大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 8

English (machine translation) 8

Language: English

8.1

Expounded by the śramaṇa Chengguan of Da Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang in the Tang

From the Commentary's "Furthermore, the third [fascicle of the] Lotus [Sūtra] states..." downward, the third [section] clarifies that there is no entering into quiescence. Since there is no entering into quiescence, there are no two vehicles of determinate nature, and the meaning of the one vehicle is also thereby revealed. The Commentary cites three passages, namely from the Lotus Sūtra, the Da zhidu lun, and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa. Now, the first is the "Chapter on the Parable of the Conjured City," which brings together and identifies the disciples transformed by the World-Honoured One. The sūtra states: "Those immeasurable, Ganges-sands-like sentient beings transformed at that time are yourselves, all you monks, and the śrāvaka disciples in future ages after my parinirvāṇa." From "After my parinirvāṇa" onward, the Commentary is completely identical. As for the words "in another land," some say this refers simply to any country outside the Sahā world. According to the Tiantai school, "another land" refers to the Land of Expedient Means with Remainder. That school establishes four lands: first, the Land where Commoners and Nobles Dwell Together, which corresponds to the Transformation Land in the Dharma-characteristics (Faxiang) system; second, the Land of Expedient Means with Remainder; third, the Land of True Reward and Non-obstruction, which corresponds to the Reward Land in the Dharma-characteristics system and encompasses both enjoyment for self and enjoyment for others; fourth, the Land of Eternally Quiescent Light, which is the Dharmatā Land. The single land of expedient means does not exist in the Dharma-characteristics system; Tiantai established it based on the Da zhidu lun. The Da zhidu lun is the passage cited below from the ninety-fifth fascicle. The treatise states: "The arhat's body of fragmented [cycle of life and death], received through the causes and conditions of previous lives, must necessarily cease. In what place do they dwell to fully accomplish the Buddha Path? Answer: Having attained arhatship, they are no longer reborn in the three realms; there is a pure buddha-land beyond the three realms where even the name of defilement does not exist. In that land, in the presence of the Buddha, they hear the Lotus Sūtra and fully accomplish the Buddha Path." As the Lotus Sūtra says: "There are arhats whom I, in another land..." and so forth; the cited passage is completely identical to the previous commentary. It also states: "If so, since the arhat receives a body of dharmatā, they should swiftly attain bodhi; why do they delay? The answer states: Because they abandoned sentient beings and abandoned the Buddha Path, and moreover falsely claimed to have attained the Path, although they do not undergo birth and death, their faculties regarding bodhi are dull and they cannot attain it swiftly, being inferior to bodhisattvas who advance directly." Explanation: The text of the Da zhidu lun clearly accords with the Lotus Sūtra; it is known for certain that although they transcend the three realms, they do not enter into quiescence. Therefore, the Commentary concludes: "They definitely resolve their minds [toward awakening]."

8.3

As for the Commentary's "Among the four kinds of śrāvakas in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa..." and so forth, it cites the treatise to establish the aforementioned principle of not entering into quiescence. First it cites, and then it explains. Now, the first. The treatise states: "Regarding śrāvakas receiving predictions, there are four kinds of śrāvakas: first, determinate śrāvakas; second, śrāvakas of overweening pride; third, śrāvakas who retrogressed from the bodhicitta; and fourth, manifestational śrāvakas. To two kinds of śrāvakas the Tathāgata gives predictions, namely manifestational śrāvakas and those who, having retrogressed, generate the bodhicitta again. As for the determinate ones and those of overweening pride, these two kinds of śrāvakas, because their faculties are not yet mature, the Tathāgata does not give them predictions. Bodhisattvas confer predictions on them. Bodhisattvas conferring predictions on them is an expedient to cause them to generate the bodhicitta." The text of the Commentary merely quotes this in abridged form. Regarding those who retrogressed from bodhicitta receiving predictions, this is like Śāriputra having already received transformation in the presence of two million koṭīs of buddhas. Furthermore, it says directly below: "I now wish again to cause you to remember the path you practiced in your original vow." Thus, it was not Śāriputra alone. Furthermore, the four great śrāvakas themselves stated that they abandoned their father and fled, meaning they had already been transformed before. In the third cycle, it cites their having already been broadly transformed in the presence of the Buddha Mahābhijñājñānābhibhū; all these are those who retrogressed from bodhicitta. Regarding manifestational ones, this is like Pūrṇa inwardly concealing his bodhisattva practices and outwardly appearing as a śrāvaka. It also says: "Therefore, all bodhisattvas act as śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas." Moreover, Ānanda remembered his own original vow, the verse stating: "As an expedient, I acted as an attendant." Rāhula's verse states: "Rāhula's secret conduct, only I can know; he manifests as my eldest son." All these are manifestational śrāvakas. Therefore, we know that as for those who can expound the sacred teaching and reflect its traces, none are not expedient means. Yet the text speaks exclusively of Pūrṇa as being manifestational only to humble the various arhats of the Lotus Sūtra. Regarding bodhisattvas conferring predictions, the treatise master himself stated just prior: "As should be understood in the 'Sadāparibhūta Chapter' below: Bowing in reverence and praising, uttering words such as, 'I dare not disrespect you, for you shall all become buddhas'—this is to reveal the buddha-nature possessed by all sentient beings." All the above is from the treatise. But Dharma Master Anguo did not accept this meaning, [asking] how could past bodhisattvas give advance predictions to the śrāvakas in the present assembly, which would mean that the various bodhisattvas propagating the Dharma, such as Bhaiṣajyarāja, should give the predictions. Explanation: Since it is the treatise master himself who says that bodhisattvas confer predictions, and the treatise itself explains it, how could one not rely on it?

8.4

Regarding the Commentary's "Since it says 'not yet mature'..." downward, it explains the treatise passage cited above. If determinate śrāvakas were definitely never to attain buddhahood, it should have said that the faculties of the other two śrāvakas "are not mature," and therefore the Buddha does not give them predictions. Since it says "not yet mature," it does not mean they will never mature. As Dharma Master Dacheng said: It should have read "not mature"; it was an error by the translator that made it "not yet mature." Therefore, the Commentary concludes with a censure: One must not, simply because it does not accord with one's own school that definitely posited entering into quiescence, judge the treatise text to be mistaken! Furthermore, regarding the above statement that it is an expedient to cause them to generate bodhicitta, just prior in that treatise there is a question: Do those śrāvakas receive predictions because they will truly attain buddhahood, or do they receive predictions while not attaining buddhahood? If they will truly become buddhas, why do bodhisattvas cultivate immeasurable and boundless varieties of merit throughout immeasurable kalpas? If they will not become buddhas, why confer false predictions upon them? The answer states: The predictions conferred on those śrāvakas are given because they have attained a determinate mind, not because the śrāvakas have actualised the dharmatā. This is because the Tathāgata expounds the Dharma of the one vehicle relying on three equalities: because the Tathāgata's dharmakāya and the dharmakāya of those śrāvakas are equal and without difference, he therefore confers predictions upon them, not because they have immediately perfected the practice of merit. Thus, bodhisattvas have perfected merits, while śrāvakas have not yet perfected merits. Explanation: Due to this passage of the treatise, it was stated above that it is an expedient to cause them to generate bodhicitta. As for the three equalities: first is the equality of the vehicle, because there are no two vehicles; second is the equality of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa; third is the equality of the dharmakāya. The present case is the third equality.

8.5

From the Commentary's "Entering the Laṅkāvatāra..." downward, this also establishes the meaning of not entering into quiescence. As for "Entering the Laṅkāvatāra," this refers to the translation by Bodhiruci of the Later Wei, which comprises ten fascicles. The World-Honoured One entered the royal city of Laṅkā, hence it is called "Entering." It equally cites three fascicles of sūtra text, all of which state that there is no real nirvāṇa, from which it is clearly known that there is definitely no entering into quiescence. If so, why speak of attaining nirvāṇa? Viewed from their own perspective, they consider it to be nirvāṇa without remainder. Viewed from the Mahāyāna perspective, it is merely entering deeply into samādhi, remaining submerged in emptiness for a long time; it is nominally called nirvāṇa in order to attract inferior vessels. In the Commentary: "The intention in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa is also identical to this," so likewise there is no real nirvāṇa. When the treatise explains the seven parables, the fourth is the Parable of the Conjured City, expounded for those of determinate nature. The treatise states: "Fourth, it is genuinely non-existent, yet there are people of overweening pride. Because they have worldly mundane samādhi and samāpatti, they produce the notion of nirvāṇa where there is genuinely no nirvāṇa, grasping it mistakenly like this. To remedy this, the Parable of the Conjured City was spoken for them, as should be understood." Explanation: Since it speaks of no real nirvāṇa, one clearly knows it is an expedient designation, and thus accords with the preceding. Furthermore, the Lotus Sūtra says: "Although I previously taught that you had attained extinction, that was only the exhaustion of birth and death, while in reality there was no extinction." Next, it cites the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra, which also establishes that the nirvāṇa mentioned above is not real.

8.6

Regarding the Commentary's "Furthermore, the Anuttarāśraya-sūtra, the Ratnagotravibhāga, and the Buddha-Nature Treatise all state that the two vehicles who enter extinction..." and so forth: The first [fascicle] of the Anuttarāśraya-sūtra states: "Ānanda! All arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas not yet in the stage of mastery, due to four kinds of hindrances, do not attain the four virtues of the Tathāgata's dharmakāya: first, the affliction that is the condition for rebirth; second, the affliction that is the cause of rebirth; third, having existence; and fourth, non-existence. What is the affliction that is the condition for rebirth? It is the ground of ignorance, which gives rise to all formations, just as ignorance gives rise to karma. What is the affliction that is the cause of rebirth? It is the formations born of the ground of ignorance, just as karma is born of ignorance. What is having existence? Conditioned by the ground of ignorance and caused by the ground of ignorance, the outflow-free activities that are generated give rise to three kinds of mind-made bodies. Just as the four graspings serve as conditions and the three types of outflow karma serve as causes to give rise to the three realms of existence. What is non-existence? Conditioned by the three kinds of mind-made bodies, there is imperceptible, subtle destruction and cessation. For instance, just as conditioned by birth within the three existences, there is moment-to-moment aging and death. Because the ground of ignorance, on which all afflictions depend, has not yet been severed, the arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas not yet in the stage of mastery cannot attain the vision of the definitive extinction of the defilement, turbidity, and foul odor of karmic impressions, which is the pāramitā of great purity. Furthermore, because the subtle afflictions caused by the ground of ignorance and their unreal activities have not yet been eliminated, they cannot attain the vision of the pāramitā of the extremely quiescent great self, free from fabrication and activity. Because the outflow-free karma arising from the subtle unreality conditioned by the ground of ignorance, and the mind-made aggregates, have not yet been completely removed, they cannot attain the vision of the pāramitā of great bliss, supremely quiescent and remote. If they have not attained the eternal and remainderless exhaustion of all afflictions, karma, and difficulties of rebirth—which for the Tathāgatas is the realm of nectar—then the discontinuous flows and cessations of inconceivable transformation birth-and-death will be immeasurable, and they cannot attain the vision of the pāramitā of great permanence, utterly free from transformation. Ānanda! Within the three realms, there are four kinds of difficulties: first, the difficulty of afflictions; second, the difficulty of karma; third, the difficulty of retribution of birth; and fourth, the difficulty of faults. The expedient birth-and-death arising from the ground of ignorance is like the difficulty of afflictions within the three realms. The cause-and-condition birth-and-death arising from the ground of ignorance is like the difficulty of karma within the three realms. The having-existence birth-and-death arising from the ground of ignorance is like the difficulty of retribution of birth within the three realms. The non-existence birth-and-death arising from the ground of ignorance is like the difficulty of faults within the three realms. It should be known thus. Ānanda! Because these four kinds of birth-and-death have not yet been eliminated, the three kinds of mind-made bodies do not possess the fruits of the pāramitās of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Only the Buddha's dharmakāya is the pāramitā of permanence, bliss, self, and purity; this you should know." Explanation: Relying on the above sūtra text, it clarifies that the two vehicles and bodhisattvas not yet in the stage of mastery all undergo inconceivable transformation [birth-and-death]. That there are karma, afflictions, and suffering outside the three realms is extremely manifest; how could one definitively assert that they are eternally extinct without remainder? Where the Commentary below explains the four kinds of birth-and-death, one may refer to this. In the later text of the treatise, the characteristics of permanence, bliss, self, and purity are also extensively explained, and their final destination can also be known. The reference below to "the two treatises, the Ratnagotravibhāga and Buddha-Nature Treatise": their general purport is identical to the Anuttarāśraya-sūtra. In the Ratnagotravibhāga it is in the fourth [fascicle], and in the Buddha-Nature Treatise it is in the second [fascicle]; these fascicles also extensively discuss the four kinds of birth-and-death.

8.7

From the Commentary's "Such sūtras and treatises..." downward, it concludes by establishing that there are no śrāvakas of determinate nature.

8.8

Regarding the commentary’s passage from "Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], fascicle nine" onward: fourth, explaining that there is no such thing as being devoid of Buddha-nature. In that sūtra, after explaining at length that icchantikas lack roots of goodness, it immediately states: "Furthermore, good sons! Just as when lotus blossoms are shone upon by the sun, there is none that does not bloom, all sentient beings are also like this: if they are able to see and hear the sun of the Great Nirvāṇa, those who have not yet aroused the mind [for bodhi] will all arouse their minds, forming a cause for bodhi. For this reason, I say that wherever the light of the Great Nirvāṇa enters the pores, it will certainly serve as a wondrous cause. Although that icchantika has the Buddha-nature, they are bound by immeasurable sinful defilements and cannot escape, like a silkworm inside a cocoon. Because of these karmic conditions, they cannot produce the wondrous cause of bodhi, and revolve through birth-and-death without end." All of the above is the text of the sūtra. The present commentary merely takes the middle portion, its intention resting on the statement 'although they have the Buddha-nature'. Since it says 'although they have it', it is not absent; they merely have not attained its functioning. Therefore, the commentary concludes: "This, then, means it exists and is not absent." Regarding the commentary further stating "Or there is Buddha-nature that an icchantika possesses" and so forth: this is from fascicle thirty-six of the [Northern] Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], and fascicle thirty-two of the Southern text, both being the "Bodhisattva Kāśyapa Chapter". It contains four propositions; here it only cites the first proposition to prove that icchantikas possess the nature. The sūtra states: "Good sons! There is Buddha-nature that an icchantika possesses and a person of roots of goodness lacks. There is Buddha-nature that a person of roots of goodness possesses and an icchantika lacks. There is Buddha-nature that both persons possess. There is Buddha-nature that both persons lack. Good sons! If my disciples understand the meaning of these four propositions, they should not raise objections saying that an icchantika definitely possesses Buddha-nature or definitely lacks Buddha-nature. If one says that sentient beings all possess Buddha-nature, this is called the Tathāgata speaking in accordance with his own intent. When the Tathāgata speaks in accordance with his own intent like this, why do sentient beings interpret it in only one absolute way?" This passage of the sūtra has been explained by commentators near and far with broad agreement and minor differences. Here I follow [the commentary of] Jianfu [temple]. His commentary states: "Now according to the sūtra, it is explained that Buddha-nature briefly has five kinds: namely, wholesome, unwholesome, neutral, as well as principle and fruit, etc. Now saying that an icchantika possesses it and a person of roots of goodness lacks it, this refers to the unwholesome Buddha-nature. However, persons of roots of goodness are of two kinds: first, a person of roots of goodness who has abandoned desire, because by abandoning desire they have cut off all that is unwholesome; second, the five natures—those at the five abodes and above lack the unwholesome nature. Both of these two persons lack the unwholesome nature. As for what the person of roots of goodness possesses and the icchantika lacks, this is the wholesome Buddha-nature. The icchantika has severed all goodness, and is therefore said to lack it. What both persons possess are the principle and the neutral natures. What both persons lack is the nature of the fruit. What is 'possessed' here refers to presently possessing it, not possessing it in the future." However, someone adhered to this sūtra text and asserted that a portion of persons with roots of goodness and a portion of icchantikas lack Buddha-nature, because the sūtra speaks of persons of roots of goodness and icchantikas lacking it. [They claimed that] those who lack it among persons of roots of goodness are people without the nature who have not severed goodness; those who lack it among icchantikas are those who have severed goodness and lack the nature; what both persons possess means both have the nature; what both persons lack means both lack the nature. This interpretation contradicts the sūtra. Therefore, the earlier text of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] states: "The Buddha-nature of the Tathāgata has two kinds: first, existence; second, non-existence. Existence refers to the thirty-two marks up to the immeasurable samādhis; this is called existence. Non-existence refers to the Tathāgata's past wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral karmic causes and retributions, afflictions, the five aggregates, and the twelve links of dependent origination; this is called non-existence. And so on up to: the Buddha-nature of an icchantika is also like this." This being so, from the Buddha above down to the icchantika below, all possess the two natures of existence and non-existence. There is no such thing as completely lacking the nature. Because the existence and non-existence of these two natures differ between a person of roots of goodness and an icchantika, the four propositions can obtain. What is explained here is that the many kinds of Buddha-nature differ in existence and non-existence; it does not explain that sentient beings are manifold in having the nature or lacking the nature. How is this known? Because the sūtra says: "There is Buddha-nature that a person of roots of goodness possesses and an icchantika lacks," and so forth; it does not say that there are some persons of roots of goodness who have Buddha-nature and icchantikas who lack Buddha-nature. Therefore, if one cannot even discern the inversion of the phrasing, how could one understand the meaning? Now, regarding these wholesome, unwholesome, causal, fruitional, and principled natures: not a single sentient being completely possesses all of them, nor does a single sentient being completely lack all of them; from beginning to end, this clarifies that all sentient beings possess everything. Between the Buddha and an icchantika there are also four propositions: what the Buddha possesses and the icchantika does not is the fruitional nature; what the icchantika possesses and the Buddha does not is the nature of ignorance and the various fetters; what both possess is the principled nature; what both lack is the nature of wholesome causes. Therefore, an icchantika definitely possesses the Buddha-nature. Furthermore, the earlier sūtra text states: "If one says that apart from sentient beings there is a separate Buddha-nature, this meaning is incorrect. Why is that? Sentient beings are identical with Buddha-nature; Buddha-nature is identical with sentient beings. It is simply due to different times that there are the pure and impure." Explanation: Since sentient beings and the nature are mutually identical, it is clear that wherever there are sentient beings, there is Buddha-nature.

8.9

Regarding the commentary's passage "Moreover, earlier citing the five natures of the Laṅkāvatāra, they themselves were confused by its text" and so forth: this refutes their citation because they did not understand the intent of the sūtra. What they cited was to prove the meaning of lacking the nature; now, explaining what they cited turns out to establish that they have the nature, not that they lack the nature. Why? Because that sūtra states: "It is not that those who burn up all roots of goodness permanently do not enter nirvāṇa." Thus there is the meaning of their entering. Regarding the commentary from "This intention then clarifies" downward: the commentary explains the intent of the sūtra. From "Moreover, the sūtra itself" downward: it cites the sūtra to conclude the point. From "The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra" downward: it cites the treatise to reaffirm it. Consistent with the preceding Laṅkāvatāra, it is not an ultimate lack of the nature.

8.10

Regarding the commentary's passage from "Therefore one knows from the preceding" downward: fifth, explaining the cited sūtras and treatises to establish the correct doctrine. In this there are two parts: first, explaining the intention of the Prajñāpāramitā and Saṃdhinirmocana sūtras. The intention clarifies that "fixed nature for a long time" and "lacking the nature for a long time" mean that beyond many kalpas those of fixed nature turn their minds, and beyond many kalpas it is stated that those without the nature possess it; therefore it says: "They are not eternally fixed nor eternally lacking." "Not eternally fixed" concludes the preceding śrāvakas; "not eternally lacking" concludes the icchantikas.

8.11

Regarding the commentary's passage from "The various treatises followed the Buddha" downward: second, resolving objections. That is, there is an objection saying: "When the great bodhisattvas composed treatises to explain the sūtras, they spoke of being eternally fixed and eternally lacking. Could it be that the bodhisattvas did not understand the Buddha's intent?" Therefore, it is now explained: The bodhisattvas were able to know how to propagate and expound in accordance with the teachings. Thus, when Vasubandhu composed treatises on the Hīnayāna, they had no involvement with the Mahāyāna. When expounding the Prajñā tenets, [he taught] nature-emptiness and quiescence; when establishing Vijñaptimātra, the nature and characteristics were distinct. And when explaining the Lotus Sūtra, the One Vehicle was made lucid. When elucidating the Daśabhūmika-śāstra, the six characteristics were perfectly fused. The other bodhisattvas can be understood by analogy with this. The Buddha established teachings in accordance with the capacities and conditions of sentient beings, and the bodhisattvas in following the Buddha also manifested the shallow and the profound. Therefore, immediately below, the citation of the Ratnagotravibhāga and the Buddhagotraśāstra accords with the single nature.

8.12

Regarding the commentary's passage from "If one claims that the Lotus Sūtra belongs to the second period" downward: sixth, citing various sūtras and treatises to refute attempts to rescue [the doctrine of] the fixed nature. Within this there are two parts: first, directly taking up and refuting [the argument]; second, concluding with their previous error. In the first part, there are again two: first, taking up the rescuing words; second, from "why" downward, refuting through objection. In the first: regarding the words "belongs to the second period", they did not establish it as a teaching of the second period per se; rather, because they considered the One Vehicle to be an intentional teaching, its meaning corresponded to the second period teaching of the Saṃdhinirmocana. Furthermore, because the Lotus Sūtra forcefully refutes the three vehicles and speaks of the One Vehicle, it corresponds to the second period. Regarding the words "in order to guide the undetermined": they cited the tenth fascicle of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, where a verse states: "In order to attract and guide one category, and sustain the rest, due to the undetermined gotra, the Buddhas speak of the One Vehicle," and so forth. That [text] has ten intentions, and this verse has two: first, in order to attract and guide one category of śrāvakas of undetermined nature; second, in order to sustain bodhisattvas of undetermined nature lest they retreat from vigor. Here only the first intention is taken, hence saying 'in order to guide those of undetermined nature'. 'All attain [Buddhahood]' is the meaning of the One Vehicle. Since it did not state that those of fixed nature do not attain it, it is an intentional [teaching]. If one makes this statement, then the commentary's "Why do they themselves classify the Lotus Sūtra as the third period?" refutes it through objection. Their commentary on the Lotus Sūtra cites the sūtra stating: "We today have obtained what was never before had; not what we previously hoped for, yet now we have obtained it of ourselves"—this is the teaching of the third period. Furthermore, it concludes below: "In order to reveal the true teaching of the third period, this sūtra was spoken." Relying on these two passages, they classify the Lotus Sūtra as the third period; yet in terms of explaining the One Vehicle as an intentional teaching, the Lotus Sūtra ends up being the second period again. Within their own school's formulation, doctrine and statements contradict each other. The commentary's "Who would dare classify the Lotus Sūtra as non-definitive?" refutes their attempt to rescue [their position]. For fear that they might salvage it by saying: "Even if it is treated as non-definitive based on implicit intention, what fault is there?", it promptly objects: "Who would dare classify it as non-definitive?" Because classifying it as non-definitive is slandering the sūtra, and one must fear incurring painful retribution. Merely through not believing that all will become Buddhas, that itself is slandering the sūtra. Why must one disbelieve the written characters and rolls of the sūtra to slander it? It is simply due to not believing the words 'You all shall become Buddhas'.

8.13

Regarding the commentary's "The Miaozhi jing" and so forth: this cites both sūtra and treatise. As for the Miaozhi jing: in the aforementioned Western regions' teaching of the three periods, in the second period it explains the three vehicles, and in the third period it explains the One Vehicle; therefore it is said that the One Vehicle ranks after the three vehicles. Next, regarding "citing the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha on establishing the correct Dharma": at the end of the eighth fascicle, the treatise states: "The Buddha spoke the correct Dharma well-established." The explanatory commentary explains: "All Buddhas of the three times jointly preach this Dharma; the principle they preach is identical and does not contradict itself, hence it is named the correct Dharma. Furthermore, wishing to show that the speaker is superior, it says 'the Buddha spoke'. Because the principle spoken is superior and the fruit attained is superior, it is named the correct Dharma. The Tathāgata's establishing of the correct Dharma has three kinds: first, establishing the Hīnayāna; second, establishing the Mahāyāna; third, establishing the One Vehicle. Among these three, the third is the most superior, hence it is called well-established." Explanation: Since that treatise also states that the third is the most superior and ranks after the three vehicles, then the three [vehicles] are not definitive. Regarding the commentary's "Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha's Record of the Differences of the Nikāyas": this is simply an alternative name for the Samayabhedoparacanacakra. Regarding the commentary's "Therefore the sūtra says: 'When near death'", this cites the text of the second fascicle of the Lotus Sūtra, the "Belief and Understanding Chapter". The sūtra states: "After a short time had passed, the father knew his son's mind had gradually become relaxed and open, having accomplished a great aspiration and despising his former mentality. When near death, he summoned his son and assembled his relatives, the king, ministers, kṣatriyas, and householders all together, and declared of himself: 'Gentlemen, you should know that this is truly my son, and I am truly his father. Everything I now possess belongs to my son. What was previously deposited and withdrawn was all known to this son.'" This reconciles the father-and-son intent regarding those without the nature and those of fixed nature, clarifying that in the assembly of the Lotus Sūtra, all śrāvakas are the true sons of the Buddha. "When near death" is a metaphor for nearing the time of nirvāṇa. The end of the third fascicle of the sūtra also states: "If the Tathāgata knows of himself that the time of nirvāṇa has arrived," and so forth, clarifying that all refer to nearing the time of nirvāṇa.

8.14

The Commentary states: "If one does not believe..." and below, which again blocks their defense. Fearing they might defend themselves by arguing: "Although it is said that the Lotus [Sūtra] was expounded near [the Buddha's] demise, the term 'near demise' is broad and leaves room for subsequently preaching other sūtras." If they offer such a defense, setting aside the Lotus [Sūtra] for a moment, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] specifically states that on the fifteenth day of the second month, when [the Buddha] approached nirvāṇa, he proclaimed extinction at dawn and entered nirvāṇa at midnight. This was undeniably the very end, and is naturally worthy of trust. After this, no other sūtra could possibly have been expounded. Yet the Nirvāṇa Sūtra also expounds the single vehicle to overturn the three vehicles, and the single nature to overturn the five natures. Thus, the single vehicle and the single nature likewise stand at the very end. How could one claim they belong to the second period as provisional [teachings]?

8.15

The Commentary states: "If one considers Prajñā to be the second period..." and below, which again refutes the defense. Fearing they might defend themselves by arguing: "We take it in contrast to Prajñā as the second period, and therefore establish the Lotus [Sūtra] as the third period, because Prajñā only clarifies emptiness, whereas the Lotus [Sūtra] reveals the Middle Way." If they mount such a defense, even if we provisionally grant it might be so because it is stated according to a predominant single perspective, it still contradicts the three periods of the Saṃdhinirmocana[-sūtra]. According to the three periods of the Saṃdhinirmocana, the three vehicles are definitive, and it refutes the second period, claiming all [its teachings] are non-definitive. Hence, as the Lotus [Sūtra] now speaks of overturning the three by means of the one, how could it be equated with the teaching of the third period?

8.16

The Commentary states: "Thus it is known that the Saṃdhinirmocana..." and below; this is the second part, concluding that the former [position] is flawed. Attempting to use the three periods of the Saṃdhinirmocana to definitively judge all the Buddha's teachings is logically incomplete. As for "because it does not stand at the very end," judged temporally, it is not the ultimate and final proclamation. Just as in the world a later edict revokes a former edict, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] and the Lotus [Sūtra] stand at the very end, and thus are able to resolve and determine the remaining meanings. If so, does not disbelieving the Saṃdhinirmocana amount to slandering the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra? Hence the text below explains: The Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken specifically for a particular class of capacities, so it is not without principle. Although the other sūtras are not the ultimate end, each accords with a specific class, and none contradicts the others. As for "the meaning is as explained before," this refers to the final reconciliation explained previously in the section on the Western Regions.

8.17

The Commentary states: "If one maintains that Buddha-nature is twofold..." and below; this is the seventh part, blocking the defense of having no nature. Within this, there are two parts: first, citing their defense, and second, discerning its validity. As for the first: That commentary on the Lotus [Sūtra] says: "However, nature is of two kinds: first, the nature of principle, which is the tathāgatagarbha expounded in the Śrīmālā[devī-sūtra]; second, the nature of practice, which is the tathāgatagarbha expounded in the Laṅkā[vatāra-sūtra]. All possess the former nature, whereas some may lack the latter nature." Therefore, the text now concedes: "These words are acceptable." The phrase "Hence the Nirvāṇa says..." and below cites the sūtra as proof.

8.18

The Commentary states: "However, the Nirvāṇa relies on the nature of principle..." and below; this is the second part, discerning its validity. The Nirvāṇa explains that having a mind leads to buddhahood; having a mind does not necessarily mean having practice. Since all attain buddhahood, it is clearly explained with respect to the nature of principle. Why, then, speak of entering quiescence? Those who enter quiescence definitely do not attain buddhahood, while those with a mind definitely will attain buddhahood—how could [these two views] complement each other?

8.19

The Commentary states: "From this it is known..." and below, which concludes and demonstrates the correct meaning. It means that an icchantika truly does not attain buddhahood. When it is currently said that an icchantika attains buddhahood, it is because they can attain buddhahood only after generating the [bodhi-]mind; they are termed icchantika only prior to generating that great aspiration. Thus it says: "because one who attains buddhahood is not an icchantika." This is just as a female body cannot attain buddhahood; yet when it is said that the dragon girl attains buddhahood, at the very moment she attains buddhahood she suddenly transforms into a man. How could it be that a female body attains buddhahood? An icchantika attaining buddhahood is also like this. This is spoken with respect to attaining buddhahood. If spoken with respect to Buddha-nature, the principle fundamentally exists. The Commentary says, "It was rather an expedient extolling or depreciating at that time": stating that icchantikas lack it means that extolling causes them to generate the mind, while depreciating causes them not to commit evil. If it is said that icchantikas possess Buddha-nature, it reveals and extols the nature of principle, causing them not to deceive themselves. If they have already become an icchantika, it causes them to quickly turn their minds around. If they quickly generate the mind, there is no difference in their attaining buddhahood. Therefore, asserting existence does not necessarily mean totally possessing both the natures of fruition and practice; asserting nonexistence does not necessarily mean totally lacking the principle, and so forth. Hence Master [Dao]sheng said: "Extolling [or depreciating] according to the time was a marvelous way to entice living beings; how could one cling strictly to the literal text?" When the Tripiṭaka Master Faxian translated the six-fascicle Nirvāṇa Sūtra, it stated: "Except for the icchantika, all possess Buddha-nature." Master Daosheng said: "Those endowed with the two modes of being are all the correct cause of nirvāṇa. The icchantika is among the sentient beings; how could they alone lack Buddha-nature? It is simply that this scripture has arrived incomplete." Because he proclaimed this view, he was banished to Mount Wuqiu. Later, when the Great Sūtra arrived, from the chapter on "Noble Practices" onward it indeed stated: "Although an icchantika has severed good roots, they still possess Buddha-nature." Thereupon, the worthy masters took light boats to welcome him and invited him to proclaim this sūtra. Whenever they came to the passage stating that the icchantika possesses Buddha-nature, the venerable masters could not help but clutch their wrists in remorse. Why, then, does the notion of lacking [Buddha-nature] still persist today?

8.20

The Commentary states: "If one maintains that entering extinction in the Lotus..." and below; this is the eighth part, blocking the defense regarding entering quiescence. Within this, it first cites their defense. It means that they defend themselves by saying: The third fascicle of the Lotus [Sūtra] above states, "In other lands I become a Buddha under different names. Although this person gives rise to the thought of extinction and enters nirvāṇa, yet in that land they seek the Buddha's wisdom, and upon hearing this sūtra they enter the Buddha's wisdom"—[they claim] this refers to magically transformed śrāvakas, not fixed-nature śrāvakas who enter extinction.

8.21

The Commentary states: "The provisional must transform the real..." and below; this is the second part, the direct refutation. Within this there are again two parts: first, a general deprivation, stating the fault that transformation would be useless. If there were fixed-nature śrāvakas, a bodhisattva might transform into a śrāvaka to entice them to turn their minds around; then transformation would be beneficial. Now, in your tradition, those of fixed nature definitely never turn their minds around; what purpose would be served by transforming into a fixed-nature one to accept the single vehicle? Thus, there being no capacity to be transformed, the transformer becomes entirely useless.

8.22

The Commentary states: "Moreover, would it not mislead..." and below; granting that there is transformation, the transformation on the contrary causes harm. The phrase "would it not mislead a class of timid and weak [practitioners]" means that a class of people detests the suffering of birth and death, and hearing that the Buddha path is long and distant, fear arises in their minds, and they always wish to take temporary refuge in the realm of quiescent extinction. If they knew that once extinguished they would remain forever submerged, they would not dare to enter quiescence. Now, seeing transformed beings arise from extinction, these timid people would believe that real enterers of extinction can arise; thus they enter extinction, hoping to arise later. In your tradition, once extinguished they definitely never arise, which ends up misleading them into eternal submersion; hence it is stated as such.

8.23

The Commentary states: "From this it is known that entering quiescence..." and below; this is the third part, establishing the correct doctrine. Prior to the Lotus [Sūtra], there were two intentions behind speaking of entering quiescence. First, for the sake of those who delight in extinction, it provisionally accorded with their minds. It addresses their thought: "There is no greater calamity than possessing a body, hence one extinguishes the body to return to nothingness. There is no greater toil than possessing knowledge, hence one cuts off knowledge to sink into emptiness." Thus, knowledge is exhausted by the form, and the form is worn out by knowledge; wandering the long path of saṃsāra, exhausted without return, it is better to attain quiescent extinction where all afflictions permanently vanish. Therefore, according with their capacity, [the Buddha] taught that there is eternal quiescence. Second, for the sake of terrifying the indeterminate Hīnayāna and timid bodhisattvas who are weary of broad benefiting and wish to rest their minds, making them hear that a śrāvaka who enters eternal quiescence sinks into nirvāṇa never to arise again causes them to produce dread and fear towards adopting the Small Vehicle, thereby spurring their minds to return to the practice of the Great Path. Because of these two benefits, it was provisionally stated to exist. Failing to comprehend this adaptability to circumstance and clinging to it as ultimate, the assembly of the Lotus [Sūtra] broadly overturned past errors, granting predictions to śrāvakas of all three capacities, and proclaiming it even for those not present in this assembly. If one is truly a śrāvaka, one will certainly believe the teaching of the single vehicle; if one does not believe, one is a person of overweening pride. In the first cycle it still says, "Except after the Buddha's passing, when no Buddha is present." Because after the Buddha's passing it is difficult to find someone who understands the meaning of the single vehicle, non-belief is allowed. When it comes to the third cycle, it explicitly states: "In other lands they definitely receive transformation." With clear passages such as these, why cling to a biased view? Hence it is said that these were all intentions prior to the Lotus [Sūtra].

8.24

The Commentary states: "Moreover, the Śrīmālā-sūtra says..." and below; this is the ninth part, reconciling the statement that the single vehicle is an expedient. The meaning is: If expounding according to inclinations were not an expedient but the truth, then there would definitely be three vehicles. Since expounding according to inclinations is an expedient teaching and not the ultimate truth, it clearly indicates there is only the single vehicle; hence it says "which is the single vehicle." Thus, "speaking expediently according to what they desire" forms one phrase. This is the single vehicle; therefore, below it says "which is the single vehicle, there are no two vehicles." This meaning directly demonstrates the purport of the single vehicle. The various masters misread it, reading it as "and speaking expediently is itself the single vehicle," and thus considered the single vehicle itself to be an expedient; this is definitively mistaken. If we speak of the great expedient of the single vehicle in its name, this is the skillful expedient of converting and gathering sentient beings to ferry them across, not an expedient posited provisionally against the ultimate truth. Hence Master Daosheng said: "Principle is fundamentally without words; relying on words to express it is itself an expedient." The Commentary says "Moreover, in that sūtra," further citing other passages from the Śrīmālā to prove that the single vehicle is the ultimate truth, as is easily known. As for the Commentary stating "Even if there were words of expedience," this again provisionally refutes it: Not to mention that the Śrīmālā contains no statement that the single vehicle is an expedient, even if we were to grant that it contained words saying the single vehicle is an expedient, it would also be an expedient statement prior to the Lotus [Sūtra]. Once reaching the Lotus [Sūtra], it again overturns the three to return to the one. How much less so when the sūtra has no such words—why insist on obstinately clinging to it?

8.25

Regarding the commentary's passage beginning with "The Lotus Sūtra says that this sūtra is difficult to believe and difficult to understand," this is the tenth part, concluding the refutation and establishment. The meaning is: because for more than forty years the triyāna had always been taught, and only upon arriving at the Lotus Sūtra was the ekayāna exclusively taught, it was therefore difficult to believe and understand. This is the text of the "Dharmabhāṇaka" chapter. The text says: "The Buddha addressed Bhaiṣajyarāja: 'The scriptural texts I have spoken are immeasurable thousands of myriads of koṭis; [some] already spoken, [some] now being spoken, and [some] yet to be spoken. Yet among these, this Lotus Sūtra is the most difficult to believe and the most difficult to understand. Bhaiṣajyarāja, this sūtra is the secret and essential treasury of the Buddhas, which must not be distributed or recklessly conferred upon people. It is that which has been guarded by the Buddhas, the World-Honoured Ones; from the past up to the present, it has never been openly expounded. Yet regarding this sūtra, even while the Tathāgata is present in the world, there are still many instances of hostility and jealousy; how much more so after his extinction!'" The commentary here cites this in brief. What has "already spoken" refers to [the texts] prior to the Lotus Sūtra, namely the Prajñāpāramitā and others. What is "now being spoken" refers to the Amitārtha-sūtra. What is "yet to be spoken" refers to the Nirvāṇa[-sūtra] and others. The reason one only then knows that the various sūtras do not match the Lotus Sūtra in being difficult to believe and understand is that the Lotus Sūtra marks the beginning of converging the three and the initial reversion to the one; hence those who believe and understand it are few. Though past sūtras were sublime, they still carried the triyāna, and never explicitly declared that there is only the one real [vehicle]. In the Nirvāṇa, although the single culmination is clarified, the Lotus Sūtra had already refuted the triyāna beforehand; so teaching the single culmination later makes it easy to accept with faith. The Lotus Sūtra is like the vanguard, and the Nirvāṇa is like the main army; once the vanguard has crushed the enemy, the rear army does not expend much effort. Furthermore, in refuting the three and revealing the one, the Lotus Sūtra is like the harvest, and the Nirvāṇa is like gleaning the ears of grain. Thus, the thirty-sixth [fascicle of the] Nirvāṇa says: "Formerly, when preaching the Lotus Sūtra on Gṛdhrakūṭa, eight thousand śrāvakas received predictions, like an autumn harvest and winter storage with nothing further to be done." This is precisely its meaning. If we go by the meaning of "difficult to believe," even if we include the Avataṃsaka under what had already been spoken, in comparison to the Lotus Sūtra it is still easy to believe. Upon first attaining right awakening, [the Buddha] immediately taught the single culmination, received by those of superior capacities without confronting the provisional teachings of the past; hence, compared to the Lotus Sūtra, it is truly easy to believe. As for the commentary saying "True indeed are these words," this confirms and settles the preceding sūtra text. From "If one faithfully clings" onward, it concludes the refutation and establishment. The triyāna and five natures constitute what is refuted; the ekayāna and one nature constitute what is established. Regarding the commentary's passage beginning with "The Sūtra of One Hundred Parables," it further cites another sūtra to corroborate and establish the single meaning. The second fascicle of that sūtra states: "Formerly, there was a settlement five yojanas away from the royal city. In the village there was delicious, fine water. The king commanded the villagers to constantly send this fine water every single day. The villagers, wearied and suffering, all wished to move far away and abandon this village. At that time, the village headman said to the people: 'Do not leave! I shall speak to the king on your behalf, so that he changes the five yojanas into three yojanas, making it closer for you so that you will not be weary travelling back and forth.' He then went to petition the king, and the king changed it to three yojanas for them. When the people heard this, they were greatly rejoiced. Someone said to them: 'These three yojanas now are no different at all from the measure of the original five yojanas.' Even though they heard this, because they believed the king's words, they refused to abandon it to the very end. Worldly beings are also like this: cultivating the right Dharma, they cross over the five destinies toward the city of nirvāṇa; but when fatigue arises in their minds, they wish to abandon it, pausing their carriage in saṃsāra, unable to advance further. The Tathāgata, the Dharma King, possessing great upāya, discriminately spoke of three within the one vehicle Dharma. Hearing this, people of the lesser vehicle rejoiced, thinking it easy to practice, and cultivated goodness and advanced in virtue, seeking to cross over saṃsāra. Later, hearing people say that there is no triyāna, but only a single path, because they believe the Buddha's words, they refuse to abandon [their practice] to the very end. One should know that those people are also like this." This sūtra is an excellent judgment from the golden mouth [of the Buddha]; provisional and real are patent, which ought to lay to rest all disputes.

First 25 of 38 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese