大般涅槃經集解 18
English (machine translation) 18
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18.1
Explaining the meaning of the Four Truths; explaining the meaning of the Four Inversions; briefly explaining the meaning of buddhadhātu; the parable of the poor woman's treasure of gold; the parable of the woman's sick son; Kāśyapa raising eleven objections demanding to show its existence; the parable of the wrestler's forehead gem.
18.2
Chapter 10: The Four Truths
18.3
Sengliang notes: This answers "Why do all the tamers rejoice in mind to teach the true truths?" Above, Māra's teachings were described as heterodox; now it is made clear that the Buddha is the tamer. Formerly, he taught that what is not suffering is suffering in order to cure the delusion of bliss. Once the delusion of bliss was cured, the Buddha rejoiced and taught that the Buddha is bliss, and the Buddha's bliss is the true truth. Sengzong says: From here up to the difficulty of seeing the nature, it extensively explains the meaning of the cause. The Four Truths are the cognitive sphere illuminated by wisdom. From the Deer Park to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, there are great differences in the stages taught; only this teaching is complete and round. To illuminate the wondrous cause of permanence, one must rely on the contemplative illumination of the Middle Way; yet without a cognitive sphere there is no way to discern wisdom, which is why the Four Truths are adduced to clarify the characteristics of the cause. Baoliang says: Formerly, when the Four Truths were taught, they pointed to the three realms; today's teaching has no principle that it does not encompass. Although the words speak of four, the essential lies in the cessation of tathatā. Today's teaching is based on the fundamental and leaves behind the branches; this purport is now revealed for the first time, matching the holy mind, and is therefore called "joyful". However, the single chapter on "The Four Truths" clarifies the principle exhaustively, which is why it says that by believing in permanence, one directly transcends birth-and-death from within the human and heavenly realms. Thus, one must first believe in permanence, and only then recognise impermanence. If one does not understand both, how could one enter the Path? Therefore, in the truth of cessation below, it says: "One who cultivates the cessation of suffering opposes the non-Buddhists." If nowadays one were indeed to cultivate the emptiness of annihilation, and if one were to awaken to the principle through suffering, then non-Buddhists should also possess correct knowledge, which is logically impossible. Formerly, this was taught merely to guide ordinary people. If there were no expedient teachings, the lowest fools would abandon all hope.
18.4
The Buddha further said to Kāśyapa: "What is called suffering [...] hell beings would possess the noble truths."
18.5
Sengliang notes: Not seeing true bliss is not called seeing suffering. Why is that? Although the mind seeks bliss, it does not recognise true bliss; taking the three realms to be bliss, it does not see suffering, and one cannot determine this by animals. Jingyi's notes record Sengzong as saying: Within each truth there are four distinctions: first, clarifying delusion; second, clarifying understanding; third, concluding the noble truth; fourth, concluding what is not the truth. To clarify the round illumination of the Middle Way, it first clarifies non-understanding, explaining the meaning by contrasting them. The first layer clarifies that the name of 'truth' lies in illumination, not in suffering. The second clarifies that although the name of 'truth' lies in illumination, it does not lie in biased attachment. Clarifying that suffering has its proper place: if it does not attain its proper place, not only is the principle lost, but one also sinks further into suffering. The wisdom with remainder of the former teaching could not avoid inversion; today's teaching exhausts the principle, which is why it is truly wholesome karma. Baoliang says: Within each truth there are four layers of attaining the name of 'truth'; essentially, because understanding requires an uncomprehended cognitive sphere, the truth is explained in terms of the cognitive sphere. The four in the truth of suffering are: first, from the beginning up to 'much distress', clarifying the loss; second, from 'if there is anyone who can know' up to 'is immediately born in heaven', clarifying the gain; third, from 'at the time of later liberation' up to 'only then does one realise and know', this confirms the gain; fourth, from 'because of not knowing in the beginning' up to 'only now does one attain true wisdom', this confirms the loss. Zhixiu says: Under each and every truth there are three meanings. The three meanings in the truth of suffering are: up to 'endures much distress', the first adduces their ignorance to reveal the essential characteristics of the truth of suffering. From 'if there is anyone who can know' up to 'only now does one attain true wisdom', the second discerns attaining the fruit from the principle. From 'if known in this way' up to 'is not the noble truth of suffering', the third concludes the heterodox and orthodox. Huilang relates Sengzong's words: There are six stages in discerning the truth of suffering. This first directly levels the principle, stating that suffering that is not correct is not the noble truth of suffering.
18.6
"Good son! If there is further a person who does not know that the Tathāgata [...] increases all fetters and endures much distress."
18.7
Sengzong notes: The second stage clarifies the loss.
18.8
"If there is anyone who can know that the Tathāgata is permanent [...] if it but passes through the ear once, they are immediately born in heaven."
18.9
Sengzong notes: The third stage clarifies the gain.
18.10
"At the time of later liberation, they can then realise and know [...] now having attained liberation, only then do they realise and know."
18.11
Sengzong notes: The fourth confirms the gain.
18.12
"Because in the beginning I did not know, [...] only starting from today do I attain true wisdom."
18.13
Sengzong notes: The fifth confirms the loss.
18.14
"If one knows in this way, it is truly cultivating [the truth of] suffering [...] this is called suffering, not the noble truth of suffering."
18.15
Sengzong notes: The sixth concludes both gain and loss.
18.16
"The noble truth of the origin of suffering: regarding true phenomena, [...] they cannot be born in heaven or attain correct liberation."
18.17
Sengliang notes: True phenomena are origin; not generating true wisdom means not generating the wisdom of origin. Receiving impure articles can assemble birth-and-death; this is true origin, yet they do not generate the wisdom of origin. Not knowing dharmatā means not seeing buddhadhātu. Jingyi's notes record Sengzong as saying: Here origin is discerned. The sentences appear twice, distinguishing where origin arises, because they do not recognise permanence. Huilang's notes record Sengzong as saying: In discerning origin, cessation, and path, there are five stages in each. This first clarifies the loss, adducing transmigrating through birth-and-death as the fault.
18.18
"If there is one with profound wisdom who does not corrupt the true Dharma,"
18.19
Sengzong notes: The second stage clarifies the gain.
18.20
"Through these causes and conditions, they attain rebirth in heaven and correct liberation."
18.21
Sengzong notes: The third stage confirms the gain.
18.22
"If there is anyone who does not know the locus of the noble truth of the origin of suffering [...] transmigrating in birth-and-death, they endure various distresses."
18.23
Sengzong notes: The fourth confirms the loss.
18.24
"If one can know that phenomena are permanent and unchanging, [...] this is called origin, not the noble truth of origin."
18.25
Sengzong notes: The fifth concludes both gain and loss.
18.26
"The noble truth of the cessation of suffering: if one extensively cultivates [...] also cultivate the teaching of emptiness, they should possess the truth of cessation."
18.27
Sengliang notes: By first rejecting what was taught formerly, one naturally knows that what is taught today is correct. Formerly, cessation was of two kinds: first, cessation of nature, meaning emptiness and non-self; second, the cessation of body and wisdom. Yet the Tathāgata is neither empty nor non-self, and body and wisdom are not extinguished; to conceive of cessation destroys the Tathāgata. Jingyi relates Sengzong's words: Birth-and-death is empty, but the Buddha-fruit is not empty. If one says that both are empty, this is an error regarding the fruit, which is why it says 'extensively'. Opposing non-Buddhists who cultivate emptiness covers all phenomena; now, distinguishing the characteristics of emptiness directly reverses heterodoxy, which is why it says 'opposes'. Huilang relates Sengzong's words: There are also five stages; this first stage adduces delusion to clarify the loss.
18.28
"If someone says that the tathāgatagarbha exists [...] extinguishing all afflictions, only then does one enter it."
18.29
Sengzong notes: The second clarifies the gain.
18.30
"If one generates this single thought as a cause and condition, one attains mastery among all phenomena."
18.31
Sengzong notes: The third confirms the gain.
18.32
"If one cultivates the Tathāgata's secret treasury [...] transmigrating in birth-and-death, they endure suffering."
18.33
Sengzong notes: The fourth confirms the loss.
18.34
"If anyone cultivates in this way, [...] this is called cultivating emptiness, not the noble truth of cessation."
18.35
Huilang notes: The fifth concludes both gain and loss.
18.36
"The noble truth of the path: that is, the jewels of Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, and correct liberation."
18.37
Sengzong notes: Here there are eight stages; this first presents the cognitive sphere of the path.
18.38
"There are sentient beings who, with inverted minds, say [...] transmigrating through the three realms of existence, they endure great suffering for a long time."
18.39
Sengzong notes: The second clarifies the loss.
18.40
"If one can generate the mind to see the Tathāgata as permanent and unchanging, the Dharma, Saṅgha, and liberation are also likewise."
18.41
Sengzong notes: The third clarifies the gain.
18.42
"Mounting this single thought, throughout immeasurable lifetimes one attains sovereign retributions as one wishes."
18.43
Sengzong notes: The fourth confirms the gain.
18.44
"Why? Because in the past, through the four inversions, [...] attaining the Buddha's correct awakening—this is called the noble truth of the path."
18.45
Sengzong notes: The fifth confirms the loss.
18.46
"If someone says that the Three Jewels are impermanent, [...] truly sees and cultivates the teaching of the Four Noble Truths."
18.47
Sengzong notes: The sixth concludes both gain and loss.
18.48
"These are called the four noble truths."
18.49
Sengzong says: "Seventh, this summarizes and concludes."
18.50
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa again said to the Buddha, [...] "cultivating and practicing the profound Dharma of the four noble truths."
18.51
Sengzong says: "Eighth, this expresses his understanding."
18.52
"Chapter Eleven: The Four Inversions"
18.53
Sengliang says: "This answers the question on 'fully perfecting correct goodness' by extensively explaining the inversions. Desiring to make the four truths fully complete, he further explains the four inversions; hence, this is propagation." Sengzong says: "Above, the object was adduced to clarify wisdom; here, delusion is clarified to reveal understanding. To extensively reveal the characteristics of understanding, he first lists the characteristics of delusion; when clarified through the doctrine, it is thereby made evident. It is also like the passage on the three cultivations above: about to explain superior cultivation, he first listed the eight inversions." Baoliang says: "This answers the ninth question, next clarifying false principles." Zhixiu says: "Above, he discriminated the four truths to lead beings to produce understanding. However, true understanding is difficult to produce, and beings tend to form perverse attachments; when they attach, it forms an inversion."
18.54
The Buddha further said to Kāśyapa: "What are called the four inversions [...] that it is impermanent is called the suffering of great transgression."
18.55
Sengliang says: "He first speaks of the nature of the inversion. It should also be explained by way of contrast, but the sūtra text is brief." Sengzong says: "From here down, he first clarifies the inversion of conceiving bliss within suffering; it has not yet distinguished conceiving suffering within non-suffering. Now he reveals the conditions of the inversion: those who hold this calculation suppose they will certainly attain the principle, and consequently within saṃsāra falsely reckon the conception of bliss." Baoliang says: "Discriminating the first inversion comprises three turns: first, clarifying the latter inversion; next, clarifying the former inversion; third, adducing the latter inversion to conclude the clause. Regarding the first, clarifying the inversion regarding the Buddha, there are four points: first, opening the heading; second, explaining the heading; third, saying that the Tathāgata is the suffering of conditioning; fourth, saying that the Buddha is the suffering of destruction. If one calculates like this, this is a person of the suffering of great transgression." Zhixiu says: "Discriminating the first inversion comprises three turns. The first ends at 'yet produces the conception of suffering; this is called an inversion.' About to reveal that there is delusion about bliss on top of suffering, he therefore discriminates the nature of suffering. There are two points: first, clarifying its inverted characteristics in terms of the principle; later, the compiler of the sūtra concludes its inverted conception. This is the first. If one gives rise to the conception of suffering regarding bliss, one will certainly obtain a suffering result, yet one claims 'I then experience bliss'; this is giving rise to the delusion of bliss regarding suffering."
18.56
"If one says that the Tathāgata has discarded this body of suffering [...] this is called producing the conception of suffering where there is no suffering."
18.57
Sengliang says: "Suffering is of two kinds: the suffering of conditioning and the suffering of destruction. The earlier mention of impermanence and alteration was the suffering of conditioning. Now saying 'discarding this body of suffering' refers to the suffering of destruction. Both inversions are listed together."
18.58
"This is called an inversion."
18.59
Zhixiu says: "The second point: the compiler of the sūtra concludes the name of the inversion."
18.60
"If I say that the Tathāgata is permanent [...] if one speaks like this, I then experience bliss."
18.61
Sengliang says: "This explains the motive for producing the inversion. 'That is the view of self': if one says that the Buddha is without birth and cessation, that is sovereignty, and sovereignty is the self. The view of self is the root of all fetters; for this reason, one does not say the Buddha is permanent." Baoliang says: "From here down is the second, clarifying the former inversion. The deluded person thinks to himself: 'If I say that the Buddha is permanent, that is calculating a self, and in the past I incurred immeasurable transgression from this calculation; now if I say that the Buddha is impermanent, I will then be free from the view of self, and therefore experience bliss.'" Zhixiu says: "This properly discriminates giving rise to the view of bliss regarding suffering. There are two points; this is the first, presenting the motive for giving rise to the inversion."
18.62
"The Tathāgata's impermanence is precisely suffering [...] because of producing the conception of bliss, it is called an inversion."
18.63
Zhixiu says: "The second point: the compiler of the sūtra concludes that it constitutes an inversion."
18.64
"Conceiving suffering in bliss is called an inversion [...] is called an inversion; this is called the first inversion."
18.65
Sengliang says: "The deluded person thinks that what is permanent does not perish, and what perishes is not permanent; this explains why it is the suffering of conditioning. As for 'how could he discard the body?': if it were bliss, he should not discard it, yet he discards it, so we know it is suffering; this explains why it is the suffering of destruction." Baoliang says: "From here down is the third, returning to adducing the latter inversion to conclude the earlier clause." Zhixiu says: "This properly clarifies that giving rise to the view of suffering regarding bliss is an inversion. There are three points: first, discriminating that it is an inversion according to principle; second, the compiler of the sūtra concludes that it constitutes an inversion; third, presenting the intention of that view."
18.66
"Conceiving permanence in the impermanent and conceiving impermanence in the permanent [...] this is called the second inversion."
18.67
Sengliang says: "The nature of emptiness is permanent; because one sees the permanent, it is permanent; one who does not see the permanent is impermanent." Sengzong says: "It should be said that forming the conception of impermanence regarding the permanent is called not cultivating emptiness. Saṃsāra is empty; the fruit of buddhahood is not empty. If one says that the fruit of buddhahood is empty, one loses the correct bounds and goes against the path of cultivating emptiness. As for 'lifespan is short and fleeting': since what is held to is contrary [to truth], one does not attain wondrous permanence; how could it not be short and fleeting?"
18.68
"Conceiving a self in the non-self and conceiving non-self in the self [...] this is called the third inversion."
18.69
Sengliang says: "As for 'without buddhadhātu': buddhadhātu is without delusion, so it is sovereign and uninterrupted; because of delusion, one is not sovereign." Baoliang says: "There are two stages. From the beginning up to 'this is called an inversion', he first clarifies the former inversion. Next, from 'the Buddha-Dharma has a self' downward, he next clarifies the latter inversion. As for 'although speaking of having a self, there is no buddhadhātu': one merely calculates a spiritual self as the self, but does not speak of the self of buddhadhātu."
18.70
"Conceiving the impure in the pure and conceiving the pure in the impure [...] we are all called persons of wrong views."
18.71
Sengliang says: "There are two stages. From the beginning up to 'is destroyed; this is called an inversion', he first clarifies the latter inversion. Next, from 'conceiving the pure in the impure' up to 'the fourth inversion', he clarifies the former inversion. From 'Kāśyapa said to the Buddha' to the end of the chapter: the explanation of the four inversions being completed, Kāśyapa expresses his understanding."
18.72
"Chapter Twelve: The Nature of the Tathāgata"
18.73
Sengliang says: "This answers 'How does one perform good karma? May the Great Sage now explain,' in order to expand upon the causes of the two fruits: long life and the vajra [body]. Above, he briefly clarified the causes, taking compassion and protecting the Dharma as the fundamental; now, he extensively clarifies the causes, thus proceeding from the three refuges up to the tenth stage." Fayao says: "From here up to 'if I were to abide, I would not be free from suffering', this answers 'how does one perform good karma?' Ever since the four reliances above, the general meaning clarified that for a practitioner, cultivating good and protecting the Dharma is good karma; here he clarifies that from which good karma arises, namely the buddhadhātu. Buddhadhātu is the principle from which goodness is generated; if that principle were absent, whence could goodness arise? This means that buddhadhātu is the root of performing good karma. Buddhadhātu is the direct cause (pradhāna-hetu), while good karma is the contributory cause (pratyaya-hetu)." Sengzong says: "What was clarified in the previous chapter was that understanding is the truth and delusion is the inversion. But understanding has subtle and manifest levels: the subtle enables rebirth in heaven, while the manifest is called correct liberation. Now, clarifying good karma broadens its beginning, while the difficulty of seeing the nature broadens its end. Why is it said to broaden the beginning of understanding? The marvel among cognitive objects does not exceed the buddhadhātu; by explaining this true object, beings give rise to the lower-grade wisdom produced by hearing. Although this is a subtle understanding, it is not without reliance on this that one produces superior practice and ultimately is able to see the nature; therefore, these are all termed the meaning of good karma." Baoliang says: "Buddhadhātu is of four kinds: the direct cause, the contributory cause, the fruit, and the fruit of the fruit. All intentions are completely encompassed by these four names. Both the contributory and direct causes are paths of conscious reflection. Averting suffering and seeking peace are the same for the foolish and the wise alike, but according to their essential functions, the meaning is divided into two. Taking the understanding that is constant from beginning to end and without functions of rising or declining, it is designated as the direct cause. There is not a single instant in which this functional understanding is absent; only upon reaching buddhahood is it unshakeable. Therefore, we know that this functional understanding of averting suffering and seeking bliss is not something induced by good or evil causes. This is what the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra calls the 'innately pure mind', and the 'Lion's Roar Chapter' calls 'the middle way of one single kind'. And does not this function, which does not go against the great principle, constitute the direct [cause]? As for the contributory cause, it takes the myriad goods as its essence: from a single thought of good upward, all foster the production of the superior fruit. Because it is aroused in reliance on conditions, it is called the contributory cause. However, this understanding is in conscious reflection yet not constant; it is newly produced yet not unceasing, so it differs from the direct cause. Without the aid of these conditions, the nature would be kept without altering; therefore, the two causes must mutually require and encompass each other. When the function of the contributory cause is sufficient and the meaning of the direct cause is also full, both functions being complete, saṃsāra is exhausted. The mind subsequent to the vajra[-like concentration] is termed all-knowledge; transforming the cause into the name of fruit, it is called the fruit nature. As for the fruit of the fruit, it is a designation in contrast to saṃsāra. Establishing a further overarching name on top of the multitude of virtues, it is called mahānirvāṇa; establishing a fruit on top of the fruit, it is called the fruit of the fruit. There is no different time; there is only a sequence in meaning. If we discuss the nature as the cognitive object, its principle pervades, but since it is equally a contributory aid, it is not distinguished separately. Below, the Buddha himself determines them as four names: the single cause, the single fruit, the double cause, and the double fruit. This chapter is divided into four sections: first, there are five parables, first determining the nature of cause and fruit; second, discriminating the three refuges of one essence, encouraging students to produce faith; third, clarifying the three kinds of middle way, directly addressing the practice of performing good karma; fourth, from 'the difficulty of seeing the nature' downward, it further answers the eleventh question, clarifying that unless one exhaustively illumines the principle of the fruit, there is no way to thoroughly see the cause." Zhixiu says: "This chapter has three sections: first, revealing the meaning of being able to perform good karma; second, clarifying the three refuges; third, clarifying the practice of wisdom with reference to the three kinds of middle way."
18.74
Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One, is there a self in the twenty-five states of existence, or not?"
18.75
Daosheng says: "Earlier it was said that the self in the Buddha-Dharma is precisely the buddhadhātu; if so, the twenty-five states of existence should have a true self. Yet as it is never seen, it still seems as if there is no self. Because the doctrine and principle have not yet been made manifest, he therefore asks this question." Sengliang says: "Being about to reveal that the true refuge is to take refuge in the Three Jewels within one's future body, he therefore first settles whether it exists or not." Fayao says: "If one examines oneself and recognizes that within one's body are the permanently abiding Three Jewels, then since the principle has no diverse destinations, one can diligently perform all goods. Therefore, he first discriminates that there is a true self and buddhadhātu, and then extensively clarifies that the substance of the Three Jewels is within the body; one should solely take refuge in this and practice good karma." Sengzong says: "Earlier it was said that saṃsāra is without a self, and calculating that there is a self is called an inversion. Now he asks whether it definitely exists or definitely does not exist: his meaning is that if it definitely does not exist, then there is no buddhadhātu; if it exists, it should not be called an inversion." Zhixiu says: "If within saṃsāra there were eternally no self, then sentient transformation would be severed at once; how then could one perform good karma?"
18.76
The Buddha said: "Good son, the self is precisely the meaning of the tathāgatagarbha; all sentient beings possess it."
18.77
Sengliang states: Now, the tathāgatagarbha, the self, and the buddhadhātu are one in substance but different in meaning. Possessing the eight kinds of mastery is the meaning of 'self'; riding the path of true suchness is termed 'Tathāgata'; and because it does not alter, it is called 'buddhadhātu'. As for 'all possess it', permanence, bliss, self, and purity are the buddhadhātu. Originally rooted in practice, through having the mind to seek and attain it, cause and effect are unbroken. As they mutally possess each other, the cause also has the fruit and the fruit also has the cause; therefore it is said that 'all sentient beings possess it'. Sengzong states: The answer to the question consists of four sections. First, relying on five parables, it distinguishes the existence and non-existence of the nature. Second, it encourages faith, explaining that confusion leads to falling into suffering, while understanding nourishes the spirit; because the principle is profound and difficult to accept, how could one not deeply generate reverence and faith? Although one generates reverence and faith, if one's reliance of mind loses its proper object, faith is of no benefit. Therefore, it encourages practitioners only to take refuge in the Three Jewels of their own bodies, without need to casually abandon their own bodies and take refuge in other Buddhas far away. If one can understand in this way, one's central宗旨 will have a foundation, and the settling of the mind will find its proper place. Although fixing the mind has its foundation, the myriad practices are fundamentally required. The essential of advancing toward permanence lies in the Middle Way; therefore, following the three refuges, it explains the Middle Way to encourage practice—this is the meaning of good karma. Baoliang states: To the question of how good karma is performed, answering with the direct cause is intended to explain that one who performs good karma must first recognize cause and effect. If the guiding direction is not established, good karma cannot be founded; hence it first distinguishes the direct cause. The five parables that follow in succession directly transmit and illuminate this principle. Zhixiu states: 'All possess it' means that all possess the nature that is destined to become the fruit of Buddhahood. By this meaning, it can cause sentient beings' birth and death to continue without interruption, enabling them to create good karma. Tanxian states: The reply to the question has two senses: first, stating that it exists; second, stating that although it exists, it is not seen. Mingjun notes: The reply has two points. First, it determines that it exists. Second, since it is said to exist, why it is not seen has two reasons: first, it explains that there is only the cause for not seeing, but no condition for seeing. Why? Because it is covered by defilements, there is naturally no cause for seeing. Since there are defiling dharmas that obstruct it, the Buddha could not expound it for them; therefore, although they do not see it themselves, this does not impair its existence. Yet expounding it without the proper recipient would inevitably result in inversion. Below, through the five parables, this purport is comprehensively elaborated.
18.78
"The buddhadhātu is the meaning of the self."
18.79
Daosheng states: The seed-character is the nature of spontaneity. The buddhadhātu must be born in the Buddhas. Earlier it was said that the self is the Buddha's storehouse; now it says that the buddhadhātu is the self—these are merely reciprocal expressions.
18.80
"This meaning of self, from the beginning […] Therefore sentient beings are unable to see it."
18.81
Daosheng states: It both screens the principle of attaining Buddhahood and obstructs the clarity that sees its realization. Sengliang: This explains the meaning of 'storehouse' (garbha). Sengzong states: This principle has never ceased to exist even for a moment; it is simply distinguished by concealment and manifestation. Why? Understanding and delusion are merely two distinct paths. If one goes against principle and gives rise to delusion, birth and death are tumultuous; if one accords with principle and gives rise to understanding, nirvāṇa is serene and tranquil. Precisely because it is covered by defilements, it is concealed and not apparent; hence in meaning it is called a 'storehouse'. Since the principle is not newly fashioned, it cannot be said to be non-existent; yet before there is the function of seeing it, it cannot be said to be existent. The teaching of the Middle Way is therefore without fault; if one grasps it as already possessed [in manifestation], that becomes an inversion.
18.82
"Good man! It is like a poor woman,"
18.83
Daosheng states: Originally having the buddhadhātu is precisely loving kindness and concern for sentient beings. Sengzong states: This is a parable for having it yet not seeing it. It is the nature of women to cherish treasure; because she does not know its location, she is poor. Sentient beings desire bliss but do not attain its basis, and therefore cycle in birth and death. Fayao states: Sentient beings possess the principle of attaining Buddhahood; because this principle originates from compassion, she is a woman. The principle of attaining Buddhahood is not yet of practical use to oneself; this is compared to poverty. Sengzong states: Kāśyapa's question earlier turned back and forth into faults; the Tathāgata now offers a parable, showing that neither extreme entails an error. The principle is like a storehouse of gold: it cannot be said to be non-existent; yet because its function has not manifested, it cannot be said to be existent. 'Woman' takes its meaning from the ability to give birth, and also takes nurturing as its virtue; this compares to the practitioner who inevitably conceives the understanding of permanence, taking the meaning of ability to give birth. The path encompasses what has not yet been heard, taking the virtue of nurturing. Baoliang states: There are five intentions behind the parables. The first parable clarifies that sentient beings in the six destinies all possess the direct cause, which is not something freshly begun. The second parable explains the reason why it could not be expounded immediately. People at that time gave rise to further doubts regarding these two parables, thinking that if it must not be non-existent, it ought to have present function, so Kāśyapa raised eleven objections based on this. The third parable gives a general answer, stating that although the principle of the nature is not non-existent, when one loses understanding, gives rise to delusion, and wanders in birth and death, how could there be present function? The fourth parable, although the above already clarified attaining first and losing later, did not clarify regaining after losing. Furthermore, it clarifies that among sentient beings there are naturally those who have never attained understanding yet have passed through the six destinies; for such persons, why must it be considered existent? Therefore, the present parable expands these two purports: first clarifying that although once lost it is later regained, and next clarifying that the direct cause is never obstructed or destroyed—thus both having undergone loss and having not yet attained are neither of them non-existent. The fifth parable specifically illustrates those who attain, clarifying the meaning of inevitable accomplishment. The 'poor woman' illustrates all sentient beings.
18.84
"within whose house"
18.85
Sengliang states: The continuity of the five aggregates takes the meaning of dwelling and shelter. The principle of cause and effect does not come from without; this is compared to 'within'.
18.86
"there was a vast storehouse of pure gold,"
18.87
Daosheng states: A 'storehouse' means that the principle of permanence and bliss is hidden and has not yet emerged. Sengliang states: One who attains a store of gold will certainly enrich people; if one sees the buddhadhātu, one becomes a Buddha. Fayao states: The buddhadhātu within the body is certainly present in its principle, just like the meaning of the treasure storehouse within that house. Tanji states: Complete with cause and effect, it is a storehouse. Sengzong states: The Dharma-treasures upon the fruit have inexhaustible virtues, compared to 'vast'. The principle of the nature is precious, taking its analogy from gold. Being hidden by delusion, in meaning it is called a storehouse. Zhixiu states: The principle of the nature is not twofold, but in following sentient beings it is not uniform; hence it says 'vast'.
18.88
"of which none of the household, whether old or young, was aware."
18.89
Daosheng states: Because they dwell together in safety, they are 'one household'. Sengliang states: Ordinary beings are compared to the young; the two vehicles are compared to the old. Fayao states: The myriad varieties of sentient beings being dissimilar constitutes 'old and young'. Residing together within defilements constitutes 'the household'. Being universally deluded regarding the principle constitutes 'none was aware'. Tanji states: The body having superior and inferior constitutes 'old and young'. Sengzong states: Wisdom from hearing is the young; wisdom from cultivation is the old. Baoliang states: Broadly citing that none in the six destinies knows, it therefore says 'old and young'. Zhixiu states: Within the single household of the Buddha-Dharma, all who are trainees, because the Buddha had not yet spoken of it, are called 'unaware'.
18.90
"At that time there was an unusual person"
18.91
Sengliang states: This illustrates the Buddha. Because he has transcended the three realms, he is an 'unusual person'. Sengzong states: The Buddha. He takes the distinct difference between cause and fruit as an analogy. Tan'ai states: Having already illustrated having it yet not seeing it, from this point downward illustrates why it could not be expounded immediately.
18.92
"who was well-skilled in expedients,"
18.93
Tanji states: Skillfully revealing the buddhadhātu. Tan'ai states: Possessing the power of great compassion.
18.94
"who said to the poor woman:"
18.95
Tan'ai states: Capacity and response stimulate each other.
18.96
"‘I will hire you now;"
18.97
Tanji states: Fulfilling my original vow. Sengzong states: This is merely an adapted discernment. The buddhadhātu is something with a definite term, belonging to one's own sphere, and does not admit of being called hiring. What is gained by hiring and borrowing offers little benefit. Now, demanding the severance of fetters through nirvāṇa without remainder, the attainment of the lesser fruit is slight compared to permanence, like hiring. Sentient beings eliminate delusion themselves to achieve the fruit; yet speaking of the Buddha hiring them to work is because relieving suffering originates from great compassion—though they themselves sever delusion, it is still the essential undertaking of the Supreme Man.
18.98
"you can for my sake"
18.99
Sengzong states: The Buddha of old made a vow to eradicate all sufferings; as long as suffering is not exhausted, his burden is not finished. If they can all cross over birth and death, it fulfills the original vow of the sage; therefore it says 'for my sake'.
18.100
"weed and clear away the overgrown brush.’"
18.101
Fayao states: First teaching non-self clears away the filth of an inverted self, while the intention lies in the true self of the buddhadhātu—this is the meaning of hiring.
18.102
"The woman replied: ‘I cannot do so now.
18.103
Sengliang states: Pointing to the time of partial cultivation, where the higher cultivation of the path should reach, they cannot yet practice permanence. Fayao states: These are figurative words. They illustrate that sentient beings focus on benefiting themselves and lack the way of universal transformation; hence it says 'cannot'. Baoliang states: Sentient beings having clung to permanence for long cannot immediately believe in impermanence. Daohui's notes state: These are words of non-faith. One must clearly recognize that the principle of the nature exists, and only then can one apply oneself diligently in practice.
18.104
"If you can show my son the storehouse of gold, only then will I quickly work for you.’"
18.105
Sengliang states: If the Buddha expounds the true self of the buddhadhātu for them, it is compared to seeking one's own storehouse of gold. Fayao states: This adapts to sentient beings having this principle, not stating their conscious intention. If they clearly know its principle and only then cultivate good, it is like first showing it to me and working afterward. Sengzong states: When the capacity for permanence is about to stir, one should become a bodhisattva, putting others first and oneself second, like showing the son the storehouse of gold. Since the merit lies in putting oneself second, the meaning of eliminating delusion is made apparent. Grasping the fruit becomes even swifter, compared to working quickly. Baoliang states: When capacity responds to the lesser teaching, the great capacity will surely ripen, and they will ultimately attain permanence and bliss; figuratively this is called 'showing'. Daohui states: This illustrates wisdom. If one can reveal the buddhadhātu and cause them to attain true understanding, only then can they carry out the practices.
18.106
"The person replied: ‘I know the expedients and can show your son.’"
18.107
Daosheng states: What was spoken of as hiring certainly involves being able to show her the storehouse of gold. Sengliang states: With the three knowledges and the four unimpeded knowledges, he can certainly expound it extensively. Fayao states: By the Tathāgata's expedients, he first expounded non-self in order to cause sentient beings to universally benefit and allow the principle to penetrate. The penetration of principle originates from the Buddha; hence it says 'can show'. Huilang recounting Tanxian states: The son illustrates future understanding.
18.108
"The woman said again: ‘Even the old and young of my household do not know of it themselves, how much less could you know?’"
18.109
Daosheng states: These are still words of non-faith. Sengliang states: Matters of the same body are near, while another body is distant; if what is near is still not known, how much less what is distant? Fayao states: This speaks of their present feelings being contrary to the principle. The wisdom of non-self obtained from the Buddha is not yet clear, and still does not speak of having a self; how much less the Buddha's wisdom seeing the self, which is fully complete, could speak of having a self? Sengzong states: If the nature is my nature, and I do not know it myself, how could someone who is not me know my nature?
18.110
"The person replied: ‘I truly am able now.’"
18.111
Daosheng states: The principle cannot perish; only I can know it. Sengliang states: Because they have delusion, though it is near they do not know; because he has no delusion, though it is distant he can see it. Fayao states: Only the Buddha can illuminate this principle; only then can it be called 'truly'.
18.112
"The woman said again: ‘I also wish to see it; you may show me as well.’"
18.113
Sengliang states: The expounding of the principle has its purport; knowing that she certainly possesses it herself, it illustrates her seeking to see it herself. Fayao states: The capacity that should hear it stirs, compared to wishing to see it. The eliciting of the teaching originates from oneself, compared to showing. Sengzong states: Transforming beings comes first, and only later extends to oneself; therefore it says 'also wish to see'. Zhixiu states: Benefiting both others and oneself, it therefore says 'as well'.
18.114
"The person then dug up and uncovered the storehouse of gold in her house."
18.115
Daosheng comments: Removing the cover of fetters and confusion is 'digging.' Because the buddhadhātu is seen, this is 'bringing forth the gold treasure.' Sengliang comments: By exclusively teaching impermanence, the eternal ātman naturally becomes apparent. Fayao comments: He expounds the teaching of nirvāṇa, making manifest the buddhadhātu to reveal it to beings. Sengzong comments: The nature does not exist in something else; once delusion is eliminated, it is definitely seen—in sense, this is called 'digging it out in one's own house.'
18.116
"The woman, having seen it, rejoiced in her heart... (and so on, down to) ...just as the poor person did not know of that treasure."
18.117
Daosheng comments: Subduing the fetters and having respectful faith is called 'seeing'; it is not yet attaining. Sengliang comments: Hearing the teaching of the buddhadhātu gives rise to subtle understanding, which is the meaning of wholesome karma. Zhixiu comments: When response to capacity does not err, the teaching necessarily meets the aptitude; this is analogized by her rejoicing.
18.118
"Good sons! I now reveal universally to all sentient beings... (and so on, down to) ...there is a treasure of true gold, yet they are unable to see it."
18.119
Sengzong comments: This matches the earlier analogy of being unable to know.
18.120
"Today the Tathāgata universally reveals to sentient beings... (and so on, down to) ...rejoice in their hearts and take refuge in and look up to the Tathāgata."
18.121
Sengzong comments: This matches the earlier 'digging it out and showing it to her.'
18.122
"Good sons! One who knows upāya is the Tathāgata... (and so on, down to) ...the treasure of true gold is the buddhadhātu."
18.123
Huilang comments: He restates the metaphors and pairs them with their applications.
18.124
"Furthermore, good sons! It is, for example, like a woman..."
18.125
Daosheng comments: The preceding explained that it is seen only upon removing delusion; the present passage explains that they have already received transformation. Sengliang comments: This is an analogy for the Buddha. A woman has the virtue of nurturing a child, and the Buddha has the path of compassionate protection. Fayao comments: The main idea is to explain why it was not taught in the past and why it is taught now. Sengzong comments: This analogy arises within the previous analogy: if [the buddhadhātu] indeed exists and is not unseen, then when the Tathāgata appeared in the world, he ought to have spoken of it early on; why did he instead cause sentient beings to give rise to the inversion of impermanence? This analogy is similar in expression to that of the new and old physicians, but different in intention: that analogy investigated the truth and falsity of the two teachings, while this analogy addresses the reproach of why the Buddha did not teach it earlier. It has roughly five points of meaning: first, explaining that in the distant past they once had an understanding of permanence; second, explaining that turning away from transformation, they lost understanding; third, explaining that wholesome roots evoked Śākyamuni to preach the one-sided teaching for them; fourth, that although the teaching of permanence was spoken, they did not yet believe it; fifth, explaining that only upon repeated preaching did they sever [doubt] and gradually believe and accept it. The woman is an analogy for the Buddhas of the past.
18.126
"...who gave birth to an infant."
18.127
Sengliang comments: An analogy for regarding sentient beings equally, without duality. Baoliang comments: Because wholesome [roots] associated with marks that are with-outflows are born from the Buddha, it is analogized by giving birth. Zhixiu comments: It refers to being born from the Buddha's mouth.
18.128
"The infant fell ill."
18.129
Daosheng comments: Receiving transformation that is not yet deep is analogized by an infant. Becoming deluded by a false ātman is analogized by falling ill. Sengliang comments: The second analogy, for losing understanding.
18.130
"This woman, grieved and distressed, sought a skilled physician."
18.131
Sengliang comments: Because the illness is one-sided, a physician is needed. The physician and the disease treat each other; he is called skilled. Sengzong comments: The physician and the mother are metaphors according to different senses: the sense of nurturing the understanding of wisdom is analogized by the mother, and the sense of curing the illness is the physician; there is no other intent. 'Seeking' means waiting for their capacity to emerge in order to cure them. Zhixiu comments: Wholesome [karma] knocks at the dharmakāya, the dharmakāya extends its response, and the response-body acts as the physician; this is analogized by seeking.
18.132
"The skilled physician having arrived..."
18.133
Sengliang comments: The capacity that can be treated emerges at this time.
18.134
"...compounded three kinds of medicine—clarified butter, milk, and rock sugar—and gave them to him, causing him to take it."
18.135
Sengliang comments: Teaching that saṃskṛta dharmas are impermanent, suffering, and non-self constitutes the three good medicines that counteract the one-sided disease. Sengzong comments: The third analogy, for teaching the one-sided doctrine.
18.136
"He then told the woman: 'After the child has taken the medicine, for the time being do not give him milk.'"
18.137
Sengliang comments: The milk of the teaching of permanence is the dharma that nourishes the good child. Speaking of non-self is analogized by little, and speaking of self is analogized by much; both use milk as an analogy. That curing proceeds by way of expedient means is analogized by the instruction. Because the false self has not yet dissipated, one must not say that the dharmakāya is the ātman. Sengzong comments: Teaching permanence is real wisdom, while teaching impermanence is expedient wisdom. At that time, one could only teach the expedient and could not yet teach the real. Because the expedient and the real are interrelated, in sense it is called 'telling' her. It is not that she does not give milk; rather, the time for giving it has not yet arrived, hence it says 'for the time being.' Because expedient wisdom is directly teaching impermanence, and real wisdom knows the time has not yet arrived and does not teach permanence, it says 'for the time being do not.'
18.138
"'You must wait until the medicine has digested, and only then give it to him.'"
18.139
Sengliang comments: Only when the ātman of the three realms is severed can one teach the ātman. Sengzong comments: If the heavy inversions are eliminated, the path of remedy also subsides.
18.140
"At that time, the woman smeared a bitter flavor upon her breasts..."
18.141
Daosheng comments: The teaching of non-self is not what beings relish; this is the bitter flavor. Sengliang comments: Impermanence and non-self inappropriately extended to the dharmakāya, having the name without the reality; this is analogized by smearing on the outside. Sengzong comments: It should have said that the physician smeared the medicine on the breast, yet saying that the mother smeared it herself is adopted for the convenience of the sense of good nurturing. Another explanation: it shows that the mother and the physician have no different substance.
18.142
"...and said to her child: 'My breasts have been smeared with poison; you must not touch them again.'"
18.143
Sengliang comments: Craving and defilement are called 'touching.' All bodies are impermanent and must not be craved or defiled.
18.144
"The child was thirsty and exhausted and wanted his mother's milk, but upon smelling the poisonous odor of the breast, he drew far away and abandoned it."
18.145
Sengliang comments: Loathing the suffering of the body and seeking the bliss of the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), when he hears that the Buddha is impermanent, in his aspiration he does not seek it. Fayao comments: He needs the milk of permanence, hence it is analogized by thirst; this is spoken with respect to the principle. Because non-self has arisen, he turns his back on the teaching of the self and does not accept it; this is analogized by abandoning it; this is spoken with respect to sentiment. Sengzong comments: Since the habit of calculating permanence has been long, from time to time it desires to arise again, like being thirsty and exhausted. The name 'permanence' originally derived from the Buddha; although it was an inverted grasp, it was still obtained from the Buddha, hence it is called 'mother's milk.' But as the urgency of the one-sided teaching became increasingly clear, the inverted mind wished to arise but could not; this is analogized by abandoning it. Another explanation: although he heard the purport of the one-sided teaching, it was as if there were a principle of returning to the real; yet since the one-sided teaching was urgent, the complete understanding could not arise at that time, just as smelling the odor caused him to abandon it.
18.146
"When the medicine had digested..."
18.147
Sengliang comments: Once the false self has been severed, it is then the time when the true ātman can be taught. Sengzong comments: The fourth analogy, for teaching the complete doctrine.
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Linked texts (1)
- 大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese