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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 7

English (machine translation) 7

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7.1

Expounded by the Śramaṇa Chengguan of the Da Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

7.2

Regarding the Commentary's words, "Second, the Chen and Sui dynasties," below, this concerns the Tiantai Four Teachings. Within this there are two parts: first, recounting the past; second, evaluating its agreements and disagreements. In the former there are also two parts: first, the lineage master; second, establishing the teachings. Concerning the lineage master, it mentions the Chen and Sui dynasties; therefore the Tiantai Biography says: "Across the two eras of Chen and Sui, he was teacher to three emperors." That is, one emperor of the Chen dynasty, namely the Last Ruler; and two emperors of the Sui, namely Emperor Wen and Emperor Yang. When Emperor Yang was Prince of Jin, he invited him to be his bodhisattva-precepts master. He passed away during the time of Emperor Yang; hence it says "the two dynasties of Chen and Sui." Tiantai is the name of a mountain; citing the place identifies the person. The monk's name was Zhiyi; as for calling him "Zhizhe" (the Wise One), the emperor conferred this title upon him to praise his virtue. Regarding "succeeding Nanyue," Wei Xuzhou's biography says: "Since the eastward transmission of Buddhism, these esoteric doctrines have been revealed—what Master [Hui]si realized, and what Great Master Zhizhe propagated. Therefore, upon their very first meeting, Master Si said: 'In the past on Vulture Peak we listened together to the Lotus [Sūtra]. Pursued by past affinities, you have come again now.' Furthermore, when entering the bodhimanda with a purified mind, he said: 'Were it not for you, it would not be realized; were it not for me, it would not be recognized.'" Because the fragrant legacy of teacher and disciple was transmitted, both are introduced together.

7.3

Regarding the Commentary's words, "Establishing the four teachings, it says," below, this is the formal establishment. Within this there are two parts: first, the formal establishment of the four teachings; second, a comprehensive evaluation. In the former part, the four teachings constitute four distinct categories. Each teaching has three sections: first, establishing the name; second, that which is realized; third, those who are addressed. What is expounded by the four teachings is the four kinds of four noble truths: first, the four truths of arising and ceasing; second, the four truths of non-arising; third, the four truths of the immeasurable; fourth, the four truths of unconstructed action, which are detailed in the "Four Truths" chapter. Now for the first: "First, the Tripiṭaka Teaching" establishes the name, which will be explained below.

7.4

Regarding the Commentary's words, "This teaching explains causes and conditions," below, this clarifies the principle expounded. The expression "causes and conditions" runs through the four teachings: by causes and conditions there is arising and ceasing; by causes and conditions there is identity with emptiness; by causes and conditions there is provisional designation; by causes and conditions there is the middle way. Because causes and conditions are primary, all four teachings partake of them. Regarding "the principle of the four true truths of arising and ceasing": suffering has affliction as its meaning; accumulation has expanding saṃsāra as its function; the path has eliminating afflictions as its efficacy; cessation has the exhaustion of encumbrances as its name. There is suffering that can be known, accumulation that can be severed, cessation that can be realized, and the path that can be cultivated. In delusion, suffering and accumulation arise while the true path is eliminated; in awakening, suffering and accumulation cease while the correct path arises. Because there is that which can arise and cease, they are called the four truths of arising and ceasing. Because suffering is definitively suffering, and so on, they receive the name "true."

7.5

Regarding the Commentary's words, "Directly teaching," below, this clarifies those who are addressed. When the wheel of Dharma was first turned in the Deer Park, Kauṇḍinya and the other five saw the truths and attained the Way; only those of the Small Vehicle attained the Way, and there were not yet those of the Great Vehicle who attained the Way. Therefore it says that it is directly for the Small Vehicle. Regarding "incidentally converting bodhisattvas": the Dazhidulun says, "Although the Buddha conferred prophecy upon Maitreya in the Āgamas, he did not explain the various bodhisattva practices." Therefore bodhisattvas are incidental.

7.6

Regarding the Commentary's words, "Second, the Shared Teaching," and so on, the text is divided into three: first, the formal establishment; second, citing scriptural proof; third, resolving objections. In the first part there are also three sections: the first is the name, which explains "shared" (*tong*) through "sameness." Therefore the Lotus [Sūtra] says, "We equally enter the dharmatā," and Master [Seng]zhao says, "The three vehicles equally contemplate the emptiness of nature and attain the Way"—just as three animals crossing a river cross one single water without distinction.

7.7

Regarding the Commentary's words, "This teaching," below, this explains what is expounded. Dharmas produced from conditions lack intrinsic nature and are directly empty; it is not that form is destroyed to make emptiness, nor is there a need for analytical deconstruction; hence it is called "directly empty." If explained in terms of the four lines of the verse in the Madhyamakaśāstra: the first teaching corresponds to "dharmas produced by causes and conditions"; this teaching corresponds to "I declare them to be empty"; the third corresponds to "it is also called provisional designation"; and the fourth corresponds to "it is also the meaning of the middle way." Therefore here it says "causes and conditions are directly empty." Regarding "the four true truths of non-arising": this is the second kind of four truths. That is, understanding suffering as devoid of suffering is called the truth of suffering; understanding accumulation as devoid of conjunction is called the truth of accumulation; understanding cessation as devoid of cessation; and understanding the path as devoid of path. The four truths are empty in nature and fundamentally free from arising and ceasing, unlike the first teaching which has that which arises and ceases. The Commentary's words, "It is the primary gateway to the Mahāyāna," distinguish it from the profoundly ultimate. It is called the primary gateway because it dispels existence with emptiness, but has not yet revealed the meaning of the middle way of wondrous existence.

7.8

Regarding the Commentary's statement starting with "primarily for bodhisattvas": this refers to the faculties addressed. Because it elucidates both emptinesses, it is said to be primarily for bodhisattvas. As for "secondarily for the two vehicles," at first it uses the gateway of emptiness to dispel and clear away the clinging minds of the small vehicle, allowing them gradually to attain ease and penetration; hence it is called "secondarily penetrating." Regarding the passage starting with "The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā": second, citing proof; this both establishes the name properly and indicates the faculties addressed. Since the three vehicles ought to study it, it is the shared teaching, where the three equally receive it. Since the two vehicles also study it, it is secondarily for them. How so? Those who wish to attain the three vehicles should study prajñā. For instance, when it says that discerning dharmas to be non-arising is called prajñā, when a śrāvaka studies non-arising, he considers that all dharmas are entirely empty and quiescent—without arising and without cessation, neither great nor small, uncontaminated and unconditioned. Contemplating in this way, he generates no joy or pleasure toward adorning Buddha lands or benefiting others, but merely wishes to tend toward quiescence; thus he accomplishes the śrāvaka vehicle. If, hearing of non-arising, one knows that because things arise from conditions they do not arise, and because they cease from conditions they do not cease—this principle of causes and conditions being neither arising nor ceasing—one who studies in this way accomplishes the pratyekabuddha vehicle. If, hearing of non-arising, one understands that all dharmas are fundamentally unarisen and presently without cessation—that within arising and cessation there is no arising or cessation, so that arising and cessation present no hindrance—eradicating evil and generating good, with compassion and wisdom assisting each other, one accomplishes the bodhisattva vehicle. By studying the same single non-arising, they accomplish three vehicles; therefore, if one wishes to accomplish one's own vehicle, one should study the prajñā of non-arising. Furthermore, just as non-attainment is prajñā: when an arhat attains it, in truth there is no dharma called 'arhat'; when a pratyekabuddha attains it, he does not apprehend the characteristics of conditions; when a bodhisattva attains it, the mind is free from hindrance. Because through non-attainment one is able to attain bodhi, it is said that the three vehicles equally receive prajñā. Inferring from this meaning, practitioners of the two vehicles also equally study the two emptinesses. As for the word "and so forth," the full text says: "One who wishes to attain the pratyekabuddha vehicle should study the perfection of wisdom; one who wishes to attain the bodhisattva vehicle should study the perfection of wisdom." This clarifies that prajñā can accomplish all fruits of the path.

7.9

Regarding the Commentary's passage starting with "However, teaching, principle, wisdom, and severance": resolving objections. That is, an objection states: "These designations of the shared and separate teachings are both established based on the shared prajñā and unshared prajñā in the Dazhidulun. Why are they not called the 'shared teaching' for the second and 'unshared teaching' for the third, but instead called 'shared' and 'separate'?" Thus it is now explained: "Shared" means that above it penetrates to the separate and complete, and below it penetrates to the two vehicles; it penetrates both the distant and the near. "Shared" [in the common sense] merely shares with the small, reaching the near but not the distant; hence it is named "shared [penetrating]". "Separate" has two meanings: why it is not called "unshared" will be explained below. Furthermore, regarding "all are shared [penetrating]": each of the eight characters above has a meaning: first, teaching is shared; second, principle is shared, and so forth. 1. Teaching is shared: the three vehicles equally receive the teaching that causes and conditions are identical to emptiness. 2. Principle is shared: they equally see the principle of one-sided truth. 3. Wisdom is shared: they equally attain the skillfully traversing all-knowledge. 4. Severance is shared: for bodhisattvas, afflictions within the realms are severed; view and thought [afflictions] are the same. 5. Practice is shared: the uncontaminated [practices] of view and cultivation are the same in practice. 6. Stages are shared: from the dry wisdom stage up to the pratyekabuddha stage, the dharma of stages is the same. 7. Causes are shared: the nine uninterrupted [paths] are the same. 8. Fruits are shared: the nine liberations and the two kinds of nirvāṇa are the same in realm. Although there are eight meanings of sharing [penetration], they are known only through the teaching; hence it is called the "shared teaching." The remaining teachings are understood by analogy. Regarding the passage starting with "Third, the separate teaching": the text is divided into two parts: first, the correct explanation; next, beginning with "why it is not named," resolving objections. The first part also has three sections: establishing the name is self-evident. Starting with "This teaching": second, clarifying what is expounded. Causes and conditions as nominal designation corresponds to the third line of the Madhyamakaśāstra. The principle of the immeasurable four noble truths is the third type of the four truths. "Immeasurable" means that suffering has immeasurable aspects, not known by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; accumulation, cessation, and path each have immeasurable aspects as well.

7.10

Regarding the Commentary's phrase starting with "specifically transforming bodhisattvas": third, clarifying the faculties addressed; this is the purport of the "Dharmadhātu Chapter" of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra.

7.11

Regarding the Commentary's passage starting with "Not named unshared": second, resolving objections. First, stating the doubt. An objection says: "Since 'separate' means unshared, this is precisely the unshared prajñā of the Dazhidulun. Why is it not named the unshared teaching?" The Commentary explains starting with "it also intends": because "separate" has two meanings: first, the meaning of not being shared with the two vehicles, as stated above; second, sequential differentiation without interpenetration; hence it is named "separate." If it were called "unshared," it would not include the latter meaning; hence it says "it also intends to eliminate what is not complete." Regarding the Commentary's passage starting with "By a single cause": presenting the characteristics of not being complete. "A single cause transcending far above" clarifies the separation in contrast to others; it is not like the shared teaching where the three vehicles cultivate in common. Here, a single path of deliverance transcends far above the two vehicles, and also departs from the two extremes to manifest the middle way. Starting with "A single fruit is not interfused": clarifying the separation regarding the dharma itself. "A single fruit is not interfused" means distinction in fruit: the three virtues and the three bodies are each not interfused, unable to have one virtue be all virtues, and so on. "Cultivated sequentially": clarifying the separation of cause in terms of the essence itself; when cultivating generosity it is not morality and so forth, and the first stage does not know the virtues of the second stage, etc. Regarding the Commentary's "unable to attain the perfect interfusion of cause and fruit": cause and fruit are not interfused with respect to each other, unable to have the cause encompass the ocean of fruit or the fruit penetrate the source of cause.

7.12

Regarding the Commentary's passage starting with "Fourth, the complete teaching": here also there are two parts: first, correctly establishing it; second, concluding in contrast to the preceding. The first part also has two sections: first, explaining the meaning; second, citing proof. The first part also has three subdivisions. Explaining the name is self-evident.

7.13

Regarding the Commentary's passage starting with "This teaching": determining what is expounded; it omits the words 'inconsequential [uncreated] four truths'. "The inconceivable middle way of the two truths of causes and conditions" is the fourth line of the treatise, which is also the meaning of the middle way. Why is it called "inconceivable"? Because it is the middle way of Buddha-nature. Furthermore, because causes and conditions are identical to emptiness, they cannot be conceived of as causes and conditions; because they are identical to the nominal, they cannot be conceived of as empty; because they are identical to the middle way, they cannot be conceived of as two. One is three and three are one; this is the inconceivable. The two truths of causes and conditions are the true and conventional truths; the middle way is the truth of ultimate meaning—these are the meanings of the three truths. Furthermore, interfusing the two truths is itself the middle way, unlike the shared teaching which mostly treats the true truth, or the separate teaching which mostly treats the conventional truth. As for "phenomena and principle are fully complete": the shared mostly treats principle, and the separate mostly treats phenomena; in the complete, to bring up phenomena is precisely phenomena identical to principle, and to bring up principle is precisely principle identical to phenomena; no principle is unilluminated, and no phenomenon is incomplete. As for "neither one-sided nor separate": "not one-sided" means not one-sided truth, not being stuck in one extreme; "not separate" means not sequential, necessarily interfusing and subsuming. The rest is as analyzed in the section on the synthesis and differentiation of the general meaning.

7.14

Regarding the Commentary's phrase starting with "Transforming only": third, the faculties addressed. Those of supreme, sharpest faculties are the capacity for perfect interfusion.

7.15

Regarding the Commentary's passage starting with "The Avataṃsaka Sūtra says": citing proof. This is the Jin translation, corresponding to chapter 73 in the current version. The sūtra states: "The Buddha preached for them the sūtra named the Wheel of Complete Causes." The verses say: / "That Buddha, knowing the faculties of the assembly were about to mature, / Came to this assembly to transform all sentient beings, / Manifesting divine transformations and great adornments, / None failing to draw near and pay reverent homage. / The Buddha with a single voice expounded with skillful means / The sūtra of the Dharma Lamp Universally Illuminating; / The minds of immeasurable sentient beings became pliant, / And all received the prediction of bodhi." / The meaning is largely identical, with only slight differences in terminology.

7.16

Regarding the Commentary's passage starting with "In the separate, teaching, principle, etc.": concluding in contrast to the preceding, meaning that the separate and complete each have the eight items of teaching and so forth. The eight of the separate teaching are: 1. Teaching is separate: the Buddha-dharmas numerous as the sands of the Ganges in the separate teaching for bodhisattvas are not shared with the two vehicles. 2. Principle is separate: the storehouse consciousness contains the principle of the conventional truth numerous as the sands of the Ganges. 3. Wisdom is separate: knowledge of the aspects of the path. 4. Severance is separate: ignorance, consisting of nescience numerous as particles of dust and sand beyond the realms of view and cultivation, is severed. 5. Practice is separate: cultivating the perfections across kalpas, the practices of benefiting oneself and transforming others. 6. Stages are separate: the thirty minds subduing ignorance constitute the stages of worthies; the ten stages generating realization and severing ignorance constitute the stages of sages; this is called separate. 7. Causes are separate: the distinct cause of the unhindered diamond[-like samādhi]. 8. Fruits are separate: the four virtues of liberation and nirvāṇa, distinct from the two vehicles. The eight meanings of the complete teaching are: 1. Teaching is complete: directly expounding the middle way, the verbal teaching is not one-sided. 2. Principle is complete: the middle way is all Buddha-dharmas. 3. Wisdom is complete: knowledge of all aspects. 4. Severance is complete: severing through non-severance, the affliction of ignorance is severed. 5. Practice is complete: one practice is all practices. 6. Stages are complete: from the first abode and the first stage, the virtues of all stages are fully present. 7. Causes are complete: simultaneously illuminating both truths, naturally flowing in. 8. Fruits are complete: the fruit of the inconceivable three virtues of wondrous enlightenment, neither vertical nor horizontal, neither parallel nor separate. Therefore it says, "In the complete, teaching and the rest are all complete."

7.17

Regarding the Commentary's passage starting with "Furthermore, these four teachings": second, general evaluation and discrimination. Within this there are three sections: first, the basis upon which the teachings are established. While they rely on the verse on the three contemplations in the Madhyamakaśāstra, the application of this verse has three different levels: First, within each single teaching the three contemplations are formed, as analyzed above in the synthesis and differentiation of the general meaning. Second, the four lines are each matched to one teaching, as explained earlier in establishing the teachings where the three combinations and separations were used to form the four teachings, which is the present text. For instance, entering emptiness from the nominal has a meaning identical to 'dharmas arisen from causes and conditions, I explain as precisely empty.' Entering the nominal from emptiness has a meaning identical to 'it is also called nominal designation,' because it connects to the second line on emptiness. Entering the middle from the nominal has a meaning identical to 'it is also the meaning of the middle way,' because it connects to the line on nominal designation above. Now combining the first two lines forms the first two teachings, and applying all four lines forms the two teachings of the separate and complete. "Entering emptiness from the nominal differs between analytical and essential": this means contemplating that dharmas nominally existing through causes and conditions are all empty and quiescent. How is this emptiness known? If one speaks of form, it is only the five sense faculties, five sense objects, and unmanifest form; these eleven forms combine to create the form aggregate, and because it is the form aggregate, it is empty. Furthermore, investigating each of these individually: the color of an eye arises from the eight subtle particles, nominally combining to produce form; analyzing down to the ultimate atom, there is no real form whatsoever; hence it is called the emptiness of form. This is called analyzing dharmas to constitute the Tripiṭaka teaching. If one says that what is arisen from causes and conditions lacks intrinsic nature, its entire essence is empty without needing to be broken down analytically. As the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa says: "The nature of form is inherently empty, not made empty by the destruction of form." Directly comprehending this form as empty from the outset of its existence is called clarifying emptiness through the essence of dharmas, whereby the shared teaching arises. Regarding "entering the nominal from emptiness" and so forth: this refers to the gradual sequence of the three contemplations, which forms the separate teaching. That is, first contemplating the true truth as originally empty and quiescent; emerging from contemplation to enter the conventional, engaging with existence to transform sentient beings, purify Buddha lands, and so forth; hence it is called entering the nominal from emptiness. Because of entering the conventional, one often becomes distracted. Next, contemplating that in the middle way movement and quiescence are non-dual, leaving far behind the two extremes of emptiness and existence, movement and quiescence. Because the three contemplations do not occur at the same time, it is named the separate teaching. Regarding "the three contemplations in a single mind" and so forth: immediately empty, immediately nominal, immediately middle; one is three and three are one; neither before nor after, neither one nor three; this is also as analyzed in the fourth meaning in the synthesis and differentiation of the general meaning above.

7.18

In the commentary, from “Furthermore, these four teachings” onward, the second [part] explains what is interpreted, distinguishing it from [the views of] other masters. Other masters might say: the Prajñāpāramitā is the teaching of emptiness, the Lotus Sūtra is the teaching of the Middle Way, and the Nirvāṇa Sūtra is the teaching of eternal presence; [or that] this is the perfect teaching and that is the biased teaching, rigidly fixing each single sūtra. Here, however, that is not the case; hence [the commentary] says: “Within a single text, multiple [teachings] may be contained.” Saying that they “may be contained” means that it does not necessarily contain all of them, but rather one, two, three, or four. Therefore, that master said: the Tripiṭaka solely reveals the Hinayāna; hence the Vaipulya “confronts” it—meaning that texts such as the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa are called the Vaipulya teaching, which confronts the Hinayāna to explain the Mahāyāna; the Prajñāpāramitā “carries” it, meaning it carries along the Hinayāna to explain the Mahāyāna; the Buddhāvataṃsaka “combines” it, combining the separate to explain the perfect; and the Lotus Sūtra no longer combines, stands solely, confronts, or carries, but explains only the perfect teaching. “Solely” means only a single teaching, whereas “confronts” contains all four. For example, when the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says, “Virtuous ones! This body is impermanent, without strength, without power, without solidity; a rapidly decaying thing that cannot be trusted,” and so forth, this is the Tripiṭaka teaching. When the chapter on Kātyāyana says, “Non-arising and non-ceasing is the meaning of impermanence,” and so forth, this is the shared teaching. When the chapter on Pūrṇa says, “Do not place impure food into a precious vessel; do not equate lapis lazuli with crystal,” where the great is not of a kind with the small, this is the separate teaching. As when the chapter on Subhūti says, “Neither severing lust, anger, and delusion, nor consorting with them; not destroying the body yet giving rise to the single characteristic; not extinguishing delusion and craving yet giving rise to clarity and liberation,” and so forth—these are all the perfect teaching; hence all four are present. Within the Prajñāpāramitā corpus there are only three teachings; the former Tripiṭaka teaching is absent, because it had already been rebuked and refuted and [that text] was not spoken for them. The Buddhāvataṃsaka “combines” it because it projects stages of practice, laying them out in graduated sequence, thus combining that part. The Lotus Sūtra has “only this one real matter,” and therefore contains no other teaching. As for the ten ṛṣis in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra who attained the fruition of arhatship, [that sūtra] contains all four teachings. If so, how does it differ from the Vaipulya? Although it contains all four teachings, [its audiences] all know the eternal presence; thus it is distinguished from the former, because, being on the verge of entering nirvāṇa, the intent was to gather all universally, so that it came to contain all four, as is evident in the text.

7.19

In the commentary, from “Furthermore, by means of the four modes” onward, the third [part] applies the four modes to constitute the eight teachings—namely: first, the sudden teaching; second, the gradual teaching; third, the indeterminate teaching; and fourth, the secret teaching. The first is the Buddhāvataṃsaka-sūtra, because it was taught suddenly upon the initial attainment [of enlightenment]. The second spans from the Deer Park to the Grove of Twin Cranes, wherein both the triyāna and the ekayāna are termed gradual. In terms of the teaching-as-doctrine, the sudden teaching subsumes two—namely, the perfect and the separate. The gradual teaching contains all four—namely, the Tripiṭaka, the shared, the separate, and the perfect. However, these two teachings were originally established by Liu Qiu, and the masters of the South added the indeterminate. Within the gradual teaching among the three teachings, the initial division into three came from Master Ji; hence it is said, “The gradual and sudden are like Master Ji.” The latter two were opened out from within the indeterminate teaching, but they differ from the earlier indeterminate, being divided into these two based on different understandings of a single sound. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: “The Buddha expounds the Dharma with a single sound; sentient beings each understand according to their capacity, universally receiving and practicing it to attain benefit—this is an unshared dharma of divine power.” In explanation: each hearing differently is the indeterminacy of what is expounded. If those who hear the Mahāyāna know that the others hear the Hinayāna, and those who hear the Hinayāna know that the others hear the Mahāyāna, this is called indeterminate; hence it says, “If they know each other, it is called indeterminate.” If one who hears the Hinayāna does not know that the other person hears the Mahāyāna, and one who hears the Mahāyāna does not know that this person hears the Hinayāna, this is called secret; hence it says, “they do not know each other.” That is to say, hearing the Mahāyāna without knowing that the other hears the Hinayāna means that the Hinayāna is secret to the one hearing the Mahāyāna; hearing the Hinayāna without knowing that the other hears the Mahāyāna means that the Mahāyāna is secret to the one hearing the Hinayāna. The teaching-as-doctrine expounded by these two teachings both encompass the Tripiṭaka, shared, separate, and perfect; thus within the sudden there are only two doctrines, while the other three contain all four doctrinal teachings. Therefore, the doctrine is grasped by means of the mode of teaching. The Buddhāvataṃsaka’s perfection is the perfection within the sudden; the Lotus Sūtra’s perfection is the perfection within the gradual. In the mode of gradual and sudden, the two sūtras differ; in the doctrine of the perfect teaching, the two sūtras are not different. Such was the Great Master’s original intention in classifying the teachings. Moreover, he also designated the perfect teaching as sudden, hence speaking of the “perfect and sudden śamatha-vipaśyanā.” From this, the Buddhāvataṃsaka is also called the sudden-sudden, and the Lotus Sūtra is called the gradual-sudden, because they are respectively the perfect-sudden within the sudden mode and the perfect-sudden within the gradual mode.

7.20

In the commentary, from “As for this master establishing his doctrines” onward, the second [part] examines their conformity and conflict. This also has two [subdivisions]: first, an intelligent assessment of conformity and conflict, beginning with conformity, and later, from “Yet, the Tripiṭaka teaching” onward, examining conflict. Because the name is prone to confusion, Jingfa brought forward four kinds of faults against it: First, the fault of overly conflating with the Mahāyāna, since the Mahāyāna also possesses a tripiṭaka, and so [it too] would have to be called a Tripiṭaka teaching. Second, the fault of the Mahāyāna lacking a tripiṭaka, since it is not called [the Tripiṭaka teaching]. Third, the fault of directly contravening the supreme teaching, as it says that one must not draw close to scholars of the Hinayāna tripiṭaka—where the phrase “Hinayāna” serves to distinguish it from the Mahāyāna, clearly showing that the tripiṭaka does not solely belong to the Hinayāna. Fourth, the fault of indeterminacy, since among the Hinayāna schools there are those that do not establish three [baskets]; for example, the Sautrāntika school establishes only the two baskets of Sūtra and Vinaya, while others establish five baskets, as the Tattvasiddhi establishes a miscellaneous basket and a bodhisattva basket outside the three. Because these four faults exist, [the commentary] generally grants their refutation. Saying “the name seems to conflate with the Hinayāna” precisely grants the first fault; however, the following [sections] will resolve them all.

7.21

In the commentary, from “The reason for this is” onward, a specific reconciliation and explanation is given. Within this are three sections: First, a specific resolution of the objection regarding the Tripiṭaka teaching. The text has four clauses to resolve five objections—namely, besides the four faults above, the fifth asks why it is not established as “Hinayāna.” As for the four clauses: The first provides the textual authority for the name “Tripiṭaka,” resolving both the fault of contravening the supreme teaching and the fault of conflating with the Mahāyāna. That is to say, because Mahāyāna and Hinayāna treatises equally establish this designation, the fault of conflation does not rest with oneself. If an objection were made saying: “Within the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, the name Hinayāna follows the terminology of its own school, while the designation Tripiṭaka follows the words of other schools, not being a shared name.” Therefore, it is now explained: The Upadeśa’s usage is following others’ names; how could the Hinayāna Tattvasiddhi also be named Tripiṭaka—could that possibly be following another school? Thus, on the basis of the above meaning, it does not contravene the supreme teaching, because Kumārajīva’s translations of sūtras mostly relied on the Upadeśa. The two words “Hinayāna Tripiṭaka” were mentioned together merely to form the phrasing. The fault of the Hinayāna does not lie in the Tripiṭaka; it only faults their small mind. Thus it censures the Hinayāna, but does not censure the Tripiṭaka that is expounded.

7.22

In the commentary, “First, confronting the old physicians” is the second [clause], explaining the reason for establishing the Tripiṭaka. The first of the four teachings directly confronts the three of the old physicians, and therefore it was necessary to specifically establish the Tripiṭaka. These three are also distinctly different, so there is no conflation with the Mahāyāna; this is why the title was specifically adopted from them. It is just as all five dust-objects are rūpa (matter), yet rūpa alone acquires the general designation. Thus, although “Tripiṭaka” generally serves as a generic name, it readily becomes a specific appellation for the Hinayāna. The phrase “old physicians” refers to the metaphor of the new and old physicians in the second chapter of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. The old physicians metaphorically represent non-Buddhists. As for morality, concentration, and wisdom, each has two kinds: first, heterodox; second, orthodox. Heterodox morality of old refers to that of chickens, dogs, and the like; orthodox morality refers to the path of the ten virtues. Heterodox concentration of old refers to the methods of spirits and deities expounded in the ninety-five varieties, or being able to know worldly auspiciousness and calamity and manifest appearances of supernormal transformations; orthodox [concentration] refers to the four dhyānas, four immeasurables, four formless [attainments], and the activation of the five supernormal powers. Heterodox wisdom of old refers to generating various heterodox cognitions based on the view of individuality and extreme views, denying cause and effect, eating feces, going naked, and the like; orthodox [wisdom] refers to generating various worldly cognitions based on the view of individuality and extreme views, speaking of cause and effect and wholesome dharmas. Now, as for the morality, concentration, and wisdom elucidated in the Tripiṭaka teaching expounded by the Buddha, this is the new physician coming from afar, knowledgeable in the eightfold arts, as spoken by the Tathāgata. First, morality refers to the five ways of receiving the precepts, bringing forth all the non-manifest and manifest forms of restraint, as exemplified by the vinaya of the five schools. Second, concentration refers to relying on the eight liberations, entering the nine successive cessations, and the like, to bring forth the six supernormal powers. Third, wisdom refers to the four noble truths of arising and ceasing, destroying the two views of individuality and extremes as well as the sixty-two views, bringing forth genuine uncontaminated [insight], and completing the eleven knowledges and the three uncontaminated faculties. These three—morality, concentration, and wisdom—are things whose names non-Buddhists have not even heard, much less having any share in them. Hence it says, “First, confronting the old physicians,” and so forth. That the three matters are distinctly different means: above, they confront the old physicians; below, they confront the shared, separate, and perfect teachings. Because they are different, the name “Tripiṭaka” is established; and on account of this meaning, the various schools mostly elucidate the tripiṭaka. Deriving the name from the majority is not the fault of indeterminacy.

7.23

In the commentary, from “Because the shared teaching fuses the three in intention” onward, the third [clause] explains why the latter three are not called Tripiṭaka, which directly resolves the fault of the Mahāyāna lacking a tripiṭaka. That is to say, although the Mahāyāna has a tripiṭaka, each possesses senses such as fusing and sweeping away; therefore, the name is not established, though their reality is not absent. Saying that “the shared teaching fuses the three in intention” means that it fuses them into emptiness and quiescence. Thus the Dharmapada says: “If one speaks of upholding precepts without good or deportment, the characteristics of precepts are like empty space—those who uphold them would be deluded. If one practices various samādhis, this is agitation, not seated meditation; when the mind flows along with perceptual objects, how can it be called concentration?” Only having no knowledge and no attainment is called true wisdom. Prajñā without ideation, suchness and cognition both tranquil—these are all the fusing of the three in intention.

7.24

In the commentary, “The separate teaching manifests the three by relying on the one dharmatā” means that, because the one dharmatā unifies them, they cannot be distinctly separate either. Not a single dharma-gate is separate from dharmatā; hence it says: “Because one knows that dharmatā is free from the faults of the five desires, one accords with it to practice śīlapāramitā. Because one knows that dharmatā has no scattered thoughts, one accords with it to practice dhyānapāramitā. Because one knows that dharmatā inherently possesses the light of wisdom free from the darkness of delusion, one accords with it to practice prajñāpāramitā,” and so forth. In the commentary, “In the perfect teaching, three and one are unobstructed” means that the three are precisely the one, and the one is precisely the three; it is not merely that a single substance unifies them, but within a single practice, the three are subsumed entirely. If even a single practice contains all, how much more so the three?

7.25

In the commentary, from “As for why it is not named Hinayāna” onward, the fourth [clause] explains why it is not called Hinayāna, resolving the fifth objection. That is to say, an objection asks: Why not name it Hinayāna, instead of forcibly establishing “Tripiṭaka” and incurring many faults? Thus it is now resolved: Because there is the Mahāyāna, it cannot be called small. Within that teaching there are also bodhisattvas who are deemed Mahāyāna. From the perspective of the Mahāyāna, they are all designated the small teaching of the Tripiṭaka. “Bodhisattvas of the six pāramitās” refers to those who separately practice the six pāramitās over three asaṃkhyeyas, each having a time of fulfillment, yet all being contaminated and not having entered the path of seeing—subduing the sheep of craving with the wolf of impermanence, melting away the fat of defilement, and fattening the body of merit, right up until they sit under the Bodhi tree, where thirty-four mental moments simultaneously sever the bonds: through the sixteen moments of seeing the truths (eight patiences and eight cognitions), together with the nine grades of cultivating defilements in the single stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, each having nine unhindered and nine liberated [paths], constituting eighteen, so that there are thirty-four in total. This is explained extensively in the Kośa, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, and elsewhere. As for “attaining the true Buddha,” the Mahāyāna says that this severing of afflictions and attaining buddhahood is merely the transformation body with eight aspects. The Hinayāna regards it as real attainment, and therefore it belongs to the small teaching. Thus, in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, this clinging to reality is termed the crooked view of the two vehicles.

7.26

Regarding the commentary's phrase, 'Therefore, the meaning of the Piṭaka, Shared, Distinct, and Perfect [teachings],' this is the second [section], which comprehensively resolves the objections concerning the four teachings. An objection states: 'The Piṭaka Teaching also contains the meanings of the Shared, Distinct, and Perfect, and even the Perfect Teaching also contains the meanings of the Piṭaka, Shared, and Distinct; why then can they not be designated interchangeably, but must be fixed [to their respective categories]?' Hence the reply now states: Although the four teachings mutually contain the other three meanings across all four meanings, these secondary aspects do not constitute their fundamental meaning. For instance, an elder Chan master of the three learnings possesses discipline, concentration, and wisdom, yet he is established only by the meaning of Chan, because Chan is his forte; since the others are merely secondary and not fully perfected [by him in that role], he is not called a vinaya master or Dharma master. The remaining two [types of master] are also like this. As for 'mutually containing': within the Piṭaka Teaching, it also shares impermanence, which the three vehicles equally receive; it also distinctively explains the four vast vows and six perfections for bodhisattvas; and it also explains the knowledge of all forms for bodhisattvas; thus the Piṭaka Teaching possesses [the other] three. As for the Shared Teaching possessing the other three: because it also speaks of the three piṭakas, it should be called the Piṭaka Teaching; because it also speaks of the knowledge of the aspects of the path, it should be called the Distinct Teaching; and because it also speaks of the knowledge of all forms, it should be called the Perfect Teaching. As for the Distinct Teaching possessing the other three: because it also speaks of the three piṭakas, also speaks of the empty principle of non-arising, and also speaks of the Middle Way's knowledge of all forms. The Perfect Teaching also speaks of the three piṭakas, also speaks of the principle of true emptiness, and also speaks of cultivating across stages throughout kalpas; therefore, it too should be entitled to the names of the other three. Hence the comprehensive reply states: although the four teachings each secondarily combine them, when critically examined and determined, these [other three] are not established. How are they not established? First, regarding the Shared and other [meanings] not being established in the Piṭaka Teaching: although there is a shared reception of impermanence, the two vehicles can bring forth the truth and sever the fetters in a single lifetime, whereas a bodhisattva does not realize it for three asampkhyeya kalpas; thus the meaning of 'Shared' is not established. Although it distinctively explains the four vast vows and six perfections for bodhisattvas, it does not expound a distinct principle nor sever distinct defilements, but gives rise to views based on the four noble truths of arising and ceasing—how could this be called 'Distinct'? Although it speaks of the knowledge of all forms, a bodhisattva in the cause-stage cannot immediately possess the knowledge of all forms. Furthermore, this knowledge of all forms illuminates only the two truths and does not illuminate the Middle Way—how could this be called 'Perfect'? Thus, when critically examined, the latter three meanings are not established; only the meaning of the three piṭakas of this very teaching is established. As for the three not being established in the Shared Teaching: although it speaks of the three piṭakas, [their] single characteristic is signlessness. Furthermore, [the vehicles] have already attained [cessation]; although it speaks of the knowledge of the aspects of the path, it only illuminates conventional phenomena within the three realms and not the Ganges-sand merits of the tathāgatagarbha. Although it speaks of the knowledge of all forms, it only illuminates the two truths and does not illuminate the inconceivable two truths of the Middle Way. Hence, when critically examined, the meanings of the [other] three teachings are not established; only the meaning of the Shared Teaching is established. As for the three not being established in the Distinct Teaching: although it speaks of the three piṭakas, these are the Ganges-sand buddhadharmas and immeasurable discipline, concentration, and wisdom, which differ from the three [trainings] of arising and ceasing. Although it speaks of the empty principle of non-arising, this is an ungraspable emptiness, not merely an emptiness seen in common with the two vehicles. Although it speaks of the Middle Way's knowledge of all forms, this is not the immediate endowment with the knowledge of all forms upon giving rise to the mind in the first abidance. Therefore, the three meanings of Piṭaka, Shared, and Perfect are all not established; only the Distinct meaning is established. As for the three not being established in the Perfect Teaching: although it speaks of the three piṭakas, they are all framed in terms of tathatā, the true characteristic, buddha-nature, and nirvāṇa. Although it has the principle of true emptiness, it is the true emptiness of buddha-nature, which the two vehicles do not know, let alone enter. Although it speaks of sequential stages and doctrines, every single one corresponds with the true characteristic, one subsuming all. Thus, the three meanings of Piṭaka, Shared, and Distinct are all not established; only the meaning of the Perfect Teaching is established. Therefore it is said: when critically examined and determined in reality, the other three are not established, and only the meaning within that teaching itself is established.

7.27

Regarding the commentary's phrase, 'Only in classifying the Avataṃsaka,' this is the third [section], which re-examines the Perfect and Distinct teachings, determining what to accept and reject, since that [master] classified the various sūtras [thereby]. He stated that the Avataṃsaka combines them, meaning that it combines the Distinct Teaching. This is being deluded by its sequential arrangement and taking it to be the Distinct Teaching, while only taking its interpenetration to be the Perfect Teaching. If split into two teachings, each loses one side; only when united and integrated do they become the definitive meaning, conforming to the Huayan lineage, because sequential arrangement and interpenetration subsume each other. This is as explained earlier under the stages of practice. If one concedes to [his view], the names are different but the meaning is the same, so there is no great fault. If one refutes it, it loses the original intent of the Avataṃsaka; therefore, we do not accept it here. For this reason, this passage is titled 'Determining What to Accept and Reject.' The remaining meanings are extensively found in the four teachings, and the essentials are already complete.

7.28

In the commentary's phrase, 'Third, Haedong in the early Tang,' it first establishes [his position] correctly and later discusses its conformity and divergence. The former part has two [sections]: first it establishes it correctly, and later, from 'the shared learning of the three vehicles' down, it explains it. That is to say, since he has not yet clarified the emptiness of phenomena as constituting the Distinct [Teaching], and it is not distinct based on the four noble truths, the twelve links of dependent origination, and so forth, he fully clarifies the two emptinesses as the Shared [Teaching], because he does not adopt the shared learning of the three vehicles. The former two [teachings] follow Tiantai with slight differences, explaining the One Vehicle in terms of 'unshared,' rather than unifying the three into one.

7.29

From the commentary's phrase, 'However, this,' down, it discusses conformity and divergence. First it sets forth the basis of the meaning. From 'He himself says' down, it directly examines conformity and divergence. Truly, because he was modest in stating that it does not subsume everything, he avoids fault. If there are distinct principles, he relegates them to what is not completely subsumed.

7.30

From the commentary's phrase, 'Fourth, a disciple of Xianshou,' down, there are also two [sections]: first it establishes [his position] correctly, and later it discusses conformity and divergence. The former part has five [sections]: first, a general indication; second, from 'The treatise states' down, citing a treatise as authority; third, from 'Speaking of the four teachings' down, directly clarifying what he establishes; fourth, from 'The first teaching refers to' down, distinctively demonstrating their characteristics; and fifth, from 'As extensively [detailed in]' down, concluding the extensive by following the abridged. That commentary also clarifies: these established teachings demonstrate the expounding [teachings] based on the expounded dharmatā. In the first teaching, the dharmatā is completely hidden; in the next, the dharmatā is partially revealed; in the third, it is partially hidden; and in the fourth, it is completely revealed. Although the dharmatā is one, its manifestations differ, hence forming four. If categorized by vehicles, the second teaching is the Hīnayāna, the third is the Mahāyāna within the three vehicles, and the fourth is the One Vehicle. This is also largely identical to Guangzhai's four vehicles.

7.31

In the section from the commentary's phrase, 'However, now,' down, discussing conformity and divergence, it first refutes them individually and later concludes their error. The former part also has two [sections]: first it refutes the first one, and later it refutes the latter three. In the first [refutation], there is the fault of conflating the heterodox and orthodox. From 'If contrasted with the teacher of the teaching' down, it wards off a defense. Fearing that someone might defend: 'If one does not recognize the heterodox, how can one know the orthodox? By contrasting and examining the heterodox and orthodox, black and white become distinctly clear.' Therefore, he now wards it off, saying: If you wish to do so, you should first divide heterodox and orthodox overall, and only then, within the heterodox and orthodox, can you divide greater and lesser, and so on. Therefore, a formula is established for this: just as in this land one first divides the three teachings, and within Confucianism distinguishes the nine schools and seven classics, within Daoism discusses the distinction of the Dao and De, and within Buddhism discusses the greater and lesser, provisional and real, so that there is no conflation. Otherwise, it would be as in the Western Regions, where one first divides inner and outer, and within the outer, divides the six masters or ten schools, and so on. 'And so on' includes dividing into greater and lesser within the inner teaching. Regarding the 'six masters,' the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa states: 'First, Pūraṇa (personal name) Kāśyapa (clan name); second, Maskarin (personal name) Gośālī (mother's name) putra; third, Saṃjayin (personal name) Vairaṭī (mother's name) putra; fourth, Ajita (personal name) Keśakambalin (wearing coarse hair-garments); fifth, Kakuda (personal name) Kātyāyana (clan name); sixth, Nirgrantha (personal name) Jñātī (mother's name) putra.' Each of these six conceived a view. The first conceived a view of annihilation, saying: 'All phenomena are empty; there is no way of loyalty and filial piety between ruler and minister, father and son.' The second, Maskarin Gośālīputra, conceived a view of permanence, saying: 'All suffering and pleasure do not stem from karmic action, but exist naturally by nature.' The third conceived a view of spontaneity, adhering to the view that the path need not be cultivated, and that when the suffering of eighty thousand kalpas is exhausted, one naturally attains liberation, like rolling a ball of thread from a high mountaintop, which naturally stops when it unwinds to the end. He established a cause of liberation, taking liberation itself as the cause. Imagining a cause where there is no cause is a heterodox cause. Denying that the path needs to be cultivated is a heterodox view. The fourth is the ascetic non-Buddhist who plucks out his own hair and exposes himself to five fires, thereby attaining liberation. Imagining a path where there is no path is attachment to mere rules and rituals. The fifth conceived an extreme view, holding that all phenomena both exist and do not exist, which is not like the Buddhadharma's existence due to causes and conditions and non-existence due to lack of intrinsic nature. Because adhering to existence as an inherently fixed existence is the view of permanence, and adhering to non-existence as an inherently fixed non-existence is the view of annihilation. Annihilation and permanence deviate from the Middle Way, together forming an extreme view. The sixth held that all retribution of suffering and pleasure arises entirely from past karma and does not depend on present conditions; when past karma is exhausted, suffering is exhausted, and even if one presently cultivates the path, one cannot sever it. This person believes in past karma as the cause, which is not a heterodox view, but denying present conditions is a partial heterodox view. The path can exhaust suffering, but he denies this ability. Imagining what is the path to be not the path is also a heterodox view. The doctrines of the six masters are detailed in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Each of these six conceived a view, as cited in the Sixth Ground.

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