大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 33

English (machine translation) 33

Language: English

33.1

Exposited by the Śramaṇa Chengguan of the Great Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, the latter three verses" and what follows, the second section folds together and re-explains the ten verses above, gradually gathering them up from the end. Within this there are two parts: first, the direct gathering; second, the concluding praise. Within the first part there are three layers: First, gathering the latter three verses as the contemplations on the three non-natures. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states: "It is on the basis of these three natures that those three non-natures are established: the first is the non-nature of characteristics, the next is the non-nature of arising, and the last is due to being far removed from the previously grasped nature of self and dharmas." Explanation: On the basis of the parikalpita nature, one speaks of the non-self-nature of characteristics, because their substantial characteristics are utterly nonexistent, like flowers in the sky or a snake on a rope. Therefore the present verse states: "All is empty and without nature; it exists through the false mind's discrimination." Next, on the basis of the paratantra nature, one establishes the non-self-nature of arising; this is like an illusion arising dependent on manifold conditions, without an intrinsically real nature falsely grasped from beginningless time. Therefore the present verse states: "Observing in accordance with principle, all are devoid of nature." Finally, on the basis of the pariniṣpanna nature, one establishes the ultimate non-self-nature; that is, the ultimate truth, because it is far removed from the previously grasped nature of self and dharmas. Therefore the present verse states: "Whether real or unreal, whether mistaken or non-mistaken, all are conventional expressions; the real is pariniṣpanna." Non-mistaken is the cognition that accords with pariniṣpanna; the cognition of pariniṣpanna is accomplished in transcendence of the world, yet all are conventional designations. If even the real does not persist, how much less the non-real? Drawing a comparison to conclude generally, it therefore says: "Its non-real, mistaken, and the mundane" are all dismissed at once.

33.3

Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, these five verses" and what follows, the second part combines the preceding four similes. Relying on this meaning, the ten verses directly answer, and can also be divided into four: first, one verse on all dharmas having no substantial nature presents the thesis and reason in terms of Dharma; next, four verses present the four matching similes; third, there are four verses that separately combine with the preceding similes; fourth, the final verse concludes the preceding meaning. Thus the five parts of an argument are complete.

33.4

Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, the preceding five verses" and what follows, the third layer is a general conclusion; the ten verses can be known.

33.5

Regarding the commentary's "Mañjuśrī's single question" and what follows, the second part is the concluding praise. Because the profound principle of dependent origination is deep, abstruse, and comprehensive, the question and answer are all-inclusive. Now this explanation exhausts my meager capacity to propagate the profound import; do not blame the commentary for being voluminous just because the sūtra text is concise.

33.6

Second, Bodhisattva Guṇacūḍa. Regarding the commentary's "the rest should be understood by analogy with this," the three above each revealed two meanings, and the seven below avoid prolix text, hence directing that they be known by analogy. If spoken in full: the two meanings of practice are, first, in accordance with whatever practice is cultivated, and second, by what practice one transforms them. The practice of the one transforming and the practice performed are not necessarily entirely identical; for instance, when performing the practice of giving, one may transform through the practice of giving, or transform through the practice of dhyāna and wisdom. The two meanings of understanding are, first, in accordance with whether there is deep or shallow understanding, and second, teaching the understanding of all buddhas and bodhisattvas to transform them. The two meanings of discourse are, first, in accordance with the speech and customs of whatever land, and second, what manner of words are suitable to use to transform them. The two meanings of mental aspiration are, first, in accordance with what dharma is sought, and second, preaching various aspirations to transform them matching their capacities. The two meanings of upāya are, first, in accordance with whatever time of advancement, and second, by using whatever skillful means to transform them. The two meanings of contemplation are, first, in accordance with whatever meaning is contemplated and sought, and second, what manner of contemplation is suitable to preach to transform them. The two meanings of observation are, first, at the time of cultivating and learning as taught, and second, preaching the characteristics of observation as appropriate.

33.7

The commentary's "Relying on the various profound sūtras and the text of this verse, there are briefly four intentions" is the heading. Below it explains them separately: among the four, the first three clarify separately, and the last one gathers them generally. In the first three: from "First, the Buddha sees" onward, the first answers that emptiness does not obstruct transformation; from "Second, the Buddha knows" onward, it answers that cognition does not obstruct compassion; from "Third, following transformation" onward, it answers that transformation does not contradict emptiness.

33.8

Regarding the commentary's "Fourth, harmonizing the above various meanings" and so forth, it gathers the above three together into a single unity. In the preceding three, the first and the last are the interpenetration of nature and characteristics, while the middle one is the dual operation of compassion and cognition; hence now they are harmonized so that compassion, cognition, nature, and characteristics are entirely unobstructed. With respect to the text there are further three parts: first, clarifying that the nature and characteristics of those transformed are unobstructed, which is the first intention above. Second, from "By this meaning" onward, it follows upon the first intention above to discern the one who transforms, which is the second intention above: compassion and cognition are unobstructed, compassion corresponding to the preceding phenomena, and cognition corresponding to the preceding principle. Third, from "Now, because quiescence is not nonexistent" onward, it further harmonizes the preceding active agent and the object, additionally incorporating the third intention above, only then becoming of one flavor. Within this there are two parts: first, directly clarifying; second, concluding the explanation. In the first part there are also three: first, harmonizing the nature and characteristics of those transformed so they are unobstructed, thereby establishing that the one who transforms transforms without transformation, which is the first intention above. Second, from "Because according with conditions is not existent" onward, it harmonizes the one who transforms, thereby establishing the third above that transformation does not lose emptiness. Third, from "Since those transformed are empty, existence and nonexistence are not two" onward, with respect to those transformed, it establishes the meaning of the second above that compassion and cognition in the one who transforms are unobstructed.

33.9

Regarding the commentary's "Without obstructing existence, one contemplates emptiness" and so forth: this is the second part, concluding and explaining. In it there are five parts: 1. Stating that only when one contemplates emptiness without obstructing existence can one enter reality concludes the import of the question; thus, the earlier refutation of teaching in accordance with [conditions] by means of emptiness did not grasp the meaning. 2. "Without moving" and so forth: stating that one follows teaching without moving from reality concludes the import of the answer. 3. From "Sentient beings do not understand this principle" onward: this concludes the intent of transformation. 4. From "Not only" onward: this directly concludes that there is no contradiction; not only is there no contradiction, they also complement each other. 5. "Therefore the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa" onward: citing proof. It merely proves explaining such a teaching for the sake of sentient beings; that is, in the 'Chapter on Contemplating Sentient Beings', "Vimalakīrti asked Mañjuśrī Bodhisattva, saying: 'How should one contemplate sentient beings?' Mañjuśrī answered, saying: 'I contemplate sentient beings as a fifth great element, as a sixth skandha, as a seventh sense-faculty, as a thirteenth āyatana'" and so forth, which intends to clarify ultimate emptiness. Therefore Vimalakīrti next asked, "If so, how is compassion practiced?" He replied: "One should explain such a teaching for the sake of sentient beings; this is called true compassion." However, the "sentient beings whose nature is quiescent yet not non-existent" mentioned above means: although their essence is quiescent, they are not without the characteristics of sentient beings. Because they are quiescent, they are constantly not different from the real; because they are not non-existent, they are constantly established. Therefore, "without moving from the true limit" and so forth is the intent of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, which means establishing all dharmas without moving from the true limit, and speaking of the true mark without destroying conventional designations. A careful examination will make this apparent.

33.10

Regarding the commentary's "The Great Sūtra also says: If one knows that the Tathāgata constantly does not teach the Dharma": this refers to the twenty-sixth [scroll of the] sūtra, which has already been analyzed under the essence of the teaching.

33.11

Regarding the commentary's "Now, regarding the initial three verses, if one clings to a self" and so forth: the commentary text has two parts: first, a general setting forth of the two contemplations; second, from "Speaking in terms of the general characteristics" onward, explaining the sūtra text. In this, it first explains according to the contemplation of the two emptinesses, and then explains according to the contemplation of the applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna). Now, regarding the first: the contemplation of the two emptinesses means that the analysis of dhātus and the four applications of mindfulness both clarify the two emptinesses; therefore, it organizes the sūtra text by means of the two emptinesses.

33.12

Regarding the commentary's "The first clarifies the emptiness of self" and so forth: this is the contemplation of the analysis of dhātus, meaning that within the eighteen dhātus and so forth, seeking a self cannot be found. The phrase "the first half-verse is the contemplation of investigative inquiry (paryeṣaṇā)" indicates this is an upāya, showing that the latter half-verse is the contemplation of reality as it is (yathābhūta).

33.13

Regarding the commentary's "meaning provisionally established by grasping conditions": this explains the first line. Next, "coming from nowhere" and so forth explains the following line. "False and seemingly established" and so forth concludes both lines together.

33.14

Regarding the commentary's "contemplating the body by means of the body": this borrows the words of the *Laozi*. That text states: "Contemplate the body by means of the body; contemplate the family by means of the family; contemplate the state by means of the state; contemplate the world by means of the world." Its intent is to take examples from one's own body nearby, and from external things far away; just like contemplating a single falling leaf to know that autumn has arrived under heaven. Although it does not understand emptiness and quiescence, by analogy it knows they are the same.

33.15

Regarding the commentary's "this contemplation is also quiescent, hence no mind is raised": this explains not raising the mind to discriminate. However, this line has two meanings: 1. Since both objects and the self are empty, one does not discriminate the difference between objects and the self. This meaning is shallow, so it is not set forth in detail. Now it clarifies that the mind knowing emptiness is itself this contemplation; once both kinds of self are quiescent, from what could contemplation arise? If contemplation is not forgotten, it is not seeing emptiness. Then the sickness of emptiness is also empty, and subject and object are both quiescent.

33.16

Regarding the commentary's "the internal body is distinguished from the external vessel and the bodies of others": this explains the two words 'internal body' in the first verse by means of the applications of mindfulness. Now, in the fourth bhūmi there are three bodies, and the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* and the *Yogācārabhūmi* each have explanations. Here it follows the intent of the *Yogācārabhūmi*: 1. taking one's own body as the internal body; 2. taking external implements such as vases, clothes, and vehicles as the external body; 3. taking external sentient beings such as wives, children, boys, and girls as the internal-external body. Therefore, it now sets apart the latter two.

33.17

Regarding the commentary's "The applications of mindfulness are of two kinds" and so forth: this explains the second line, "Who is the self in this?" That is to say, there is a question asking: according to the contemplation of the applications of mindfulness, one contemplates the body as impure, contemplates feeling as suffering, contemplates the mind as impermanent, and contemplates dharmas as non-self; why now contemplate the body as non-self? Therefore it now answers, saying: there are general and specific [modes]. The objection above was made according to the specific; now it speaks in terms of the general. Therefore, in contemplating the body, one can cultivate the contemplations of non-self, suffering, impermanence, and impurity; here it merely mentions non-self.

33.18

Regarding the commentary's "There are also two kinds: first, the Lesser; second, the Greater" and so forth: this explains the whole verse in general to resolve an objection. That is, someone asks: below, since feeling, mind, and dharmas are separately contemplated, dharmas ought to be non-self; why are there no contemplations of impurity, suffering, and so forth? Therefore it now answers, saying: it is because it is spoken in terms of the Mahāyāna. However, the Mahāyāna contains both contemplations: in terms of conventional truth, one contemplates the body and so forth as impure and so forth; in terms of the ultimate truth, one contemplates the body and so forth as identical to space and so forth. Now, analyzing by contrasting the Great and the Lesser, contemplating the body as impure and so forth belongs only to the Hīnayāna, while contemplating the nature and characteristics of the body as identical to space belongs only to the Mahāyāna.

33.19

Regarding the commentary's "The phrase 'Who is the self?' already embraces both kinds of self": above, explaining "Who is the self?" according to the contemplation of the analysis of dhātus only dispelled the self of persons; only in the subsequent second verse did it dispel the self of dharmas. Now, according to the Mahāyāna applications of mindfulness, it embraces both kinds of self. That is, seeking a controller within the four great elements and five aggregates, none can be found at all; merely the aggregation of the skandhas and so forth means there is no self of persons. Contemplating the characteristics of the skandhas and so forth as empty because they are produced through conditions means there is no self of dharmas.

33.20

Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, specifically, body and feeling are not identical" and so forth: this also resolves an objection. That is, someone asks: both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna contemplations contemplate body, feeling, mind, and dharmas; why then do all three verses contain the word 'body'? Therefore this resolution is provided: because body, feeling, mind, and dharmas merely combine the five skandhas, and all five skandhas are 'body'. It is also like the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*, 'Chapter on Upāya', which says: "This body is like a mass of foam, which cannot be grasped; this body is like a bubble, which cannot last long; this body is like a mirage, born from thirst and craving; this body is like a plantain tree, with no solidity within; this body is like a phantom, arising from inverted views." These sequentially serve as similes for the five skandhas, and all are called 'this body'. If spoken of specifically, one should say: this form is like a mass of foam, feeling is like a bubble on the water, perception is like a mirage in the heat, formations are like a plantain tree, and consciousnesses are like a phantom. Now all are called 'body', making it clear that all four stations may be called 'body'; therefore it is said that generally, feeling and so forth are all 'body'.

33.21

Regarding the commentary's "The import of the preceding question" and so forth: this concludes the preceding question.

33.22

Regarding the commentary's "Life means the life-faculty (jīvitendriya)" and so forth: the commentary text has two parts: first, explaining the first half-verse, in which there are again two parts: first, explaining the two words 'longevity' and 'life'; second, explaining both lines as a whole. Now, regarding the first: it first relies on the Hīnayāna, namely the verse in the *Kośa*, 'Chapter on Faculties', which says: "The essence of the life-faculty is longevity itself, capable of sustaining warmth and consciousness." The commentary quotes the *Abhidharma* stating: "What is the life-faculty? It refers to longevity in the three realms. It means there is a distinct dharma capable of sustaining warmth and consciousness, called the life-faculty. Among these three dharmas, longevity is what sustains, and hence is called the essence." The commentary says "form and mind"; form is warmth, because warmth must rely on form.

33.23

Regarding the commentary's "In reality, it refers to the force of karmic seeds" and so forth: this explains according to the Mahāyāna. That is, after the first fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* extensively refutes the Hīnayāna view that there is a life-faculty distinct from form and mind, it reveals the correct doctrine, saying: "However, relying on what directly generates [them], these consciousness seeds are drawn by karma; their distinction of functions has a definite duration of abiding, provisionally established as the life-faculty." And the commentary's statement "drawing the entity of the generic similarity (sabhāga) of a single period of retribution" applies generally to both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna: in Mahāyāna it is provisional, while in Hīnayāna it is real. Therefore the *Kośa* says: "Relying on generic similarity and life, it causes the mind and so forth to continue." It also says: "Generic similarity is sentient beings, etc. 'Similar' means that their bodily forms and so forth are mutually alike. 'Part' means cause, meaning that due to this part, the bodily forms and so forth of sentient beings are caused to be similar. The word 'sentient beings' refers to the basis of generic similarity, setting it apart from non-sentient things. The word 'etc.' sets it apart from the non-similar, properly revealing the meaning of generic similarity as that which relies [on it]." The treatise says: "There is a distinct real entity called generic similarity. When it says 'sentient being generic similarity' (nikāya-sabhāga), it is because there are numerous generic similarities." It is as extensively explained there. After the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* extensively refutes this, it reveals the correct doctrine, saying: "However, it is provisionally established as generic similarity based on the differentiated states of resemblance in the bodies and minds of sentient beings." This is the Mahāyāna meaning, fully set forth as in the commentary.

33.24

Regarding the commentary's "Arising dependently from karmic conditions" and so forth: second, generally illuminating the first half-verse, it first explains by means of the approach of causes and conditions, and then, from "How much more so in a single kṣaṇa" onward, explains by means of the approach of arising and ceasing.

33.25

Regarding the commentary's "Illustrated by a wheel of fire" and so forth: this explains the latter half of the verse. The commentary has three points: the first two both illustrate the above approach of arising and ceasing; the first is in terms of the object known, and the second is in terms of the cognizing subject. The third point illustrates the above approach of causes and conditions: whereas the preceding doctrinal exposition contrasted cause and effect, here in the synthesized metaphor, the dependent and the basis are contrasted. Life is that which depends, and mind is that upon which it depends; because it is provisionally established based on mind, it is cause and condition. Master Daosheng says: "Like fire on a stick of firewood, rotating it forms a circle; the circle must rely on the fire to achieve illumination. Sentience is also like this; it must rely on the mind to achieve its function. Just as that sentience depends on mind, this life depends on mind by analogy."

33.26

Regarding the commentary's statement: "However, impermanence and so forth are explained differently across sūtras and treatises": sūtras such as the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* all explain them; they will be explained extensively below under the third abidance. Here, drawing upon the *Madhyāntavibhāga* is simply one explanation. That is, in the second chapter of that treatise, it fully possesses impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self. The treatise states: "There are three kinds of impermanence: first, impermanence of non-nature, which refers to the imagined nature, because this is permanently nonexistent; second, impermanence of arising and ceasing, which refers to the dependent nature, because it has arising and perishing; third, impermanence of defilement and purity, which refers to the consummate nature, because its status transforms. There are three kinds of suffering: first, suffering of what is grasped, which refers to the imagined nature, because it is grasped by the pudgala-ātmadṛṣṭi; second, suffering of phenomenal aspects, which refers to the dependent nature, because it possesses the aspects of the three sufferings; third, suffering of conjunction, which refers to the consummate nature, because it is conjoined with the aspects of suffering. There are three kinds of emptiness: first, emptiness of non-nature, which refers to the imagined nature, because there is no principle by which this can be said to exist, and because it is said to be empty due to this nonexistence; second, emptiness of different nature, which refers to the dependent nature, because what is falsely conceptualized does not truly exist, yet it is not utterly devoid of all kinds of nature; third, emptiness of intrinsic nature, which refers to the consummate nature, because its intrinsic nature is revealed by the two emptinesses. There are three kinds of non-self: first, non-self of signlessness, which refers to the imagined nature, because this sign is originally nonexistent and therefore called signless, and this very signlessness is spoken of as non-self; second, non-self of distinct signs, which refers to the dependent nature, because although this sign exists, it is not like that imagined nature and therefore called distinct signs, and these very distinct signs are spoken of as non-self; third, non-self of intrinsic sign, which refers to the consummate nature, because what is revealed by non-self is taken as its intrinsic sign, and this very intrinsic sign is spoken of as non-self." That treatise concludes: "Thus, the four kinds—impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self—as explained, are each divided into three kinds according to their sequence, based on fundamental reality." The commentary explains: As for "fundamental reality," the treatise above states: "It refers to the three intrinsic natures. As for why they are called 'reality,' a verse states: 'Concerning the three intrinsic natures, it is accepted that one is permanently nonexistent, one exists but is not true, and one has both existence and nonexistence as reality.'" The commentary explains: That treatise explains this fully in corresponding sequence: "One is permanently nonexistent" is the imagined; "one exists but is not true" is the dependent; "one has both existence and nonexistence as reality" is the consummate. Explaining this line, it states: "Only the consummate both exists and does not exist; only existence and nonexistence are accepted as reality in this nature." The commentary explains: The meaning of the treatise is that it possesses both existence and nonexistence; having this nonexistence, it is therefore reality. The word "non-" belongs with what precedes it, not meaning "non-reality"; the point is to clarify that the other two natures are both established upon this reality. Now, since this sūtra lacks "suffering" but contains "signlessness," the commentary relies on the three non-selves to open up the three kinds of signlessness. In that treatise's explanation of non-self, signlessness is present in each; moreover, relying also on these three kinds of signlessness in correspondence to the three sufferings, when comparing the treatise with the commentary, their extensive and abbreviated formulations become clear. From the commentary's statement "However, all are interfused and subsumed" onwards, it resolves objections, which is readily understood.

33.27

Regarding the commentary's statement: "However, this consciousness-only has briefly two divisions": this is because in the second fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, four masters differ. That is, Sthiramati posits only a single self-witnessing division (*svasaṃvittibhāga*); second, Nanda posits two, namely the objective division (*nimittabhāga*) and the subjective seeing division (*darśanabhāga*); third, Dignāga posits three, adding the self-witnessing division; fourth, Dharmapāla posits four, adding the division that witnesses the self-witnessing (*svasaṃvittisaṃvittibhāga*) to the preceding three. Relying on the tenets of that treatise, the four divisions constitute the definitive view. Therefore, the present commentary says there are briefly two divisions, because various sūtras, treatises, and passages in that treatise mostly speak of two, referring to the freedom from the signs of the two graspings, and so on. The treatise's text has three parts: first, explaining the positing of two; second, explaining the positing of three; third, explaining the positing of four. Sthiramati's single division is refuted collaterally in the discussion of the two divisions. First, in positing the two divisions, the treatise states: "However, when defiled consciousness itself arises, it all appears resembling the object of cognition (*ālambana*) and the cognitive subject. One should know that its associated dharmas are also like this. Resembling the sign of the object of cognition is called the objective division; resembling the sign of the cognitive subject is called the seeing division." The commentary explains: This means that the two dependent divisions resemble the two imagined divisions. Furthermore, in the Hīnayāna, the objective division is called the cognitive aspect (*ākāra*), because it grasps the object of cognition; the seeing division is called the entity (*vastu*), because it is the intrinsic nature of mind and mental factors. Here, because it resembles an object external to the mind, it is called resembling the object of cognition. Because external dharmas do not exist here, the objective division transformed [by consciousness] is merely the object of cognition. If one understands that the objective division is not yet an error, grasping outward beyond the mind is what constitutes error. Furthermore, "seeing" means being able to cognize the object; its meaning applies to both mind and mental factors, and is not the meaning of discursive investigation. Discursive investigation is capable only by prajñā. Next, it refutes Sthiramati's positing of only the self-witnessing division. The treatise states: "If mind and mental factors lacked the sign of an object of cognition, they should not be able to cognize their own objects of cognition." The commentary explains: This means the mind cognizing form should not be able to cognize form. The treatise states: "Or each should be able to cognize everything." The commentary explains: This means that any single consciousness, etc., would be able to cognize all objects. If the eye-consciousness, lacking an object of cognition, could still cognize form, then other consciousnesses lacking form as an object should also be able to cognize form. Since the others cannot cognize everything, we clearly know that asserting the absence of an object of cognition is not correct. The definitive view here is that when cognizing its own object, there must be an aspect on the mind bearing the object, just as an image resembling a face arises on the surface of a mirror. Next, it refutes the absence of a cognitive subject. The treatise states: "If mind and mental factors lacked the sign of a cognitive subject, they should not be able to cognize, like empty space and so forth." The commentary explains: Because, being the same as empty space, they would be unable to cognize. The treatise states: "Or empty space and so forth would also be cognitive subjects." The commentary explains: This is a counter-objection: if dharmas of mind and mental factors lacked a cognitive subject yet could cognize objects of cognition, then empty space and so forth, lacking a cognitive subject, should also cognize objects of cognition. The treatise states: "Therefore, mind and mental factors must possess two signs, as the sūtra states: 'Everything is consciousness alone; the objects cognized do not exist at all. The division of the cognizer and the division of the cognized each turn spontaneously according to their own nature.'" The commentary explains: This is the *Ghanavyūha-sūtra*. The first half clarifies that there are no external objects; the second half clarifies that there are the two divisions of seeing and objective image. Each arising from its own causes and conditions is called turning spontaneously according to its own nature. Below, it concludes with the definitive view. The treatise states: "For one who realizes that there is no object of cognition separate from consciousness, the transformed objective division is the object of cognition, and the seeing division is called its own cognitive aspect. The entity upon which the objective and seeing divisions rely is called the thing (*vastu*), which is the self-witnessing division." The commentary explains: Although this is the position of those who posit two divisions, it already contains three. Next, the treatise states: "If this did not exist, one should not be able to remember dharmas of mind and mental factors, just as one is certainly unable to remember an object that has never been experienced." The commentary explains: This clarifies the existence of the self-witnessing division. The meaning is: the objective division, separate from the seeing division, has no distinct substance, but is merely two functions; hence, there must be a distinct relying entity. If there were no self-witnessing, one should not remember dharmas of mind and mental factors, just as one certainly cannot remember an object never experienced. For example, if the seeing division has not experienced the object of the objective division, it cannot remember it; it must have experienced it to be able to remember it. If there were no self-witnessing, one could not remember already-ceased minds and mental factors, because they were never cognized by self-witnessing. That would be like the seeing division being unable to remember an unexperienced object; now, since one can remember them, it is clear that self-witnessing previously cognized them, just as the seeing division remembers an experienced object. Next below, it posits three divisions. The treatise states: "However, when each mind and mental factor arises, examined through reason, each has three divisions, because the measured (*prameya*), the measurer (*pramāṇa*), and the fruit of measurement (*pramāṇaphala*) are distinct, and because the objective and seeing divisions must have an entity upon which they rely." The commentary explains: The measured is the objective division; the measurer is the seeing division; the fruit of measurement is the self-witnessing division. This is because the self-witnessing division serves as the basis for the objective and seeing divisions. As stated in a verse of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: "That which resembles the object is the measured; the aspect of grasping is the first, self-witnessing is the second, and the third is the measurer and the fruit; these three have no distinct substance." The commentary explains: The measured is like silk; the measurer is like a ruler; the fruit of measurement is like the knowledge understanding the measurement. What is the meaning of "fruit"? It has the meaning of fulfilling the cause. Stating that they have "no distinct substance" means they are the identical consciousness; hence, apart from the mind there is no object. Next, it posits four divisions. The treatise states: "Furthermore, if mind and mental factors are finely distinguished, there should be four divisions. Three divisions are as before; the fourth is the division that witnesses the self-witnessing. If this did not exist, what would witness the third? Since the mental divisions are identical [in nature], they should all be witnessed." The commentary explains: The seeing division is a mental division and must have a self-witnessing division; the self-witnessing is a mental division and should have a fourth division that witnesses it. The treatise states: "Furthermore, the self-witnessing division would have no fruit, because all measurers possess a fruit." The commentary explains: The seeing division is a measurer and must have the fruit of self-witnessing. The self-witnessing measures the seeing division and must have a fourth fruit. Lest someone save the argument by saying, "One can in turn use the seeing division as the third's fruit," the treatise next states: "It should not be that the seeing division is the third's fruit, because the seeing division is sometimes subsumed under non-valid cognition (*apramāṇa*); therefore, the seeing division does not witness the third. That which witnesses its own nature must be direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)." The commentary explains: The intention is to clarify that the seeing division extends across the three cognitions. The three cognitions are direct perception, inference (*anumāna*), and non-valid cognition. This clarifies that when seeing cognizes the objective division, it may be valid or non-valid; a non-valid dharma cannot serve as the fruit of direct perception. Or, seeing cognizing an objective division may be inference, whereas cognizing self-witnessing is direct perception. The self-witnessing is the mental entity and can serve as the fruit for inference and non-valid cognition; the seeing division is not the mental entity and cannot serve as the fruit of measurement for self-witnessing; hence, the seeing division cannot witness the third. That which witnesses its own nature must be direct perception; since the third and fourth divisions are both direct perception, they can witness each other, avoiding the fault of infinite regress. The meaning is: if one takes the seeing division as the measurer, merely using three divisions is sufficient. If one takes the seeing division as the measured, there must be a fourth as the fruit of measurement. To use a general metaphor: the silk is like the measured; the ruler is like the measurer; the intellect is the fruit of measurement, namely the self-witnessing division. If the ruler is what is employed and the intellect is what employs it, what uses the intellect? That is the person, like the division that witnesses the self-witnessing. The person can use the intellect, and the intellect can direct the person; thus, they can mutually witness each other. It is also like a bright mirror: the mirror's reflection is the objective division; the mirror's clarity is the seeing division. The front surface of the mirror is like the self-witnessing; the back of the mirror is like the division witnessing the self-witnessing. The front relies on the back, and the back relies on the front; hence, they can mutually witness each other. One can also take copper as witnessing the self-witnessing: the mirror relies on the copper, and the copper relies on the mirror. The above four divisions: this doctrine existed only after Dharmapāla. In the treatise, these four divisions may be subsumed into three, because the fourth is subsumed into the self-witnessing division, their fruit-entity being one. The treatise states that they may be subsumed into two, because the latter three are all of the nature of the cognitive subject; hence, in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* they are made into two, also being subsumed into seeing. The treatise states that they may be subsumed into one, because their substance is not distinct, as stated in a verse of the *Laṅkāvatāra*: "Due to grasping by one's own mind, the mind turns resembling external objects. What is seen by it does not exist; therefore, it is said to be mind-only." Thus, everywhere it speaks of one mind alone; this term "one mind" also subsumes mental factors. The cognitive aspect of consciousness is precisely cognition (*vijñapti*), and cognition is precisely the seeing division of consciousness. The commentary explains: Although the explanations of the word "understanding" in the verse across the treatises above differ in opening and closing, here we merely briefly cite the two divisions of objective and seeing; hence, at the beginning that treatise establishes two divisions, and everywhere mostly speaks of objective and seeing. If one understands that the objective division is merely transformed by mind, this is not error; to take the objective division as external and grasp outside the mind is what is called error. Therefore, the explanation above stated: the two dependent divisions resemble the two imagined divisions of seeing and objective image. Here, in terms of the imagined, it constitutes error. The four divisions above, in text, seem essential to horizontal dharmalakṣaṇa doctrines; therefore, they were cited.

33.28

Regarding the commentary's "causing one to investigate names and so forth and enter into the contemplation of reality as it is": this borrows the four contemplations through investigation and the four contemplations of reality as it is from the stage of applied preparation (prayogamārga) to explain the sūtra text. The four investigations are: first, name; second, referent; third, intrinsic nature; and fourth, distinction. Here, when it says "names and so forth", "and so forth" encompasses the remaining three.

33.29

Regarding the commentary's "meaning understanding names and so forth" onward: it uses mental verbalisation (manojalpa) to explain the characteristics of the contemplation through investigation. Within this there are three parts: first, it explains in general. Second, from "'mental' means the mental consciousness" onward, it cites the seventh fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha to explain the characteristics of mental verbalisation. The treatise states: "'Mental' refers to the mental consciousness; its coarseness, subtlety, and thought only take verbal designations as their objective conditions for conceptualisation, and there is no distinct referent apart from them that can be cognised. Furthermore, it necessarily conceptualises all dharmas based upon names." Thus it speaks of "conceptualisation of mental verbalisation". Third, from "verbal designations being merely" onward, it harmonises the treatise with the sūtra to elucidate the characteristics of the four investigations. Names express intrinsic nature, phrases express distinctions; both names and phrases are termed "names", while intrinsic nature and distinctions are both "referents". Hence it simply speaks of "names and referents".

33.30

Regarding the commentary's "since one follows conceptualisation" onward: second, it specifically explains the second half of the stanza, [which says] not a single dharma has ever managed to enter into dharmatā. Now, this phrase takes up the Mahāyānasaṃgraha cited above and the sūtra's words that "everything is conceptualisation"; hence it states, "since one follows conceptualisation". Regarding "the flow of mind falsely imputes": this cites the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra to establish the point. In the third fascicle of that sūtra, following an exposition refuting non-Buddhist teachings as all being mundane philosophies (lokāyata), at the end a brāhmaṇa asks: "Is the existence of the three realms due to the causal conditions of ignorance, craving, and karma? Or is it without cause?" I then replied: "Both of these are also mundane philosophies." He asked again: "Do all dharmas enter into particular characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) and common characteristics (sāmānyalakṣaṇa)?" I again replied: "These two are also mundane philosophies." The brāhmaṇa said: "...up to the mind's flow falsely imputing external dust (objects)." [The Buddha replied:] "All these are mundane philosophies." Hence it is said that "the flow of mind falsely imputes".

33.31

Regarding the commentary's "and has not yet comprehended mind-only": above, it followed the preceding sense of conceptualisation as the reason for not entering dharmatā. From here down, it adduces a comparative analogy to explain the meaning of not entering. There are, in brief, two essential contemplations: first, the contemplation of mind-and-consciousness only; second, the contemplation of reality as it is—tathatā. If one cannot even comprehend the contemplation of mind-only, which is shallow, how could one enter the contemplation of tathatā, which is profound and wondrous? Dharmatā is merely an alternative name for tathatā.

33.32

Regarding the commentary's "if one can thus awaken oneself and penetrate" onward: whereas the preceding passage directly interpreted the sūtra text regarding the meaning of not entering, this passage inversely elucidates the capacity to enter, which is the contemplation of reality as it is. Within this, one first enters the contemplation of mind-and-consciousness only. The words "awaken oneself" correspond to the Laṅkāvatāra above. The Laṅkāvatāra states: "That brāhmaṇa asked again: 'Is there anything that is not mundane philosophy?' The Buddha answered: 'There is, but non-Buddhists cannot know it, because they falsely cling to unreal fabrications regarding external natures. It means when false conceptualisation does not arise, one awakens to existence and non-existence. When false conceptualisation does not arise from one's own mind's direct perception, external dust is not received, and false conceptualisations are forever extinguished; this is called non-mundane philosophy. This is my Dharma, not yours.'" Here, "awakening oneself" abbreviates its main import, directing one to awaken to one's own mind. The word "penetrate" reflects the intent of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: penetrating that there is only the conceptualisation of mental verbalisation and no real entity serves as the upāya for entering consciousness-only. Not apprehending external characteristics constitutes entering mind-only. Regarding the commentary's "and furthermore this mind" onward: it cites the Awakening of Faith to substantiate the contemplation of reality as it is—tathatā. That treatise states: "If the mind scatters, one should immediately rein it in to make it abide in correct mindfulness. As for correct mindfulness, one should know it is mind-only, without external objects." Commentary: This is the contemplation of mind-and-consciousness only. Next, it states: "And furthermore, this mind is also without an intrinsic characteristic, unobtainable from moment to moment." Commentary: This is the contemplation of reality as it is—tathatā. The words "false conceptualisation does not arise" are also from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, as cited before. "One then enters dharmatā" concludes and confirms the above meaning.

33.33

Regarding the commentary's "the above concerns the mind's divergence; it is not that the essence is not identical": this resolves an objection and re-explains. That is, an objection states: according to the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa and elsewhere, everything is tathatā, and freedom from the nature of words is itself liberation. The sūtra below also states: "All dharmas are like this, and so is the sphere of the Buddhas." Even the three poisons and the four inversions are pure; how can it be said that words do not enter dharmatā? Here there are two resolutions: first, it is explained in terms of the practitioner's mind not entering the principle, not in terms of the essence of dharmas failing to be identical with dharmatā. Second, it is explained in terms of the object contemplated also having nothing to be entered; hence the text below states: "The profound realm of the Tathāgata / Its measure is equal to space; / All sentient beings enter it, / Yet in reality there is nothing entered."

33.34

Regarding the commentary's "sixth, one stanza concluding generally": it concludes generally the five sections, causing one to be free from subject and object. Regarding "it also closely concludes the preceding two stanzas": this is because the characteristics of subject and object are prominent. It first clarifies the preceding stanza, and from "moreover, contemplating all" onward it clarifies the subsequent stanza. With the contemplation of mental verbalisation, even if one attains reality as it is, subject and object still exist, which is why it is called "not yet discarded". A stanza on applied preparation states: "If one sets up some small thing before oneself, / Thinking it to be the nature of consciousness-only, / Because there is something apprehended, / One does not truly abide in consciousness-only." Thus it is merely an upāya for consciousness-only; only upon attaining the stage of penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya / darśanamārga) does one enter mind-only.

33.35

Regarding the commentary's "these two divisions of object and vision, due to repeated habituation from beginningless time, manifest with various resembling characteristics": this is the meaning of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Saying "resembling" shows that they lack genuine reality; they merely resemble the two characteristics. If one clings to them as real, they become the imagined nature (parikalpita).

33.36

Regarding the commentary's "produced dharmas must perish" onward: this explains the second half of the stanza. However, it takes up the first half to proceed: since mind and object depend on each other, they are both born from conditions; produced dharmas must perish, entirely terminating. Because they do not abide for an instant, it says: "How could they pause for a moment?"

33.37

Regarding the commentary's "if one understands that characteristics are characterless" onward: it directly reveals the stanza's intention. Above, it directly explained the text of the stanza to clarify the fault of the two graspers (grāhya-grāhaka). Now, causing one to understand them means causing one to be free from the two graspers, which is the sūtra's intention. Thus, by inversely explaining the sūtra text while according with the sūtra's intent, understanding mind-only accomplishes the contemplation of mind-and-consciousness only. From "if one understands the absence of nature" onward, it accomplishes the contemplation of reality as it is—tathatā. When mind and object are both eradicated, one abides in non-conceptualisation. As the stanza on the stage of penetration cited above says: "When regarding the cognised object / Cognition grasps nothing at all, / At that time one abides in consciousness-only, / Because one is free from the characteristics of the two graspers." The sphere of self-awakened cognition corresponds to the meaning of the Laṅkāvatāra. The unmoving dharmadhātu corresponds to the meaning of the Mahāprajñāpāramitā. The "Mañjuśrī Section" states: "Fixing conditions on the dharmadhātu, mindful of the dharmadhātu, not moving the dharmadhātu, knowing the true dharmadhātu, one should not agitate it." This means that if one says 'I enter the dharmadhātu', one has already moved the dharmadhātu; when both subject and object are eradicated, the characteristic of entering becomes entirely quiescent. Therefore, not moving the dharmadhātu constitutes entering dharmatā.

33.38

Regarding the commentary's "therefore the final stanza concludes the above contemplations" onward: it states the overall intent of this stanza, clarifying that it concludes generally what precedes.

33.39

Regarding the commentary's "the Buddha thus transforms" onward: it generally reveals the meaning of the answer.

33.40

Third: karma and result are extremely profound. Regarding the commentary's "the four great elements are without a master" and so forth: the second fascicle of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa states: "Because the four great elements combine, it is nominally called a body. The four great elements have no master, and the body also has no self. Furthermore, the arising of this sickness is entirely due to attachment to a self; therefore, toward the self one should not produce attachment." Here, it takes that text to explain the present sūtra.

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Linked texts (1)

大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese