大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45.20

45.20

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Among the four, the first one,' this is the third [section], differentiating through various portals, which is based on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Within it are three [aspects]: first, spoken in terms of freedom from hindrances; second, freedom from defilements; third, being the path of departure, because desire is a hindrance to the path and now one departs from it. The fourth is 'the path of departure' [in that] all paths of departure can lead one out of suffering. However, the last two are both in terms of freedom from the hindrance of defilements: the third is the hindrance that is departed from, and the fourth is the path that is capable of departure; furthermore, the third raises difficulties regarding the cause of departure, while the fourth raises difficulties regarding the fruit of departure. Alternatively, both of the last two can be understood generally in terms of the causal stage.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The first two are self-benefit,' this is the second [section], weighing the two benefits. Yet in terms of answering difficulties, both are benefiting others, as explained immediately below. Now, in terms of the first two, raising difficulties regarding the Buddha’s body, this is praised in terms of the virtue of self-benefit; the latter two raise difficulties regarding transforming others, and thus are called benefiting others.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The reason for praising these four oneself,' this is the third [section], clarifying the reason for the praise. Also in terms of the differences in the faculties addressed, all hold the meaning of benefiting others. Because bodhisattvas seek the knowledge of all forms and sever what is known, the first is for them. Because the two vehicles seek to exhaust all outflows, the second is for them. Because desires hinder all three vehicles, and all three vehicles aspire to emerge from suffering, the latter two are for both.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The Dàzhìdù lùn, scroll twenty-eight,' this is a general indication of its source. However, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra, fascicle 5, the Prajñā[pāramitā], fascicle 53, and the Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle 4, also explain it extensively. Herein the essential nature is brought out in sequence. As for 'in sequence,' because the function of virtues is sovereign and wisdom is supreme, it is clarified first. By being endowed with all-knowledge, one can exhaust all outflows. By being endowed with wisdom and severance, one expounds the Dharma to transform living beings. Within expounding the Dharma, one first expounds the causes of birth-and-death and later emerging from birth-and-death. This single portal is already subsumed within the previous portal of the two benefits. In the Yogācāra and Abhidharma-samuccaya, emerging from suffering is third and obstructing the path is fourth, placing fruit first and cause later, just like suffering and accumulation. Furthermore, following the preceding sequence, it corresponds inversely to the four truths: all-knowledge raises difficulties regarding the true path, the second raises difficulties regarding true cessation, the third regarding the cause of accumulation, and the fourth regarding the fruit of suffering. Though not seen in the sūtras and treatises, its meaning must indeed be so.

As for bringing out the essential nature, there are five kinds in total: 1. The essential nature in its proper character: taking faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom as its nature. 2. The essential nature of what is induced: whether concentration or wisdom. 3. The supreme essential nature: the fundamental and subsequently attained cognitions. Among the four, the first encompasses both cognitions, the second is the fundamental, and the third and fourth are both subsequently attained, because they are minds that expound the Dharma. If in terms of abiding in oneself, all four are fundamental; in terms of being able to answer difficulties, all four take the subsequently attained as their nature. 4. The essential nature of association: taking the four aggregates as its nature. 5. The essential nature of retinue: taking the five aggregates as its nature, just like the ten powers, where path-concomitant, concentration-concomitant, and unmanifest form assist in answering difficulties. The four essential natures above are from Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 57 and the Abhidharma-samuccaya. The Yogācāra says: 'Taking faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, and the faculty of one who possesses complete knowledge as its nature.' The Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 'Whether concentration or wisdom, as well as the minds and mental factors associated with them.' It also says: 'If giving rise to function, it takes subsequently attained cognition as its nature; if abiding in its self-nature, it takes fundamental cognition as its nature.' The fifth essential nature is also added according to the principle. Furthermore, if fearlessness is spoken of in terms of virtue, the first is the virtue of wisdom, the second is the virtue of severance, and the third and fourth are the virtues of grace. Now, in terms of what is capable of knowing, all take wisdom as their nature. The remaining meanings can be known.

Seventh, the unexplained (avyākrata).

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Now first, the two meanings of unexplained,' this is first examining the name. Within it are four: 1. Explaining the general name; 2. Clarifying the reason for not answering; 3. Separately indicating the fourteen [points]; 4. Comprehensively reconciling the differences. Now for the first: The Kanding also posits two meanings, taking the former as correct; now, relying on the treatises, the latter is taken as correct. In the Abhidharmakośa, fascicle 19, the second [section] explaining the unexplained is divided into two: 1. Explaining indeterminate retribution; 2. Occasioned by this, explaining the four modes of answering questions. The former is the indeterminate in contrast to good and evil, as detailed in the second part of that treatise explaining the four unexplained matters. The verse says: 'One should answer categorically, through distinction, through counter-interrogation, and by setting aside, / As in death, birth, superiority, and the oneness or difference of the self and aggregates.' Commentary: The upper two lines point to the facts and explain them. Now, questions and answers are of four kinds: 1. Those to be answered categorically; 2. Those to be answered through distinction; 3. Those to be answered through counter-interrogation; 4. Those to be answered by setting aside (answering means declaring).

'Like asking about death: “Do all sentient beings die?” One should answer categorically: “All sentient beings will definitely die.” Like asking about birth: “Will all sentient beings be reborn?” One should answer through distinction: “Those with defilements take rebirth; those without defilements are not reborn.” Like asking about superiority, one should answer through counter-interrogation. If someone asks: “Are humans superior or inferior?” one should counter-interrogate: “In comparison to what do you ask?” If they say in comparison to devas, one should say humans are inferior; if they say in comparison to the lower realms, one should declare that humans are superior.' Commentary: 'Lower' means the miserable destinies.

'Like asking about the oneness or difference of the self and aggregates: that is, if one asks, “Are the self and the five aggregates identical or different?” one should answer by setting it aside; this should not be answered. If an entity of the self existed, one could ask about identity or difference; since fundamentally there is no entity of the self, identity or difference cannot be established. Just like asking, “Is the child born of a barren woman white or black?” one should answer by setting it aside. Because a barren woman fundamentally has no child, how could one discuss its being white or black?' The above is spoken according to the Mahāvibhāṣā. When the verse says 'and so forth,' it includes the fundamental treatise Jñānaprasthāna and what is taught in the sūtras. Now the sūtra shall be recounted:

What kind of question should be answered categorically? If it is asked: 'Are all conditioned phenomena impermanent?' this question is called one that should be answered categorically. What kind of question should be answered through distinction? If someone asks: 'Having deliberately performed an action, what fruit will one experience?' this question is called one that should be answered through distinction: performing good, one experiences human or deva realms; performing evil, one experiences the miserable destinies. If someone asks: 'Is the retribution of a person identical with or different from the self?' (this hypothetically asks about a self), one should counter-interrogate: 'Relying on what self do you ask this?' If they answer: 'Relying on the coarse self (the self upon the aggregate of form),' one should declare that it is different from the retribution (because retribution and form are different, one says different). This question is called one to be answered through counter-interrogation. What kind of question should only be answered by setting it aside? If someone asks: 'Is the world eternal (first question)? Impermanent (second question)? Both eternal and impermanent (third question)? Neither eternal nor impermanent (fourth question)? Is the world finite (fifth question)? Infinite (sixth question)? Both finite and infinite (seventh question)? Neither finite nor infinite (eighth question)? Does the Tathāgata exist after death (ninth question)? Not exist (tenth question)? Both exist and not exist (eleventh question)? Neither exist nor not exist (twelfth question)? Is the soul different from the body (thirteenth question)? Is the body different from the soul (fourteenth question)?' This question is called one that should only be answered by setting it aside. These fourteen questions cannot be determined, and are called the fourteen indeterminate matters. Because the entity of a self is non-existent, they must all be answered by setting them aside.

Fascicle 35 of the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra] also has four answers, though with a slight difference in one name. That is, from the second half of the sūtra onward, occasioning Kāśyapa’s objection about the existence or non-existence of Buddha-nature, the Tathāgata answers: 'Good son! For the sake of sentient beings, the Tathāgata has four kinds of answers: 1. Definitive answer; 2. Distinctive answer; 3. Answer according to the question; 4. Answer by setting aside. Like asking, “What fruit is obtained by doing evil?” one should answer that one obtains the fruit of suffering. This is called a definitive answer. 2. Good son! The Tathāgata’s ten powers, four fearlessnesses, great compassion, three applications of mindfulness, the Śūraṅgama and eighty-thousand million samādhi portals, the thirty-two marks, eighty secondary characteristics, five seals of wisdom, thirty-five thousand samādhi portals, the vajra-samādhi and four thousand two hundred samādhi portals, and immeasurable, boundless upāya-samādhis—such dharmas are Buddha-nature. Such Buddha-nature has seven attributes: 1. Eternal, 2. Self, 3. Bliss, 4. Purity, 5. True, 6. Real, 7. Good. This is called a distinctive answer. As you previously asked: “Does a person who has severed roots of goodness possess Buddha-nature?” They also possess the Tathāgata’s Buddha-nature, and also possess the Buddha-nature of a bodhisattva in their last lifetime; because the hindrances to these two Buddha-natures are not yet exhausted, they can be called non-existent, but because they are definitely attainable, they can be called existent. This is called a distinctive answer.' 3. The sūtra says: 'As I have said, all phenomena are impermanent. Then someone asks: “For the sake of what phenomenon does the World-Honoured One speak of impermanence?” The answer is: “For the sake of conditioned phenomena; non-self is likewise.” “For the sake of what phenomenon is it said that all is burning?” “For the sake of defilements.” This is called an answer according to the question.' 4. The sūtra says: 'If someone says: “Does a person who has severed roots of goodness definitely have Buddha-nature, or definitely lack Buddha-nature?” This is called an answer by setting aside.' Below, Kāśyapa raises an objection: 'Not answering is called setting aside. For what reason does the Tathāgata answer now and call it an answer by setting aside?' The Buddha answers: 'Good son! I do not say that setting aside without answering is called an answer by setting aside. Good son! An answer by setting aside also has two aspects: first, to prohibit; second, not to cling. Because of this meaning, it is called an answer by setting aside.'

Commentary: Relying on the above texts, it is clear that not answering constitutes the unexplained, not the indeterminate among good and evil. In terms of the fourteen difficulties, it is identical to the Abhidharmakośa. Conforming to the meaning of the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], the present text corresponds precisely to the meaning of prohibition, and concurrently causes one not to cling.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The reason for not answering,' this is the second [section], clarifying the reason for not answering. Within it are two: first, a general statement of the purport, which is also the purport of the Dàzhìdù lùn; later, 'The Dàzhìdù lùn, fascicle 3,' properly cites the treatise to explain. First, fascicle 3 is cited with five explanations, most of which correspond to answering the fourteen difficulties, and also cover the various unexplained phenomena in the sūtras. As for the first, because there is no real matter, it directly answers the fourteen. The second, the cartwheel, directly answers what is the original limit of birth-and-death. The third, having no benefit and causing harm, also answers the coming and going of the world, etc., because arising from the cause of accumulation returns to the principle of quiescence, and falsely investigating coming and going obscures the four truths. The fourth, that people cannot know, also answers how many Buddhas and how many sentient beings there are, because the Buddha’s wisdom knows inexhaustible phenomena. The fifth explanation also answers the sequence of Buddhas, etc. The general purport can be known.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Fascicle seventeen,' this second [part] cites this text, which invokes a past precedent. Now its text is somewhat abridged; fully it says: There was a monk who, contemplating and observing the fourteen difficulties, could not penetrate them; unable to bear it in his mind, he took his robes and bowl to the Buddha’s place and said to the Buddha: 'If the Buddha can explain these fourteen difficulties for me and make me understand, I will become your disciple; if you cannot explain them, I will seek another path.' The Buddha told him: 'Foolish man! Did you make a covenant with me: “If you answer the fourteen difficulties, I will become your disciple”?' The monk said: 'No.' The Buddha said: 'Foolish man! Why do you now say, “If you do not answer me, I will not become your disciple”? I expound the Dharma to save people afflicted with old age, sickness, and death. These fourteen difficulties are dharmas of dispute, of no benefit to the Dharma, and are mere prapañca; what is the use of asking them? If I were to answer you, your mind would not comprehend, and up until death you would not understand, unable to attain liberation from birth, old age, sickness, and death. For instance, suppose a man was struck by a poisoned arrow, and his relatives called a doctor wishing to draw out the arrow and apply medicine, but he said: “The arrow must not yet be drawn out. I must first know your name, clan, parents, and age. Next I wish to know from what mountain, what wood, and what feathers this arrow came; who made the arrow point, and what kind of iron it is; I also wish to know what mountain wood and what animal horn made the bow; I also wish to know where the medicine grew and what species name it has. Only after knowing all such matters will I allow you to draw out the arrow and apply medicine.”' The Buddha asked the monk: 'Could this man come to know all these things and then have the arrow drawn out?' The monk said: 'He could not know them. If he waited to know them all, he would already be dead.' The Buddha said: 'You are just like this. Struck by the arrow of wrong views smeared with the poison of craving, which has entered your heart, do you wish to pull out this arrow and become my disciple? Or do you not wish to pull out the arrow, but wish to seek the exhaustion of the world's eternity, impermanence, finitude, infinitude, and so on? Seeking it without attaining it, you will lose your wisdom-life, die together with beasts, and throw yourself into darkness.' Ashamed, the monk deeply understood the Buddha's words, and immediately attained the path of an arhat. Furthermore, if a bodhisattva wishes to become an omniscient person, investigating the truth of all phenomena and knowing their true nature, they do not stagnate or become obstructed within the fourteen difficulties. Knowing that this is a severe sickness of the mind, being able to emerge and endure is called the dharma of patience. Commentary: This is precisely what the lower text of the commentary extensively refutes by citing treatises, and the meaning of concluding with great learning in the sūtra. The treatise's citation of the simile of the poisoned arrow is largely identical to the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], which was already cited previously.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The Laṅkāvatāra also says,' this third sūtra has the Buddha instruct one to be careful not to practice or associate with worldly treatises. It relates: In the past a brāhmaṇa came and asked me: 'Gautama, is everything created?' I answered the brāhmaṇa: 'That everything is created is the first worldly treatise.' He asked again: 'Is everything uncreated?' I answered again: 'That everything is uncreated is the second worldly treatise.' He asked again: 'Is everything eternal or impermanent? Arisen or unarisen?' I answered: 'These are six worldly treatises.' He said again: 'Is it identical or different? Both or neither? Do all causes take birth and manifest through various conditions?' I answered: 'These are eleven worldly treatises' (and so on extensively). I said: 'All these are worldly treatises, not what I teach; they are your worldly treatises. I teach only the habit-energy of beginningless false and deceptive conceptual discrimination, the causes of all kinds of evil in the three realms of existence, wherein being unable to perceive the direct perception of one's own mind, one gives rise to conceptual discrimination, clinging to external entities.' He asked again: 'Does the existence of the three realms come from the cause of karma rooted in delusion and craving, or from the cause of ignorance?' I answered: 'Both of these are also worldly treatises.' He asked again: 'Do all phenomena enter into self-characteristics and common characteristics?' I answered again: 'This is also a worldly treatise. Brāhmaṇa, even the flow of mind falsely calculating external dusts is all worldly treatises.' He asked again: 'Is there anything that is not a worldly treatise?' The Buddha answered to the effect: 'Among the non-Buddhists there is none. In my teaching there is that which is not a worldly treatise. You non-Buddhists cannot know it, because of your false and deceptive grasping at external entities through untrue conceptual discrimination. When conceptual discrimination does not arise, one awakens to existence and non-existence. In the direct perception of one's own mind, conceptual discrimination does not arise, external dusts are not received, and conceptual discrimination is eternally stilled; this is called not a worldly treatise. This is my Dharma, not yours.' The verse says: 'As long as the mind flows on, / that is a worldly treatise. / When conceptual discrimination does not turn, / that person sees their own mind. / Coming means phenomena arise; / going means phenomena do not manifest. / Clearly understanding going and coming, / conceptual discrimination arises no more.' Explanation: The former verse shows no false views; the latter verse shows understanding the extinction of delusion. According to the present sūtra text, this is precisely all the false calculations of the previous section. Although asking again about the conditions of delusion and craving is correct principle, because of not understanding one's own mind, it constitutes worldly treatises; therefore the Dàzhìdù lùn says 'obscuring the true aspect of phenomena,' which also shares the purport of universally dispelling attachment in the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra].

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Speaking of the fourteen,' this third [section] indicates the characteristics of the fourteen, which can be known. If calculated through the five aggregates and three periods of time, they form the sixty-two views, as explained previously.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'However, across the sūtras and treatises,' this fourth [section] comprehensively reconciles different explanations. The phrase 'Characteristics may be identical or different' means mostly identical and slightly different. In various places they are also called the fourteen inexpressibles; fascicle 19 of the Abhidharmakośa has already been stated above and is identical to this. Fascicle 17 of the Dàzhìdù lùn explains the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā; chapter 21, the 'Buddha-Mother Chapter' of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, says: 'Furthermore, Subhūti! By means of the prajñāpāramitā, the Buddha knows as it truly is the emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of all sentient beings.' 'World-Honoured One! How are they known?' The Buddha said: 'The emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of all sentient beings all arise based on form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. The Buddha, within this, knows the emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of sentient beings; namely, “The soul and the world are eternal—this is truth, anything else is falsehood”—this view relies on form. The three phrases concerning the soul and the world being impermanent, etc., can be understood by analogy. Furthermore, “The world is finite—this is truth, anything else is falsehood,” and so on, the four phrases can be understood by analogy, all being views that rely on form.' At the end it says: 'Relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this. The soul being the body is a view relying on form, etc.; being different from the body is also like this; relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this.' It also says: '“After death there is a Tathāgata—this is truth, anything else is falsehood”—this is a view relying on form. Second, “After death there is no Tathāgata”; third, “After death there both is and is not a Tathāgata”—these two phrases, like the first, conclude: “Relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this.”' Commentary: These are merely minor differences in the various phrases across the aggregates. In the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], fascicle 39, the mendicant Śreṇika asks: 'Is there a self? Is there no self?' and raises objections extensively. These are also minor variations; being complicated, they are not brought out here.