大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 22

English (machine translation) 22

Language: English

22.1

Composed by Śramaṇa Chengguan of the Great Huayan Monastery at Mount Qingliang in the Tang

In the fifth fascicle, from here on is the second [group], the assembly of beings of equal rebirth. When the commentary states "without moving from the true, yet accomplishing phenomena": this is the non-obstruction of phenomena and principle functioning as upāya, just as engaging with existence without being deluded about emptiness. Next, "skilfully using the causal approach to tally with the fruit": this is the upāya of the non-obstruction of phenomenon and phenomenon, because cause and fruit interpenetrate.

22.3

Regarding the commentary's "vertically penetrating the four lands," and so on: these are all as in the "Chapter on the Formation of the World." To speak briefly of the vertical: it means that in a single place there are four lands. Since the land of dharmatā is the substance of the [other] three lands, it is fundamentally pervasive and permanent. The land of personal enjoyment has a measure that encompasses the dharmadhātu, identical to dharmatā. The land of enjoyment for others and the transformation land are not separate from the above two, just as the shadow of an object is not separate from space and sunlight. Moreover, the land of enjoyment for others and the transformation land, being seen differently according to the mind, are also like two shadows interpenetrating each other; therefore, within a single dust mote there are the four lands. Horizontally pervading the dharmadhātu refers to all the distinct lands in the ten directions. As for "the horizontal and vertical blending with each other": fusing the horizontal with the vertical, within a single dust mote there are lands of the ten directions; fusing the vertical with the horizontal, the four lands within a single dust mote constantly pervade the ten directions. The final conclusion may be understood from this.

22.4

Regarding the commentary's statement that "the first half clarifies the general pervading the particular": the pervader and the pervaded are not separate from the environment and the person, and both environment and person each have two aspects: first, the general; second, the particular. The complete body of the Buddha is the general of the person; a single hair pore, and so on, is the particular of the person. A single Buddha land is the general of the environment; a single fine dust mote, and so on, is the particular of the environment. Here, because the first half describes the Buddha pervading within a dust mote, it says that the general pervades within the particular. Regarding "essence and function are unobstructed": the upper line is essence, because there is no going or coming. The lower line is function, because it manifests in all lands. It is also the general pervading, for "general" means the body pervading the lands. The rest may be reflected upon.

22.5

Regarding the commentary's statement "if one does not enter the ocean, how can one obtain jewels": this is from the chapter "Contemplating the Buddha Path" in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa: "Just as one who does not descend into the great ocean cannot obtain the priceless jewel, so too, one who does not enter the great ocean of afflictions cannot obtain the jewel of omniscient knowledge."

22.6

Regarding the commentary's statement: "The sūtra says: Mercury combined with pure gold can coat all forms and images," and so forth: gold is like the dharmakāya, and mercury is like prajñā; because prajñā illumines capacities, the true body accords with responses. Tiantai Zhizhe also used this meaning to explain the responsive function of the [Tathāgata's] lifespan in the Lotus Sūtra.

22.7

Regarding the commentary's statement: "If one sits cross-legged, the body is at peace and enters samādhi," and so forth: "and so forth" includes the remaining verses, which say: "Awesome virtue brings people's veneration, / Like the sun shining upon the world, / Dispelling drowsiness and the heart of laziness. / The body is light and without fatigue or slouching, / Awakening is also facile and light, / Sitting peacefully like a coiled dragon. / Seeing even a painting of sitting cross-legged, / The demon king is also terrified; / How much more so one who has entered the Path, / Sitting peacefully and unshakeable!" This is from the eighth [fascicle of the] treatise.

22.8

Regarding the commentary's passage beginning with, "However, equality of the three periods of time": this re-explains the cognitive stage of well-abiding equality of the three periods of time. Within the text there are three parts: first, pointing to the preceding to raise the topic; second, from "Provisionally relying upon..." onward, individually elucidating the doctrinal characteristics; third, from "According to this explanation..." onward, concluding with an explanation of the phrase "cognitive stage of well-abiding." Within the second part, which directly explains the equality of the three periods of time, there are three sections: first, solely in terms of the Buddhas, as in the "Chapter on Inquiring into Clarity": "All Tathāgatas of the ten directions share the single dharmakāya," and so forth; second, solely in terms of sentient beings: although the six destinies differ, all are subject to the three defilements; third, from "If sentient beings and the Buddha are compared..." onward, stating the meaning of equality between sentient beings and the Buddha. Within this there are two: first, equality at different times; second, equality at the same time. In the first part, it first generally speaks of equality; then, from "This is according to the three periods of time..." onward, it individually indicates the doctrinal characteristics, citing the verse appearing four times in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] to explain it. Now, we first relate that sūtra, and only afterward explain the commentary.

When the commentary says "the verse appearing four times," it is because it appears in four places, also called the four abodes: first, appearing in the tenth fascicle; second, in the seventeenth fascicle; third, in the twenty-seventh fascicle; fourth, in the twenty-eighth fascicle.

The first section is in the "Chapter on the Tathāgata Nature," which is Chapter 9, the "Chapter on Bodhisattvas," in the Southern edition. Mañjuśrī addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One! Now this Cunda still harbors doubt in his mind." The Buddha questioned Mañjuśrī. Mañjuśrī said: "Cunda's mind doubts that the Tathāgata is permanently abiding, by virtue of having obtained the power of seeing the Buddha-nature. If one is permanent by virtue of seeing the Buddha-nature, before one had originally seen it, one must have been impermanent. If originally impermanent, afterward it must likewise be so. Why? Just as worldly objects, which originally did not exist and now exist, or having existed then cease to exist, all such objects are impermanent. For this reason, between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there would be no distinction." At that time, the World-Honoured One spoke this verse: "Originally existing, now non-existent; originally non-existent, now existing—that there are conditioned dharmas of the three periods of time has no basis in reality. Good sons! For this reason, between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there are distinctions and there are no distinctions." Mañjuśrī praised him, saying: "Excellent! Truly it is as the holy teaching says. Only now do I understand that between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there are distinctions and there are no distinctions." The Buddha said no more, so Kāśyapa then requested the Buddha to speak. The Tathāgata then cited for him the simile of the elder milking the cow to illustrate the Buddha-nature: the color of the milk is always one, just as the nature is without difference. The first appearance above is concluded.

The second appearance is in the seventeenth fascicle, the "Chapter on Pure Conduct," which is the fifteenth fascicle in the Southern edition. Because he had finished explaining non-attainment to Kāśyapa, Kāśyapa grasped the understanding and wished to ask further about the meaning of non-attainment. He brought up the verse spoken earlier by the Buddha, "originally existing, now non-existent," to inquire, and the Tathāgata answered him, saying: "As for 'originally existing,' it is because in the past I originally had immeasurable afflictions. Because of the afflictions, in the present there was no great parinirvāṇa. As for 'originally non-existent,' originally there was no prajñāpāramitā. Because there was no prajñāpāramitā, in the present one fully possesses all bonds of affliction." This explains the first half of the verse. "If there is a śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a deva, a māra, a Brahmā, or a human who says that the Tathāgata has afflictions in the past, future, or present, that has no basis in reality." This explains the second half. Below, the sūtra's meaning is briefly summarized as twofold: First, clarifying that originally having the body born of parents, one lacks the adamantine body; originally lacking the thirty-two marks, one fully possesses the four hundred and four illnesses. Second, stating that originally having impermanence, non-self, and so forth, now one lacks anuttarabodhi; originally lacking the seeing of Buddha-nature, now one has impermanence and so forth. In total there are eight sections, the general meaning of which is largely the same, all clarifying that "originally existing" refers to having worldly false causes; "now non-existent" refers to lacking supramundane true virtues; "originally non-existent" refers to lacking supramundane causes; "now existing" refers to having worldly false dharmas. It concludes: "I sometimes know and speak of not knowing, have marks and speak of having no marks, merely converting beings in accordance with what is appropriate." The above is the conclusion of the second appearance.

The third appearance is in the twenty-seventh fascicle, which is Chapter 25, the "Chapter on the Lion's Roar," in the Southern edition: "Because of saying that all sentient beings will definitely attain bodhi, therefore I say that all sentient beings definitely possess Buddha-nature. Sentient beings in truth do not yet possess the thirty-two marks and eighty minor signs. For this reason, I spoke the verse: 'Originally existing, now non-existent,' and so forth. Good sons! In general, existence is of three kinds: first, future existence; second, present existence; third, past existence. That all sentient beings in the future will have anuttarabodhi is called Buddha-nature. All sentient beings in the present have afflictions, and therefore in the present do not possess the thirty-two marks and eighty minor signs. Sentient beings in past lives had the eradication of afflictions, and therefore in the present are able to see the Buddha-nature. For this reason, I always proclaim that all sentient beings, even icchantikas, possess Buddha-nature, because of future existence. It is like someone having milk, and being asked whether there is ghee." The above is the conclusion of the third appearance.

The fourth appearance is in the twenty-eighth fascicle, which is the twenty-sixth in the Southern edition. Because of clarifying that food is the cause of life, not that food itself is life, this verse is spoken: "Originally existing, now non-existent," and so forth.

Fifth, relating that the ancient masters failed to grasp the intention of the treatise. Explanation: In the four places of the sūtra above, the intention of the verse is largely the same, though its application slightly differs. The various masters mostly explained its characteristics at length under the tenth fascicle. Master Yuan cited the meaning of the seventeenth fascicle, explaining: "The first two lines establish one's own principle; the lower two lines refute the fixed definitions of others." Explaining the upper two lines, he is entirely identical with the seventeenth fascicle. Explaining the lower two lines, he says: "This text is abbreviated; it should also say: 'that there are non-existent dharmas in the three periods of time likewise has no basis in reality.' The meaning is: regarding the Buddha, afflictions existed in the past and are now completely severed; therefore, that there are existing dharmas throughout the three periods of time has no basis in reality. Nirvāṇa did not exist in the past and has now been fully realized; saying that there are non-existent dharmas throughout the three periods of time likewise has no basis in reality. Regarding sentient beings, the reverse can be known. Thus no single dharma is definitively existing in the three periods of time, or definitively non-existent in the three periods of time. This meaning clarifies that they are necessarily mutually existing and mutually non-existent." Next, resolving the objection, he says: "The Buddha now presently realizes it, which differs from the two vehicles; hence they are not without distinction. They too will attain it in the future, so there is likewise no distinction." This answers Mañjuśrī's doubt. Furthermore, he says: "The Buddha has already realized it now; how can one object that afterward it will also be impermanent?" Explanation: This resolves Cunda's doubt. The various masters largely share this view. But then this verse would merely be a dharma of existence and non-existence across the three periods of time; how could it resolve Cunda's objection? The gist of the objection was precisely: if one is permanent by virtue of seeing the Buddha-nature, since seeing has a beginning, it must have an end; just like worldly things, having come into existence, they return to non-existence. Now, by merely clarifying experiential seeing, how could one resolve this? If we look at Dharma Master Chaowu's explanation answering the doubt, his intention is well-constructed and represents Master Sheng's view: "It is only that I first accord with it; it is not that illumination now exists." Yet his explanation of the verse is also mostly identical with Master Yuan's, and using the verse to answer the objection likewise does not accord with reason. Master Jianfu took "originally existing, now non-existent" and, from the treatise's meaning, brought out two kinds of doubts, explaining the lower half of the verse identically with Master Yuan. Failing to grasp the intention of the treatise, it does not exhaust the principle.

Sixth, directly reconciling with the intention of the treatise. Here we first present the treatise's intention, and afterward present the distinct intentions across the four appearances in the sūtra. First, we determine the dharmas of "originally existing, now non-existent." That is, if afflictions and karma are inborn, they are called "original"; if the holy nature of liberation is acquired through cultivation, it is "now." Explanation: This directly accords with the seventeenth fascicle's "originally having afflictions, now lacking nirvāṇa," and so forth. Therefore the treatise says: "Expounding it for the two vehicles does not slander the Mahāyāna; if expounding it for the Mahāyāna, it slanders the Mahāyāna." The meaning is: this is a dharma conforming to marks, a conditioned dharma of the three periods of time. The distinction between delusion and awakening is an impermanent dharma; it can convert the two vehicles, but it is not the true nature of Mahāyāna nirvāṇa. Having determined above the dharmas of "original" and "now," next we directly state the intention of the verse.

The treatise states: "This verse has two intentions: first, refuting erroneous doctrines; second, establishing correct doctrine. Refuting erroneous doctrines relies on language; establishing correct doctrine relies on the meaning, not on language. However, erroneous views are twofold: first, heterodox traditions; second, the Hīnayāna. The upper three lines are the dharmas established by heterodox and Hīnayāna views. The fourth line universally negates them, saying: 'has no basis in reality.' First, as for heterodox traditions: 'originally existing' is identical with the Sāṃkhya view that the effect exists within the cause; 'originally non-existent' is identical with the Vaiśeṣika view that the effect does not exist within the cause; 'existing in the three periods of time' is identical with the Nirgrantha view that the effect both exists and does not exist within the cause. All possess many faults, hence it says: 'has no basis in reality.' Second, as for refuting the Hīnayāna: it is as explained earlier. Stating that afflictions originally exist is taught for the Hīnayāna; for those of the Mahāyāna, it incurs three kinds of faults. That is, if afflictions originally exist, do they exist in the ultimate truth, or do they exist in the conventional truth? If they exist in the ultimate truth, prior and posterior would be without difference, and afflictions could not be severed. If they exist in the conventional truth, the conventional truth has no origin; how could it be called 'originally existing'? Regarding 'originally non-existent, now existing': if originally non-existent, it should not exist later. If an originally non-existent dharma could come to exist, space should produce flowers, and all originally non-existent dharmas should all be produced. If they are shared throughout the three periods of time, it evidently cannot be established, because the three periods of time are mutually contradictory. Therefore it concludes below: 'has no basis in reality.' Thus, refuting the Hīnayāna by stating that existing dharmas of the three periods of time have no basis in reality has already refuted erroneous doctrines.

"As for establishing the correct doctrine: 'originally existing, now existing' transcending the three periods of time is called the correct doctrine. 'Originally existing, now existing' means that from the initial arousal of the mind up to the attainment of nirvāṇa, it is of one flavor without difference, neither relying on productive causes nor relying on destructive causes. Its existence is pure; dharmas of ordinary beings cannot defile it, and dharmas of holy beings cannot purify it, up to transcending all paths of language and all conceptualization, ineffable and inconceivable, encompassing cause and effect while being neither cause nor effect. The single essence of the Tathāgata supremely encompasses all wondrous jewels; this great nirvāṇa transcends the three periods of time, preaching the virtues of nirvāṇa up to permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Furthermore, there are two kinds of meanings: if it is 'originally existing, now existing,' then it is the view of eternalism; if it transcends the three periods of time, then it is the view of annihilationism. If the two meanings are mutually dependent, they constitute freedom from annihilationism and eternalism, which is the meaning of the middle way. In this way, conventional truth and ultimate truth are mutually dependent; hence there is the reality of the twelve links of dependent origination. Why? Free from the two extremes is the true twelve links of dependent origination. If one can skillfully understand this, one sees the Tathāgata presently abiding in the world." Explanation: This latter section further harmonizes nature and marks, rendering them unhindered. The rest is fully as in the treatise.

Having understood the treatise's intention, we now take the treatise to explain the doubts in the sūtra. The treatise states: "Cunda had doubts due to two causes and conditions: first, Cunda saw the identical characteristics and did not see the distinct characteristics, hence generating doubt; second, Mañjuśrī saw the distinct characteristics and did not see the identical characteristics, hence generating doubt." Both were skillful doubts raised on behalf of sentient beings. However, if assigned individually, the first doubt is Cunda's doubt in the sūtra, and the second doubt is Mañjuśrī's doubt. Yet these two doubts in the text reflect and imply each other; in reality, both individuals had both doubts, which is why it says Cunda had two kinds of doubts.

Now first: how did he see the identical? That is, Cunda took the doubt of "originally non-existent, now existing" to be identical with the doubt of "originally existing, now non-existent," saying: "The Buddha originally did not see the Buddha-nature, and later saw the Buddha-nature, thereby attaining permanent abiding; is this not originally non-existent and now existing? Originally non-existent and now existing is a produced dharma. A produced dharma must perish, hence it is impermanent. This is identical with worldly things; hence it is called 'seeing the identical.'" How did he not see the distinct? He did not see that the Tathāgata accords with the absence of the three periods of time, differing from ordinary beings and the Hīnayāna. Therefore, now raising the distinct, the answer states: "In terms of conditions, one first tallies with it, taking it as originally non-existent and now existing. The nature of bodhi does not belong to the three periods of time; when wisdom tallies with this nature, being identical with the nature, it is permanent. How can one object: 'Having a beginning, it must have an end, and is impermanent'?" Cunda's doubtful mind was spontaneously dispelled from this.

As for resolving Mañjuśrī's doubt: Mañjuśrī saw the distinct and did not see the identical, hence doubting. That is, seeing the distinction of delusion and awakening in the three vehicles, and now that they are identical with the two vehicles in being impermanent and utterly extinguished, there would be no distinction. This is called generating doubt from seeing the distinct. How did he not see the identical? He did not see that they are identically devoid of the three periods of time. Now the answer states: "Tallying with the absence of the three periods of time, once attained it is eternally permanent. How could it be identical with the impermanence of the two vehicles? In having no nature of the three periods of time, there is no distinction; in tallying or not tallying, there are distinctions." Those of superior faculties, upon hearing this once, have both doubts abruptly dispelled, while those of middling and lower faculties have not yet awakened. Kāśyapa gave rise to compassion, and in the "Chapter on Pure Conduct," he asked based on non-attainment. The Buddha raised eight sections, and within all eight sections, he invariably concluded: "that there are conditioned dharmas of the three periods of time has no basis in reality"—this is non-attainment.

In the twenty-seventh fascicle, because of saying that all sentient beings will definitely attain bodhi, this is the meaning of future existence. Therefore, he spoke of having three kinds of existence: first, future existence; second, past existence; third, present existence. Clarifying these three kinds of existence is also in terms of delusion and awakening; how could the Buddha-nature of bodhi belong to the three periods of time? In the twenty-eighth fascicle, food is the cause of life, not life itself; just as the Buddha-nature is the cause, not the Buddha himself. This too is a dharma of causes and conditions of the three periods of time spoken in accordance with marks. If one grasps it according to marks, it likewise has no basis in reality.

Explanation: The classification and explanation of the verse appearing four times above exhausts the principle completely. Next, we should explain the intention of the present commentary. According to the seventeenth fascicle, "originally existing" and "now existing" both refer to delusion, while "originally non-existent" and "now non-existent" both refer to the true; hence it says: "I originally had afflictions and now lack nirvāṇa; originally lacked prajñā and now have afflictions." Why is it so? Because it is in terms of the Buddha's past causes. And in the twenty-seventh fascicle, it says that sentient beings in the past had the causes and conditions of severing afflictions and now see the Buddha-nature; this is the true dharma being originally non-existent and now existing. Thus, Cunda's generating doubt was precisely an objection raised in terms of the World-Honoured One having originally not existed and now existing due to seeing the Buddha-nature. From this we know that whether true or false, both apply to "originally existing, now non-existent" and "originally non-existent, now existing." Therefore, the commentary adopts the intention of the sūtra and the intention of that treatise, speaking of both the true and the false in comparing sentient beings and the Buddha. Furthermore, because the seventeenth fascicle speaks in terms of the Buddha's past, it takes the Buddha's past time as the "original." It also takes the past time as "now"; comparing it to sentient beings, it takes the present time as the "original." It also takes the present time as "now," not different from the Buddha having afflictions in the past. All of these reflect and imply each other.

Afterward, explaining the commentary: The present commentary adopts this intention, taking the past as "original" and the present as "now." Regarding afflictions, that the Buddha "originally existed and now does not exist" is because when the Buddha was an ordinary being in the past, he had afflictions, but now, having accomplished right awakening, he lacks afflictions. That sentient beings are "originally non-existent and now existing" is: in terms of the pure nature, they originally lack afflictions; in terms of adventitious defilements, they now have afflictions.

22.9

As for the commentary's statement that "Bodhi is originally existent and now non-existent for sentient beings," this also refers to bodhi that is pure by nature being originally existent; but because it is currently obscured by adventitious defilements, they are deluded about the real and give rise to the false, having not yet realized or attained perfectly pure bodhi; therefore it is said to be "now non-existent." The statement that "for the Buddhas, it is originally non-existent and now existent" refers to perfectly pure bodhi: because it was not cultivated to completion in the past, it is said to be "originally non-existent"; because it has now been cultivated and attained, it is said to be "now existent." The above has already explained the first half of that verse.

22.10

The commentary's statement "In terms of the difference between delusion and awakening..." onward explains the second half of the verse. However, according to the treatise's meaning, all three lines are characteristics, and only the fourth line sweeps away the preceding three to constitute the true nature. Now the commentary uses the third line to summarize the three times and the fourth line to dismiss them, hence saying that the second half reveals the nature. While adopting the text slightly differently, it is entirely the treatise's intent. What does "in terms of the difference between delusion and awakening," etc., mean? It means that when deluded, there is falsity, yet it is not that there is no truth; when awakened, one sees the nature, yet the nature is not newly existent now. Thus Master Sheng said: "It is only that I have now first encountered it; it is not that the illumination newly exists now. Since the illumination does not reside in the present, it is peerless and great. And since it is called great, it is praised as permanent." From this we know that although delusion and awakening differ, the nature of nirvāṇa does not shift across the three times and is serenely, permanently abiding. To encounter it is to tally with it, identical with that nature's permanence, just as initial awakening is identical with original [awakening], with no further difference between initial and original. How could one object by saying that what has a beginning must have an end? Thus Cunda's objection is dispelled. The commentary's "If based on pure nature..." onward is, secondly, in terms of simultaneous equality, which is precisely the meaning of the second half of the previous verse. Because its nature is free from the three times, it is currently equal. "Without obstructing the distinction between delusion and awakening" is the treatise master's final harmonizing of nature and characteristics, causing them to be free from annihilationism and eternalism. If there were a nature outside of characteristics, the nature would be annihilation and characteristics would be fixed permanence; therefore, apart from delusion and awakening there is no separate true nature. Because of deviating from permanence, the impermanence of the three realms exists. Because of understanding the real nature of impermanence, the twin principles of permanence and cognition are perfected without one-sidedness. The illumination tallies with it, like a mirror suspended in a high hall reflecting all myriad images. The sūtra cites the two birds with this intention. Therefore the triyāna both has distinctions and has no distinctions, which is nirvāṇa. Mañjuśrī comprehended: because the nature is non-dual, there is no distinction; because delusion and awakening have shallow and deep degrees, there are distinctions; thus Mañjuśrī's doubt was eliminated. With Mañjuśrī's doubt dispelled, Kāśyapa's doubt also ceased. The rest is as in the treatise above. The commentary's "The quiescence of sentient beings is itself the dharmakāya" onward shows the characteristics of both having distinctions and having no distinctions. Saying that "the quiescence of sentient beings is itself the dharmakāya" means that sentient beings are not different from Buddhas; "the dharmakāya in concordance with conditions is named sentient beings" means that Buddhas are not different from sentient beings—thus there is no distinction. Next, the pair stating "Sentient beings who are quiescent and not non-existent are established while constantly not differing from the real" clarifies that non-distinction does not obstruct distinction. Because of quiescence there is no distinction; because they are not non-existent sentient beings, it does not obstruct distinction; "constantly not differing from the real" completes the quiescence above, while the word "established" completes the sentient beings who are not non-existent above. As for "The dharmakāya which accords with conditions and is not existent is manifested while constantly not differing from phenomena," because it accords with conditions, the Buddha is not different from sentient beings; the non-existent dharmakāya then does not obstruct differing from sentient beings; "constantly not differing from phenomena" completes the concordance with conditions above, while the word "manifested" completes the non-existent dharmakāya above. From "Therefore defilement and purity..." downward, it synthesizes and concludes. As for the commentary's "How much more so when, according with the nature, they mutually encompass each other..." downward: the above was merely the non-obstruction of phenomena and principle, which is already inconceivable and may be found in other sūtras; this, however, is the non-obstruction of phenomena and phenomena, which is unique to the meaning of the Huayan. The concluding explanation from "Thus..." downward can be understood. This single preceding principle might seem incidental, yet the profound purport of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] is seen herein. The commentary's "The text of the nine assemblies and five cycles..." etc., points to this single preceding sūtra as a single teaching adapted to circumstances. Thus from the Deer Park to the Twin Trees, the arena of the one vehicle and the three vehicles was taught suddenly—how much more so the Tathāgata's speech?

22.11

The chapter on the ten powers under the seventh [bodhisattva], Kāñcanārcis Bodhisattva. In the commentary, from "The sūtra texts below repeatedly clarify the ten powers..." downward, the commentary's text is divided into three: first, the reason for establishing the chapter; second, from "However, the Mahāprajñāpāramitā..." downward, broadly referencing others' explanations; third, from "Now briefly..." downward, opening the sections to explain the text. The present first part is the first gate among the seven gates. Fearing people might say that our tradition values only names and characteristics, it broadly brings out this intent. The text has five intents: first, because the sūtra texts are numerous, by explaining this one section, other places will follow suit; second, they are uncommon virtues; third, all Buddhas equally possess them—these two are two gates in the Yogācāra[-bhūmi]; fourth, bodhisattvas generate the mind based on them, which is the "Ten Abodes Chapter," for without recognizing the ten powers, how could one generate the mind? Fifth, pure conduct leads to contemplation, and without comprehending the ten powers it is not true pure conduct.

22.12

Regarding the commentary's "First, establishing the intent," the commentary text has four parts: first, generally revealing the intent of establishment, which is in chapter twenty-seven of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa; second, from "The Tathāgata is uniquely one..." downward, the reasons for establishing ten; third, from "Due to time..." downward, the reasons for establishing many; fourth, from "The causes and conditions for delivering people..." downward, the reasons for expounding ten. The third is the gate of discrimination in the Yogācāra[-bhūmi]. However, the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] also speaks of seven gates, which differ slightly from this: first, intrinsic nature; second, discrimination; third, uncommonness; fourth, equality; fifth, operation; sixth, sequence; seventh, distinction. The preceding has two gates, and now there is discrimination. What is discrimination? The Yogācāra[-bhūmi] states: "Through three discriminations, know that they are immeasurable: first, discrimination by time, meaning following and entering into all that is to be known subsumed under the three times; second, discrimination by category, meaning following and entering into all conditioned specific characteristics, common characteristics, and all mental aspects; third, discrimination by continuum, meaning following and entering into all continuums and all matters and meanings of the diverse sentient beings." Fourth, the reasons for expounding ten may be contemplated. In the second part, explaining names, the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] is in fascicle forty-nine, and under intrinsic nature it is in fifty-seven, which is the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī. Under the fifth part, sequence, it is divided into four: first, generally listing the sequences of various texts; second, from "For now, relying on..." downward, clarifying the sequence relying on the treatise; third, from "The many gates of the Yogācāra..." downward, indicating that the extensive treatment is elsewhere; fourth, from "The above..." downward, harmonizing the sequence of the sūtra. In the third part, regarding the statement "many gates," the treatise states: "When the Tathāgata first accomplished right awakening, he immediately and suddenly realized the ten kinds of powers of cognition, and only later did they sequentially manifest one by one. That is, he first gave rise to the power of the possible and impossible to observe all phenomena and establish all non-erroneous causes and effects. Having observed this, he next gave rise to the cognition power of one's own karma: for those seeking superior fruits in the desire realm, he skillfully expounded it to cause them to leave unwholesomeness. If there are those seeking the worldly path of detachment from desire, he instructed them to advance toward the merits of dhyāna meditation, and thus gave rise to the power of concentration. If sentient beings seek the supramundane dharma of detachment from desire, he expounded the supramundane path for them. That is, herein he first gave rise to the power of faculties to observe whether faculties are superior or inferior. Next he observed whether those faculties were preceded by inclinations. Next he observed whether inclinations were preceded by latent afflictions. Having known faculties, desires, and latent afflictions, he next caused them to enter into the focal object. Next, having gathered and stabilized their minds through the preliminary engagement of entering the focal object and having cultivated pure practice, he expounded the middle way for them to cause them to leave annihilationism and eternalism—namely, past lives eliminates eternalism, and the divine eye eliminates annihilationism. Next, he caused them to permanently sever all afflictions and all residual habit-energies, giving rise to the power of the destruction of the outflows." There are further different sequential gates, but fearing prolixity, they are not cited.

22.13

Regarding the commentary's seventh part, explaining the text, the commentary text has three parts: first, generally discerning the central intent; second, from "The first verse..." downward, correctly explaining; third, from "However, regarding the above ten powers..." downward, re-evaluating through various gates. In the second part, within each text it is divided into two: first, name and meaning; second, explaining the text. Within name and meaning, there are either two or three, as will be known when reaching the text. Now, within the first power there are three: first, explaining the name: that causes and effects correspond is called the possible (sthāna); if they do not correspond, it is called the impossible (asthāna). Second, from "Its operation..." downward is the operation. In the second verse on the power of karma: first, explaining the name; second, from "How does it differ from the first?" downward, next discerning the difference. The first power is in terms of what is done, while one's own karma is in terms of the doer; this is still not understood as to what doer and done mean. That is, viewing karma in relation to the person, having already killed, etc., this karma of killing and the like will inevitably incur a retribution, which is called 'what is done.' If this person commits killing, he will inevitably fall into hell; this is called 'the doer.' This is the above 'one's own karma,' because each incurs retribution according to good or evil, which is its operation. In the third verse on the power of faculties: first, explaining the name; from "and being able to..." downward, second, clarifying the operation. Its "correctly knowing regarding this" explains the words 'cognition power' upwards, and explains 'able to operate' downwards. The following are all modeled on this. In the fourth, the cognition of resolute faith: first, explaining the name; second, from "causing them to relinquish..." downward, the operation; third, from "This and the previous..." downward, third, discerning the difference. Here there are two explanations: first, in terms of the difference between past and present arising, hence the Upadeśa states: 'Because the two kinds of desire serve as the causes and conditions for superior and inferior faculties.' The Daśabhūmika-śāstra separately praises faculties and desires, as in 'having faculties without desire, one can understand but does not delight; having desire without faculties, although hearing, one does not understand.' Second, from "The treatise states..." downward, the second is the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] distinguishing that delight arising relying on faculties is the power of faculties; correctly discriminating desire and delight is called the power of resolute faith. In the fifth, the power of realms: first, explaining the name and essence; second, from "nature is seed..." downward, discerning the difference. Herein there are two: first, correctly explaining; second, resolving an objection. First: first citing the Upadeśa, whose meaning can be known; next citing the Yogācāra[-bhūmi], where someone might ask: in the power of resolute faith, one also knows that their resolute faith will form this seed; what difference is there between that and the nature of realms here? Therefore the commentary answers: illuminating resolute faith as giving rise to seeds is the power of resolute faith; merely illuminating seeds is the power of realms. However, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa clarifies the distinction between seed and present manifestation, internal and external, while the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] holds that resolute faith encompasses both seed and present manifestation, whereas nature is solely seed.

22.14

Regarding the Commentary's 'If habitual desire forms nature' and so forth: second, resolving objections. This addresses the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*: if desire arises based on nature, the meaning is as explained previously; but if habitual desire forms nature, then desire precedes and nature follows, so how are they distinguished again? Thus, they are reconciled in terms of broadness and narrowness: desire is narrow, while nature is broad. Regarding 'desire is only one factor of the universal [mental factors],' this refers to the *Abhidharmakośa* verse on the ten universal mental factors: 'Sensation, ideation, volition, contact, desire, / prajñā, mindfulness, attention, / resolve, and samādhi / are pervasive across all minds.' Here it is the fifth of the ten, desire. Regarding 'nature is pervasive across all factors': since there are eighty-four thousand mental factors such as greed, 'broad number' means mental factors. Next, a passage from the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* is quoted to substantiate the orthodox meaning. Regarding the Commentary's 'If nature is seed' and so forth: distinguishing it against faculties. Within this there are two parts: first, resolving it directly in terms of broadness and narrowness; second, from 'in terms of faith and the like directed toward the fruit' onward, resolving a previous implicit objection. The objection states: 'Since nature is broad and pervasive, why is it not called a faculty?' The reply states: 'Precisely because it is broad, it cannot be called a faculty. When faith and the like are directed toward the fruit, the noble path of the three vehicles has superior function and supremacy, so they may be called faculties. Nature lacks this capacity, so how could it be called a faculty?' The above concludes the direct explanation. Afterward, from 'the three wholesome roots' onward, an analogy is raised to establish this: the three wholesome roots are wholesome, yet they are not called faculties; how could nature, which encompasses greed, anger, and the like, be called a faculty? Regarding the three wholesome roots, they are merely named 'three wholesome roots' by reversing the three unwholesome roots; unlike faith and the like, whose essence and characteristics are clearly manifest, they are not established as faculties. This is provisionally based on one meaning. If 'faculty' is taken to encompass the twenty-two faculties, then that toward which they are directed differs. 'Faculty' is defined by superior function and supremacy; 'nature' is defined by unalterability.

22.15

Regarding the Commentary's 'Meaning it is not merely that the Buddha's cognition is like empty space' and so forth: this has two kinds of transcendent characteristics. Ordinary power of knowing realms merely takes the Buddha's cognition as capable of knowing, with the active knower and the known being distinct. Now it states that the Buddha's cognition is impartial like empty space, so the realms of sentient beings are all objects within the Tathāgata's cognition. This is the first superiority. Second, that cognition can encompass and contain them still pertains to the category of cognition; now, they are simultaneously manifested in a single pore, so fine form can contain them, truly because the nature of form and the nature of cognition merge without obstruction. Merging characteristics through nature constitutes the Avataṃsaka school's power of knowing realms. In the sixth, the power of knowing the paths leading to all destinies, first the name and essence are explained. 'Whether practices of renunciation or practices not of renunciation' presents the topic. From 'such as practicing the contaminated' onward, it is explained specifically. The *Yogācārabhūmi* also states: 'Such as one prone to greed cultivating the meditation on impurity and so forth is called practice leading everywhere; also, the gates leading to all five destinies; or the various practices of different views of non-Buddhists, śramaṇas, and brāhmaṇas; or practices of blameless destiny in this world or other worlds—these are called practices leading everywhere.' The matters under this name constitute its operational function. Second, from 'If one knows such' onward, the distinction is made. First, it is distinguished against realm. The meaning is: if practice arises from nature, it belongs to the purview of nature; if one merely observes its practice, it belongs to practices leading to destinies. Next, from 'the first power' onward, it is distinguished against the first power; there are two meanings, which can be understood. However, distinguishing oneself against others also constitutes an operational function. The seventh verse concerns the power of meditative absorption. First, the name is explained. The *Yogācārabhūmi* calls it the cognitive power of meditative absorptions, liberations, samādhis, and samāpattis. From 'the Buddha well knows' onward, concluding it as cognitive power constitutes the operational function. Second, from 'this and...' onward, the distinction is made. Here, there is a question: 'Personal karma is of three kinds: first, demerit; second, merit; third, non-moving [karma]. Non-moving karma is precisely meditative absorption; how does it differ from this?' One should also reply: 'Karma is pervasive across absorption and distraction. Here it is taken solely in terms of absorption, so it is manifestly distinct.' The Commentary's resolution follows the intention of the *Yogācārabhūmi*: if one merely knows the essence of absorption, it is personal karma; if one knows both the essence and function of absorption, it is the power of meditative absorption. In the eighth verse on the power of past lives, first the name also reveals the operational function; second, from '*Yogācāra*' onward, the distinction is made. That is, someone asks: 'In the cognition of past lives, one knows their cultivated causes; how then does this differ from [the power of paths] leading everywhere?' In the reply there are three parts: first, the direct reply based on the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Knowing only causes is practice leading everywhere, whereas also knowing fruits is subsumed under past lives. Regarding 'name, clan, suffering, pleasure, and such matters,' the *Yogācārabhūmi* lists eight verbal expressions for knowing all past identities: first, such a name; second, type of birth; third, clan; fourth, food and drink; fifth, experiencing suffering and pleasure; sixth, long duration; seventh, abiding long; eighth, boundary of lifespan. Here only three are listed, with 'and such' encompassing the remaining five. Second, from 'This and the *Upadeśa*...' onward, the objection from the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* is cited. Third, from 'Therefore one should resolve it by saying...' onward, the commentator provides the answer. From 'The *Yogācāra* contrasts...' onward, it shows the intention behind the *Yogācārabhūmi*'s past lives lacking cause; if it is subsumed by the word 'and so forth,' it is logically admissible. In the ninth verse on the power of the divine eye, first the name is explained, which also constitutes the operational function; second, from 'knowing the past' onward, the distinction is made, which can be understood. The five eyes and ten eyes in the text are all as in the 'Chapter on Transcending the World.' In the tenth verse on the power of exhaustion of outflows, first the name is explained, which constitutes the operational function; second, from 'in the text' onward, the text is explained. Because exhaustion of outflows allows no confusion, no distinction is made. The remaining residual traces are four: greed, anger, delusion, and conceit. The residual trace of greed is like that of Kālodayin; the residual trace of anger is like that of Śāriputra; the residual trace of delusion is like that of Cūḍapanthaka; the residual trace of conceit is like that of Pilindavatsa. No teaching has ever spoken of residual traces of views and doubts, because if there were residual traces of views, one would not see reality. Broadly speaking, perhaps there could be.

22.16

Regarding the Commentary's 'However, the above ten powers' and so forth: third, examining and analyzing them again through various approaches. Within this there are two parts: first, matching them with the six types of compound analysis; second, revealing their efficacy. In the former: first, in the general name, if one merely says 'cognitive power,' it is a karmadhāraya compound; if one says 'ten powers,' it is a dvigu compound. Second, from 'here past lives' onward, matching the specific names: past lives is called proximal because cognition is close to mindfulness. The statement that past lives is also a tatpuruṣa compound is because it is the subsequent mindfulness of the cognitive object of past lives. Second, from 'however, these ten powers' onward, distinguishing their efficacy, which can be understood. The brief meaning of the ten powers has also been fully explained; to cite further would risk obscuring the profound principle.

22.17

Regarding the Commentary's 'The Buddha's majestic power has briefly three kinds': this corresponds to *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle forty-seven. There it has two categories. First, it lists three kinds, stating: first, noble majestic power; second, Dharma majestic power; third, innate majestic power. Next, it also states: there are further five kinds: first, supernatural majestic power; second, Dharma majestic power; third, innate majestic power; fourth, majestic power shared with śrāvakas; fifth, majestic power unshared with the two vehicles. That text explains their characteristics in detail; now the Commentary cites three without following its sequence, and when explaining the text, it draws from both places. 'Wind does not stir his robes' and so forth is the innate [majestic power] among the five. Innate [powers] are manifold: the Buddha and bodhisattvas always lie on their right side like a lion king; though appearing to rest on a mattress of grass and leaves, lying on one side, there is never any disturbance; all Tathāgatas, Arhats, and Samyaksaṃbuddhas, though appearing to sleep, do not toss and turn; when a great gale suddenly rises, it does not stir the robes on their bodies; walking like an ox king, stepping like a lion, and so forth. Here it merely says 'wind does not stir his robes and so forth,' where 'and so forth' encompasses the remaining matters. Looking from the five to the three: supernatural paths correspond to noble majestic power, and shared and unshared merely show transcendence; the Commentary encompasses both. Regarding Dharma majestic power, the Commentary states: 'meaning the Dharma power of fulfilling the pāramitās,' which is speaking of the cause. From 'causing the five faculties' onward, its fruition characteristics are distinguished. In that Dharma majestic power, the pāramitās each have four characteristics: first, severing what is to be countered; second, fulfilling provisions; third, benefiting oneself and others; fourth, distinguishing the fruit, where each fruit is different. Giving obtains great wealth and a retinue of companions; morality results in rebirth among humans and devas; patience causes the mind to be free of sorrow and regret at the time of death and leads to rebirth in the heavenly realm; vigor obtains joyful delight in the superior endeavors of great men; meditative absorption obtains supernatural powers and rebirth in the dhyāna heavens; the fruit of wisdom can abandon the two heavy obstructions of afflictions and the knowable. In the *Yogācārabhūmi* above, these are mostly proximate fruits and are also explained separately. Here, they are ultimate fruits and are also explained collectively. Being free of all impurities is the fruit of liberation; having strength in the hundred joints is the fruit of giving and so forth; being solid and indestructible is the fruit of the morality pāramitā; therefore, the Elder Samantanetra uses the causes of the ten pāramitās to achieve the fruits of the ten bodies. From 'pervading the ten directions' onward, the Commentary reconciles the sūtra text with the above meaning of fruits. The remaining meanings are detailed as in the treatise.

First 17 of 53 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese