大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 74

English (machine translation) 74

Language: English

74.1

Exposited by the monk Chengguan of the Great Avataṃsaka Monastery on Mount Qingliang under the Tang.

As for the commentary's "Second, explaining the names" and below, the text of the commentary has three parts: first, correctly explaining the present sūtra; second, from "The Jin sūtra" onward, harmonising it with other sūtras; third, from "However, regarding superknowledges and clarities" onward, distinguishing confusions and harmonising the explanations. Within this there are two: first, directly citing a treatise to clarify the distinction between the marks of superknowledges and clarities; second, harmonising and explaining the sūtra text. Now to the first. The treatise has a question: "What is the distinction between superknowledges and clarities?" It answers: "Simply knowing matters of past abodes is called a superknowledge; if one knows past actions and karmas, it is a clarity. Furthermore, simply knowing dying here and being born there is called a superknowledge; knowing that action, cause, condition, and juncture are not lost is called a clarity. Furthermore, simply exhausting the defilements without knowing whether one will be reborn or not reborn is called the superknowledge of the exhaustion of outflows; if one knows that with outflows exhausted one will never again be reborn, it is called a clarity." Explanation: The preceding text of this treatise explains the "consummate in clarity and conduct," that is, the three clarities, and on this basis distinguishes their differences by contrasting the three clarities with the six superknowledges. Now the commentary merely cites one clarity, and at the end states "and so on," which groups together the latter two.

74.4

As for the commentary's "Now, taking this sūtra, superknowledge is detailed" and below, this is the second part, harmonising and explaining the sūtra text. Within this there are two: first, harmonising the Jin sūtra's [use of] "clarity," conforming with the text and conforming with the meaning—in meaning both are exhaustively illuminated, and the text has proof. Next, from "The Jin sūtra's intent lay in conforming with the meaning" onward, it harmonises the present sūtra text. The statement "striving not to violate the text" means: the text has ten superknowledges, sharing this with the six superknowledges; clarities are only three, so ten would have no basis. For "superknowledge," the Sanskrit is *ṛddhi* (level tone); for "clarity," it is *vidyā* (rising tone).

74.5

As for the commentary's "First, others' minds; second, the divine eye" and so forth: because the sūtra does not list them completely, they are now enumerated by name. In the text there are four parts: First, enumerating the individual names. Second, from "These ten are all termed superknowledges of cognition" onward, distinguishing their common designation. The designation "superknowledge" has already been explained above. Now we merely explain the word "cognition," which brings forth its essence. From "If according to characteristics" onward, it distinguishes the differentiations of cognition. Third, from "These ten are also" onward, their expansion and contraction in relation to the six. One need only look at the sequence listed previously, and it is easily understood in the text. Fourth, from "However, the Hīnayāna" onward, resolving objections. That is, there is an objection: "If the ten superknowledges were completely different, one could divide provisional and real; but since the difference between ten and six is based on an expansion of the six, how could they surpass the six?" Therefore it now explains: The names and numbers differ slightly, but the doctrinal import diverges completely. The text has three sections: first, clarifying the Hīnayāna; second, distinguishing the triyāna; third, explaining the ekayāna. The statement "The Hīnayāna's cognitive function has limits" means: past abodes know matters of only eighty thousand kalpas; the divine eye sees only three thousand worlds; the divine ear, others' minds, and psychic power are all confined within three thousand; and the exhaustion of outflows does not exhaust the knowable; hence it is said to have limits. "The triyāna is equally pervasive" clarifies that it does not exhaust layers upon layers. The ekayāna is layered upon layer, clearly being different. For instance, the divine eye sees lands within dust motes, dust motes within lands, and the Buddhas of dust lands; the hair-pores of a Buddha's body contain layers upon layers of dust lands. When the Tathāgata expounds the Dharma in those layered lands, the divine ear hears it all. As for the sentient beings therein, the knowledge of others' minds completely comprehends them. In a single thought-moment it knows multiple lands, so how could it be confined to eighty thousand? In a single dust mote, it proceeds to infinite lands, so how could it be confined within three thousand? Although the three clarities know causal arising, they have not exhausted the layers upon layers; hence it is said that "they still surpass those clarities," how much more so the realms of the six superknowledges of the triyāna and Hīnayāna! Next, there is an objection: "If so, merely clarifying the six superknowledges with differing meanings already sifts out provisional and real; why is there a need for ten?" Therefore it says that relying on matters reveals the complete; hence they are expanded into ten, because ten times ten dharmic gates are the fundamental tenet. As for the commentary's "Marking them as 'others' minds'" and below, the text of the commentary has two parts: first, explaining the name; second, distinguishing the characteristics. In the text there are three: First, combining the grasper and the grasped in explanation: cognition is the grasping, and others' minds are the grasped. Second, "Directly approaching the grasped," removing the grasper and explaining according to the grasped. Third, from "Whether grasped or king [of mind]" onward, revealing the breadth and narrowness of the cognition.

74.6

As for the commentary's "However, when cognition takes others' minds as object" and below, this is the second part, distinguishing the characteristics. Within this there are two: first, recounting different explanations; second, harmonising the present sūtra. In the former, it is that *Viṃśikā*, where the verse says: "How is the cognition of others' minds? It apprehends its object not in accordance with reality, / Just like the cognition knowing one's own mind, it does not know like the Buddha's realm." "Does not know like the Buddha's realm" means that only a Buddha attains the fundamental substance.

74.7

As for the commentary's "Relying on Consciousness-Only" and below, this is the second part, harmonising the meaning of the present sūtra. Within this there are three: First, marking what is accepted, adopting Sthiramati's earlier statement that "the former is not yet an error either." Second, from "Because absorbing the object" onward, bringing forth the reason why it is without error. Third, from "If apart from the Buddha" onward, concluding with a critique of the explanation by the second master, Dharmapāla. Within the second there are also three: first, directly bringing forth the reason; second, demonstrating the characteristics of others' minds in the dharmatā; third, concluding and establishing the correct doctrine. Within the first, directly bringing forth the reason demonstrates that the Faxiang school has three meanings: The first says, "Absorbing the object into mind without destroying the object," which demonstrates the existence and nonexistence of mind and object. They attain the fundamental substance, fearing that it would destroy mind-only. Since it does not destroy the object, what harm is there in attaining it? What error is there in destroying it? Because for one without mind, "Having no mind toward the myriad things, the myriad things have never ceased to exist. Here the gain lies in the quiescence of spirit, and the loss lies in the emptiness of things," meaning that things exist substantially. If mind-only destroys the object, then the gain lies in the emptiness of the object and the loss lies in the existence of the mind. Therefore, because objects are transformed by mind, it is called mind-only. What is transformed is not nonexistent; why must it be destroyed? If based on conditioned arising being without intrinsic nature, then mind and object are both extinguished; hence it is said, "Borrowing mind to dispel the object, once the object is dispelled, mind is extinguished; it is not that mind alone remains." The second says, "Because the dual extinction of grasper and grasped does not obstruct their preservation": the above non-destruction of the object provisionally dispelled the flaw of fearing substance; now it dispels the principles of emptiness and existence. Therefore mind and object are both admitted, as their preservation and extinction rely on each other. Emptiness and existence depend on each other: because of conditioned arising they exist; existence is preservation, and emptiness is extinction; emptiness and existence interpenetrate, and both preservation and extinction are fully maintained. The third says, "The ultimate truth of mind-only is neither one nor different," which directly presents the principle of complete mind-only. Although the first explanation above has the meaning of mind-only, it still communicates with the mind-only of arising and ceasing. Although the second meaning has the dual extinction without constraint, it has not yet stated that mind and object mutually absorb each other. Now, clarifying complete Consciousness-Only, it is called the ultimate truth of mind-only. Because they share the same ultimate truth, they are not different; because they do not destroy grasper and grasped, they are not one. Because they are not one, there are the grasper and the grasped, and the meaning of 'other' is established; because they are not different, grasper and grasped are equal, and the meaning of mind-only is established. The statement "When precisely taking the other as object, it is just oneself" concludes that one attains the fundamental substance without the error of an external mind. Because it is just oneself, it does not lose Consciousness-Only.

74.8

As for the commentary's "Through the sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind" and below, this is the second part, directly demonstrating the characteristics of others' minds in the dharmatā. This has two pairs: the former pair clarifies the grasped, and the latter pair clarifies the grasper. Now, for the first, the statement "The sentient beings' mind that is identical to the Buddha's mind" clarifies that the grasped sentient beings' mind is identical to the Buddha's mind; this clarifies non-difference. Next, the statement "Which is not identical to the Buddha's mind of the sentient beings' mind" clarifies that the sentient beings' mind and the Buddha's mind are not identical. Because they are not identical, the meaning of the grasped exists; because they are not different, the meaning of mind-only is not destroyed. The statement "acting as the grasped" concludes the grasped, distinguishing it from not being the grasper. Next, distinguishing the grasper, it says, "Through the Buddha's mind that is identical to the sentient beings' mind": this phrase clarifies that the grasping Buddha's mind is identical to the sentient beings' mind; this clarifies non-difference. Next, the statement "Which is not identical to the sentient beings' mind of the Buddha's mind" clarifies that the Buddha's mind and the sentient beings' mind have the meaning of not being one. Because they are not one, it acts as the grasper; because they are not different, it does not destroy the meaning of Consciousness-Only. The statement "acting as the grasper" concludes the grasper, distinguishing it from not being the grasped. Furthermore, illustrating this with an analogy, it is like mixing water and milk. The milk is what is mixed, analogising the sentient beings' mind as the grasped. The water is what mixes, analogising the Buddha's mind as the grasper. Because these two blend together as if of a single flavour, when the king of geese sips it, the milk is exhausted while the water remains, so one knows they are not one. Yet this water is called water identical to milk, and this milk is called milk identical to water; although the two are mutually identical, they have the meaning of not being one. Therefore it should be analogised thus: the milk identical to water, not being the water identical to milk, is what is mixed; the water identical to milk, not being the milk identical to water, is what mixes. The meaning can be known.

74.9

As for the commentary's "Being thus interfused, they are therefore neither one nor different," this is the third part, concluding and establishing the correct doctrine.

74.10

As for the commentary's "If apart from the Buddha" and below, this is the third part, concluding with a critique of Dharmapāla. The statement "one conversely loses true Consciousness-Only" means: because he does not know that the external substance is just the Buddha's mind.

74.11

Third, the superknowledge of past abodes. From "All because the bodhisattva attains the eye of the nine periods, seeing them just as one sees the present" onward, this explains the meaning of knowing. That it says "sees" means cognitive seeing. The above directly clarifies it. Second, from "If not so" onward, it establishes it by counter-challenge. Third, from "If it were only what was formerly experienced" onward, it fends off a defense. That is, fearing someone might defend: "Events seen in the past—although the events are destroyed, the seeds of seeing still persist, so they can be known." From "Then it would be" onward, to fend off this defense, the text has three refutations: First, a privative refutation. That is, because one would only see mind and not see things; since what is seen is different, how could seeing the present mind be called the cognition of past abodes? Second, from "Moreover, what was never experienced" onward, a concessionary refutation. Even conceding that there are seeds capable of cognitive seeing, what was not experienced in the past should not be cognitively seen. That is, having been human in the past, how could one see universally? Now having attained the cognition of past abodes, one knows far and wide. Third, from "Moreover, merely seeing the present" onward, concluding, this is a refutation based on violating the name.

74.12

Fourth, the superknowledge of knowing kalpas. "However, in the Mahāyāna school, future dharmas are devoid of both essence and function; how are they now known?" This generally queries the meaning of knowing. That is, the Hīnayāna may say that the three periods all exist, and the future merely lacks function yet, or conceding that it can be seen, it lacks essence yet. In the Mahāyāna, essence and function are both absent, so there is nothing that can be known or seen. Next, from "Relying on the expedient teaching" onward, within the answer there are two: First, answering by establishing the principle according to the provisional teaching. That is, seeing the cause and knowing the fruit, just as seeing marks and appearances and knowing subsequent good or bad fortune.

74.13

As for the commentary's "If according to the ekayāna" and below, this is the second part, answering according to the true reality of the ekayāna. Within this there are four: First, directly clarifying the real meaning. Second, from "However, it is not the present of the present" onward, resolving an objection. That is, someone asks: "If so, why is it called seeing the future?" The intent of the answer is understandable. Third, from "If this existence is" onward, establishing the principle and challenging again: Conceding that it exists essentially or exists through conditions, both have faults. Fourth, from "If looking from the present time" onward, harmonising through principle: that is, not looking at the future toward the present time. If looking at the future toward the present time, this future is just the present; how could the future exist? If pursuing downward toward the future to look at the future, the future is the present of the future, hence different from the present.

74.14

The fifth, sixth, and seventh superknowledges can all be known from the text.

74.15

Eighth, the penetration of innumerable physical bodies (rūpakāya). Under "Now, first, from understanding that the dharmadhātu has no definite, real form (rūpa)," the text of the commentary has two parts: first it clarifies the overall meaning, and then under "Within this, the six lines..." it explains the text. In the former, the intention is to clarify that this is emptiness that is identical with form, not the true emptiness in which form is extinguished; hence it does not obstruct the manifestation of form. Within this, it first clarifies emptiness that is identical with form, and therefore it is able to manifest form. Because, as stated above, there is no real form, form itself is empty. Since form itself is empty, it is not an annihilatory emptiness (ucchedā-śūnyatā). Furthermore, having no definite reality reveals that it is not permanent; and being not an annihilatory emptiness reveals that it is not annihilated, because if it definitely existed it would be permanent, and if it definitely did not exist it would be annihilated. Now, being neither annihilated nor permanent, it is the true dharmadhātu. As for the passage from "because emptiness being devoid of form does not obstruct form," it clarifies that emptiness does not obstruct form, and therefore is able to manifest form. From "Preservation and loss, concealment and revelation..." onward, it concludes the above meaning, which will be understood below. However, this passage of the text actually contains multiple meanings: First, when form and emptiness are viewed in relation to each other, there are three meanings in all: 1. the meaning of mutual opposition, hence it says that in emptiness there is no form; 2. the meaning of mutual non-obstruction, hence it says "because it does not obstruct form"; 3. the meaning of mutual creation, hence it was said earlier that there is no definite, real form, and that in its entire substance it is empty, because it is not an annihilatory emptiness. This means that if this illusory form were not in its entire substance empty, it could not constitute illusory form; hence one must also say that in form there is no emptiness, and therefore form does not obstruct emptiness. Thus, its entire substance is form, because it is not annihilation. Because here it is specifically explaining the meaning of understanding the absence of form, it speaks only of the aspect of form being identical with emptiness. In the second section below, on the aspect of being able to manifest form, it will appropriately clarify that form does not obstruct emptiness, and so forth. Only when these three are unhindered is it called true emptiness, and also termed wonderful existence. Second, these two lines dispel the confused notions regarding the three emptinesses held by those prior to the grounds (bhūmi): namely, that having no definite, real form, in its entire substance it is empty, because it is not an annihilatory emptiness. This dispels the second doubt of "emptiness destroying form" and grasping an annihilatory emptiness. By "in emptiness there is no form," it dispels the third doubt of "emptiness being a thing," which claims that emptiness is existent. Now it clarifies that emptiness does not even have form—how could it have substance? How much less could there be emptiness within form; emptiness definitely lacks substance. Next, saying "because it does not obstruct form" dispels the first doubt that "emptiness is distinct from form," which grasps an emptiness outside of form. Since it says it does not obstruct form, it clarifies that it is not outside of form. Only when freed from these three errors is it called the true emptiness of the pure dharmadhātu. Third, it also contains the meaning of the Contemplation of the Dharmadhātu, which is the first contemplation: the Contemplation of True Emptiness Ending Marks. That contemplation has four gates: 1. the contemplation of resolving form into emptiness, which is the meaning of emptiness in the present gate; 2. the contemplation clarifying that emptiness is identical with form, which is the meaning of being able to manifest form in the second section; 3. the contemplation of the non-obstruction of form and emptiness, which is the meaning of formlessness manifesting form in this third section; 4. the contemplation of total annihilation leaving nowhere to rest, which is also within this section. In that first contemplation of resolving form into emptiness, there are four lines; each first states the thesis and then explains the first three. The statement of the thesis in all [three] is the same, saying: "Form is not identical with emptiness, because it is identical with emptiness." Now, saying "there is no definite, real form, because in its entire substance it is empty and not an annihilatory emptiness" is that first line. It says: because form is not identical with an emptiness that is annihilatory emptiness, it is said that "it is not identical with emptiness"; because form in its entire substance is true emptiness, it is said "because it is identical with emptiness." Now, saying "it does not obstruct form" is that second line. The characteristics of blue and yellow are not identical with the principle of true emptiness; therefore it says: "Form is not identical with emptiness." However, blue and yellow have no substance, none of them being not empty; therefore it says: "because it is identical with emptiness." Truly, because the emptiness that is the lack of substance of blue and yellow is not identical with blue and yellow, it is said: "it is not identical with emptiness." Precisely because there must be blue and yellow for one to speak of their lack of substance, it clarifies that it does not obstruct form. Next, saying now that "in emptiness there is no form" is that third line: "because there is no form in emptiness, it is not identical with emptiness; resolving form to have no substance, it therefore says 'because it is identical with emptiness.'" Truly, because resolving form into emptiness means that in emptiness there must be no form, therefore through the emptiness of form, form is not emptiness. The above three lines use Dharma to sift out emotional attachment. The fourth line immediately says: "Form is precisely emptiness." That is to say, whatever is a phenomenon of form is necessarily not different from true emptiness, because all phenomena of form necessarily lack own-nature; therefore form is precisely emptiness. This is precisely what the present commentary means by the first [point]: "the dharmadhātu has no definite, real form; in its entire substance it is empty." As for the commentary's "because preservation and loss, concealment and revelation are all sovereign," this is a general conclusion to the preceding meaning. Within this there are two meanings: First, it concludes the above: "in emptiness there is no form" is "loss"; "not obstructing form" is "preservation"; "in its entire substance it is empty, because it is not an annihilatory emptiness" encompasses both preservation and loss. Preservation and loss pertain to form; concealment and revelation pertain to emptiness. The principle of emptiness is truly constant and cannot be said to be "lost"; but when form is preserved, emptiness is concealed, and when form is lost, emptiness is revealed. This is spoken of solely with regard to resolving form into emptiness. If one includes the second, "not obstructing the manifestation of form," that clarifies the contemplation that emptiness is identical with form. When discussing preservation and loss, concealment and revelation: when form is precisely emptiness, form is lost and emptiness is revealed; when emptiness is precisely form, emptiness is concealed and form is preserved. However, in both cases, precisely what is lost is preserved, and precisely what is concealed is revealed; hence it says "sovereign." Thus, it serves as a general conclusion for that third contemplation of the non-obstruction of emptiness and form. As for "total annihilation leaving nowhere to rest," it is found in the explanation of the text below. The commentary's "simply because when sought through deluded discrimination it cannot be found" onward is precisely that meaning of total annihilation leaving nowhere to rest. It states: this true emptiness contemplated cannot be said to be identical with form or not identical with form, identical with emptiness or not identical with emptiness; none of all dharmas are admissible, and even this statement is not entertained; it is utterly cut off and without any resting place, beyond the reach of words and inaccessible to understanding—this is called the sphere of practice. Why? Because the arousal of mind and the stirring of thought run counter to the substance of the Dharma and forfeit right mindfulness. When comparing the present commentary's text with that citation, their mutual subsumption is evident. As for the commentary's "because it takes the form that is identical with emptiness to be wonderful form," this uses what precedes to establish what follows: because previously it understood the absence of form and manifested form, it forms wonderful form. Next, saying "Furthermore, form and emptiness are not two" onward compares the present with the preceding, mutually establishing each other through alternating perspectives. First, form and emptiness not being two establishes the true emptiness above, entirely completing what went before; next, "not two and yet two" uses what precedes to establish what follows; next, "form and emptiness blend and identify" blends the two texts above, returning them to the initial dharmadhātu; finally, "the inexhaustible dependent origination" establishes the boundless below. The essential purport of true emptiness and wonderful form is detailed as in the chapter 'Clarifying by Inquiries'.

74.16

Ninth, the penetration of the cognition of all dharmas. As for "However, these three pairs of explanations have three meanings": these three meanings are scattered throughout the sūtras and treatises, and ancient masters accepted or rejected them differently according to their own views. In the intention of the present commentary, all of them are gathered, and their distinct meanings are all taken as correct interpretations; only by combining these three intentions does one exhaust the profound purport. However, in these three pairs, all of them establish their differences through the lower line, whereas the upper line of "neither different" has the same meaning throughout: they are all alike in dispelling the mark of differentiation. The lower line, contrasted with the upper, separately establishes three levels: First, considering it solely in terms of revealing the real, one sweeps away traces and enters into the profound. "Neither different" sweeps away the mark of differentiation. "Nor not different" sweeps away the trace of the aforesaid non-difference; thus it dispels and dispels further, until there is nothing left to dispel. And within the text there are two parts: first it generally explains both lines, hence saying "because they are empty by mutual dependence." Next, it first refutes difference, saying "because difference mutually lacks [the other], it is said to be not different." This is the intention in the chapter 'Examination of Combination' of the Madhyamakaśāstra. Because the Hīnayāna asserts the combination of the three factors of seeing, the visible, and the seer, it uses difference to refute it, saying: "If there were different things, there would be combination; seeing and so forth have no difference. Since different things are not established, how could seeing and so forth combine?" The explanation says: this only generally clarifies that there is no difference, and that if there is difference there is no combination. Next, it refutes difference by analogy, saying: "Not only are the visible and so forth ungraspable in their marks of difference, all existing dharmas are without marks of difference." The explanation says: above it generally states their absence; below it provides the reason for their absence, saying: "Difference is different because of difference; apart from difference, there is no difference. If a dharma arises conditioned by something, that dharma is not different from its cause." This means, for instance, the eye is different from form, and form is different from the eye: this is called difference. Now it clarifies that because it is different due to form, the eye is different; hence it says "difference is different because of difference." If apart from form, from what would the eye differ? Hence it says "apart from difference, there is no difference." In that case, the two differences of eye and form are established depending on each other, so there is no fixed eye or form to constitute difference; hence it says "if a dharma arises conditioned by something, that dharma is not different from its cause." It is also like beams and rafters making a house: the house is not different from the dharmas such as beams and rafters; hence it says "if a dharma arises conditioned by something, that dharma is not different from its cause." If the eye is like the house, then form is added like the beams, etc.; if form is like the house, the eye is like the beams, etc.; thus they are mutually the condition. Therefore the commentary says "difference mutually lacks [the other]," meaning that because eye and form depend on each other, there is no fixed difference. Furthermore, it is like the difference between long and short: within long there is no mark of short, so long has nothing to correspond to, and thus there is no long; within short there is no mark of long, so short has nothing to correspond to, and thus there is no short. Since there is neither long nor short, who can speak of difference? Hence it says "because difference mutually lacks [the other], there is no difference." Furthermore, within long there is inherently no mark of long, and within short there is inherently no mark of short; taking what long and short could one speak of difference? This is also the intention of the Madhyamakaśāstra, as well as the intention of the Śataśāstra. Therefore the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "In difference there is no mark of difference, nor is there in non-difference. Because there is no mark of difference, there is no difference between this and that." In the chapter 'Examination of One' of the Śataśāstra, the non-Buddhists assert oneness, and the Buddhist refutes it, saying: "If cause and effect were not different, the three periods of time would be one." They rescue their position, saying: "It is not so, because cause and effect are established by mutual dependence, like long and short." The commentary says: "Like seeing short because of long, and seeing long because of short; like seeing a lump of clay: viewing the pot, it is the cause; viewing the earth, it is the result." The Buddhist refutes: "Because of the joint error of depending on the other and mutual opposition, the mark of long is not in the long, nor in the short, nor in both." The commentary says: "If there were truly a mark of long, whether it existed in the long, or in the short, or in both, all of these are ungraspable. Why? Within long there is no mark of long, because it depends on the other—because it is long due to short. Within short there is also no mark of long, because their natures are mutually opposed. If within short there were long, it could not be called short. Nor is there long in both, because both would incur the errors. If it existed in the long or in the short, both errors have already been explained above. Taking what could they combine? Since the mark of long does not exist, the mark of short is likewise. If there is neither long nor short, how could there be mutual dependence?" The refutation of difference above is complete. Next, when the commentary says "stopping difference, it says 'not different'" onward, it explains the absence of non-difference through the gate of mutual dependence, meaning that because there is no difference to depend on, both are mutually cut off, thereby according with nature-emptiness (svabhāva-śūnyatā). This is also the intention of the Śataśāstra's saying: "If there is neither long nor short, how could there be mutual dependence?"

74.17

As for the commentary's "second, in terms of mutual manifestation": above it merely revealed the real, which was solely nature and not marks; now, possessing both nature and marks, it is called mutual manifestation. It means that because the essence is one, it is not different; because the marks are differentiated, it is not not different. This adduces both affirmations to reveal both negations.

74.18

Under the commentary's "third, in terms of mutual negation," the text has two meanings: First, previously it clarified mutual identity, and therefore attains mutual negation. That is to say, marks are originally different, but now being identical with nature, there is no difference; hence they are not different. Nature is originally one, but now being identical with marks, there is no oneness; hence it is not not different. Second, under "Furthermore, marks are non-marks..." it clarifies that being fundamentally separate within their very marks, they therefore attain mutual negation. Under "Therefore, leaving the two extremes..." it concludes the profound purport.

74.19

As for the commentary's "the dharmatā does not run parallel with the true, hence it is of a single mark": this refers to Master Ying's statement, "The dharmatā does not run parallel with the true, and the sages and worthies have no different paths, because the principle has no disparate flavor."

74.20

As for the commentary's statement, "'One' is also not taken as 'one', and therefore there is no-characteristic": this is as the Dharmapada says: "The manifold array of all phenomena / Is sealed by a single phenomenon. / How could there be differentiation / Within a single phenomenon?" This corresponds to the preceding "single characteristic". Next it says: "'One' is also not taken as 'one', / In order to destroy all numbers. / Those of shallow wisdom cling to phenomena, / Seeing 'one' and taking it to be 'one'." This is the meaning of the latter line. As for the commentary's statement, "Existence and nonexistence are both phenomena, and are nonexistent due to mutual dependence": this explains "neither nonexistent nor existent". That is, existence is an existent phenomenon and nonexistence is a nonexistent phenomenon; hence it says "existence and nonexistence are both phenomena". Regarding "nonexistent due to mutual dependence": in the introductory chapter of the Sanlun [texts], a verse states: "If there were an existent that could exist, / Then there would be a nonexistent that could not-exist. / Now there is no existent that can exist, / Nor is there any nonexistent that can not-exist." That is, existence is established on the basis of nonexistence; since existence is conventionally produced from nonexistence, it is not existent. Nonexistence is spoken of on the basis of existence; since nonexistence is established due to existence, it is not nonexistent. If one picks up from the preceding: above it says that "no-characteristic" is precisely the meaning of nonexistence; now, negating that "no-characteristic", it therefore says "neither nonexistent". Nonexistence itself does not remain; how could existence be established? Hence it says "neither nonexistent nor existent", both being nonexistent because they are mutually dependent.

74.21

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Dharma and non-dharma are merely conventional designations": dharma and non-dharma have three meanings. First, existent phenomena are dharma, and nonexistent phenomena are non-dharma; but as existence and nonexistence have already been refuted above, this is not the meaning here. Second, unwholesome phenomena are non-dharma, and wholesome phenomena are dharma. Third, characteristic is dharma, and nature is non-dharma. Here it encompasses these two: wholesome and unwholesome are mutually conditioned and are also conventional designations; in the dharma of dispelling characteristics, explaining nature serves as non-dharma. Since characteristics do not remain, nature cannot be established; hence "even dharma should be abandoned, how much more so non-dharma?" Nature and characteristics are mutually conditioned, and are also merely conventional designations.

74.22

From the commentary's "Both are sought in terms of reality" onward: this concludes by revealing reality. In each of the pairs above, the upper phrase mostly serves as what is remedied, and the lower phrase serves as the remedying agent: as the unreal is what is remedied and the real is the remedying agent, or dharma is what is remedied and non-dharma is the remedying agent. Since both return to reality, both are tranquil. "The rest should all be patterned on this": this explains the sūtra text from "not following the conventional, yet not failing to follow the conventional" onward.

74.23

Tenth, samādhi and spiritual superknowledges. From "First, indicating the name" onward, the commentary text has two parts: first it explains the characteristics; afterward, from "Because phenomena and principle are not one" onward, it explains the name. The first part also has two parts: first it gives the main explanation; afterward, from "This is precisely" onward, it discriminates the samādhi—that is, it discriminates essence and function against the other traditions. Within this there are three parts: first, discriminating principle and phenomena; second, discriminating functions; third, warding off counter-arguments and re-discriminating. Now, regarding the first: "This is precisely cessation of principle" is this very school, because the essence of the dharmadhātu is tranquil. From "Unlike" onward, it is the Faxiang school: because it is only the cessation of phenomena, the mind must not operate for it to be called cessation.

74.24

From the commentary's "Only the cessation of phenomena" onward: second, discriminating that their functions are unequal. First it clarifies that in the cessation of phenomena, since the sixth and seventh [consciousnesses] do not operate, how could they give rise to function? Afterward, from "Realizing the cessation of principle" onward, it distinguishes that the merit of the cessation of principle is superior: because phenomena are directly principle, samādhi and distraction are unimpeded.

74.25

From the commentary's "Nor is it that the mind is in samādhi" onward: third, warding off counter-arguments and re-discriminating. Fearing they might argue, "Although mental concepts are extinguished, preparatory practices prior to samādhi cause the body to give rise to function," it now discriminates this, [showing] it is not our school's view either. Because while the mind is directly in samādhi it cannot give rise [to function], this wards off Faxiang. Next, saying "Nor is it solely clarifying that both samādhi and distraction are severed": this wards off the Chan school. Cessation and contemplation are both obliterated, neither in samādhi nor distracted; this is explained suddenly in terms of principle, and is also the purport of the Sudden Teaching, hence it is not the school of this sūtra. Only from "However, phenomena and principle" onward does it reveal the correct doctrine: by attuning to the unimpeded principle, one attains ease in both samādhi and distraction. From "The seventh ground above" onward, it cites two sūtras as proof, all as explained previously.

74.26

Chapter Twenty-Nine: The Ten Forbearances

74.27

Regarding the commentary's "Third, the central purport": the commentary text has two parts. First it properly determines the central purport; afterward, from "However, this practice of forbearance" onward, it analyzes it through doctrinal categories. Within that there are three parts: first, determining the stages; second, from "The essence is precisely" onward, identifying the essence; third, from "Although it is a single cognition" onward, distinguishing the categories. Speaking of "one": it is the single anutpattikadharmakṣānti. Speaking of "two": it refers to forbearance of the emptiness of persons and the emptiness of phenomena. Speaking of "three": it refers to the Fo xing lun's explanation of the three forbearances of non-nature, and the Bodhisattvabhūmi-śāstra's explanation of forbearance of faith, forbearance of accord, and anutpattikadharmakṣānti. Speaking of "four": first, there are two meanings—one is as in the Treatise on the Eighth Ground: 1. non-arising of phenomena, 2. non-arising of intrinsic nature, 3. non-arising of numerical distinctions, 4. non-arising of active karma; the second is that in the Viśeṣacintābrahma-paripṛcchā-sūtra four forbearances are taught: 1. forbearance of non-arising, 2. forbearance of non-cessation, 3. forbearance of causes and conditions, 4. forbearance of non-abiding, which have already been fully cited in the explanation of the sūtra's preface. Speaking of "five forbearances": this refers to the Renwang jing, the first being the forbearance of suppression, etc., as explained in the Ten Grounds. As for saying "etc.", there are multiple meanings. First, it includes the six forbearances, as explained in the Yingluo [jing], already cited at the beginning of the Ten Samādhis. Or ten forbearances are taught, as on the eighth ground. Or fourteen and fifteen are taught, as in the Renwang and Yingluo, both as cited in the chapters on the Ten Grounds and the Ten Abodes. Regarding "the various teachings differ": this comprehensively distinguishes the various forbearances as differing according to the teachings. The Hīnayāna does not establish the designation "forbearance". The various doors above mostly run throughout beginning and end; the single anutpatti[kadharmakṣānti] alone also encompasses the Sudden Teaching.

74.28

Regarding the commentary's "Among the names, the first three are based on phenomena": the commentary text divides into two. First is a general division; afterward, from "Among the three, the first one" onward, it shows them individually. Within this there are also two: first, explaining the phenomena; second, explaining the similes. The first part again has two: first, explaining the phrase itself; afterward, discriminating between the comprehensive and the restricted. The first two are self-evident. Within anutpattikadharmakṣānti there are inherently two meanings: first, clarifying both principle and cognition; second, from "If in terms of the cognition of non-arising" onward, speaking solely in terms of cognition, fully as on the eighth ground—that is, the purity of forbearance. The purity of forbearance again has two aspects: 1. non-arising of cognition, which is because the essence of non-conceptual cognition is free from thought and deliberation; 2. non-arising of defilements, because false conceptualizations do not arise.

74.29

From the commentary's "Furthermore, these three forbearances" onward: second, discriminating between the comprehensive and the restricted, first comprehensive, then restricted. In the comprehensive there are three parts: first, properly showing the comprehensive. Second, from "If in terms of their corresponding stages" onward, showing by contrast that they are not restricted: that is, according to the Bodhisattvabhūmi, sound belongs to the stage of provisions, the forbearance of accord belongs to the stage of preparatory practice, and anutpattikadharmakṣānti belongs to direct realization, so it says the three forbearances are clearly distinct. They are clearly distinct and not the same. From "Because they should not" onward, it concludes the meaning of not being restricted. Third, from "Accord is only according with principle" onward, it resolves objections. In the text there are two objections. The first direct objection states: "The stage of preparatory practice accords with anutpattikadharmakṣānti, hence it is called the forbearance of accord; if one does not view it in terms of stages, how can there be a forbearance of accord?" Thus it now resolves it by saying: "accord" has two meanings. First, according with anutpattikadharmakṣānti, which is preparatory practice; now it is according with the principle of non-arising, so it is not in terms of stages. Next, pursuing this implication, the objection states: "If so, how is it different from non-arising?" Next, from "The forbearance of accord generally accords with phenomena and principle" onward, it resolves the objection: since it generally accords with phenomena and principle, it is not like non-arising which only accords with principle. From "The sūtra says" onward, it cites the sūtra to corroborate this. However, non-arising differing from accord has yet another meaning: namely, only according with the non-arising of principle, defilement and cognition do not arise. Wishing to show that the forbearance of accord differs from both of these two meanings, it simply takes both according with phenomena and principle as sufficient to distinguish the two. Furthermore, the commentary's statement above that "the former two are comprehensively the preparatory practices for non-arising" refers to the preparatory practices spoken of for this equal awakening itself, and is not like the earlier view that took the three forbearances as clearly distinct.

74.30

From the commentary's "Furthermore, based on the five forbearances" onward: second, distinguishing that there is a restricted meaning, which is superior and not inferior. When the five forbearances clarify the meaning, non-arising corresponds to the seventh, eighth, and ninth grounds. When the three forbearances clarify the meaning, everything from direct realization onward comprehensively connects to non-arising. Although this meaning exists, since there are here sound and the forbearance of accord, one knows that it is definitely comprehensive; the phrase [regarding restriction] is not the primary intention.

74.31

From the commentary's "Among the latter seven similes" onward: second, explaining the similes. Within this there are two: first, synthesizing six explanations; afterward, from "Guangtong" onward, discriminating the comprehensive and the restricted. In this there are also two: first, recounting the past [masters]; afterward, the commentary synthesizes and reconciles them. In the former part, there are seven masters in total: 1. Guangtong, 2. Xianshou, 3. the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, 4. Master Yuan, 5. the Vajracchedikā-śāstra, 6. the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, 7. the Laṅkāvatāra. Now, Guangtong has two parts: first, recounting the past; afterward, synthesizing and reconciling. In the former, he first correlates the seven similes with the three dharmas above, because their doctrinal categories are identical; afterward, from "It also says an illusion" onward, he shows the characteristics of the similes individually, largely the same as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Saying "arising without arising": illusory phenomena arise from conditions and have no fixed nature. "An object without an object": objects of the six sense spheres are like mirages resembling water, yet not being water. "Knowing without knowing": awareness within a dream is not real awareness. "Hearing without hearing": echoes produced by a valley are not original sounds. "Abiding that is non-abiding": lightning refers to the Jin translation of the sūtra, taking the meaning from the Vimalakīrti: "This body is like lightning, not abiding from thought-moment to thought-moment." From "Since it now says shadow" onward, he explains by analogy with that, also taking the meaning of the Vimalakīrti. The sūtra says: "This body is like a shadow, appearing from karmic conditions"; hence it says appearing without the characteristic of appearing. An apparition suddenly exists from nothing, hence it says "the characteristic of existence without existence". Space does not impede actions, hence it says "the characteristic of doing without doing". All of these take specific meanings from within the similes.

74.32

From the commentary's "These similes, then" onward: second, the commentary synthesizes and reconciles them. Saying "the vehicle of the simile is restricted to a single characteristic": within illusion there is only the characteristic of arising without arising, and not the six characteristics such as an object without an object or knowing without knowing, and likewise the simile of space has only the characteristic of doing without doing, and lacks arising without arising and so forth; hence it is said to be restricted to one. Saying "the meaning of the tenor of the simile comprehensively applies to many phenomena": as the characteristic of arising without arising comprehensively clarifies the phenomenon of dependent origination without being restricted to distinctions such as internal and external, so existence without existence merely clarifies that all existents are immediately unreal, without being restricted to the Bodhisattva's ability to transform, and thus it comprehensively applies to many phenomena. Just as an object without an object and hearing without hearing also have restricted meanings, the commentary therefore uses the words "comprehensively applies in meaning". From "Although it is not in the text" onward, it provisionally grants and establishes this meaning.

74.33

From the commentary's "Furthermore, the ancient worthy" onward: second, Xianshou's explanation. First it recounts the past [master], and afterward, from "This explanation" onward, it synthesizes and reconciles. The text provisionally grants it, but the intention implicitly dismisses it. That is, the verses in the later Chapter on Leaving the World contain distinct similes, so the meaning can be established; but as the main explanation below shows that the tenor of the simile is comprehensive, it merely accords with the subsequent sūtra text, and hence it is an implicit dismissal. Regarding "the verses in Leaving the World": the sūtra says: "Viewing form as like a mass of foam, / Feeling as like a bubble on water, / Perception as like a mirage in the heat, / Formations as like a plantain tree, / Mind and consciousness as like an illusion, / Manifesting various matters. / Knowing the aggregates in this way, / The wise have no attachment." This is that text. Regarding "Therefore now the simile of the shadow also illustrates formations": the simile of the shadow in the present text corresponds to lightning in the Jin translation; being contrasted with Guangtong above, it therefore says "also".

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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese