大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 20

English (machine translation) 20

Language: English

20.1

Expounded by the śramaṇa Chengguan of Da Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

Section 7: Praising and Extolling Virtues. First, stating the heading, which has two parts: First, in contrast to the titles of the ten sections, it praises and extols the virtues of the Fundamental Teacher. Second, when it says "it is also the launching preface," this is in contrast to the tripartite division of the sūtra into introductory, central doctrine, and transmission sections. The first chapter is the introduction, which conventionally is divided into two: first, certifying faith; second, launching. Now, the previous six sections are all considered certifying faith, and the following four sections together constitute the launching. Praising launches the Buddha's virtues; bringing forth the assembly reveals the Buddha's function. The actual launching in the Great Sūtra is different: ancient masters merely used auspicious omens of heaven and earth as the launching.

20.3

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Second, universally revealing the causes and conditions of virtuous conduct": the commentary's text has two parts: first, universally displaying the general idea; second, structural division and explanation. Now, as for the first, it directly explains the heading text: why it is named universally revealing the causes and conditions of virtuous conduct. First, explaining "universally revealing": it naturally has two senses. First, looking back from the preceding, it is universal: the previous forty assemblies each revealed superior virtues according to what was appropriate, so what was revealed was restricted—such as revealing the ocean spirits by saying "the ocean of the Buddha's merits filled their bodies," and so forth—whereas now it universally reveals the virtues of all forty assemblies. Second, looking forward to what follows, it is universal: the subsequent forty assemblies each attain distinct dharmas, whereas now it universally reveals their possession of virtues. From "previously born together" onward, it follows the track to construct an objection. That is, someone objects: "The previous section revealing those born together stated that all gathered roots of goodness together with Vairocana—is this not universal?" Therefore, it now answers: "The previous was restricted to those born together, whereas this encompasses both the common and the distinct; only then can the virtues of the forty assemblies be called universal." Furthermore, previously it clarified their gathering together; below it resolves the objection again: not only are the universal and specific unequal, but there is also truly a difference in the textual purport. Previously it said gathering together, which is on par with the Buddha's virtue, hence they are the host and companions; now it says having been gathered and embraced, being exclusively gathered and embraced by the Buddha, hence they are retinue. In order to distinguish the two senses, the previous text omitted gathering and embracing, and this text omits gathering together; they may implicitly evoke each other, hence it says "the text mutually shadows and omits."

20.4

The commentary says: "This text has multiple dispositions," below which is the second part, structural division. Saying "multiple dispositions" means that it may either be divided into three or into two. In dividing into two, the designations established may also differ. Within this, there are three parts: first, dividing into three; second, the discerning classification below "the beginning and end are causes"; third, contrasting with the preceding provisional word below "moreover, the first section", because now dividing into two, "having long embraced" and "now seeing" are also discerning classifications. Among the three parts above, the second is conditions. That the beginning and end are causes is explained in terms of self-cultivation being the cause, and the Buddha's embrace being the condition. Now being able to see the Buddha is due to having been embraced in the past; embrace is the proximate cause. Since cause and condition are manifest as the stimulus, having been embraced in the past, he consequently responds.

20.5

Regarding the commentary's statement, "As for 'all,' it refers to both discriminated and innate [obscurations], whether seeds or manifest activity": this means that the two obscurations are each twofold. First is the discriminated, which is due to false teachers, false teachings, and false conceptualization; this is severed on the path of seeing, and when one enters the first bhūmi it is severed and eradicated forever. Second is the innate, which does not depend on the previous two, but exists spontaneously from birth; this is severed on the path of cultivation, being severed bhūmi by bhūmi. These are again twofold: first, manifest activity, and second, seeds. As for the manifest activity of the cognitive obscuration, it is severed bhūmi by bhūmi. As for the manifest activity of the afflictive obscuration, it is also severed bhūmi by bhūmi. The seeds of affliction are severed continuously right up to the vajropamasamādhi. As for the commentary's statement, "The subtle traces and heavy residues of the heavy residues of the two obscurations": the subtle traces of the two obscurations are just what is formed through perfuming; they are called habit-energies to distinguish them from manifest obscurations. However, habit-energies are twofold: cause and fruit. Those that can serve as causes for actively manifest obscurations are also called seeds. These causal habit-energies are severed by fundamental cognition; when this cause is severed, manifest [obscurations] no longer arise, and hence they do not produce manifest causes. Those that are merely heavy residues are called solely habit-energies; these fruitional habit-energies are severed by subsequently acquired cognition, because when manifest heavy residues are severed, one knows that manifest [obscurations] do not exist. As for "heavy residue," it is so called because it contradicts what is fine and light. However, heavy residues are threefold: first, actively manifest heavy residues, because greed, anger, delusion, and so forth make the practitioner's mind unfit. Second, seed heavy residues, because the seeds of affliction obstruct all cognitions. Third, the heavy residues of heavy residues, which are not actually afflictions but resemble afflictions, such as Śāriputra's habit-energy of anger, Pilindavatsa's habit-energy of arrogance, and the like. Here it is the third, because the sūtra speaks of "residual habit-energies," and also because the stage is ultimate. The previous two are subsumed under "all"; thus the commentary explains, "whether seeds or manifest activity." Above it says "already severed," which implies the path capable of severing, distinguishing it from the path of suppression; hence it says "already severed." Paths of severing are twofold: first, fundamental non-conceptual cognition, which directly realizes the true principle revealed by the two empties; because it is free of objective marks, it can sever the seeds and manifest activity of the two obscurations. Second, subsequently acquired non-conceptual cognition: although it does not directly realize [it] and lacks the power to sever the dormant latencies that delude principle, nevertheless, because it has clear, immediate, and unerring realization regarding established and unestablished marks, it can also permanently sever those dormant latencies that delude phenomena, which are severed by cultivation. All the above represents the purport of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. There is another explanation: within the cognitive obscuration there are also two kinds. First is that which can obstruct the objective sphere of what is to be known, which is non-defiled unknowing and not grasping at dharmas. For example, regarding the five fields of knowledge, if there is something not yet understood, it is merely unknowing; how could there ever be grasping? However, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says: "Because of grasping at self and dharmas, the two obscurations arise together. If one realizes the two empties, those obscurations are accordingly severed." This is spoken in terms of the discriminated obscurations of the path of seeing, because one severs obscurations by realizing the principle of emptiness. When it says it is an obscuration and not grasping, this is spoken in terms of severing the innate obscurations on the path of cultivation, because universally knowing existent things accomplishes all-knowledge. The above is the obscuration of what is to be known. Second, what is to be known is itself the obscuration; hence it is named "cognitive obscuration." Its essence is simply wholesome minds and mental factors; because those two marks of emptiness and existence have not yet been eliminated, contemplating the mind with marks still entails grasping. The former is based on comprehending the conventional; the latter is based on realizing the real; hence it is called the obscuration to cognition. The antidotes to this obscuration are also twofold: first, understanding existence; second, penetrating emptiness; for when both emptiness and existence are clearly illuminated, it is called universal knowing. However, the orthodox doctrine of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi is solely the obscuration of what is to be known. Here, based on its theoretical coherence, it is also employed. Question: If the permanent severance of habit-energies belongs solely to the Tathāgata, why does this also state that all are already severed? Answer: There are two explanations for this. First, in terms of characteristic marks of dharmas, complete and absolute eradication belongs solely to the Tathāgata. If considered in terms of progressive separation, it also extends to bodhisattvas. For the sūtra teaches three kinds of heavy residues severed across three positions. The Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra teaches three heavy residues: first, in the skin, severed at the first bhūmi; second, in the flesh, severed only at the eighth bhūmi; third, in the bone, severed solely at the Buddha-bhūmi. Although other stages also sever heavy residues, these three stages are prominent; therefore, it speaks particularly of the first bhūmi because it abandons the ordinary and enters the stage of the noble; the eighth bhūmi, because undefiled [cognition] is constantly continuous; and the Buddha-bhūmi, because the fruit is complete and they can be abandoned all at once. Moreover, these are precisely bodhisattvas of the eighth bhūmi; hence it says "severed." Second, in terms of perfect fusion, it is as clearly shown in the commentary text.

20.6

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Giving is the condition for gathering," etc.: this briefly illustrates the characteristics of the four means of gathering. However, the Yogācārabhūmi states that each has nine categories; when we reach the "Chapter on Xianshou," we will briefly explain them.

20.7

Regarding the commentary's statement, "having already surpassed the extraordinary wholesome roots of the seventh bhūmi": because on the seventh bhūmi there is expedient wisdom within emptiness and extraordinary practice within existence, and effortful practice is fulfilled, it is therefore called "immeasurable."

20.8

Regarding the commentary's statement, "the one path and the immeasurable paths": as for the "one path," it is because all unimpeded people leave birth-and-death via a single path. The "Chapter on Leaving the World" states: "The one path is the bodhisattva path, because of not abandoning the sole bodhicitta. The two paths are the bodhisattva path, namely upāya and prajñā." There are three paths, four paths, and up to ten paths. It also states: "Bodhisattvas have immeasurable paths, immeasurable auxiliary paths, immeasurable paths of cultivation, and immeasurable paths of adornment." Each briefly enumerates ten lines; thus the myriad practices that meet the eye are all the bodhisattva path.

20.9

From the commentary's "In particles of dust, hairs, kṣetras, and oceans" downward: the above was the purport of common-characteristic prajñā; this is the profound purport of the One Vehicle of the Avataṃsaka.

20.10

From the commentary's statement, "This passage is particular relative to what precedes," downward: it generally displays the purport of the text. In the text on generally possessing virtues, there are three sections; in the third, "virtuous practices being complete," there are themselves seven phrases; here there are only two, hence it says "particular." Since it speaks of attaining the liberation-gates of all Buddhas, this is the general heading for the more than four hundred gates. Although the meaning faces in both directions, structurally it provisionally belongs to what precedes.

20.11

Regarding the commentary's statement, "First, mounting the cause to enter the fruit": taking the power of superior understanding is mounting the cause; entering the great sea of the Tathāgata's virtues is entering the fruit. "Chong" means harmonious, deep, empty, high, and rising. Here it specifically means rising, with the sense also encompassing emptiness and height.

20.12

Regarding the commentary's statement, "It is also superior understanding sealing and sustaining the fruitional virtues": previously, sealing words meant that inferentially knowing the two adornments and compassion are all the path of teaching. Here, sealing the fruit means that the mind secretly merges with the fruitional sea as the path of realization. Regarding the commentary's statement, "As for the term 'liberation-gate'": first it generally explains, and afterward perfectly fuses. In the former, there are three explanations: first, the three characters "liberation-gate" all belong to the Buddha; second, "liberation" belongs to the fruit, and "gate" belongs to the ocean-like assembly; third, all three characters belong to the ocean-like assembly. In this there are two: first, in terms of the cause, distinguishing one's own sphere into subjective and objective; second, taking what is already liberated and looking toward the fruit as the gate.

20.13

From the commentary's "However, general and particular" downward: second is perfect fusion. It fuses the three meanings above: general and particular being perfectly fused fuses the first meaning; cause and fruit interpenetrating fuses the latter two meanings; and multilayered unimpededness runs through all three meanings above. For instance, just as the general contains the particular and the particular also contains the general, within a single liberation-gate there are all liberation-gates, and so forth; contemplate this. Regarding the commentary's "In terms of contemplating the mind": in the commentary, first it directly explains. Next, from "If taking the gate" downward, it clears away traces, first concluding in reverse; afterward, from "directly entering" downward, it directly concludes: subject and object both being quiescent is called "both obliterated"; the gate and principle being clearly distinct is called "directly entering." Directly entering means principle is completely tallied with; both obliterated means faults are completely stilled.

20.14

Regarding the commentary's statement, "and the principle of emptiness and existence matching the real": this emptiness is external emptiness. If one contrasts the emptiness of principle with external emptiness, external emptiness detached from dharmas is annihilationist emptiness, whereas the emptiness of principle identical with phenomena is true emptiness. If external emptiness is also manifested by the mind, and is also revealed through opposing form and extinguishing form, then this extinguished emptiness, lacking intrinsic nature due to conditions, is precisely emptiness of intrinsic nature. Therefore, when the eighteen kinds of emptiness explain the "great emptiness," it refers to the emptiness of the ten directions—that is, the space of the ten directions—which is also emptiness of intrinsic nature. Therefore the commentary says, "the principle of emptiness and existence matching the real"; that is, the emptiness of existence is in every case the emptiness of intrinsic nature.

20.15

Regarding the commentary's statement, "First, clarifying that the previous great functioning has the functioning of no functioning-marks," etc.: within these two meanings, first, functioning is identical with the quiescence of essence; second, functioning is identical with the omnipresence of essence. As for the two upāyas: first, due to forgetting quiescence, it does not impede functioning; second, due to relying on quiescence, it can give rise to functioning.

20.16

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Third, liberation of self-characteristics": because all dharmas are distinct from one another—form is not mind, etc.—they are called self-characteristics. Now none of them arise; hence it is called liberation. This clarifies that without those marks of arising, the essence of dharmas does not arise; hence they are called self-characteristics. If one simply dispels the marks of arising, abiding, and ceasing, they are also common characteristics. The commentary text has four parts: first, a brief structural explanation; second, from "However, not arising" downward, opening the topical headings; third, from "Distinguishing explanations" downward, explaining individually according to the headings; fourth, from "This is the correct Dharma" downward, concluding with an exhortation. In the third, there are three explanations: first, particular explanation; second, general explanation; third, progressive explanation. In the first of these, the text has two parts: first, explaining non-arising and non-ceasing; second, explaining non-coming and non-going. In the first of these, there are five levels: the first three separately rely on the three natures and their texts are identical; the fourth unites the previous three with differing meanings; the fifth perfectly fuses the four propositions without impediment. In separately relying on the three natures, each has three explanations: the first universally speaks in terms of the nature itself; the second speaks in terms of the two meanings of that nature; the third speaks in contrast to the three non-natures, where only the two meanings of the consummate nature differ slightly. How do the three natures each have two meanings? For the parikalpita there are two: first, existent to perception; second, non-existent in principle. For the paratantra there are two: first, conditionally arisen; second, without intrinsic nature. For the pariniṣpanna there are two: first, existent as nature; second, non-existent as marks.

20.17

From the commentary's "First, in terms of the parikalpita" downward: the three meanings of the parikalpita. First, the parikalpita has no essence, like a snake on a rope; therefore there is nothing that can arise or cease. Second, regarding the two meanings: existent to perception would correspond to arising; non-existent in principle, its essence is ceasing. Now this existence to perception is precisely non-existence in principle; how could there be arising? Precisely where it is non-existent in principle, only there is it existent to perception; therefore it is not ceasing. The others below can be understood by analogy. Third, in contrast to the non-natures: due to the absence of the parikalpita, the absence of marks is revealed; hence the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi says, "Relying precisely on these three natures, those three non-natures are taught." From this we know that if there were no parikalpita, how could one know the absence of marks? Below is also analogous.

20.18

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Second, in terms of the nature of dependent origination": first, universally speaking, dharmas of causes and conditions arise in dependence on other [factors]; because what is produced by causes and conditions has no arising, the sūtra therefore says: "All dharmas have no coming; therefore they have no arising. Since arising does not exist, ceasing also cannot be attained." Second, in explaining the two meanings, "Furthermore, because dependent origination is without intrinsic nature": conditioned arising is precisely devoid of intrinsic nature. "Dependent origination devoid of intrinsic nature": being devoid of intrinsic nature is precisely the nature of conditions. The former line means empty because of causes and conditions; this line means existent because of lacking intrinsic nature. Hence it cites the Madhyamakaśāstra: "Because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas can be accomplished," which solely proves the latter line. Third, in revealing the non-nature: if there were no causes and conditions, one would not know the absence of intrinsic nature; hence the treatise analyzes with the four propositions: "Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another, nor from both, nor without cause; therefore one knows there is no arising." If one does not examine this, how could one know non-arising? Non-arising is precisely the nature of arising without intrinsic nature.

20.19

On the commentary's "Third, in terms of the consummate [nature]...", the first meaning is self-evident. In the second [explanation], concerning the two meanings, it differs slightly from the preceding two. That is, the second and third are both in terms of two meanings; the second refers to the two meanings of the Dharma-characteristic tradition (Dharmalakṣaṇa), revealing the meaning of naturelessness upon these two meanings. Namely, because it is not an object of the deluded mind, this is the meaning of the absence of characteristics. Because it is verified by noble cognition, this is the meaning of the presence of the nature. And because it is not an object of the deluded mind, it is far removed from grasping at self and dharmas, thereby enabling the manifestation of the naturelessness of ultimate meaning (paramārthanihsvabhāvatā). As for the third [passage] stating "Furthermore, its essence does not undergo change..." onwards, this is in terms of unchangingness and concordance with conditions. These are the two meanings within the Dharma-nature tradition (Dharmatā): since it is unchanging, it is unarisen; and because it is unchanging, it is able to accord with conditions; thus, unarisen is the meaning of unceasing. Since concordance with conditions constitutes unceasing, and because by according with conditions it does not forfeit its own-nature, one then knows that unchanging, hence unceasing, is the meaning of unarisen. Therefore it says, "they are a single entity."

20.20

Regarding the commentary's "Fourth, comprehensively in terms of the three natures..." and so forth: this combines the preceding three, yet their meanings are entirely distinct; in principle, it actually combines the three natures and three naturelessnesses to form four propositions (catuṣkoṭi). Just as a single thought-moment flickers into arising in an instant, it possesses the six meanings. That is, a single thought-moment is a conditionally arisen dharma, which is the dependent nature (paratantra); mentally imputing it to be real is the imagined nature (parikalpita); its essence being fundamentally empty and quiescent is the consummate nature (pariniṣpanna). The three natures are fully present. Since the three naturelessnesses are explained precisely based on the three natures, the six meanings are fully present. Now, on the basis of the three natures, three propositions are established, and together upon the three naturelessnesses one proposition is established: that is, upon a single thought, since the principle is fundamentally non-existent, the imagined is unarisen; the fundamentally non-existent principle is precisely the consummate, hence unceasing; the dependent is natureless, hence also unarisen, yet without destroying characteristics, hence also unceasing. The three propositions are fully present. As for the statement "in terms of the three naturelessnesses, it is neither unarisen nor unceasing": above, in terms of the imagined, it was unarisen, but now the imagined is itself natureless, hence that 'unarisen' does not exist, which constitutes 'not unarisen'. Above, in terms of the consummate, it was unceasing, but now the consummate is itself the naturelessness of ultimate meaning, hence 'not unceasing'. Above, in terms of the dependent, it was both unarisen and unceasing, but now the dependent is itself the naturelessness of arising (utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā), so how could there be 'both unarisen and unceasing'? Therefore, the three natures above do not go beyond unarisen and unceasing. Now, reversing those three natures to form the three naturelessnesses, it is a double negation. In the fifth, the four propositions are merged without obstruction. Because upon a single thought-moment and upon a single fine particle the six meanings are present, they are completely merged. When it says 'combining the four propositions', this does not mean the four propositions of the fourth portal, but rather combines the preceding two types of four propositions, general and specific.

20.21

Under the commentary's "Second, neither coming nor going", there are three meanings in the explanation: first, solely in terms of essence; second, activating function based on essence; third, subsuming function back into essence. In the first, turning away and abandoning would be going, yet it says 'not going' because cognition illuminates delusion as empty, leaving nothing to abandon, and illuminating affliction as baseless is itself the cognitive essence. 'Approaching and verifying the true principle' should be the meaning of coming, as in 'Tathāgata'. Yet it says 'not coming' because the real cannot be attained. The illuminated essence has no selfhood and is itself the true principle. Therefore the sūtra states: 'The Tathāgata comes from nowhere.'

20.22

Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, activating function based on essence..." and so forth: this is the second, explaining in terms of both essence and function together. Activating function based on essence is therefore going, but because it is function identical with essence, it does not go. Manifesting before [beings] in response to their capacities should be coming, but because the response does not separate from essence—like the reflection of the moon—it does not come.

20.23

Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, proceeding to respond to the multitudes of capacities yet not going..." and so forth: this is the third, explaining solely in terms of function. Proceeding to respond should be going, but because the response lacks the characteristic of a response, it does not go. 'Constantly returning to quiescence' should be coming, but because cessation cannot be attained, it does not come. Furthermore, being function identical with essence, it proceeds without going; because function is identical with essence, it returns without coming. Now, the preceding [explanation] explained going with respect to the Buddha and coming with respect to capacities, whereas this one explains going with respect to capacities and coming with respect to the Buddha. Furthermore, the preceding was seeing the Buddha come in relation to capacities, while this one is seeing capacities come in relation to the Buddha. However, although the three meanings differ, they all reveal that not coming is precisely not going. Under the commentary's "From this...", it explains effortless action (anābhoga). The jewel (maṇi) is in terms of the body; the celestial drum is in terms of speech; being free from ideation is in terms of the mind; the intent of the text is clear. Regarding the commentary's "Second, comprehensive explanation": since it was stated that unarisen and unceasing pertains to practice, and neither coming nor going pertains to the cognitive object, this is also limited; why is it called comprehensive? The above was the intent of Xianshou. Unarisen and unceasing was limited to the object and did not extend comprehensively to practice; neither coming nor going was limited to practice and did not extend comprehensively to the object. Now, reversing their non-comprehensiveness to make them comprehensive, all four meanings extend comprehensively to both object and practice, and hence it is called comprehensive. Therein, first is general, and then from "meaning deluded thought" onwards is specific. It also relies on the three natures to establish contemplation practice. The first is the imagined: harmonizing with the absence of characteristics, how could there be arising and ceasing? Second, from "Furthermore, although activating great function..." onwards, contemplation is based on the dependent. Third, from "Furthermore, constantly matching the real..." onwards, contemplation is based on the consummate. From "This explanation is in terms of practice" onwards, it concludes the attribution. From "Explaining not coming in terms of the object" onwards, it is also based on the three natures: the first is the imagined; second, from "Furthermore, when conditions assemble..." onwards, it is based on the dependent; third, from "Furthermore, all dharmas are identical with tathatā..." onwards, it is based on the consummate. And all of them, drawing upon conciseness, each put forward one meaning; by analogy with the previous 'unarisen', each could also possess the five [meanings]. The preceding three should also be explained separately, and the fourth and fifth merged and harmonized. As on the imagined, one should also say: 'existential imputation is principled non-existence, hence not coming; principled non-existence is existential imputation, hence not going', and so forth. Merely changing the two words 'arising and ceasing' to the two words 'coming and going', the rest may be inferred from what precedes.

20.24

The commentary's "Third, reciprocal explanation". The reason for providing this explanation involves three intentions: First, what came before explained each clause on its own; now, to show that they explain each other, as the sūtra states: 'All dharmas have no coming, and therefore there is no arising', and so on. This is also called a mutually conditioning explanation. Second, "Furthermore, since there is neither coming nor going, there is neither oneness nor difference": next is precisely the reciprocal explanation. Wishing to clarify that the four [aspects] such as non-arising and non-ceasing contain endless meanings, it briefly raises the eight negations, which is the tenet of the Madhyamakaśāstra. The treatise states: 'Neither arisen nor ceased, neither permanent nor annihilated, neither one nor different, neither coming nor going.' When Piṅgala commented on this, he provided a reciprocal, mutually conditioning explanation. Now adopting this momentum, [the commentary] therefore gives this explanation. How is it that neither coming nor going yields neither oneness nor difference? If there were coming and going, there would be the agent and the object; agent and object constitute difference, while relative to this, there would be oneness. Now, without coming or going, there is neither oneness nor difference. How is it that neither arising nor ceasing yields neither permanence nor annihilation? If one accepts that there is arising, arising is existence. Determinate existence is permanence. If one accepts that there is ceasing, ceasing is non-existence. Determinate non-existence is annihilation. Now, without arising and ceasing, how could there be annihilation or permanence? Therefore, the Madhyamakaśāstra asks: 'Non-arising and non-ceasing have already refuted all dharmas in general; why speak of these six items again?' The answer states: 'To establish non-arising and non-ceasing. That is, there are those who do not believe in non-arising and non-ceasing, but believe in non-permanence and non-annihilation. If one investigates non-permanence and non-annihilation deeply, that is itself non-arising and non-ceasing; therefore we know the two meanings mutually establish each other.' From "Cognition harmonizes..." onwards, it explains effortless action. Third, from "Thus the arising of non-arising..." onwards, arising and non-arising reciprocally establish each other. The various negations above mutually established each other to generally reveal the principle of non-arising. Now, nature and characteristic mutually establish each other: because this non-arising is not the same as nihilistic annihilation, it does not obstruct arising. If it obstructed arising, it would not be true non-arising; hence, not obstructing arising establishes non-arising. Thus, because it is conditionally arisen, it is natureless; because it is natureless, it is conditionally arisen. The two meanings mutually establish each other, which is true non-arising. The rest can be known by analogy.

20.25

Regarding the commentary's "They do not even create good..." and so forth: heterodox explanations of emptiness claim that it is vast and completely empty of things, or say that non-obstruction does not prevent the creation of evil. If one truly understands emptiness, good accords with principle; fearing the creation of agitation and disturbance, one does not even give rise to a mind that evilly contradicts principle to follow deluded impulses—how much less would one actually commit [evil]? If one claims that non-obstruction does not obstruct committing evil, why would non-obstruction not allow cultivating good practices and severing evil? Loathing the cultivation of wholesome dharmas out of fear of having an attachment, yet indulging one's impulses to commit evil—why does one not fear attachment then? This clarifies sentient beings of evil and great heterodox views.

20.26

The commentary's "They do not even rely on the Buddha": the meaning is identical to the preceding: entering the contemplation of the Buddha through principle, they fear harboring a contemplating mind; all the more so would generating karmic thoughts be an egregious contradiction of ultimate principle.

20.27

Regarding the commentary's "This is free from the characteristics of the two graspings": the eighth [fascicle] of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi has four [pairs of] two graspings: first, object and view (nimitta and darśana); second, name and form (nāmarūpa); third, king and mental factors (citta and caitta); fourth, root and branch. The root is the eighth [consciousness] maturation (vipāka); the branch is the maturation of the first six consciousnesses. Here it corresponds to object and view: what is awakened to is the object, and what can awaken is the view. Being far removed from the awakened and the object of awakening is called the noble cognition of self-realization (pratyātmāryajñāna). Therefore the Laṅkāvatāra states: 'In all things there is no nirvāṇa, nor is there a Buddha of nirvāṇa. There is no Buddha nirvāṇa, far removed from the awakened and the object of awakening.' This is precisely the meaning. The above is from the first [fascicle of the] sūtra. The second [fascicle] further states: 'The Buddha told Mahāmati: "What was known by the ancient sages, transmitted progressively from one to another, is that conceptual construction is natureless. When a bodhisattva-mahāsattva, dwelling alone in a quiet place, observes with self-realization without relying on others, freeing himself from the conceptual construction of views, he enters superior and supreme advancement into the Tathāgata stage—this is called the characteristic of the noble cognition of self-realization."'

20.28

Regarding the commentary's "In the Daśabhūmika-śāstra, 'relying on the Buddha's power'...": the treatise merely says, 'Showing freedom from self-conceit, because there is no biased mind.' Earlier authors sometimes matched both phrases generally; the commentary's intent takes matching them distinctly as correct, and so it matched them accordingly.

20.29

Regarding the commentary's "The compilers of the canon adopted this": because earlier authors all maintained that [these verses] restated the prose.

20.30

Regarding the commentary's comparative analysis from "However, the prose here..." onwards: it shows the formal conventions for uttering verses. Having previously raised the four kinds to clarify the poetic forms of verses, it next clarifies eight meanings, which are the reasons for establishing verses; these apply both to reiterative verses (geya) and isolated verses (gāthā). The "Flower Treasury Chapter" also has ten instances and five pairs, which pertain solely to reiterative verses. This current analysis here is confined strictly to this passage. Although these are isolated verses, the compiler of the sūtra listed them extensively, and thus they must be integrated and interpreted. In all there are six pairs: First, cause and effect: as the tenth verse states, 'The Buddha, throughout ocean-like boundless great kalpas, sought bodhi for the sake of sentient beings.' This raises the cause, while the prose states 'the place of his own awakening', which manifests the effect. Second, essence and function: the second verse states, 'Able to light the wonderful Dharma lamp that illuminates the world'—this is function; the prose states, 'Universally viewing all things with complete mastery'—this is essence. Third, mutual implication and abbreviation: the prose states, 'Knowing all dharmas to be unarisen, unceasing, neither coming nor going', whereas the verse merely states, 'Fully understanding that characteristics do not exist'—this is abbreviation in the verse. The fourth verse states, 'Eternally extinguishing the dark minds of sentient beings' ignorance', while the prose only has 'Presently seeing all dharmas'—this is abbreviation in the prose. Fourth, difficulty and ease: as with the first heavenly king, the prose merely states, 'Attained the liberation of the power of quiescent upāya of the dharmadhātu and space realm'; without seeing the verse text, it would be difficult to interpret. Fifth, difference between dharma and metaphor: the second in the prose merely states, 'Viewing all dharmas', whereas the verse states, 'Able to light the wonderful Dharma lamp that illuminates the world'—this is it. Sixth, alternating presentation of subject and object: the first heavenly king merely states, 'The dharmadhātu and space realm are the pervasible spheres', while the verse states, 'The Buddha's body pervades all great assemblies'—thus the prose lacks the pervading agent. Considering merely the first section, it possesses all six pairs; how much more so for the lower sections, where explicit passages are very numerous! As for 'those who transmit it should assess it well': the Yijing's Feng hexagram states, 'The waxing and waning of heaven and earth diminish and grow in accord with time.' The commentary explains: 'Diminishing means exhausting; growing means generating.' That is, where something can be added, add it; where something can be reduced, reduce it; where it can be brought out, bring it out; where it can be submerged, submerge it; hence it is called 'assessing'.

20.31

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "the two passages illuminate each other": if the prose is not understood, one observes the verse text; if the verse text is difficult to discern, one observes the prose, and it is easily understood.

20.32

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "First, inexhaustible manifestation," etc.: the Contemplation on Returning to the Source speaks of three kinds of pervasion. 1. A single dust mote universally pervades the dharmadhātu, which corresponds to the sūtra's "filling the dharmadhātu without end." 2. A single dust mote gives rise to inexhaustible pervasion, which is the meaning stated previously in the Commentary. 3. A single dust mote contains emptiness and existence in pervasion, which is the meaning stated later in the Commentary.

20.33

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "cannot be apprehended as identical, different, both, neither, etc.": pervading all assemblies, this should be different; filling the dharmadhātu, this should be solely one. Now, both nature and characteristics are quiescent, so neither can be grasped. If there were identity and difference, these would combine to form "both." Since both identity and difference are gone, from where could "both" come? If there were a proposition of "both" that negates the double negative [of "neither"], then since the proposition of "both" is already absent, how could the double negative be established? Therefore, all four propositions are negated, and all hundred negations are extinguished; quiescent, solely quiescent. As for saying "etc.," one also cannot speak of the four [propositions] of existence, non-existence, etc., or the distinctions between the true and the responsive; there is only resonance through realization.

20.34

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "Because of destroying avidyā, one attains the blazing light of sambodhi": this comes from Chapter 21 of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra (Chapter 19 of the Southern recension), the "Bodhisattva Noble and Virtuous King Chapter." Because the Bodhisattva Vaiḍūryaprabha was about to arrive and emit light, the Buddha questioned Mañjuśrī. Mañjuśrī at first entered into the ultimate truth and replied: "World-Honoured One! Such light is called wisdom, and wisdom is inherently permanent; permanent dharmas have no causes and conditions. Why does the Buddha ask for what causes and conditions there is this light?" After explaining at length the absence of causes and conditions, at the end he said: "World-Honoured One! There are also causes and conditions. Because of destroying avidyā, one attains the blazing lamp of anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi." Here it is quoted in abridged sense.

20.35

Second, the Fourth Dhyāna. Regarding the Commentary's statement from "Solely because true emptiness can establish cause and effect" onward: this answers the doubt raised above. This sentence clarifies that because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas can be accomplished. If there were no meaning of emptiness, cause and effect would be definitely existent, and one would fall into eternalism. As for saying, "because cause and effect are established, it is true emptiness," this is the meaning of emptiness through causes and conditions. If one explains emptiness apart from cause and effect, that would be nihilistic emptiness.

20.36

Third, the Third Dhyāna. Regarding the Commentary's statement, "As for the words 'light and shadow', there are briefly two": Xianshou had yet another meaning, which is not preserved here; hence it says "briefly." His explanation states: "For example, when a bright and clean object catches the sunlight, a light and shadow appears upon the house wall. The Tathāgata's manifesting a body in response to capacities is also like this. However, it has multiple meanings: 1. The meaning of aggregation of conditions, meaning that great wisdom is pure and clear, and the sun of compassion and vows shines, manifesting the Buddha's shadow within the dark chamber of sentient beings. 2. The meaning of swiftness, because there is nowhere distant it does not reach. 3. The meaning of unobstructedness, because it cannot be grasped or held. 4. The meaning of efficacious function, because it can destroy darkness. 5. The meaning of non-arising, because it has no existence. This is explained at length as in the 'Chapter on the Ten Kṣāntis'." This interpretation seems somewhat forced, so it was abridged and not preserved. As for the two shadows clarified now in the Commentary: the Mahāyānasaṃgraha briefly presents three shadows: 1. the shadow reflecting the physical substance, 2. the shadow of the moon in water, and 3. the shadow in a mirror, as detailed in the 'Chapter on the Ten Kṣāntis'. Here it refers to the first two. Now speaking of "light and shadow," the mirror image is omitted, leaving precisely the first meaning. The sun serves as an analogy for the Tathāgata's body, while trees and other physical substances serve as an analogy for sentient beings. The sun has no differing essence, but physical substances have myriad variations. When a tree leans, its shadow is slanted; when a shape is upright, its shadow is straight. The shadow does not appear inside the sun, but only beside the physical substance. The playing of shadows takes many forms, varying in myriad ways according to the mind. Second is the shadow of the moon in water; because the moon has light, it is also called light and shadow. "The shadow mostly resembles the moon" because it follows the moon's fullness and waning. "It slightly resembles the water" because it conforms to movement and stillness.

20.37

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "Either subduing or embracing": the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra says, "Those who should be embraced are embraced; those who should be subdued are subdued. Through embracing and subduing, the true Dharma abides for a long time."

20.38

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "Meaning the realm of sentient beings," etc.: the Yogācārabhūmi has five immeasurable realms; the previous text listed four. When it states later, "by means of the realm of upāya," this refers to the realm of upāya for taming, so all five are complete.

20.39

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "The rākṣasa of craving and views is truly terrifying": this comes from Chapter 11 of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the parable of the rākṣasa begging for the floating float. Creating evil due to greed and the like is the rākṣasa of craving. Denying cause and effect, leading to breaking the precepts, is the rākṣasa of views begging for the float. This was already cited above.

20.40

Within the Fourth, the Second Dhyāna: regarding the Commentary's statement, "Sūtras and treatises jointly speak of five kinds of bliss," etc.: the treatises refer to the Yogācārabhūmi and others, and the sūtra refers to the explanation of the meaning of happiness within the explanation of ultimate truth in Chapter 2, "Self-Benefit and Benefiting Others Chapter," of the Bodhisattva-bhūmi (Shan jie jing). The sūtra says: "What is called happiness? The meaning of happiness has five kinds. What are the five? 1. Causal bliss, 2. Experiential bliss, 3. The bliss of severing sensation, 4. The bliss of detachment, 5. The bliss of bodhi. What is causal bliss? Due to internal and external contact, and with contact as condition, experiential bliss arises; this is called causal bliss. Due to practicing wholesome dharmas, one attains the bliss of other lives; this is called causal bliss. What is experiential bliss? From causes and conditions, the body increases and the mind finds peace and security; this is called experiential bliss. Experiential bliss has two kinds. What are the two? 1. Tainted, 2. Untainted. Untainted has two kinds: 1. The stage of training, 2. Beyond training. Tainted has three: the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm. The three existences have internal and external āyatanas, hence there are six contacts. The six contacts have two kinds: 1. Bodily bliss, 2. Mental bliss. Operating together with the five consciousnesses is called bodily bliss; operating together with the mental consciousness is called mental bliss. Cultivating the noble path severs sensations, so the path increases and there are no sensations; this is called the bliss of severing sensation. Permanently severing defilements, so that body and mind have no affliction, is called the bliss of detachment. Because of experiencing permanent bliss, it is called the bliss of bodhi. Some may say: the samādhi of non-conception is called the bliss of severance. This meaning is incorrect. Why? Because it does not sever the bliss of sensation. The bliss of detachment has four kinds: 1. The bliss of renunciation, 2. The bliss of quiescence, 3. The bliss of severance, 4. The bliss of bodhi. Worldly people have much sorrow and suffering; permanently severing this suffering is called the bliss of renunciation. Severing the greed of the desire realm is called the bliss of quiescence. Permanently severing defilements is called the bliss of severance. Experiencing permanent bliss is called the bliss of bodhi. A bodhisattva is always able to bestow bliss upon sentient beings; this is called the bliss of bodhi. A bodhisattva mahāsattva personally experiences permanent bliss and transmits it to sentient beings; this is called the bliss of bodhi. Why is it called causal bliss? Because it is the cause of bliss, it is called causal bliss, not experiential bliss. Experiential bliss is not called causal bliss; it is called natural bliss. The bliss of severance is not called causal bliss, nor experiential bliss; because it severs many blisses, it is called the bliss of severance. The bliss of detachment is not called causal bliss, nor experiential bliss, nor the bliss of severance; because it contemplates the manifold faults of saṃsāra, it is called the bliss of wisdom. The bliss of bodhi is not called causal bliss, nor experiential bliss, nor the bliss of severance, nor the bliss of detachment; because it is boundless and permanent, it is called the bliss of bodhi, the invincible bliss, the boundless bliss, the supreme bliss, also called permanent bliss, and quiescent bliss. A bodhisattva mahāsattva who can bestow such five kinds of bliss upon sentient beings—this is the meaning of causal bliss." Now, when comparing the Commentary to that sūtra, the numbers and names differ. If one wishes to harmonize them, the fruit and the counter-elimination of suffering correspond to experiential bliss. Unfolding the absence of affliction corresponds to the bliss of detachment and the bliss of bodhi. In the sūtra, detachment has four kinds; here, saying "the bliss of detachment through renunciation" encompasses its two kinds of renunciation, which corresponds to the first detachment and also captures the third, the bliss of severance. It further unfolds bodhi into the two blisses of bodhi and nirvāṇa. As for fascicle 96 of the Yogācārabhūmi, it states that bliss has two kinds: 1. The bliss of desire, 2. Detachment. Detachment again has three kinds: 1. Inferior, referring to from [the sphere of] nothingness on down; 2. Middling, referring to the peak of existence; 3. Superior, referring to the samādhi of cessation of sensation. However, relying on the ultimate truth, the World-Honoured One spoke of three kinds of most quiescent bliss, referring to equal liberation, so they are subsumed into three: 1. That which should be detached from; 2. That which should be cultivated, which refers to the previous three superior, middling, and inferior detachments, called detachment with a superior; 3. The supreme, ultimate, unsurpassable abiding bliss of liberation, which is the liberation from greed and the like mentioned earlier.

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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese