the meaning of "fruit"? It has the meaning of fulfilling the cause. Stating that they have "no distinct substance" means they are the identical consciousness; hence, apart from the mind there is no object. Next, it posits four divisions. The treatise states: "Furthermore, if mind and mental factors are finely distinguished, there should be four divisions. Three divisions are as before; the fourth is the division that witnesses the self-witnessing. If this did not exist, what would witness the third? Since the mental divisions are identical [in nature], they should all be witnessed." The commentary explains: The seeing division is a mental division and must have a self-witnessing division; the self-witnessing is a mental division and should have a fourth division that witnesses it. The treatise states: "Furthermore, the self-witnessing division would have no fruit, because all measurers possess a fruit." The commentary explains: The seeing division is a measurer and must have the fruit of self-witnessing. The self-witnessing measures the seeing division and must have a fourth fruit. Lest someone save the argument by saying, "One can in turn use the seeing division as the third's fruit," the treatise next states: "It should not be that the seeing division is the third's fruit, because the seeing division is sometimes subsumed under non-valid cognition (*apramāṇa*); therefore, the seeing division does not witness the third. That which witnesses its own nature must be direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)." The commentary explains: The intention is to clarify that the seeing division extends across the three cognitions. The three cognitions are direct perception, inference (*anumāna*), and non-valid cognition. This clarifies that when seeing cognizes the objective division, it may be valid or non-valid; a non-valid dharma cannot serve as the fruit of direct perception. Or, seeing cognizing an objective division may be inference, whereas cognizing self-witnessing is direct perception. The self-witnessing is the mental entity and can serve as the fruit for inference and non-valid cognition; the seeing division is not the mental entity and cannot serve as the fruit of measurement for self-witnessing; hence, the seeing division cannot witness the third. That which witnesses its own nature must be direct perception; since the third and fourth divisions are both direct perception, they can witness each other, avoiding the fault of infinite regress. The meaning is: if one takes the seeing division as the measurer, merely using three divisions is sufficient. If one takes the seeing division as the measured, there must be a fourth as the fruit of measurement. To use a general metaphor: the silk is like the measured; the ruler is like the measurer; the intellect is the fruit of measurement, namely the self-witnessing division. If the ruler is what is employed and the intellect is what employs it, what uses the intellect? That is the person, like the division that witnesses the self-witnessing. The person can use the intellect, and the intellect can direct the person; thus, they can mutually witness each other. It is also like a bright mirror: the mirror's reflection is the objective division; the mirror's clarity is the seeing division. The front surface of the mirror is like the self-witnessing; the back of the mirror is like the division witnessing the self-witnessing. The front relies on the back, and the back relies on the front; hence, they can mutually witness each other. One can also take copper as witnessing the self-witnessing: the mirror relies on the copper, and the copper relies on the mirror. The above four divisions: this doctrine existed only after Dharmapāla. In the treatise, these four divisions may be subsumed into three, because the fourth is subsumed into the self-witnessing division, their fruit-entity being one. The treatise states that they may be subsumed into two, because the latter three are all of the nature of the cognitive subject; hence, in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* they are made into two, also being subsumed into seeing. The treatise states that they may be subsumed into one, because their substance is not distinct, as stated in a verse of the *Laṅkāvatāra*: "Due to grasping by one's own mind, the mind turns resembling external objects. What is seen by it does not exist; therefore, it is said to be mind-only." Thus, everywhere it speaks of one mind alone; this term "one mind" also subsumes mental factors. The cognitive aspect of consciousness is precisely cognition (*vijñapti*), and cognition is precisely the seeing division of consciousness. The commentary explains: Although the explanations of the word "understanding" in the verse across the treatises above differ in opening and closing, here we merely briefly cite the two divisions of objective and seeing; hence, at the beginning that treatise establishes two divisions, and everywhere mostly speaks of objective and seeing. If one understands that the objective division is merely transformed by mind, this is not error; to take the objective division as external and grasp outside the mind is what is called error. Therefore, the explanation above stated: the two dependent divisions resemble the two imagined divisions of seeing and objective image. Here, in terms of the imagined, it constitutes error. The four divisions above, in text, seem essential to horizontal dharmalakṣaṇa doctrines; therefore, they were cited.