成唯識論述記 6.522

6.522

述曰：謂二十句者，《對法》第一云：謂如計色是我、我有色、色屬我、我在色中。一蘊有四，五蘊二十句也；即二十句中五是我見，十五是我所見。何以五我見，十五我所者？以相應我所，隨遂我所，不離我所故，十五種是我所也，如《對法》第一自有問答廣解。分別行緣蘊，不分別所起處，故有二十句。分別行緣蘊，行謂行相，是我、我所之行相也。所者我所，如但於色蘊分別其我、我所行相，不分別此所說我所之所起處，我所必依我見後起。此於色蘊所說三所不分別，言此之我所依計何蘊為我，此從彼起，但總分別我、我所行。問：亦不分別計色之我是何我所之所從起，何但說言不分別所？答：我為根本，不從他起。言色是我，已分別訖，不是不分別其所起處，我所必依我見後起，故不同也。其六十二見等准此應知。六十五者，《婆沙》、《雜蘊》第一，世第一品末，第十卷約蘊、約界、處等分別。此言「等」者，等處、等界也。謂如以色為我，於餘四蘊各有三所，謂是我瓔珞、我僮僕、我器，即有十二；色為一我，即總十三也。如是五蘊有六十我所，五我見也，此皆分別行緣蘊，亦分別所起處。又此是分別所起，非是俱生，俱生之我不別計故。以何為證？五十八說：二十句薩迦耶見皆見苦斷，唯依分別，不依俱生。六十五見雖無正文，准二十句亦唯分別。此皆作意分別行，緣蘊等方始生故。然總緣蘊為我，亦通分別者，如《顯揚》說。此依一切異生為論，非依一人有此諸見。

The Commentary states: Regarding the twenty propositions, fascicle one of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: as in grasping form as self, self possessing form, form belonging to self, and self being within form. There are four for each aggregate, making twenty propositions for the five aggregates; within the twenty propositions, five are views of a self, and fifteen are views of what belongs to a self. Why are five views of a self and fifteen views of what belongs to a self? Because of what belongs to a self as associated, what belongs to a self as attendant, and what belongs to a self as unseparated; therefore fifteen kinds are what belongs to a self, as widely explained with questions and answers in fascicle one of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Discriminating the mode of activity in reference to the aggregates, but not discriminating the locus from which they arise, there are twenty propositions. 'Discriminating the mode of activity in reference to the aggregates': 'mode' refers to the cognitive mode of activity, which is the cognitive mode of activity of self and what belongs to a self. 'What' refers to what belongs to a self: as when merely discriminating the cognitive mode of activity of self and what belongs to a self with respect to the aggregate of form, without discriminating the locus from which this stated 'what belongs to a self' arises; for what belongs to a self must arise subsequent to the view of a self. Here, regarding the three [kinds of] belonging stated with respect to the aggregate of form, one does not discriminate by saying, 'Grasping which aggregate as a self does this belonging to a self rely on, and from which does it arise?'; one merely discriminates generally the modes of self and what belongs to a self. Question: Neither does one discriminate which 'what belongs to a self' the self that grasps form arises from; why only say that one does not discriminate the locus? Answer: The self is the fundamental root; it does not arise from another. When stating that form is the self, the discrimination is already complete; it is not that its locus of origin is not discriminated. What belongs to a self must arise subsequent to the view of a self, so they are not the same. The sixty-two views and so on should be understood by analogy with this. Regarding the sixty-five, fascicle ten—at the end of the chapter on Supreme Mundane Dharmas in the first [part] of the Saṃyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra (or Vibhāṣā)—discriminates them according to aggregates, dhātus, āyatanas, and so on. The word 'and so on' here encompasses āyatanas and dhātus. For instance, taking form as the self, each of the remaining four aggregates has three [relations of] belonging, namely being my ornament, my servant, and my utensil, thus making twelve; form as one self makes a total of thirteen. Thus across the five aggregates there are sixty [views of] what belongs to a self and five views of a self. These are all discriminating the mode of activity in reference to the aggregates, and also discriminating the locus from which they arise. Moreover, these are arisen through conceptual discrimination, not innate, because the innate self is not individually conceived. What proves this? Fascicle fifty-eight states: The twenty propositions of satkāyadṛṣṭi are all abandoned through seeing suffering, relying purely on conceptual discrimination, not on innate [afflictions]. Although the sixty-five views lack a direct text, by analogy with the twenty propositions they are also purely conceptually discriminated. This is because all of these arise only after purposive mental attention and discriminating modes of activity in reference to the aggregates, etc. However, grasping the aggregates collectively as a self also extends to conceptual discrimination, as stated in the Prakaraṇāryavācā. This is discussed based on all ordinary persons (pṛthagjana), not that a single person possesses all these views.