大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45.20

45.20

疏「四中初一」下，第三諸門分別，即《瑜伽論》。於中有三：初約離障言、次離煩惱、三是出離道者，欲為道障，今出離故。四是出離之道者，諸出離道能出於苦。然其後二並約離煩惱障，三是所離之障、四是能離之道，而三就離因為難、四就離果為難。亦可後二通約因位。疏「初二自利」下，第二二利料揀。然約答難，並是利他，如次下明。今約前二，就佛身難，是約自利德歎；後二約化他為難，故云利他。疏「所以自歎此四者」，第三彰歎所以。亦約被根差別，則皆是利他義。菩薩為求種智斷所知故，初一為之；二乘求盡諸漏，第二為之；欲皆障於三乘，三乘皆期出苦故，後二並為。疏「智論二十八」下，總示其源。然《菩薩藏經》第五、〈般若〉五十三、〈顯揚〉第四亦廣明之。此中即有次第出體。言次第者，德用自在，智最勝故，首而明之。由具一切智，能盡諸漏。由具智斷，說法化生。說法之中，先說生死因、後出生死故。而此一門，即前二利門中已攝此意。若《瑜伽》、《對法》，出苦為第三，障道為第四，先果後因，亦如苦集。又依上次者，即倒對四諦，謂一切智約真道為難，二約真滅為難，三約集因，四約苦果。未見經論，義必應然。若出體者，總有五種：一剋性體，即信，進，念，定，慧為體。二引發體，若定若慧。三最勝體，即正體，後得二智。四中，初一通二智，二即正體，三四皆後得，以是說法心故。若約自住，四皆正體。約能答難，此四並以後得為性。四相應體四蘊為性，五眷屬體五蘊為性。亦猶十力，道共、定共、無表戒色，助答難故。上之四體，即《瑜伽》五十七。及《雜集》說。《瑜伽》云「以信進念定慧及具知根為性。」《對法》云「若定若慧及彼相應諸心心所」，又云「若起作用，後得智為性；若住自性，正體智為體。」第五一體，亦以義加。又無畏若約德說，初即智德、二即斷德、三四恩德。今就能知，並智為體。餘義可知。第七無記。疏「今初，無記二義」下，即初徵名。於中四：一釋總名、二彰不答所以、三別示十四、四總會不同。今初。《刊定》亦立二義，而以前義為正；今依諸論，以後為正。《俱舍》第十九中，第二明無記中，自分為二：一明無記報、二因便明四記，前即對善惡之無記也，廣如彼論第二別明四無記事。頌曰「應一向分別，反詰捨置記，如死生殊勝，我蘊一異等。」釋曰：上兩句指事釋之。且問記有四：一應一向記、二應分別記、三應反詰記、四應捨置記（記者答也）。「如問死者，一切有情皆當死不？應一向記：一切有情皆定當死。如問生者，一切有情皆當生不？應分別記：有煩惱者受生，無煩惱者不生。如問殊勝，應反詰記。有作是問：人為勝劣？應反詰言：方何所問？若言方天，應言人劣；若言方下，應記人勝。」釋曰：下即惡趣。「如問我蘊一異者，謂若作是問：我與五蘊為一為異？應捨置記，此不應答。若有我體，可問一異；本無我體，一異不成。如問：石女生兒，為白為黑？應捨置記。謂石女本自無兒，何得論其白黑？」上依《毘婆沙》說。頌言等者，等取《發智》本論及契經說。今當敘經。云何有問應一向記？謂諸行皆無常耶？此問名應一向記。云何有問應分別記？謂若有問：諸有故思造作業已，為受何果？此問名為應分別記。造善受人天，造惡受惡趣。謂若有問：士夫報與我為一為異（此假問我）？應反詰言：汝依何我作是問？答言：依麁我（色蘊上我）。應記與報異（報色不同故言異也）。此問名為應反詰記。云何有問但應捨置答？若有問：世為常（一問）？無常（二問）？亦常亦無常（三問）？非常非無常（四問）？世為有邊（五問）？無邊（六問）？亦有邊亦無邊（七問）？非有邊非無邊（八問）？如來滅後為有（九問）？非有（十問）？亦有亦非有（十一問）？非有非非有（十二問）。為身者異命（十三問）？為命者異身（十四問）？此問名為但應捨置。此十四問，皆不可記，名十四不可記事。以我體既無，是故皆應捨置答也。《涅槃》三十五亦有四答，而一名小異。謂從經一半向後，因迦葉難佛性義有無，如來答云：「善男子！如來為眾生故有四種答：一者定答、二分別答、三者隨問答、四置答。如問作惡得何果耶？應答得苦果。是名定答。二善男子！如來十力、四無所畏、大悲、三念處、首楞嚴等八萬億諸三昧門、三十二相、八十種好、五智印等、三萬五千諸三昧門、金剛定等四千二百諸三昧門、方便三昧無量無邊，如是等法是佛性者。如是佛性則有七事：一常、二我、三樂、四淨、五真、六實、七善。是名分別答。如汝先問：斷善根人有佛性者，亦有如來佛性，亦有後身菩薩佛性，是二佛性障未盡故，得名為無，必定得故，得名為有。是名分別答。」三經云「如我所說一切法無常。復有問言：如是世尊為何法故說於無常？答言：為有為法故，無我亦爾。為何法故說一切燒？為煩惱故。是名隨問答。」四經云「若有說言：斷善根人定有佛性？定無佛性？是名置答。」下迦葉難云：「不答名置。如來今者何因緣答而名置答？」佛答云：「善男子！我亦不說置而不答名為置答。善男子！置答復二：一者遮止、二者莫著。以是義故，得名置答。」釋曰：據上諸文，明是不答以為無記，非善惡中之無記也。據十四難，正同《俱舍》。準《涅槃》意，今文正當為遮止義，兼令莫著。疏「所以不答」下，第二彰不答所以。於中二：先總出意，亦《智論》意。後「智論第三」下，正引論釋。先引第三有五復次，多同答十四難，兼經中諸無記法。如第一，無實事故，正答十四。第二車輪，即答何等為生死最初際。第三無利有失，兼答世界來去等，以從集因生歸寂滅理，妄徵來去即覆四諦。第四人不能知，兼答有幾佛幾眾生，以佛智知無盡法故。第五復次兼答佛等先後，通意可知。疏「第十七」下，二引此文，即引昔例。今其文稍略，具云：有一比丘於十四難思惟觀察不能通達，心不能忍，持衣鉢至佛所，白佛言：「佛能為我解此十四難，使我了者，當作弟子；若不能解，我當更求餘道。」佛告言：「癡人！汝共我要誓：『若答十四難，汝作我弟子』耶？」比丘言：「不也。」佛言：「汝癡人！今何以言：『若不答我，不作弟子。』我為老病死人說法濟度，此十四難是鬪諍法，於法無益、但是戲論，何用問為？若為汝答，汝心不了，至死不解，不能得脫生老病死。譬如有人身被毒箭，親屬呼醫欲為出箭塗藥，便言：『未可出箭。我先當知汝姓字親里父母年歲。次欲知箭出在何山、何木、何羽？作箭鏃者為是何人、是何等鐵？復欲知弓何山木、何蟲角？復欲知藥是何處生、是何種名？如是等事盡了知之，然後聽汝出箭塗藥。』」佛問比丘：「此人可得知此眾事然後出箭不？」比丘言：「不可得知。若待盡知，此則已死。」佛言：「汝亦如是。為邪見箭愛毒所塗已入汝心，欲拔此箭作我弟子？為不欲拔箭而欲求盡世間常無常邊無邊等？求之未得即失慧命，與畜生同死，自投黑暗。」比丘慚愧深識佛語，即得阿羅漢道。復次菩薩欲作一切智人，推求一切法真知其實相，十四難中不滯不礙。知其是心重病，能出能忍是名忍法。釋曰：即疏下文引論廣破，及經結多聞之意是也。論文引毒箭之喻，與《涅槃》大同，前已引竟。疏「楞伽亦云」下，即第三經，佛令慎勿習近世間諸論。舉昔有婆羅門來問我云：「瞿曇！一切所作耶？」我答婆羅門言：「一切所作是初世論。」彼復問言：「一切非所作耶？」我復報言：「一切非作是第二世論。」復問言：「一切常耶無常耶？生耶不生耶？」我報言：「是六世論。」復云：「一耶異耶？俱耶不俱耶？一切因種種受生現耶？」我報是言：「十一世論（廣說云云）。」我言：「悉是世論，非我所說，是汝世論。我唯說無始虛偽妄想習氣，種種諸惡三有之因，不能覺知自心現量，而生妄想攀緣外性。」彼復問云：「癡愛業因故有三有耶？為無明因耶？」我報言：「此二者亦是世論。」彼復問言：「一切法皆入自相共相耶？」我復報言：「此亦世論。婆羅門！乃至意流妄計外塵皆是世論。」又問：「頗有非世論不耶？」佛答意云：「外道中無。我論中有非世論。汝諸外道不能知，以於外性不實妄想虛偽計著故。謂妄想不生，覺了有無。自心現量妄想不生，不受外塵妄想永息，是名非世論。此是我法，非汝有也。」偈中云「乃至心流轉，是則為世論。妄想不轉者，是人見自心。來者謂事生，去者事不現，明了知去來，妄想不復生。」解曰：前偈無妄見，後偈了知妄滅。據今經文，正是前文一段所有妄計。其再問癡愛因緣等雖是正義，不了自心故為世論，故《智論》云「覆諸法實相」，亦同《涅槃》通遣著意。疏「言十四者」下，第三示十四相，可知。若曆五蘊三世成六十二見，如前已說。疏「然諸經論」下，第四總會異說。言「相或同異」者，多同少異。諸處亦說名十四不可說，《俱舍》十九已如上說，正與此同。《智論》十七即釋《大品》，《大品》二十一〈佛母品〉云「復次須菩提！佛因般若波羅蜜，諸眾生心數出沒屈伸如實知。『世尊！云何知之？』佛言：『一切眾生心數出沒屈伸，皆依色受想行識生。佛於如是中知眾生心數出沒屈伸，所謂神及世間常是事實，餘妄語，是見依色神及世間無常等三句準知。又世間有邊是事實，餘妄語等，四句準知，皆是見依色。』」末云「依受想行識亦如是。神即是身，是見依色等，異身亦然，依受想行識亦然。」又云「死後有如去，是事實，餘妄語。是見依色。二死後無如去，三死後或有如去、或無如去二句，同初結云依受想行識亦如是。」釋曰：斯即歷蘊諸句小異耳。《涅槃》三十九，先尼梵志問：「有我耶？無我耶？」等，廣有問難。亦是小異之相，繁不出之。

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Among the four, the first one,' this is the third [section], differentiating through various portals, which is based on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Within it are three [aspects]: first, spoken in terms of freedom from hindrances; second, freedom from defilements; third, being the path of departure, because desire is a hindrance to the path and now one departs from it. The fourth is 'the path of departure' [in that] all paths of departure can lead one out of suffering. However, the last two are both in terms of freedom from the hindrance of defilements: the third is the hindrance that is departed from, and the fourth is the path that is capable of departure; furthermore, the third raises difficulties regarding the cause of departure, while the fourth raises difficulties regarding the fruit of departure. Alternatively, both of the last two can be understood generally in terms of the causal stage.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The first two are self-benefit,' this is the second [section], weighing the two benefits. Yet in terms of answering difficulties, both are benefiting others, as explained immediately below. Now, in terms of the first two, raising difficulties regarding the Buddha’s body, this is praised in terms of the virtue of self-benefit; the latter two raise difficulties regarding transforming others, and thus are called benefiting others.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The reason for praising these four oneself,' this is the third [section], clarifying the reason for the praise. Also in terms of the differences in the faculties addressed, all hold the meaning of benefiting others. Because bodhisattvas seek the knowledge of all forms and sever what is known, the first is for them. Because the two vehicles seek to exhaust all outflows, the second is for them. Because desires hinder all three vehicles, and all three vehicles aspire to emerge from suffering, the latter two are for both.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The Dàzhìdù lùn, scroll twenty-eight,' this is a general indication of its source. However, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra, fascicle 5, the Prajñā[pāramitā], fascicle 53, and the Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle 4, also explain it extensively. Herein the essential nature is brought out in sequence. As for 'in sequence,' because the function of virtues is sovereign and wisdom is supreme, it is clarified first. By being endowed with all-knowledge, one can exhaust all outflows. By being endowed with wisdom and severance, one expounds the Dharma to transform living beings. Within expounding the Dharma, one first expounds the causes of birth-and-death and later emerging from birth-and-death. This single portal is already subsumed within the previous portal of the two benefits. In the Yogācāra and Abhidharma-samuccaya, emerging from suffering is third and obstructing the path is fourth, placing fruit first and cause later, just like suffering and accumulation. Furthermore, following the preceding sequence, it corresponds inversely to the four truths: all-knowledge raises difficulties regarding the true path, the second raises difficulties regarding true cessation, the third regarding the cause of accumulation, and the fourth regarding the fruit of suffering. Though not seen in the sūtras and treatises, its meaning must indeed be so.

As for bringing out the essential nature, there are five kinds in total: 1. The essential nature in its proper character: taking faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom as its nature. 2. The essential nature of what is induced: whether concentration or wisdom. 3. The supreme essential nature: the fundamental and subsequently attained cognitions. Among the four, the first encompasses both cognitions, the second is the fundamental, and the third and fourth are both subsequently attained, because they are minds that expound the Dharma. If in terms of abiding in oneself, all four are fundamental; in terms of being able to answer difficulties, all four take the subsequently attained as their nature. 4. The essential nature of association: taking the four aggregates as its nature. 5. The essential nature of retinue: taking the five aggregates as its nature, just like the ten powers, where path-concomitant, concentration-concomitant, and unmanifest form assist in answering difficulties. The four essential natures above are from Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 57 and the Abhidharma-samuccaya. The Yogācāra says: 'Taking faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, and the faculty of one who possesses complete knowledge as its nature.' The Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 'Whether concentration or wisdom, as well as the minds and mental factors associated with them.' It also says: 'If giving rise to function, it takes subsequently attained cognition as its nature; if abiding in its self-nature, it takes fundamental cognition as its nature.' The fifth essential nature is also added according to the principle. Furthermore, if fearlessness is spoken of in terms of virtue, the first is the virtue of wisdom, the second is the virtue of severance, and the third and fourth are the virtues of grace. Now, in terms of what is capable of knowing, all take wisdom as their nature. The remaining meanings can be known.

Seventh, the unexplained (avyākrata).

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Now first, the two meanings of unexplained,' this is first examining the name. Within it are four: 1. Explaining the general name; 2. Clarifying the reason for not answering; 3. Separately indicating the fourteen [points]; 4. Comprehensively reconciling the differences. Now for the first: The Kanding also posits two meanings, taking the former as correct; now, relying on the treatises, the latter is taken as correct. In the Abhidharmakośa, fascicle 19, the second [section] explaining the unexplained is divided into two: 1. Explaining indeterminate retribution; 2. Occasioned by this, explaining the four modes of answering questions. The former is the indeterminate in contrast to good and evil, as detailed in the second part of that treatise explaining the four unexplained matters. The verse says: 'One should answer categorically, through distinction, through counter-interrogation, and by setting aside, / As in death, birth, superiority, and the oneness or difference of the self and aggregates.' Commentary: The upper two lines point to the facts and explain them. Now, questions and answers are of four kinds: 1. Those to be answered categorically; 2. Those to be answered through distinction; 3. Those to be answered through counter-interrogation; 4. Those to be answered by setting aside (answering means declaring).

'Like asking about death: “Do all sentient beings die?” One should answer categorically: “All sentient beings will definitely die.” Like asking about birth: “Will all sentient beings be reborn?” One should answer through distinction: “Those with defilements take rebirth; those without defilements are not reborn.” Like asking about superiority, one should answer through counter-interrogation. If someone asks: “Are humans superior or inferior?” one should counter-interrogate: “In comparison to what do you ask?” If they say in comparison to devas, one should say humans are inferior; if they say in comparison to the lower realms, one should declare that humans are superior.' Commentary: 'Lower' means the miserable destinies.

'Like asking about the oneness or difference of the self and aggregates: that is, if one asks, “Are the self and the five aggregates identical or different?” one should answer by setting it aside; this should not be answered. If an entity of the self existed, one could ask about identity or difference; since fundamentally there is no entity of the self, identity or difference cannot be established. Just like asking, “Is the child born of a barren woman white or black?” one should answer by setting it aside. Because a barren woman fundamentally has no child, how could one discuss its being white or black?' The above is spoken according to the Mahāvibhāṣā. When the verse says 'and so forth,' it includes the fundamental treatise Jñānaprasthāna and what is taught in the sūtras. Now the sūtra shall be recounted:

What kind of question should be answered categorically? If it is asked: 'Are all conditioned phenomena impermanent?' this question is called one that should be answered categorically. What kind of question should be answered through distinction? If someone asks: 'Having deliberately performed an action, what fruit will one experience?' this question is called one that should be answered through distinction: performing good, one experiences human or deva realms; performing evil, one experiences the miserable destinies. If someone asks: 'Is the retribution of a person identical with or different from the self?' (this hypothetically asks about a self), one should counter-interrogate: 'Relying on what self do you ask this?' If they answer: 'Relying on the coarse self (the self upon the aggregate of form),' one should declare that it is different from the retribution (because retribution and form are different, one says different). This question is called one to be answered through counter-interrogation. What kind of question should only be answered by setting it aside? If someone asks: 'Is the world eternal (first question)? Impermanent (second question)? Both eternal and impermanent (third question)? Neither eternal nor impermanent (fourth question)? Is the world finite (fifth question)? Infinite (sixth question)? Both finite and infinite (seventh question)? Neither finite nor infinite (eighth question)? Does the Tathāgata exist after death (ninth question)? Not exist (tenth question)? Both exist and not exist (eleventh question)? Neither exist nor not exist (twelfth question)? Is the soul different from the body (thirteenth question)? Is the body different from the soul (fourteenth question)?' This question is called one that should only be answered by setting it aside. These fourteen questions cannot be determined, and are called the fourteen indeterminate matters. Because the entity of a self is non-existent, they must all be answered by setting them aside.

Fascicle 35 of the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra] also has four answers, though with a slight difference in one name. That is, from the second half of the sūtra onward, occasioning Kāśyapa’s objection about the existence or non-existence of Buddha-nature, the Tathāgata answers: 'Good son! For the sake of sentient beings, the Tathāgata has four kinds of answers: 1. Definitive answer; 2. Distinctive answer; 3. Answer according to the question; 4. Answer by setting aside. Like asking, “What fruit is obtained by doing evil?” one should answer that one obtains the fruit of suffering. This is called a definitive answer. 2. Good son! The Tathāgata’s ten powers, four fearlessnesses, great compassion, three applications of mindfulness, the Śūraṅgama and eighty-thousand million samādhi portals, the thirty-two marks, eighty secondary characteristics, five seals of wisdom, thirty-five thousand samādhi portals, the vajra-samādhi and four thousand two hundred samādhi portals, and immeasurable, boundless upāya-samādhis—such dharmas are Buddha-nature. Such Buddha-nature has seven attributes: 1. Eternal, 2. Self, 3. Bliss, 4. Purity, 5. True, 6. Real, 7. Good. This is called a distinctive answer. As you previously asked: “Does a person who has severed roots of goodness possess Buddha-nature?” They also possess the Tathāgata’s Buddha-nature, and also possess the Buddha-nature of a bodhisattva in their last lifetime; because the hindrances to these two Buddha-natures are not yet exhausted, they can be called non-existent, but because they are definitely attainable, they can be called existent. This is called a distinctive answer.' 3. The sūtra says: 'As I have said, all phenomena are impermanent. Then someone asks: “For the sake of what phenomenon does the World-Honoured One speak of impermanence?” The answer is: “For the sake of conditioned phenomena; non-self is likewise.” “For the sake of what phenomenon is it said that all is burning?” “For the sake of defilements.” This is called an answer according to the question.' 4. The sūtra says: 'If someone says: “Does a person who has severed roots of goodness definitely have Buddha-nature, or definitely lack Buddha-nature?” This is called an answer by setting aside.' Below, Kāśyapa raises an objection: 'Not answering is called setting aside. For what reason does the Tathāgata answer now and call it an answer by setting aside?' The Buddha answers: 'Good son! I do not say that setting aside without answering is called an answer by setting aside. Good son! An answer by setting aside also has two aspects: first, to prohibit; second, not to cling. Because of this meaning, it is called an answer by setting aside.'

Commentary: Relying on the above texts, it is clear that not answering constitutes the unexplained, not the indeterminate among good and evil. In terms of the fourteen difficulties, it is identical to the Abhidharmakośa. Conforming to the meaning of the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], the present text corresponds precisely to the meaning of prohibition, and concurrently causes one not to cling.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The reason for not answering,' this is the second [section], clarifying the reason for not answering. Within it are two: first, a general statement of the purport, which is also the purport of the Dàzhìdù lùn; later, 'The Dàzhìdù lùn, fascicle 3,' properly cites the treatise to explain. First, fascicle 3 is cited with five explanations, most of which correspond to answering the fourteen difficulties, and also cover the various unexplained phenomena in the sūtras. As for the first, because there is no real matter, it directly answers the fourteen. The second, the cartwheel, directly answers what is the original limit of birth-and-death. The third, having no benefit and causing harm, also answers the coming and going of the world, etc., because arising from the cause of accumulation returns to the principle of quiescence, and falsely investigating coming and going obscures the four truths. The fourth, that people cannot know, also answers how many Buddhas and how many sentient beings there are, because the Buddha’s wisdom knows inexhaustible phenomena. The fifth explanation also answers the sequence of Buddhas, etc. The general purport can be known.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Fascicle seventeen,' this second [part] cites this text, which invokes a past precedent. Now its text is somewhat abridged; fully it says: There was a monk who, contemplating and observing the fourteen difficulties, could not penetrate them; unable to bear it in his mind, he took his robes and bowl to the Buddha’s place and said to the Buddha: 'If the Buddha can explain these fourteen difficulties for me and make me understand, I will become your disciple; if you cannot explain them, I will seek another path.' The Buddha told him: 'Foolish man! Did you make a covenant with me: “If you answer the fourteen difficulties, I will become your disciple”?' The monk said: 'No.' The Buddha said: 'Foolish man! Why do you now say, “If you do not answer me, I will not become your disciple”? I expound the Dharma to save people afflicted with old age, sickness, and death. These fourteen difficulties are dharmas of dispute, of no benefit to the Dharma, and are mere prapañca; what is the use of asking them? If I were to answer you, your mind would not comprehend, and up until death you would not understand, unable to attain liberation from birth, old age, sickness, and death. For instance, suppose a man was struck by a poisoned arrow, and his relatives called a doctor wishing to draw out the arrow and apply medicine, but he said: “The arrow must not yet be drawn out. I must first know your name, clan, parents, and age. Next I wish to know from what mountain, what wood, and what feathers this arrow came; who made the arrow point, and what kind of iron it is; I also wish to know what mountain wood and what animal horn made the bow; I also wish to know where the medicine grew and what species name it has. Only after knowing all such matters will I allow you to draw out the arrow and apply medicine.”' The Buddha asked the monk: 'Could this man come to know all these things and then have the arrow drawn out?' The monk said: 'He could not know them. If he waited to know them all, he would already be dead.' The Buddha said: 'You are just like this. Struck by the arrow of wrong views smeared with the poison of craving, which has entered your heart, do you wish to pull out this arrow and become my disciple? Or do you not wish to pull out the arrow, but wish to seek the exhaustion of the world's eternity, impermanence, finitude, infinitude, and so on? Seeking it without attaining it, you will lose your wisdom-life, die together with beasts, and throw yourself into darkness.' Ashamed, the monk deeply understood the Buddha's words, and immediately attained the path of an arhat. Furthermore, if a bodhisattva wishes to become an omniscient person, investigating the truth of all phenomena and knowing their true nature, they do not stagnate or become obstructed within the fourteen difficulties. Knowing that this is a severe sickness of the mind, being able to emerge and endure is called the dharma of patience. Commentary: This is precisely what the lower text of the commentary extensively refutes by citing treatises, and the meaning of concluding with great learning in the sūtra. The treatise's citation of the simile of the poisoned arrow is largely identical to the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], which was already cited previously.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The Laṅkāvatāra also says,' this third sūtra has the Buddha instruct one to be careful not to practice or associate with worldly treatises. It relates: In the past a brāhmaṇa came and asked me: 'Gautama, is everything created?' I answered the brāhmaṇa: 'That everything is created is the first worldly treatise.' He asked again: 'Is everything uncreated?' I answered again: 'That everything is uncreated is the second worldly treatise.' He asked again: 'Is everything eternal or impermanent? Arisen or unarisen?' I answered: 'These are six worldly treatises.' He said again: 'Is it identical or different? Both or neither? Do all causes take birth and manifest through various conditions?' I answered: 'These are eleven worldly treatises' (and so on extensively). I said: 'All these are worldly treatises, not what I teach; they are your worldly treatises. I teach only the habit-energy of beginningless false and deceptive conceptual discrimination, the causes of all kinds of evil in the three realms of existence, wherein being unable to perceive the direct perception of one's own mind, one gives rise to conceptual discrimination, clinging to external entities.' He asked again: 'Does the existence of the three realms come from the cause of karma rooted in delusion and craving, or from the cause of ignorance?' I answered: 'Both of these are also worldly treatises.' He asked again: 'Do all phenomena enter into self-characteristics and common characteristics?' I answered again: 'This is also a worldly treatise. Brāhmaṇa, even the flow of mind falsely calculating external dusts is all worldly treatises.' He asked again: 'Is there anything that is not a worldly treatise?' The Buddha answered to the effect: 'Among the non-Buddhists there is none. In my teaching there is that which is not a worldly treatise. You non-Buddhists cannot know it, because of your false and deceptive grasping at external entities through untrue conceptual discrimination. When conceptual discrimination does not arise, one awakens to existence and non-existence. In the direct perception of one's own mind, conceptual discrimination does not arise, external dusts are not received, and conceptual discrimination is eternally stilled; this is called not a worldly treatise. This is my Dharma, not yours.' The verse says: 'As long as the mind flows on, / that is a worldly treatise. / When conceptual discrimination does not turn, / that person sees their own mind. / Coming means phenomena arise; / going means phenomena do not manifest. / Clearly understanding going and coming, / conceptual discrimination arises no more.' Explanation: The former verse shows no false views; the latter verse shows understanding the extinction of delusion. According to the present sūtra text, this is precisely all the false calculations of the previous section. Although asking again about the conditions of delusion and craving is correct principle, because of not understanding one's own mind, it constitutes worldly treatises; therefore the Dàzhìdù lùn says 'obscuring the true aspect of phenomena,' which also shares the purport of universally dispelling attachment in the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra].

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Speaking of the fourteen,' this third [section] indicates the characteristics of the fourteen, which can be known. If calculated through the five aggregates and three periods of time, they form the sixty-two views, as explained previously.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'However, across the sūtras and treatises,' this fourth [section] comprehensively reconciles different explanations. The phrase 'Characteristics may be identical or different' means mostly identical and slightly different. In various places they are also called the fourteen inexpressibles; fascicle 19 of the Abhidharmakośa has already been stated above and is identical to this. Fascicle 17 of the Dàzhìdù lùn explains the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā; chapter 21, the 'Buddha-Mother Chapter' of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, says: 'Furthermore, Subhūti! By means of the prajñāpāramitā, the Buddha knows as it truly is the emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of all sentient beings.' 'World-Honoured One! How are they known?' The Buddha said: 'The emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of all sentient beings all arise based on form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. The Buddha, within this, knows the emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of sentient beings; namely, “The soul and the world are eternal—this is truth, anything else is falsehood”—this view relies on form. The three phrases concerning the soul and the world being impermanent, etc., can be understood by analogy. Furthermore, “The world is finite—this is truth, anything else is falsehood,” and so on, the four phrases can be understood by analogy, all being views that rely on form.' At the end it says: 'Relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this. The soul being the body is a view relying on form, etc.; being different from the body is also like this; relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this.' It also says: '“After death there is a Tathāgata—this is truth, anything else is falsehood”—this is a view relying on form. Second, “After death there is no Tathāgata”; third, “After death there both is and is not a Tathāgata”—these two phrases, like the first, conclude: “Relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this.”' Commentary: These are merely minor differences in the various phrases across the aggregates. In the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], fascicle 39, the mendicant Śreṇika asks: 'Is there a self? Is there no self?' and raises objections extensively. These are also minor variations; being complicated, they are not brought out here.