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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45

English (machine translation) 45

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Contents

45.1

Expounded by the śramaṇa Chengguan of the Great Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

45.2

In the Commentary, from "Precepts, concentration, wisdom" onwards, the fourth [part] directly explains in accordance with the text. Within this, there are seven points: 1. pointing to examples to explain briefly; 2. from "The Prajñāpāramitopadeśa" onwards, citing the treatise to explain collectively; 3. from "However, namely transforming the previous" onwards, establishing the reason for the five; 4. resolving and clearing objections; 5. identifying the essential nature; 6. harmonising and explaining the collective name; 7. harmonising the provisional and the real. The first two are clear. Within the third, there are two points: first, the direct explanation, which is the meaning of the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa and the Renwang jing.

45.3

In the Commentary, from "Therefore the Renwang" onwards, citing proof: matching them in order is quite plain to see. However, in the new translation of the sūtra, it is the chapter "Practices of Bodhisattvas"; the sūtra says: "Furthermore, a bodhisattva of the lineage of the Path, cultivating the ten dedications, generates ten patient minds: namely, contemplating the five aggregates of form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, they attain patience in precepts, patience in concentration, patience in wisdom, patience in liberation, and patience in the knowledge and vision of liberation; contemplating the causes and effects of the three realms, they attain patience in emptiness, patience in signlessness, and patience in wishlessness; contemplating the provisional and real two truths and the impermanence of all dharmas, they attain patience in impermanence; contemplating the emptiness of all dharmas, they attain patience in the non-arising [of dharmas]." What is discussed now is the first five; the text cited is from the older translation of the sūtra, so its order differs from this one.

45.4

In the Commentary, from "Knowledge-and-vision and wisdom" onwards, the fourth [part] resolves objections, which is the objection concerning mutual confusion. First the objection, then the answer. Regarding "the three explanations in the Buddhabhūmi": the present is the first explanation. The second says: "All are unimpeded wisdom conditioned by liberation, termed the knowledge and vision of liberation." "Wisdom conditioned by liberation" is wisdom conditioned by the truth of cessation. Wisdom conditioned by the rest is wisdom conditioned by the remaining three truths, etc. The third says: "All pervade those in training and beyond training; attained partially in the stage of training and completely in the stage beyond training, because all buddhas and bodhisattvas possess all five."

45.5

In the Commentary, from "These five, separately explained" onwards, the fifth [part] identifies the essential nature. Because the knowledge and vision of liberation and wisdom differ according to what is illuminated, both are alike wisdom. Wisdom is associated with perception; the knowledge and vision of liberation is simply wisdom associated with consciousness.

45.6

In the Commentary, from "However, this five-part dharmakāya" onwards, the sixth [part] harmonises and explains the collective name as supramundane. The reason for citing the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā as proof is the first treatise mentioned above.

45.7

In the Commentary, from "Question: The five unappropriated aggregates" onwards, the seventh [part] harmonises the provisional and real. The citation of Cunda is as found in the Profound Discourse. However, the third fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā also says: "Should the five unappropriated aggregates be called conditioned or unconditioned? Answer: They should not be spoken of as conditioned or unconditioned. Why? Because karmas and defilements do not exist, they should not be called conditioned; because they manifest in accordance with wish, they should not be called unconditioned. Why is this? The unappropriated aggregates manifest before one in accordance with what is wished and desired; the unconditioned is not like this, because it is eternally abiding." Exposition: This is a provisional statement negating both, based on the mutual preclusion of essence and function; thus it is not definitively declared to be conditioned or unconditioned. Furthermore, mentioning 'appropriated five aggregates' reveals that ordinary beings possess the five aggregates with appropriation. The Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā says: 'Aggregates of appropriation are those that conjoin with appropriation. Appropriation refers to the defilements within the aggregates.' The historical account of Cunda has already appeared in the Profound Discourse.

45.8

In the Commentary, "Fourth, the conditioned": first, explaining the collective name. Citing two treatises: "The Yogācāra says: tied to causes and conditions." The first fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra says: "The conditioned is produced in conjunction by the gathering of multiple conditions. Why is that which has not yet arisen in the future called conditioned? Because it belongs to that category, it is also called conditioned. Just as unburned firewood in its unburned state is called firewood because it belongs to that category; or, establishing names based on past and future presents no fault, just as lutes and zithers are called 'resonant', or like breasts, lotus ponds, and the like. Unarisen dharmas do not depart from that category; hence they are called conditioned." That they have arising and cessation is still a brief statement. The Abhidharmasamuccaya says: "If a dharma has arising, cessation, abiding, and alteration, it can be called conditioned. All dharmas are conditioned, with the sole exception of a portion of the dharmadhātu, dharma-object, and dharma-base; this is in order to abandon attachment to an impermanent self." Exposition: Here, the treatise answers three questions: 1. answering what is conditioned; 2. from 'all dharmas' onwards, answering how many are conditioned; 3. from 'in order to abandon' onwards, answering for what purpose one contemplates the conditioned.

45.9

In the Commentary, "Here we briefly cite four things": in reality, the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, and others broadly list many dharmas. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā states: "What are conditioned dharmas? If a dharma has arising, abiding, and cessation (this explains the meaning of conditioned): the five aggregates of the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm, up to the feelings produced by causes and conditions of mental consciousness, the four stations of mindfulness up to the eighteen unshared dharmas, for the sake of all-knowledge—these are conditioned dharmas." The Prajñāpāramitopadeśa explains: "Conditioned dharmas briefly possess three characteristics: first, the so-called arising, abiding, and cessation; second, bound to the three realms; third, the four stations of mindfulness up to the eighteen unshared dharmas. Although there are unconditioned dharmas, because they are accompanied by action/effort, they are conditioned dharmas. Having unconditioned characteristics makes them unconditioned dharmas." Exposition: Here, since the eighteen unshared dharmas and the rest are subsumed under determinate dharmas, we only briefly present the four; sentient beings then encompass the aggregates, bases, and elements.

45.10

On the commentary's "Now, as for the loci of reliance..." below, it explains the meaning of the three realms. When it says "Hence the treatise states," this refers to the eighth [fascicle] of the Abhidharmakośa. The word "etc." encompasses the remaining two realms: one should say "the realm pertaining to form is called the form realm" and "the realm pertaining to formlessness is called the formless realm." Omitting the two characters "pertaining to" (suoshu), one simply names it "desire realm," and so forth. For example, when one says "sesame beverage" or "vajra bracelet," both "beverage" and "bracelet" are general designations, while "sesame" and "vajra" are specific qualifiers; because the specific relies upon the general, they are called "sesame beverage" and "vajra bracelet." Fully stated, one should say "the beverage pertaining to sesame," and so forth, but omitting "pertaining to," one simply says "vajra bracelet," and so forth. "Realm" is the general designation, while "desire," and so forth, are the specific qualifiers; omitting the intermediate words, one says "desire realm," and so on. The treatise states: "Here, what dharma is referred to by the word 'desire'? Answer: In brief, it refers to gross food and craving induced by lust." The annotation states: "Craving for lust is called craving; craving for food is called desire." Yet this phrasing remains implicit. The upper fascicle of the Benye [jing] states: "O sons of the Buddha! Because of the two karmas of views and attachments, beings are deluded about all desirous minds within the dharmadhātu; therefore, the retribution generated by desire is divided as the retribution of the desire realm. O sons of the Buddha! Because of the two karmas of views and attachments, beings are deluded about all form minds within the dharmadhātu; therefore, the retribution generated by the form mind is divided as the retribution of the form realm. O sons of the Buddha! Because of the two karmas of views and attachments, beings are deluded about all concentration minds within the dharmadhātu; therefore, the retribution generated by the concentration mind is divided as the retribution of the formless [realm]." For this reason, within the single dharmadhātu there are the retributions of the three realms. If one were to make it even easier to understand: the desire realm has physical bodies received through male and female shapes and sexual desire; the form realm lacks male and female shapes and has form alone; and the formless realm is so called because it lacks form. What was called "views and attachments" in the Benye [jing] above refers to that sūtra's statement that there are seven views and six attachments. That sūtra states: "O sons of the Buddha! 'Avidyā' refers to the failure to comprehend all dharmas, generating the karmic retributions of the three realms through delusion about the dharmadhātu. For this reason I say that from the store of avidyā arise thirteen afflictions: namely, the seven views of wrong view, self view, eternalist view, annihilationist view, view of [attachment to] rules, view of theft, and doubtful view—they are called 'views' because they seek across all places. Furthermore, they give rise to six minds of attachment: greed, love, anger, delusion, desire, and conceit, arising at all times within the dharmadhātu. All afflictions take these thirteen as their root, and avidyā serves as the root for these thirteen, with avidyā generating thoughts in conjunction with these thirteen." Hence, within the dharmadhātu, distinctions are made into thoughts of the three realms; that is, what is referred to as the two karmas of views and attachments, and so forth, as cited above.

45.11

The commentary's "Fifth, the unconditioned" has six [sections]: first, explaining the general name; second, analysis and synthesis; third, explaining the text; fourth, distinguishing provisional and ultimate; fifth, identifying its essential nature; and sixth, concluding by demonstrating the purpose of hearing much. Now, the first: explaining the general name. From "The Yogācāra..." below, it cites proofs; as before, the two treatises correspond to the preceding two definitions. The Samuccaya states: "Because it lacks arising, abiding, and cessation, it is called unconditioned, for it does not fall into reckoning." This is what the chapter on Ānanda in the Vimalakīrti says: "The Buddha's body is unconditioned and does not fall into any reckoning." "Reckoning" is just the conditioned. The remaining definitions merely invert the conditioned above; therefore, the commentary concludes: "The general designations across the treatises do not differ in their main import."

45.12

In the commentary below, under "Yet...", the second [section] on analysis and synthesis states: "Yet the Hīnayāna mostly speaks of three kinds." That is, treatises such as the Abhidharmakośa say: "The uncontaminated refers to the truth of the path, and three kinds of unconditioned dharmas: namely, space and the two cessations." In stating that "most" do so: the Vibhajyavāda has four: (1) space, (2) cessation without deliberation (apratisaṃkhyānirodha), (3) cessation of ideation and feeling, and (4) tathatā. The Mahāsāṃghika speaks of nine unconditioned dharmas: namely, the [above] three, along with the four formless [attainments], the nature of the limbs of dependent origination, and the nature of the limbs of the noble path. The Mahīśāsaka also has nine: adding to the three [others], immobility, the three natures, the limbs of the path, and dependent origination.

45.13

The commentary states: "The Mahāyāna Karatalaratna speaks of four" because it adds tathatā to the Hīnayāna three. Or it is said that there are six, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and other treatises, extensively discussed below. Or they are divided into eight; the second fascicle of the Samuccaya states: "There are eight kinds of unconditioned dharmas: namely, the tathatā of wholesome dharmas, the tathatā of unwholesome dharmas, the tathatā of neutral dharmas, space, cessation through deliberation (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), cessation without deliberation, immobility, and the cessation of ideation and feeling. Among these eight unconditioned dharmas thus established, one should know that it is because their loci of reliance have distinctions. By analyzing tathatā, three kinds are provisionally established; it is not on account of their intrinsic nature. The tathatā of wholesome dharmas refers to the selfless nature, emptiness, the signless bhūtakoṭi, and the ultimate dharmadhātu. Why is tathatā called selflessness? Because its intrinsic nature is devoid of mutable nature; that is, at all times its real nature of selflessness does not change. Because it does not change, it is said to be without mutation; one should know that this is precisely the selfless nature, being free from the two selves. Why, furthermore, is this called emptiness? Because it is not traversed by any defilements. Why is that? Because taking this as an object of condition can cause all defiled phenomena to become completely empty and quiescent. At times it is said that defilement is merely adventitious dust, and that all signs are quiescent; hence it is called signless. Because it is an unerring object of condition, it is called bhūtakoṭi. 'Real' (bhūta) means without error; this locus is the culmination, hence it is called 'limit' (koṭi). Because it is the realm traversed by supreme noble wisdom, it is called the ultimate truth. Because it is the locus of reliance for all wonderful dharmas of the three vehicles, it is called the dharmadhātu. As with the wholesome tathatā, one should know that the unwholesome and neutral are also like this." The rest is as in that treatise. From "Wishing gradually..." below, the commentary brings out the treatise's intent.

45.14

From the commentary's "This sūtra speaks of six..." below is the third [section], explaining the text. Within this are two parts: first, a general clarification of presence and absence; afterward, from "The word 'space'..." below, it explains them individually, relying extensively on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Since there are six unconditioned dharmas, there are six segments. First, the wording explaining space entirely follows the intent of the commentary on the Baifa [lun]. That is, the meaning in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi where it is provisionally posited on the basis of dharmatā. That treatise first explains dharmatā, stating: "It refers to tathatā revealed by emptiness and selflessness; it is neither existent nor non-existent, the path of mind and speech is cut off, and it is neither one nor different from all dharmas, and so forth. Being the true reality of dharmas, it is called dharmatā. Being free from all obstructions, it is called space." Interpretation: When that treatise explains that dharmatā is empty, it only says that it is free from all obstructions. The Baifa [lun] additionally takes up external space, saying that it is revealed by the absence of material things; hence the Abhidharmakośa states: "Here, space is unobstructive."

45.15

The commentary's "Second, nirvāṇa": nirvāṇa is identical to cessation through deliberation. It first clarifies original purity (prakṛtiviśuddhi), which is merely a tangential presentation of an alternative interpretation. When it says "The thirty-fourth [fascicle] of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] also agrees with this statement," this is the explanation in the Kanding ji, meaning that it agrees with what is spoken in this sūtra regarding space and nirvāṇa. Hence, in explaining the four propositions on arising through conditions, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra states: "Those which are neither arisen through conditions nor the twelve links of dependent origination are space and nirvāṇa." This then agrees with the meaning of original purity. Second, the latter interpretation is correct, stating that the fruit of original purity is precisely the completely purified nirvāṇa. A question might be asked: If it is a fruit, how does it differ from cessation through deliberation? Because cause and fruit differ, two paths are distinguished; therefore, in the initial general explanation it takes this interpretation as correct, stating that within cessation through deliberation, nirvāṇa is divided out because the two paths are distinct. From "Yet the Mahāyāna..." below, it settles the above two interpretations. As for "the latter explanation is correct," this matches where the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi explains cessation without deliberation by saying: "It does not depend on the power of deliberation, because its intrinsic nature is originally pure."

45.16

The commentary's "Third, cessation through analytical deliberation" (shuyuán miè): from "Hence the Tang Tripiṭaka [Master]..." below, it presents its alternative name. When it says "It refers to what is attained by the power of deliberation," this is the explanation of the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra. Hence its analogy states: "Just as a cart drawn by oxen is called an ox-cart, by omitting the intermediate words it is spoken of in this way, simply called cessation through deliberation." The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi explains: "By the power of discernment and deliberation, one extinguishes all defilements and ultimately realizes and encounters it; hence it is called cessation through deliberation."

45.17

Regarding the commentary's "Yet this cessation has two [aspects]": it individually explains the word "cessation." These two meanings are called cessation. If one also includes the wisdom capable of extinguishing, wisdom is also called cessation.

45.18

Regarding the commentary's "Fourth, cessation not through analytical deliberation": hence the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states: "It does not depend on the power of deliberation; being intrinsically pure, and revealed by the lack of conditions, it is called cessation without deliberation." Interpretation: The treatise preserves two meanings. The first meaning differs from the Hīnayāna, so the commentary text above adopted it as the definitive standard. As for "the lack of conditions," the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra states: "Completely obstructing future arising, cessation without deliberation is separately attained." The explanation below states: "'Future arising' refers to dharmas to arise in the future: when conditions assemble they arise, and when conditions are lacking they do not arise; at the time when conditions are lacking, one attains cessation without deliberation. Obstructing future dharmas so that they perpetually do not arise is called 'completely obstructing.' As for 'separately attained,' it means that cessation without deliberation possesses real substantial nature; because a separate attainment arises in the state where conditions are lacking, the attainment of cessation without deliberation is not due to cessation through deliberation, but solely due to the lack of conditions; hence it is called cessation without deliberation." The treatise clarifies this by pointing to facts, stating: "For instance, when the eye and the mind concentrate on a single visible form, the remaining visible forms, sounds, scents, tastes, tangibles, and so forth, pass away. The bodies of the five consciousnesses that take those objects as condition, and so forth, remain in future lifetimes and definitively do not arise. Because they cannot take past objects as condition and their conditions are incomplete, one attains cessation without deliberation." Interpretation: When the eye takes form as condition, it ought also to take sound and so forth as condition, but because it is focused exclusively on form, the ear and so forth do not take sound and so forth as condition. Because the simultaneous sounds, and so forth, have already passed away in that kṣaṇa, the consciousnesses that take sound, and so forth, as condition will never arise again. This is because the first five consciousnesses take only direct perception (pratyakṣa) as condition, not the past or future. When it says "tangibles and so forth," "and so forth" includes mental objects among dharmas that are simultaneous with what is capable of cognition, such as the objects cognized by the knowledge of others' minds. This knowledge of others' minds only takes the present mental king as condition; it also ought to take mental factors as condition, but because it is focused exclusively on the mental king, it attains cessation without deliberation regarding the mental factors.

45.19

Regarding the Commentary's “[The] fifth, conditioned arising”: the text of the Commentary has two parts: first, a dual presentation; second, from “Specifically meaning” downward, a specific explanation, first explaining the specific and next explaining the general. Now, as for the first, the text has four sections: 1. Adducing what was posited by the various Hīnayāna schools. 2. From “The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, fascicle thirty-two” downward, adducing the position of Mahāyāna treatises to substantiate and corroborate the above meaning. Herein the treatise text first has a question: “Why is it that such dharmatā and bhūtakoṭi are not spoken of in the śrāvaka teachings, while in the Mahāyāna they are spoken of everywhere?” The answer is: “In the śrāvaka teachings these two are also spoken of.” Below it is identical to the Commentary, and has already been cited in the Mysterious Meaning. 3. From the Commentary's “The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] also states” downward, adducing Mahāyāna sūtras to establish the meaning of the unconditioned. First citing the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], which is in the northern text, the “Chapter on Kāśyapa Bodhisattva”, the thirty-fourth fascicle, serving as the beginning of the chapter (the thirty-first in the southern text). In the northern text, half a fascicle later, twenty-one controversies are listed, this being the sixth, where the sūtra states: “Some say that the twelve links of conditioned arising are conditioned phenomena; some say that the twelve links of conditioned arising are unconditioned phenomena.” It is only in the thirty-fifth [fascicle] that it explains, the sūtra stating in full: “Good son, how do I explain in the sūtra what is called the twelve links of conditioned arising? From ignorance arises karmic formations; from karmic formations arises consciousness; from consciousness arises name-and-form; from name-and-form arise the six sense bases; from the six sense bases arises contact; from contact arises feeling; from feeling arises craving; from craving arises clinging; from clinging arises becoming; from becoming arises birth; from birth there is old age, death, worry, sorrow, suffering, and distress. Good son! When my disciples heard this explanation, they failed to understand my meaning, and proclaimed that the Tathāgata states the twelve links of conditioned arising are definitively conditioned. Again, at another time, I addressed the monks with an analogy, saying: ‘Whether Buddhas appear or do not appear, the nature and characteristics of the twelve links of conditioned arising are constantly abiding. Good son! There are twelve links of conditioned arising that do not arise from conditions; there are those that arise from conditions but are not the twelve links of conditioned arising; there are those that arise from conditions and are also the twelve links of conditioned arising; and there are those that neither arise from conditions nor are the twelve links of conditioned arising. Those that are the twelve links of conditioned arising and do not arise from conditions are the twelve links of future lives. Those that arise from conditions and are not the twelve links of conditioned arising are the five skandhas of an arhat. Those that arise from conditions and are also the twelve links of conditioned arising are the five skandhas of an ordinary person. Those that neither arise from conditions nor are the twelve links of conditioned arising are space and nirvāṇa.’ Good son! When my disciples heard this explanation, they failed to understand my meaning, and proclaimed that the Tathāgata states the twelve links of conditioned arising are definitively unconditioned.”

Elucidation: According to the sūtra's words, both the conditioned and unconditioned fail to grasp the intended meaning. If according to Master Yuan’s explanation, each has its reason, but there are two intentions. The present Commentary adopts the first intention. The second intention states: directly regarding the facts of conditioned arising, those in the present are called conditioned, while those in the future, whose functions have not yet arisen or manifested, are called unconditioned.

Elucidation: The latter explanation accords with the meaning of the sūtra's last four lines; the former explanation accords with the initial meaning of the sūtra and the intent of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, etc. 4. From the Commentary's “Looking toward the present sūtra” downward, the commentator sets forth the present intention. Next, from “The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā states” downward, he adduces another sūtra to substantiate and establish the above orthodox meaning. This is what was cited by Piṅgala in the Madhyamakaśāstra to explain the initial meaning that conditioned arising does not arise. As for the Commentary’s “The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] also says: ‘The twelve links of conditioned arising are precisely the Buddha-nature,’” it again cites the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] to reaffirm the above meaning; this is fascicle thirty-two of the northern text, the “Chapter on the Lion’s Roar”. The sūtra states: “Good son! Ignorance cannot absorb formations, nor can formations absorb consciousness. Yet it can be named ‘ignorance conditions formations, formations condition consciousness.’ Whether Buddhas appear or do not appear, the dharmadhātu is constantly abiding. If it is said that the Buddha-nature abides in sentient beings: good son, eternal phenomena have no dwelling; if there were an abode, it would be impermanent. Good son! The twelve links of conditioned arising have no fixed abode; if there were an abode, the twelve links of conditioned arising could not be called eternal. The Tathāgata’s dharmakāya also has no abode; the dharmadhātu, the dharma-āyatana, the dharma-skandha, and space are all without abode. The Buddha-nature is likewise: it has no abode at all.” Further below, it also says: “The Buddha-nature is called the twelve links of conditioned arising. Why? Because through conditions the Tathāgata is constantly abiding. All sentient beings definitively have such twelve links of conditioned arising; therefore it is said that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature. The twelve links of conditioned arising are precisely the Buddha-nature, and the Buddha-nature is precisely the Tathāgata.”

Elucidation: The intent of the sūtra above takes precisely the nature of the twelve links of conditioned arising to be the Buddha-nature, and thus it is unconditioned.

In the Commentary's text, from “Although the twelve links of conditioned arising are mentioned” downward, the second part resolves an objection, which says: “If conditioned arising lacking self-nature is unconditioned, could the skandhas, dhātus, etc. have a skandha-nature or dhātu-nature?” Therefore, this resolution is made so that the meaning is all-inclusive. This is why the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] was cited above saying “dharmadhātu, dharma-āyatana, dharma-skandha, and space”, explaining that all three categories have no abode, identical to the Buddha-nature.

Regarding the Commentary’s “abiding of dharmatā”: this is precisely tathatā, showing that this dharmatā is just an alternative name for tathatā in the Vijñaptimātratā, etc. From the Commentary’s “Meaning it is not deceptive” downward, it explains its name specifically. First, explaining tathatā inherently has two meanings: first, an integrated explanation, which solely sets aside the deceptive; second, from “Furthermore, truly real and constantly so” downward, an analytical explanation. That is, the Vijñaptimātratā states: “‘Tatha’ means true and real, showing that it is not false or deceptive. ‘Tā’ means constantly so, expressing that it has no change or mutation.” Therefore the Commentary says “setting aside the deceptive and setting aside phenomenal facts.” From the Commentary's “in all states” downward, it explains the name dharmatā. Thus the verse in the Vijñaptimātratā says: “The ultimate truth of these dharmas / Is also precisely tathatā, / Because it is eternally so in its nature; / It is precisely the true nature of consciousness-only.” Next, explaining the word “abiding” also has two meanings: first, connecting it with the above to explain it, so that the three words form one term, meaning that the above two explanations accord with the Faxiang school, while adding this word “abiding” accords with the Faxing school. Dharmatā means concordance with conditions, and the word “abiding” means unchanging, because in accordance with conditions it does not lose its own nature. Since both meanings are complete, the deceptive is itself the true, which is the doctrine of the Faxing school. Second, from “If based on the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa” downward, it explains specifically, taking the word “dharma” above and the word “abiding” below to form a meaning by themselves, constituting the seven unconditioneds, whereby the word “dharma” has a dual use.

From the Commentary's “However, Hīnayāna” downward, the fourth section compares and sets aside the provisional and real. First it adduces Hīnayāna; later, from “As for Mahāyāna” downward, it adduces the Mahāyāna to critique the Hīnayāna. “Not only is there an increase in number,” as has already been stated before. “The meaning is also different,” which is clarified directly below. The Hīnayāna meaning is roughly as stated above, and in detail as extensively cited and refuted in the Vijñaptimātratā. From the Commentary’s “In the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi it is established by two meanings” downward, it directly differentiates the characteristics of Mahāyāna unconditioneds, which is the second fascicle of the treatise. In the treatise, having first refuted the various Hīnayāna schools’ clinging to the unconditioned as substantially existent, it reveals the orthodox doctrine, saying: “However, the sūtras speak of unconditioned phenomena such as space. In brief, there are two kinds: 1. Those nominally established through designation based on the transformations of consciousness. That is, having heard space and other unconditioneds spoken of, such an image appears on consciousness; this manifested image is similar before and after, without mutation, and is nominally called eternal.”

Elucidation: This unconditioned space lacks a substantial referent, being only transformed by the mind, just like subtle atoms which are nominal without an entity. Because its name was heard from the Buddha or elsewhere, the mind transforms it. Next, the treatise further states: “2. Those nominally established through designation based on dharmatā. That is, the tathatā revealed by emptiness and selflessness, which is neither existent nor non-existent, beyond the reach of mind and speech, neither one nor different from all dharmas, is the true principle of dharmas, and hence called dharmatā. Being free from all obstacles, it is called space. Through the power of analytical discrimination, various afflictive defilements are extinguished and ultimately realized, hence it is called analytical cessation. Without relying on the power of discrimination, its fundamental nature is pure, or it is revealed through the deficiency of conditions, hence it is called non-analytical cessation. Because feelings of suffering and pleasure cease, it is called unmoving. Because conception and feeling do not function, it is called the cessation of conception and feeling.”

Elucidation: The Commentary takes the treatise’s meaning to explain the sūtra text, but only accords with what is in the sūtra, not strictly with what is in the treatise. The above explanation of non-analytical cessation possessing two meanings relies on this treatise text.

From the Commentary’s “Here dharmatā” downward, the fifth section identifies the essence, that is, that treatise indicating the essence of the unconditioned. The treatise states: “These five are all nominally established based on tathatā.” From “Tathatā is also nominally established through designation” down to “hence called tathatā”, all is text from the treatise. “Being the nature of dharmas, it is called dharmatā” is an addition from the Commentary’s meaning, which is also the meaning of the preceding text of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. “Not possessing a separate substantial entity apart from form and mind” takes the treatise’s meaning as a conclusion; the complete treatise states: “Unlike other schools which hold that apart from form, mind, etc., there are real, eternal dharmas called tathatā; therefore the various unconditioneds are not definitively real entities.”

Elucidation: The statement that tathatā is also nominal is because its essence cannot be grasped. To counteract views of emptiness, tathatā is spoken of as existence; to counteract the Mahīśāsaka and other Hīnayāna schools clinging to it as definitively real, it is spoken of as empty, which does not mean that the essence of the unconditioned is itself empty. “Do not consider it illusory”: ‘empty’ sets aside the imagined nature (parikalpita), and ‘illusory’ sets aside the dependent nature (paratantra), directly revealing that tathatā is the consummated nature (pariniṣpanna). Because it has no false or inverted dharmas, it is called tathatā.

As for the Commentary's “Now, a learned person” downward, the sixth section concludes and shows the purport of broad learning; this is readily understood.

Regarding the Commentary's “Sixth: the explicable dharmas (vyākaraṇadharma)”, there are two parts within it: first, explaining the general name; second, explaining the specific characteristics. Now, for the first. First recounting the past, namely the Kanding ji. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā also states: “Whether wholesome dharmas or unwholesome dharmas, these are called explicable dharmas, because they do not depart from their stated characteristics.” From the Commentary's “This is” downward, it discriminates the error: since the inexplicable (avyākṛta) below does not refer to the three natures, how can this explicable be likened to it? Later, from “It should be said” downward, it establishes the correct view. From the Commentary’s “Below identifying what is explicated” downward, within discriminating characteristics, it first refers to the remainder as being as before, and later explains that it does not wish to multiply words.

From the Commentary's “The four fearlessnesses” downward, it explains solely this one item. As for “Now it shall be briefly clarified”: in various sūtras it is mostly distinguished through five gates: 1. Discriminating the name; 2. Identifying the essence; 3. Modes of operation; 4. Sequence; 5. Miscellaneous gates. The present Commentary only has three gates, omitting the identification of the essence and sequence. Thus it is divided into three: first, explaining the name; second, discriminating characteristics; third, miscellaneous differentiations. Within the first there are two parts: first the general name, then the specific names. Now for the first: the upper two lines state the topic; from “meaning being fearless in the face of external objections” downward is the direct explanation. From “Yogācāra” downward, it cites evidence for the characteristic of fearlessness. As for “seeing no real causal characteristics whatsoever”, it means that their objections all give rise to doubt based on traces without understanding the real principle contemplated, and therefore these objections have no real basis. If there were truly something questionable, one might fear; since what is questioned is not real, what is there to fear?

From the Commentary’s “There are four fearlessnesses” downward is the second part, explaining the specific names. The text merely lists them without explaining, as the explanation of the names is implicit in the modes of operation below, and hence is omitted here. If explained fully: 1. “Fearlessness of omniscience”, also called in the Yogācāra fearlessness of right and equal enlightenment, meaning that by virtue of right enlightenment awakening to all dharmas, one is called omniscient. 2. “Destruction of outリークス (āsrava)”, because the seeds and manifestations of all afflictions and āsravas are completely severed. 3. “Obstacles to the path”, also called obstructing dharmas, because when speaking of obstructing dharmas, defilement necessarily acts as an obstruction. 4. “The path to deliverance from suffering”, speaking of the path of departure, because when noble ones cultivate it, they definitively emerge from suffering. Attaining fearlessness in these four are all tatpuruṣa compounds, meaning the fearlessness of omniscience, and so on.

From the Commentary's “These four sections each have objection and reply” downward is the second part, discriminating characteristics. 1. The objection to the fearlessness of omniscience, in which there are two parts: first, taking up the objection; second, from “There are monks” downward, the direct objection. Within this, it first sets forth the origin of the objection. That is, in the Vinayas of various schools there are often these words: “At that time, monks came to the Tathāgata, bowed their heads at his feet, and the Buddha asked them: ‘Monks, are you dwelling in comfort? Is begging easily accomplished? Do you not suffer over food and drink?’” etc. Now, asking why he questioned is precisely the objection. From “Omniscient” downward, it formulates the objection. From the Commentary's “The Buddha himself proclaimed: ‘I am an omniscient person’” downward is the reply. Within it, he first confirms the objection, showing that the meaning of omniscience is not lost. If stated completely, all say: “Facing this objection, I see no basis for it, dwell at ease, without dread or fear, and proclaim myself in the supreme position of the Great Sage.” Second, from “Merely to gather in those who come” downward, he sets forth the reason for being omniscient: it is merely a manifested inquiry, not that he himself did not know. As for gathering in those who come, it is necessary to make them give rise to a superior mind, giving rise to the mind of the Way upon hearing the Buddha's comforting inquiries. Regarding “according with worldly human affairs between teacher and disciple”, this has two meanings: first, to establish the above characteristic of manifestation; second, to cause other people to examine matters thoroughly—if even the Buddha, who knows, still asks, how much more so for others who do not know? It is also to provide a model for later generations: seeing someone come and generate the resolve, one should guide and gather them in, hence it is said to accord with the worldly.

From the Commentary’s “2. There is an objection saying” downward is the second fearlessness. In the initial objection, the text also has two parts: first, taking up the objection, namely that the sūtra states ‘my āsravas are completely exhausted.’ Later, from “Why love” downward, is the direct objection, the origin of the objection being contained within it. That is, Rāhula was expelled by the Saṅgha and was at the latrine; the Buddha said to the monks: “Why does a jackal drive out a lion's whelp?” This is speaking affectionately to Rāhula. Devadatta repeatedly performed evil deeds, and the Buddha at times scolded him as an ignorant person, or called him a child who eats spittle, etc. From the Commentary’s “The Buddha, facing this objection, saw no basis for it” downward is the reply. Within it, he also first confirms the objection without losing the meaning of the exhaustion of āsravas; later, “Merely in order to tame them in accordance with their capacities” sets forth the reason for affection and wrath. That is, Rāhula is compared to a wise elephant that follows human intentions and is tamed with gentle words. Devadatta is compared to a vicious horse that is tamed only with harsh flogging. It is not that the Tathāgata had affection for Rāhula or wrath toward Devadatta, which would mean his āsravas were not exhausted.

From the Commentary's “3. There is an objection saying” downward is the third fearlessness. In the initial objection there are also two parts: first, taking up what was questioned; later, from “For what reason” downward, taking up the doubt and presenting the direct objection. From the Commentary’s “The Buddha facing” downward, in the reply there are also two parts: first, confirming the objection, not losing that desire is an obstacle to the path. If complete, it should also say: “Facing this objection, I see no basis for it, dwell peacefully without dread, occupying the station of the Great Sage,” hence it says “proclaimed his own virtuous title.” Later, from “What I declared as desire being able to obstruct the path” downward, he sets forth the reason why it does not obstruct: if one speaks of wrong conduct obstructing the noble paths, or if one speaks of having a wife obstructing the path of freedom from desire, [it must be noted that] those of the first two fruits have long established morality and thus severed wrong conduct, but since they have not yet separated from desire, they have not severed wife and children—what fault is there in this? Therefore, defiled dharmas are not non-obstructive.

From the Commentary’s “4. There is an objection saying” downward is the fourth fearlessness. In the initial objection there are also two parts: first, taking up the doubt, namely as stated: “I expound to my disciples the path of departure, and when noble ones cultivate it, they definitively depart and definitively penetrate.” Later, from “Why did arhats” downward is the direct objection: since they suffered festering sores and snakebites, are these not suffering? Could it be that arhats lack the noble path? Is this not contradictory? From the Commentary’s “The Buddha, facing this objection” downward is the reply. It should also say in full: “Facing this objection, I see no basis for it, dwell peacefully without fear, occupying the station of the Great Sage.” From “I expound the noble path” downward, he resolves the previous objection. There are two intentions, however: 1. Due to former karma of past lives bringing about this body, they attained the arhat state in this body; since suffering relies on the body's presence, they had this suffering, not that after attaining the arhat state this suffering arose. This is the intention of the present Commentary. 2. A further intention states: those beyond training truly have no karmic fruits of suffering; to demonstrate that evil causes necessarily have suffering retributions, these noble ones manifested the appearance of undergoing suffering to give rise to teachings for future generations. Just as the World-Honoured One underwent the golden lance, etc., which was a manifestation whose meaning was not real, hence the Commentary omits it.

45.20

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Among the four, the first one,' this is the third [section], differentiating through various portals, which is based on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Within it are three [aspects]: first, spoken in terms of freedom from hindrances; second, freedom from defilements; third, being the path of departure, because desire is a hindrance to the path and now one departs from it. The fourth is 'the path of departure' [in that] all paths of departure can lead one out of suffering. However, the last two are both in terms of freedom from the hindrance of defilements: the third is the hindrance that is departed from, and the fourth is the path that is capable of departure; furthermore, the third raises difficulties regarding the cause of departure, while the fourth raises difficulties regarding the fruit of departure. Alternatively, both of the last two can be understood generally in terms of the causal stage.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The first two are self-benefit,' this is the second [section], weighing the two benefits. Yet in terms of answering difficulties, both are benefiting others, as explained immediately below. Now, in terms of the first two, raising difficulties regarding the Buddha’s body, this is praised in terms of the virtue of self-benefit; the latter two raise difficulties regarding transforming others, and thus are called benefiting others.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The reason for praising these four oneself,' this is the third [section], clarifying the reason for the praise. Also in terms of the differences in the faculties addressed, all hold the meaning of benefiting others. Because bodhisattvas seek the knowledge of all forms and sever what is known, the first is for them. Because the two vehicles seek to exhaust all outflows, the second is for them. Because desires hinder all three vehicles, and all three vehicles aspire to emerge from suffering, the latter two are for both.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The Dàzhìdù lùn, scroll twenty-eight,' this is a general indication of its source. However, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra, fascicle 5, the Prajñā[pāramitā], fascicle 53, and the Prakaraṇāryavācā, fascicle 4, also explain it extensively. Herein the essential nature is brought out in sequence. As for 'in sequence,' because the function of virtues is sovereign and wisdom is supreme, it is clarified first. By being endowed with all-knowledge, one can exhaust all outflows. By being endowed with wisdom and severance, one expounds the Dharma to transform living beings. Within expounding the Dharma, one first expounds the causes of birth-and-death and later emerging from birth-and-death. This single portal is already subsumed within the previous portal of the two benefits. In the Yogācāra and Abhidharma-samuccaya, emerging from suffering is third and obstructing the path is fourth, placing fruit first and cause later, just like suffering and accumulation. Furthermore, following the preceding sequence, it corresponds inversely to the four truths: all-knowledge raises difficulties regarding the true path, the second raises difficulties regarding true cessation, the third regarding the cause of accumulation, and the fourth regarding the fruit of suffering. Though not seen in the sūtras and treatises, its meaning must indeed be so.

As for bringing out the essential nature, there are five kinds in total: 1. The essential nature in its proper character: taking faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom as its nature. 2. The essential nature of what is induced: whether concentration or wisdom. 3. The supreme essential nature: the fundamental and subsequently attained cognitions. Among the four, the first encompasses both cognitions, the second is the fundamental, and the third and fourth are both subsequently attained, because they are minds that expound the Dharma. If in terms of abiding in oneself, all four are fundamental; in terms of being able to answer difficulties, all four take the subsequently attained as their nature. 4. The essential nature of association: taking the four aggregates as its nature. 5. The essential nature of retinue: taking the five aggregates as its nature, just like the ten powers, where path-concomitant, concentration-concomitant, and unmanifest form assist in answering difficulties. The four essential natures above are from Yogācārabhūmi fascicle 57 and the Abhidharma-samuccaya. The Yogācāra says: 'Taking faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom, and the faculty of one who possesses complete knowledge as its nature.' The Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 'Whether concentration or wisdom, as well as the minds and mental factors associated with them.' It also says: 'If giving rise to function, it takes subsequently attained cognition as its nature; if abiding in its self-nature, it takes fundamental cognition as its nature.' The fifth essential nature is also added according to the principle. Furthermore, if fearlessness is spoken of in terms of virtue, the first is the virtue of wisdom, the second is the virtue of severance, and the third and fourth are the virtues of grace. Now, in terms of what is capable of knowing, all take wisdom as their nature. The remaining meanings can be known.

Seventh, the unexplained (avyākrata).

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Now first, the two meanings of unexplained,' this is first examining the name. Within it are four: 1. Explaining the general name; 2. Clarifying the reason for not answering; 3. Separately indicating the fourteen [points]; 4. Comprehensively reconciling the differences. Now for the first: The Kanding also posits two meanings, taking the former as correct; now, relying on the treatises, the latter is taken as correct. In the Abhidharmakośa, fascicle 19, the second [section] explaining the unexplained is divided into two: 1. Explaining indeterminate retribution; 2. Occasioned by this, explaining the four modes of answering questions. The former is the indeterminate in contrast to good and evil, as detailed in the second part of that treatise explaining the four unexplained matters. The verse says: 'One should answer categorically, through distinction, through counter-interrogation, and by setting aside, / As in death, birth, superiority, and the oneness or difference of the self and aggregates.' Commentary: The upper two lines point to the facts and explain them. Now, questions and answers are of four kinds: 1. Those to be answered categorically; 2. Those to be answered through distinction; 3. Those to be answered through counter-interrogation; 4. Those to be answered by setting aside (answering means declaring).

'Like asking about death: “Do all sentient beings die?” One should answer categorically: “All sentient beings will definitely die.” Like asking about birth: “Will all sentient beings be reborn?” One should answer through distinction: “Those with defilements take rebirth; those without defilements are not reborn.” Like asking about superiority, one should answer through counter-interrogation. If someone asks: “Are humans superior or inferior?” one should counter-interrogate: “In comparison to what do you ask?” If they say in comparison to devas, one should say humans are inferior; if they say in comparison to the lower realms, one should declare that humans are superior.' Commentary: 'Lower' means the miserable destinies.

'Like asking about the oneness or difference of the self and aggregates: that is, if one asks, “Are the self and the five aggregates identical or different?” one should answer by setting it aside; this should not be answered. If an entity of the self existed, one could ask about identity or difference; since fundamentally there is no entity of the self, identity or difference cannot be established. Just like asking, “Is the child born of a barren woman white or black?” one should answer by setting it aside. Because a barren woman fundamentally has no child, how could one discuss its being white or black?' The above is spoken according to the Mahāvibhāṣā. When the verse says 'and so forth,' it includes the fundamental treatise Jñānaprasthāna and what is taught in the sūtras. Now the sūtra shall be recounted:

What kind of question should be answered categorically? If it is asked: 'Are all conditioned phenomena impermanent?' this question is called one that should be answered categorically. What kind of question should be answered through distinction? If someone asks: 'Having deliberately performed an action, what fruit will one experience?' this question is called one that should be answered through distinction: performing good, one experiences human or deva realms; performing evil, one experiences the miserable destinies. If someone asks: 'Is the retribution of a person identical with or different from the self?' (this hypothetically asks about a self), one should counter-interrogate: 'Relying on what self do you ask this?' If they answer: 'Relying on the coarse self (the self upon the aggregate of form),' one should declare that it is different from the retribution (because retribution and form are different, one says different). This question is called one to be answered through counter-interrogation. What kind of question should only be answered by setting it aside? If someone asks: 'Is the world eternal (first question)? Impermanent (second question)? Both eternal and impermanent (third question)? Neither eternal nor impermanent (fourth question)? Is the world finite (fifth question)? Infinite (sixth question)? Both finite and infinite (seventh question)? Neither finite nor infinite (eighth question)? Does the Tathāgata exist after death (ninth question)? Not exist (tenth question)? Both exist and not exist (eleventh question)? Neither exist nor not exist (twelfth question)? Is the soul different from the body (thirteenth question)? Is the body different from the soul (fourteenth question)?' This question is called one that should only be answered by setting it aside. These fourteen questions cannot be determined, and are called the fourteen indeterminate matters. Because the entity of a self is non-existent, they must all be answered by setting them aside.

Fascicle 35 of the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra] also has four answers, though with a slight difference in one name. That is, from the second half of the sūtra onward, occasioning Kāśyapa’s objection about the existence or non-existence of Buddha-nature, the Tathāgata answers: 'Good son! For the sake of sentient beings, the Tathāgata has four kinds of answers: 1. Definitive answer; 2. Distinctive answer; 3. Answer according to the question; 4. Answer by setting aside. Like asking, “What fruit is obtained by doing evil?” one should answer that one obtains the fruit of suffering. This is called a definitive answer. 2. Good son! The Tathāgata’s ten powers, four fearlessnesses, great compassion, three applications of mindfulness, the Śūraṅgama and eighty-thousand million samādhi portals, the thirty-two marks, eighty secondary characteristics, five seals of wisdom, thirty-five thousand samādhi portals, the vajra-samādhi and four thousand two hundred samādhi portals, and immeasurable, boundless upāya-samādhis—such dharmas are Buddha-nature. Such Buddha-nature has seven attributes: 1. Eternal, 2. Self, 3. Bliss, 4. Purity, 5. True, 6. Real, 7. Good. This is called a distinctive answer. As you previously asked: “Does a person who has severed roots of goodness possess Buddha-nature?” They also possess the Tathāgata’s Buddha-nature, and also possess the Buddha-nature of a bodhisattva in their last lifetime; because the hindrances to these two Buddha-natures are not yet exhausted, they can be called non-existent, but because they are definitely attainable, they can be called existent. This is called a distinctive answer.' 3. The sūtra says: 'As I have said, all phenomena are impermanent. Then someone asks: “For the sake of what phenomenon does the World-Honoured One speak of impermanence?” The answer is: “For the sake of conditioned phenomena; non-self is likewise.” “For the sake of what phenomenon is it said that all is burning?” “For the sake of defilements.” This is called an answer according to the question.' 4. The sūtra says: 'If someone says: “Does a person who has severed roots of goodness definitely have Buddha-nature, or definitely lack Buddha-nature?” This is called an answer by setting aside.' Below, Kāśyapa raises an objection: 'Not answering is called setting aside. For what reason does the Tathāgata answer now and call it an answer by setting aside?' The Buddha answers: 'Good son! I do not say that setting aside without answering is called an answer by setting aside. Good son! An answer by setting aside also has two aspects: first, to prohibit; second, not to cling. Because of this meaning, it is called an answer by setting aside.'

Commentary: Relying on the above texts, it is clear that not answering constitutes the unexplained, not the indeterminate among good and evil. In terms of the fourteen difficulties, it is identical to the Abhidharmakośa. Conforming to the meaning of the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], the present text corresponds precisely to the meaning of prohibition, and concurrently causes one not to cling.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The reason for not answering,' this is the second [section], clarifying the reason for not answering. Within it are two: first, a general statement of the purport, which is also the purport of the Dàzhìdù lùn; later, 'The Dàzhìdù lùn, fascicle 3,' properly cites the treatise to explain. First, fascicle 3 is cited with five explanations, most of which correspond to answering the fourteen difficulties, and also cover the various unexplained phenomena in the sūtras. As for the first, because there is no real matter, it directly answers the fourteen. The second, the cartwheel, directly answers what is the original limit of birth-and-death. The third, having no benefit and causing harm, also answers the coming and going of the world, etc., because arising from the cause of accumulation returns to the principle of quiescence, and falsely investigating coming and going obscures the four truths. The fourth, that people cannot know, also answers how many Buddhas and how many sentient beings there are, because the Buddha’s wisdom knows inexhaustible phenomena. The fifth explanation also answers the sequence of Buddhas, etc. The general purport can be known.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Fascicle seventeen,' this second [part] cites this text, which invokes a past precedent. Now its text is somewhat abridged; fully it says: There was a monk who, contemplating and observing the fourteen difficulties, could not penetrate them; unable to bear it in his mind, he took his robes and bowl to the Buddha’s place and said to the Buddha: 'If the Buddha can explain these fourteen difficulties for me and make me understand, I will become your disciple; if you cannot explain them, I will seek another path.' The Buddha told him: 'Foolish man! Did you make a covenant with me: “If you answer the fourteen difficulties, I will become your disciple”?' The monk said: 'No.' The Buddha said: 'Foolish man! Why do you now say, “If you do not answer me, I will not become your disciple”? I expound the Dharma to save people afflicted with old age, sickness, and death. These fourteen difficulties are dharmas of dispute, of no benefit to the Dharma, and are mere prapañca; what is the use of asking them? If I were to answer you, your mind would not comprehend, and up until death you would not understand, unable to attain liberation from birth, old age, sickness, and death. For instance, suppose a man was struck by a poisoned arrow, and his relatives called a doctor wishing to draw out the arrow and apply medicine, but he said: “The arrow must not yet be drawn out. I must first know your name, clan, parents, and age. Next I wish to know from what mountain, what wood, and what feathers this arrow came; who made the arrow point, and what kind of iron it is; I also wish to know what mountain wood and what animal horn made the bow; I also wish to know where the medicine grew and what species name it has. Only after knowing all such matters will I allow you to draw out the arrow and apply medicine.”' The Buddha asked the monk: 'Could this man come to know all these things and then have the arrow drawn out?' The monk said: 'He could not know them. If he waited to know them all, he would already be dead.' The Buddha said: 'You are just like this. Struck by the arrow of wrong views smeared with the poison of craving, which has entered your heart, do you wish to pull out this arrow and become my disciple? Or do you not wish to pull out the arrow, but wish to seek the exhaustion of the world's eternity, impermanence, finitude, infinitude, and so on? Seeking it without attaining it, you will lose your wisdom-life, die together with beasts, and throw yourself into darkness.' Ashamed, the monk deeply understood the Buddha's words, and immediately attained the path of an arhat. Furthermore, if a bodhisattva wishes to become an omniscient person, investigating the truth of all phenomena and knowing their true nature, they do not stagnate or become obstructed within the fourteen difficulties. Knowing that this is a severe sickness of the mind, being able to emerge and endure is called the dharma of patience. Commentary: This is precisely what the lower text of the commentary extensively refutes by citing treatises, and the meaning of concluding with great learning in the sūtra. The treatise's citation of the simile of the poisoned arrow is largely identical to the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], which was already cited previously.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'The Laṅkāvatāra also says,' this third sūtra has the Buddha instruct one to be careful not to practice or associate with worldly treatises. It relates: In the past a brāhmaṇa came and asked me: 'Gautama, is everything created?' I answered the brāhmaṇa: 'That everything is created is the first worldly treatise.' He asked again: 'Is everything uncreated?' I answered again: 'That everything is uncreated is the second worldly treatise.' He asked again: 'Is everything eternal or impermanent? Arisen or unarisen?' I answered: 'These are six worldly treatises.' He said again: 'Is it identical or different? Both or neither? Do all causes take birth and manifest through various conditions?' I answered: 'These are eleven worldly treatises' (and so on extensively). I said: 'All these are worldly treatises, not what I teach; they are your worldly treatises. I teach only the habit-energy of beginningless false and deceptive conceptual discrimination, the causes of all kinds of evil in the three realms of existence, wherein being unable to perceive the direct perception of one's own mind, one gives rise to conceptual discrimination, clinging to external entities.' He asked again: 'Does the existence of the three realms come from the cause of karma rooted in delusion and craving, or from the cause of ignorance?' I answered: 'Both of these are also worldly treatises.' He asked again: 'Do all phenomena enter into self-characteristics and common characteristics?' I answered again: 'This is also a worldly treatise. Brāhmaṇa, even the flow of mind falsely calculating external dusts is all worldly treatises.' He asked again: 'Is there anything that is not a worldly treatise?' The Buddha answered to the effect: 'Among the non-Buddhists there is none. In my teaching there is that which is not a worldly treatise. You non-Buddhists cannot know it, because of your false and deceptive grasping at external entities through untrue conceptual discrimination. When conceptual discrimination does not arise, one awakens to existence and non-existence. In the direct perception of one's own mind, conceptual discrimination does not arise, external dusts are not received, and conceptual discrimination is eternally stilled; this is called not a worldly treatise. This is my Dharma, not yours.' The verse says: 'As long as the mind flows on, / that is a worldly treatise. / When conceptual discrimination does not turn, / that person sees their own mind. / Coming means phenomena arise; / going means phenomena do not manifest. / Clearly understanding going and coming, / conceptual discrimination arises no more.' Explanation: The former verse shows no false views; the latter verse shows understanding the extinction of delusion. According to the present sūtra text, this is precisely all the false calculations of the previous section. Although asking again about the conditions of delusion and craving is correct principle, because of not understanding one's own mind, it constitutes worldly treatises; therefore the Dàzhìdù lùn says 'obscuring the true aspect of phenomena,' which also shares the purport of universally dispelling attachment in the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra].

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'Speaking of the fourteen,' this third [section] indicates the characteristics of the fourteen, which can be known. If calculated through the five aggregates and three periods of time, they form the sixty-two views, as explained previously.

Regarding the commentary’s phrase 'However, across the sūtras and treatises,' this fourth [section] comprehensively reconciles different explanations. The phrase 'Characteristics may be identical or different' means mostly identical and slightly different. In various places they are also called the fourteen inexpressibles; fascicle 19 of the Abhidharmakośa has already been stated above and is identical to this. Fascicle 17 of the Dàzhìdù lùn explains the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā; chapter 21, the 'Buddha-Mother Chapter' of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, says: 'Furthermore, Subhūti! By means of the prajñāpāramitā, the Buddha knows as it truly is the emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of all sentient beings.' 'World-Honoured One! How are they known?' The Buddha said: 'The emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of all sentient beings all arise based on form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. The Buddha, within this, knows the emergence, disappearance, bending, and extending of the mental factors of sentient beings; namely, “The soul and the world are eternal—this is truth, anything else is falsehood”—this view relies on form. The three phrases concerning the soul and the world being impermanent, etc., can be understood by analogy. Furthermore, “The world is finite—this is truth, anything else is falsehood,” and so on, the four phrases can be understood by analogy, all being views that rely on form.' At the end it says: 'Relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this. The soul being the body is a view relying on form, etc.; being different from the body is also like this; relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this.' It also says: '“After death there is a Tathāgata—this is truth, anything else is falsehood”—this is a view relying on form. Second, “After death there is no Tathāgata”; third, “After death there both is and is not a Tathāgata”—these two phrases, like the first, conclude: “Relying on feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness is also like this.”' Commentary: These are merely minor differences in the various phrases across the aggregates. In the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra], fascicle 39, the mendicant Śreṇika asks: 'Is there a self? Is there no self?' and raises objections extensively. These are also minor variations; being complicated, they are not brought out here.

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