大般涅槃經集解 20
English (machine translation) 20
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20.1
Extensive discourse on the meaning of the Middle Way; Explaining the Middle Way of existence and non-existence; Explaining the Middle Way of the true nature of phenomena; Explaining the Middle Way of continuity; Explaining the meaning of the buddhadhātu as support and foundation; Explaining the blossoming of flowers on elephant tusks at the time of thunder; The simile of the hundred blind men treating their eyes; The simile of the poor man seeing the prince's pure and wondrous blade.
20.2
Chapter on the Nature of the Tathāgata, the Third
20.3
Then the Buddha praised Bodhisattva Kāśyapa: [...] "You have already accomplished profound and sharp wisdom."
20.4
Sengliang comments: In the tenth section, the Buddha returns to endorse, praise, and elaborate.
20.5
"I shall now further explain well to you how to enter the tathāgatagarbha."
20.6
Sengliang comments: Having already known the place of refuge, one should properly cultivate and advance toward it. Below, this extensively distinguishes gains and losses to reveal the practice of the Middle Way. Sengzong comments: Below is the fourth major section. Previously, wholesome karma was opened, discerning that in the former teaching it was not taught that sentient beings possess the nature, which was an inversion whereby wholesome karma could not be achieved; now, relying on the complete teaching, all have the true nature, and this correct understanding is precisely wholesome karma. The principle is profound and difficult to understand, frequently provoking slander; to encourage generating faith and understanding, one must properly recognise the signs of the future fruit. Although one may set one's intention and aspire from afar, without practice one cannot attain it; therefore, one should cultivate the contemplative practice of the Middle Way. Below, discerning the Middle Way has ten distinctions: First, two clauses initially determine cause and fruit, which briefly reveals the essence and characteristics of the Middle Way; second, explaining that contravening the principle constitutes an inversion; third, explaining that conforming to the principle constitutes understanding; fourth, explaining that the Tathāgata, knowing their partial inclinations, can skillfully heal them; fifth, again citing the principle to test their attachments; sixth, tracing the root origin of the arising of delusion, which is generating widespread erroneous attachments toward the partial teachings taught by the Tathāgata; seventh, explaining that not only do they directly generate the inversion of impermanence in the midst of the partial teaching, but they are also confused by the former words on cause and fruit, generating the conception of two phenomena; eighth, citing the Middle Way of continuity from the 'Lamp Flame Chapter' of the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra; ninth, using the simile of milk and curd to re-elucidate the principle of the Middle Way; tenth, praising the teaching, saying that this sūtra is profound and hidden, and only now exhausts the principle. Baoliang comments: Below is the third part in the major section. It discerns three kinds of Middle Way, properly clarifying the meaning of producing wholesome karma. First, clarifying the Middle Way of existence and non-existence that is free from annihilation and permanence; second, clarifying the Middle Way of the true nature of phenomena; third, discerning the Middle Way of continuity. In clarifying the Middle Way free from existence and non-existence, there are five chapters: first, clarifying loss; second, clarifying gain; third, generally providing a simile for gain and loss; fourth, providing a simile for the Buddha; fifth, encouraging practice. In clarifying loss, initially two clauses are opened, broadly clarifying the idea of those in the world who incur loss; second, from 'If one says that all phenomena have no self' onward, both six practices are cited to properly clarify loss. As for the first two clauses: if one conceives that the body has a spiritual self, this is the view of permanence, making clear that such a person will never be free from suffering. Or again, there are those who say: 'The Buddha also has a self like the spiritual self.' This is the first clause. As for 'no-self': if one claims that this body up to and erroneously including the Buddha is entirely annihilated, since both would be empty phenomena, even if one cultivates pure conduct, what would be attained? Zhixiu comments: Discerning the Middle Way of neither annihilation nor permanence. There are five points: First, from the beginning up to 'has no benefit', it properly clarifies the principle of the Middle Way of permanent abiding. Although it exists, it is not within the cause, yet the fruit is not utterly non-existent. Second, up to 'must rely on annihilation or permanence', it clarifies that contravening what was stated above results in the two views, which constitutes loss. Third, up to 'far removed from the two extremes, he teaches the true Dharma', it discerns resting the mind in the principle, cultivating and attaining the middle. Fourth, up to 'the pure buddhadhātu is permanently abiding and unchanging', it explains the two chapters above (the second and the third), clarifying the reason why there are delusion and understanding. Fifth, up to 'although there is going and coming, it is permanently abiding and unchanging', it admonishes and encourages practitioners.
20.7
"If the self abides, that is a permanent phenomenon [...] cultivating pure conduct has no benefit."
20.8
Sengliang comments: First stating that the principle cannot be one-sided, he wishes to reveal the fault of the one-sided. 'Has no benefit': if all is without self, then cultivating the path yields no fruit, which properly discerns the fault of the one-sided. Sengzong comments: 'Not free from suffering': if the self is in the aggregates, it is identical with the aggregates. If the self is permanent, suffering should also be permanent. If suffering were permanent, it could never be escaped. Yet now suffering can definitely be escaped; hence we know the permanent fruit is not in the body. The six-fascicle version says: 'If there were a self, one would never experience suffering. Yet one must experience suffering; therefore we know there is no self.' 'No benefit': if one's ultimate end is extinction, then one cultivates pure conduct in vain. Baoliang comments: If one conceives this body to have a spiritual self, that is the view of permanence, and this person will never be free from suffering; they also say the Buddha likewise has a self of the spiritual self. 'No benefit': if one says that this body, including the Buddha, is entirely annihilated, since both would be empty phenomena, what benefit is there in cultivating pure conduct in vain?
20.9
"If one says that all phenomena have no self, [...] it is also like this; it must rely on annihilation or permanence."
20.10
Sengliang comments: This discerns the error of one-sided adherents. 'Like an inchworm': they never depart from annihilation or permanence. Sengzong comments: The second point clarifies that contravening the principle and grasping at signs gives rise to attachments to annihilation and permanence. Within saṃsāra, although it is said there is no self, the principle of the nature does not perish, and consciousness is not cut off on account of it. If one conceives that all things are utterly extinguished, then above it contravenes the complete ultimate, and below it contravenes the causal nature; this is called the view of annihilation. If one says there is a real self that abides within saṃsāra, permanent and unperishing, this is the view of permanence. Saying 'all conditioned phenomena are impermanent': above clarified the inversion of self; this clarifies the inversion of permanence; below are the six clauses on the contrast between suffering and bliss. Cultivating all phenomena as permanent leads to falling into the view of permanence; 'falling into the view of permanence' means to clarify that ordinary persons fluctuate without settling, at times conceiving annihilation and at times conceiving permanence, like an inchworm.
20.11
"For this reason, one who cultivates the remaining phenomena as suffering [...] far removed from the two extremes, he teaches the true Dharma."
20.12
Sengliang comments: Based on the error of the one-sided views above, he distinguishes the different characteristics. Sengzong comments: This third point clarifies understanding by conforming to the principle. The reason it says 'remaining' is that if one first speaks of the Buddha-fruit, then the remainder—saṃsāra—has not yet been spoken of; if one first speaks of saṃsāra, it is likewise. Baoliang comments: Among these five distinctions, this is the second, clarifying gain. Saṃsāra is the remainder of nirvāṇa, and nirvāṇa is also the remainder of saṃsāra; it regards attainment as good.
20.13
"Ordinary, foolish people have no doubt in this regard, like a weak, sick person whose bodily strength becomes light and supple after taking clarified butter."
20.14
Sengliang comments: Even ordinary persons have no doubts in this regard when practicing the path, easily advancing toward the Buddha-fruit; how much more so the noble ones! This explains the meaning above. The record of Sengzong by Jingyi states: Doubt is the crossing to understanding; when an intense inversion resides in the mind, how could they know to doubt? 'Bodily strength becomes light and supple' means that a weak person cannot tolerate much clarified butter. Restlessly moving without stop, uncertain between annihilation and permanence, they readily shift between grasping and releasing. Huilang's account of Sengzong states: It means that upon hearing it, ordinary people immediately become free of doubt, just as a weak, sick person takes clarified butter and their physical strength becomes light, agile, and briskly refreshed. Baoliang comments: 'Have no doubt' concludes the preceding thought. From 'like a person taking clarified butter' onward is the third point, generally citing gain and loss to make a simile. This simile of taking clarified butter clarifies the existence of gain and loss. It means that when a wise person attains the principle, there must be benefit, just as a sick person taking clarified butter gains strength. Below, the four great elements are used as a simile for those who incur loss.
20.15
"The fundamental nature of the phenomena of existence and non-existence is indefinite, just as the natures of the four great elements are not the same and mutually conflict."
20.16
Sengliang comments: 'Indefinite' means not one-sided. Because nirvāṇa is real, it is called subtle existence; because saṃsāra is unreal, it is called non-existence. Cause and fruit are continuous; having two characteristics within a single entity that are indefinite clarifies that the principle of phenomena is not one-sided. Baoliang comments: Providing a simile for those who incur loss. Being about to make a simile, he first cites the annihilation and permanence conceived by those who incur loss. Conceiving annihilation is non-existence, and conceiving permanence is existence; since these are arbitrary reckonings, they are indefinite. Below, he cites the different natures of the four great elements as an analogy, like conceiving permanence.
20.17
"A skilled physician well knows, following their partial manifestations, [...] the pure buddhadhātu is permanently abiding and unchanging."
20.18
Sengliang comments: When sentient beings' defilements manifest in a one-sided manner, the Tathāgata responds to them, also providing partial teachings to cut off their one-sided delusions and cause them to meet the Middle Way. If one hears a partial teaching, one thinks that the buddhadhātu undergoes change. Sengzong comments: The fourth point. The physician is the Buddha: for those with the disease of permanence, he teaches the partial teaching; for those with the disease of annihilation, he teaches the complete teaching; and according to the differences among the three poisons, he also teaches three medicines to treat them. Baoliang comments: The fourth provides a simile for the Buddha. Just as that skilled physician well knows the source of the illness, he takes measures according to the illness.
20.19
"If one says it exists, the wise should not be tainted by attachment."
20.20
Sengliang comments: There is proof in the subsequent text. If one holds that the buddhadhātu definitely exists, this is called defiled attachment; if one holds that the buddhadhātu definitely does not exist, this is called false speech. Sengzong comments: The fifth again cites the principle to verify that delusion is a fault. Regarding those who claim there is a self in saṃsāra: for the school that posits a self, why is it called defilement? Since it is called defilement, one should know that erroneous bias does not accord with the principle. Baoliang comments: The fifth teaches practitioners to depart from grasping and attachment. Regarding the unified Three Jewels of the future person, one should not grasp and seize upon them as if they were material forms.
20.21
"If one says it does not exist, that is false speech."
20.22
Sengzong comments: If there is no sovereign self upon the complete fruit, why would the noble one designate you with words? Baoliang comments: If one says that in the future two heads and three crowns are entirely non-existent, that is false speech.
20.23
"If one says it exists, one should not remain silent."
20.24
Sengliang comments: There should not be a noble silence. In the Viśeṣacintā-[brahma-paripṛcchā-sūtra], because all dharmas are empty, it is called noble silence; here there is no corresponding antithesis. Sengzong says: If there were a self in saṃsāra, when it was investigated and questioned, why was there silence? Baoliang says: One should not grasp it as the Vātsīputrīya renunciants do. Statements such as these encourage practitioners to infer the principle and thereby accord with the Middle Way.
20.25
"Nor should they engage in conceptual proliferation and dispute […] because they do not understand the subtle, secret treasury of the Tathāgata."
20.26
Sengliang comments: It has already been explained that within the principle there is no bias; biased grasping is dispute, while non-bias is understanding the real. Sengzong says: The four equivalent types of grasping all have faults. The fault of identifying with matter (rūpa) is like the Sāṃkhya. The fault of separating from matter is like the Vaiśeṣika. Grasping a single conscious soul (ātman) as neither identical nor different is like the Vātsīputrīya renunciants. The annihilationist non-Buddhists grasp everything as non-existent, which is opposite to the former; all these are disputes. Merely seeking understanding while what one grasps is erroneous—one should only seek the principle of the true mark; how could one lightly give rise to grasping?
20.27
"If suffering is spoken of, foolish people then claim […] within my very body there is the seed of the buddhadhātu."
20.28
Sengliang comments: Having already distinguished gain and loss, he now repeats the exhortation. The nature of the direct cause is permanent, and permanence is bliss. Sengzong's record by Jingyi says: From here below is the sixth section, tracing the source of delusion and the reason for the arising of inversions. Not having grasped the intent of the partial teaching, they then grasp that everything is suffering. The wise are not so; they obtain the intent beyond the teaching and do not remain stuck in partial words. Sengzong's record by Falian says: From here below is the eighth section, the origin and cause of being confused by the partial teaching and giving rise to delusion. Here there are three rounds explaining how people are confused by the teachings. The first is confusion over the partial teaching; the second is confusion over the complete teaching; the third is double confusion over both the partial and complete teachings. "If suffering is spoken of, foolish people then claim impermanence"—this is the first confusion. Previously, on the partial teaching, it only spoke of giving rise to delusion without distinguishing the inception of the delusion; now it clarifies the root source of the arising of delusion. In proper sequence, it should first address confusion over the complete teaching above. Having repeatedly clarified this meaning so that they know wrong views are erroneous, now for the first time confusion over the partial teaching is addressed. "Speaking of all as suffering, yet unable to know that the body has the nature of bliss"—the previous line erroneously said the Buddha is also impermanent; here it says there is not an absolute absence of the buddhadhātu. The four phrases of impermanence, non-self, emptiness, and quiescence are all saṃskṛta, whereas vimokṣa is asaṃskṛta. Non-self is the emptiness of sentient beings; emptiness and quiescence are the emptiness of dharmas. "Within my very body there is the seed of the buddhadhātu" means that sentient beings are the direct cause, serving as the seed.
20.29
"If non-self is spoken of, ordinary people will claim […] though there is coming and going, he is permanently abiding and unchanging."
20.30
Sengliang comments: Saṃskṛta causes and fruits arise from inversions; their nominal designations are unreal. Being "like an illusion or transformation" means they are seen through conditions. Sengzong's record by Jingyi says: As the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra states, "Kātyāyana later broadly proclaimed its meaning," not only failing to realize that the Buddha-ground is devoid of suffering, but also not recognizing the non-arising of suffering; therefore he drew Vimalakīrti's rebuke. First it speaks of suffering, next of impermanence, next of non-self, and next of emptiness, without speaking of impurity. Sengzong's record by Falian says: Regarding "like an illusion or transformation," the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra states, "Even if there were a dharma surpassing nirvāṇa, I would still declare it to be like an illusion or a dream." This refers to total emptiness, as in the severance after eighty thousand kalpas. "The lion among humans, though there is coming and going" is spoken according to concealed aspects. It says the Buddha also enters extinction, yet in truth the dharmakāya truly never perishes.
20.31
"If one says that with ignorance as condition there are volitional formations […] the nature of non-duality is itself the true nature."
20.32
Sengliang comments: Above, failing to discriminate was the fault; here, seizing upon fixed characteristics of cause and fruit and clinging to the saṃskṛta is the fault. Below, by means of suffering, impermanence, and non-self, the fault of clinging to the asaṃskṛta is revealed. "Self and non-self have no duality in their nature" clarifies the Middle Way of the supreme truth, which is free from the two extremes of existence and non-existence. Sengzong's record by Jingyi says: This eighth passage was once explained by my master as referring to being confused by the complete teaching and giving rise to delusion. Examining the text, there is no glaring difference, so it is just explained according to different interpreters. Above, the Middle Way of existence and non-existence has already been clarified, yet it is also necessary to clearly reveal the Middle Way of continuity, because their conceptual imports interpenetrate. The preceding three lines clarify cause and fruit within tainted dharmas; the black and white dharmas encompass both tainted and untainted, clarifying cause and fruit. When ordinary people hear the words "cause and fruit," they assume a vast separation and produce the thought of two dharmas. Those who deeply penetrate them realize the difference between cause and fruit, and therefore they cannot be said to be identical; yet because cause and fruit are interrelated, they cannot be said to be different. Sengzong's record by Falian says: This is the second round: confusion over the complete teaching. Hearing that the dharmakāya is permanent while the stage of training is impermanent, ordinary people cling to the claim that the Buddha and sentient beings, brightness and ignorance, differ, and that the saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta have no connection to each other. The partial teaching also clarifies the twelve links of dependent origination; why are they different? They are borrowed as an analogy: if one does not understand brightness and ignorance, how could one properly penetrate the wondrous principle of the complete teaching? Ignorance is the cause, and brightness is the fruit; the subsequent lines on saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta and so forth are all like this. Baoliang says: From here below is the second layer, clarifying the Middle Way of the true mark. If one strictly speaks of the past teaching, it took the emptiness and existence of saṃsāra as real in a one-sided way. If spoken in terms of the present sūtra, it recognizes the wondrous substance of the conscious spirit, tathatā, as real, knowing that from the vajra-like mind back must be suffering, emptiness, and impermanence, while the Buddha-fruit must be permanence, bliss, self, and purity. If one forms such an understanding, then at both extremes one attains the real meaning, fulfilling the practice of the Middle Way. Why is this? The substance of saṃsāra is empty, and from the beginning has been without duality or difference. The substance of nirvāṇa is suchness, and is also originally signless. This is the principle of realizing and knowing the true mark of all dharmas. Yet what is clarified here is solely this single path; although the matters passed through below are many, their essential meaning is no longer different. Those who cling to signs say that conditioned dharmas have a fixed nature, and ignorance also has a fixed nature, two things unrelated to each other. Therefore the Buddha says: in the principle of the true mark, both are non-existent. Zhixiu says: From here below, the Middle Way of non-difference upon continuous dharmas is explained in this section. There are two meanings: first, stating that "the nature of non-duality is itself the true nature" directly reveals non-difference, which is the meaning of a single nominal designation; second, from "self and non-self have no duality in their nature" down to "have no two marks" is the second meaning: because the mark of principle is profound and far-reaching, fearing that upon hearing it people will not immediately understand, he cites what was praised by all Buddhas and clarified in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā—that I also once spoke of the principle of designated oneness to corroborate the present teaching, clarifying that its principle is extremely real and cannot fail to be believed.
20.33
"If one says that one should cultivate all dharmas as suffering […] the nature of non-duality is itself the true nature."
20.34
Sengzong's record by Jingyi comments: Examining these words, they seem to be confusion over the complete teaching giving rise to delusion. When it is taught that from the vajra-mind back all dharmas are bliss, hearing these words, they take them to be inherently distinct; this is getting confused and stuck on one extreme of the nominal designation of continuity. If one does not explain it this way, one returns to confusion arising from the partial teaching. Namely, the partial teaching states that all is suffering, and they claim that the secret treasury is also suffering. When ordinary people hear this, they give rise to annihilationist views: that in moment-by-moment arising and ceasing, the preceding ceases and the succeeding arises without any connection at all, completely departing from the intent of continuity and non-difference. Sengzong's record by Falian says: In the third round, people had doubts, thinking two individuals were confused by the two teachings. Now it clarifies that a single person is doubly confused by both teachings, attributing it to one person. "All dharmas" refers to the partial teaching. Ordinary people claim there are two, which refers to the complete teaching. It should also have five lines as before; mentioning only suffering and non-self is because, relying on the contemplation of non-self, one concurrently attains the emptiness of dharmas and that nirvāṇa is also empty, completely exhausting it.
20.35
"Self and non-self have no duality in their nature […] you should uphold and revere it in this way."
20.36
Daosheng comments: Cause and condition cannot be separated. Because causes and conditions exist, through training one is able to attain Buddhahood; how could there be a self apart from non-self? Sengzong says: This is the eighth section, the correct principle. As understood by the wise, cause and fruit are interrelated. Baoliang says: In the time of the past teaching, self and non-self were not formulated. In terms of the present teaching, it goes without saying. "Self" is based on the Buddha-fruit; "non-self" is based on saṃsāra. When discussed within the true mark, there is no difference.
20.37
"Good son, you should also firmly remember […] taught that self and non-self have no two marks."
20.38
Daosheng comments: The meaning of non-duality clarified there is also like what is taught now. Sengzong's record by Jingyi says: The eighth section cites the Middle Way taught in the former emptiness teaching as corroboration. In its "Lamp-Wick Chapter," it clarifies that neither the preceding flame nor the succeeding flame can scorch [the wick], yet the scorching is not separate from the preceding and succeeding flames. It was already taught long ago, not clarified only now; errors are brought out again, and without the sūtra they cannot be resolved. Baoliang says: The third layer clarifies performing wholesome karma. It distinguishes the Middle Way of continuity in terms of the practitioner. This non-difference between self and non-self was explained above, but what was clarified above was based on the aspect of non-difference through emptiness, whereas here it discusses the aspect of continuity. Transposing this discourse on a single practitioner's continuity, it is called self and non-self; therefore the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra is cited as corroboration. The meaning of continuity is just like the meaning of nominal designation based on causal completion. If it were strictly one, it would not be called causally completed; if each were different, it would also not be called causally completed. In causal completion, there is that which can complete and that which is completed, and that which can complete is the totality. Continuity is also like this now: if strictly one, it is not continuous; if strictly different, it is also not continuous. It must be that the preceding dharma passes away and the succeeding dharma arises, filling the place of what once was; this is the language of continuous nominal designation on the Middle Way. Hence, from cause to fruit, it is compared to the continuity of the five flavours. Sengzong's record by Falian says: The ninth section cites the sūtra as corroboration. However, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā does not speak of the meaning of self and non-self; it speaks of being neither attained by the initial mind nor attained apart from the initial mind, establishing the meaning of non-duality.
20.39
"Just as milk produces curd, curd produces fresh butter […] and from cooked butter one obtains ghee."
20.40
Daosheng comments: He adduces a nearby matter to illustrate the distant principle. Sengliang comments: The three kinds of Middle Way take causes and conditions as their basis. Simply by confirming causes and conditions, the rest becomes clear of itself. First he speaks of the direct cause, like the dharmas of milk, curd, and so forth; later he refutes arbitrary grasping, establishing the meaning of arising from causes. Sengzong's record by Jingyi says: From here below is the ninth section, borrowing an analogy to reveal the intent of the Middle Way's identity and difference. First he presents three checkpoints: here, he does not allow arising from self or other, but allows arising from milk. This statement is not yet fully explained; below, because Kāśyapa raises objections, the meaning of existence and non-existence is then revealed. Sengzong's record by Falian says: The tenth section borrows milk and curd as an analogy, also corroborating the eighth section's intent of non-duality and the interrelation of cause and fruit. "Milk produces curd" means that from cause to fruit, the principle cannot be different. The principle of the ordinary and the noble are interrelated in principle. Zhixiu says: Third, he next clarifies the Middle Way of cause and fruit, which has three rounds of back-and-forth. First the Buddha speaks for himself; second, Kāśyapa objects; third, the Buddha replies. From here down to "have no two marks" is the first intent.
20.41
"Is the nature of such curd produced from milk […] and so forth up to ghee, which is also like this."
20.42
Daosheng comments: Examining the core of the principle, it must arise from conditions, neither from other nor from self. Zhixiu says: First he opens three chapter headings.
20.43
"If it were produced from another, it would be made by another and not produced from milk; if it were not produced from milk, milk would have no function."
20.44
Daosheng states: Without milk, [curd] does not exist; how could it be produced from an other? Sengliang states: If water could produce curd, what purpose would milk serve? Sengzong states: As for 'made by an other,' aside from milk, all other things are called 'other.'
20.45
"If it were produced from itself, it ought not to be similar […] it certainly does not come from any other place."
20.46
Daosheng states: If it could produce itself, why must it necessarily follow upon what is similar? Sengliang states: If it were produced from itself, it ought not to require milk. If it necessarily arises in succession to milk, it cannot lack a cause, so it is not by its own power. As for 'then they are not co-arisen,' because it is successive, they are not simultaneous. If it could produce itself, they could also be simultaneous. As for 'does not come from any other place,' previously by non-simultaneity it was shown not to be self-produced, yet it also appears as though it comes from another place to succeed upon the other. Sengzong states: This refutation has three levels: first, saying it should not succeed milk; second, saying it should be simultaneous with milk; third, saying it should come from a different place.
20.47
"One should know that within the milk there is already the characteristic of curd."
20.48
Daosheng states: It does not come from an other, nor does it produce itself; it can only emerge from milk. Therefore it is said that its characteristic is already present.
20.49
"Because the sweet flavor is predominant, it cannot transform itself […] and so on up to sarpirmaṇḍa, which is also like this."
20.50
Sengliang states: That 'there is already the characteristic of curd' means that there is already sweetness. That 'it cannot transform itself' means that it must await the fermenting agent to transform the predominant into the lesser. When sweetness is predominant it is milk; when sweetness is lesser it is curd. Hence they are not one. Yet they share the same nature of sweetness, and because their nature is not different, this is the meaning of the Middle Way. Baoliang states: That 'there is already the characteristic of curd' means that speaking of the effect within the cause, it is bound to exist, so it is said to exist.
20.51
"It is due to the conditions of the water and grass eaten by this cow […] its milk then has differences in color and flavor."
20.52
Sengliang states: This is merely an extensive verification by means of concrete facts. Baoliang states: That which is called 'rich and fertile' is a metaphor made for the practitioner. The Snow Mountains symbolize the body of the five aggregates; the grass symbolizes the principle of the six practices regarding the nature of cause and effect; the cow symbolizes the practitioner. If one trains in nirvāṇa's cause-and-effect buddhadhātu, one heads straight toward the fruit of buddhahood and does not pass through the four destinies.
20.53
"Because of the causal conditions of the karma of knowledge and ignorance, these sentient beings give rise to two characteristics."
20.54
Daosheng states: Turning one's back on knowledge constitutes ignorance; hence one is deluded about non-dual characteristics, taking them to be two characteristics. Originally they are not two.
20.55
"If ignorance is overturned, it transforms into knowledge […] is also like this, having no two characteristics."
20.56
Sengliang states: Sentient beings possess a mind and know that suffering is to be detested and bliss is to be sought. Not recognizing suffering is called ignorance; when one recognizes it, the designation of ignorance is overturned. Thus there is the difference between illumination and darkness, and they are not identical.
20.57
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'World-Honoured One! […] what is the meaning of curd being within milk?'
20.58
Sengliang states: The Middle Way of causal conditions is free from existence and non-existence. What the Buddhas explained above possesses the flavor of the Middle Way's principle, hence the question is asked. Sengzong states: Above, the three gates were raised to explain that self-production and other-production entail errors. Although production from milk was admitted, the principle has not yet been seen. A challenge assuming definite existence and definite non-existence is hypothetically raised in order to make the import of the Middle Way manifest.
20.59
"World-Honoured One! If one says that within milk there is definitely the characteristic of curd […] why does milk not produce grass?"
20.60
Sengzong states: Among the hundred grasses there ought also to be milk; likewise, if there is grass within milk, grass is the cause and milk is the fruit. If there were the fruit within the cause, there could also be the cause within the fruit, and this would repeatedly entail errors.
20.61
"Good son! One cannot definitively say that there is curd within milk […] nor can one say that it is produced from an other."
20.62
Sengliang states: When it is sweet there is no sourness, so it is not existent; sweetness is the cause of sourness, so it is not non-existent. As for 'not produced from an other,' it definitely emerges from milk, proving the meaning of cause. Sengzong states: The Buddha himself analyzes and distinguishes that, being free from both extremes, curd can be produced. Above, it was already determined that it is not produced from itself, so it is not explained again now.
20.63
"If one says that within milk there is definitely curd […] within milk there is definitely the nature of curd."
20.64
Sengzong states: Since yellow and white, bland and sour, are not of one kind, we know that at the time of milk there is no curd.
20.65
"If one says that within milk there is definitely no curd […] one cannot say that within milk there is definitely no nature of curd."
20.66
Sengzong states: If milk's lack of curd were like the non-existence of a rabbit's horns, why could it produce curd and not produce a rabbit's horns?
20.67
"If one says that this curd is produced from an other […] one cannot say that curd is produced from an other."
20.68
Sengzong states: Previously, errors were shown regarding definite existence and definite non-existence; now he again analyzes the fault of production from an other. If it were produced from an other, why would water not produce curd?
20.69
"Good son! Because of the conditions of the cow eating grass, its blood turns white."
20.70
Sengzong states: The errors of the three gates have already been fully explained above. Now the correct doctrine is revealed: it is not that transformation can occur without relying on conditions. This clarifies the meaning of depending on conditions.
20.71
"After the grass and blood cease, by the merit-power of sentient beings […] that it exists apart from milk is impossible."
20.72
Baoliang states: Although grass and milk are different, there is the meaning of continuity forming a single flavor; one must not rigidly adhere to the view that they are inherently and naturally different.
20.73
"Good son! Knowledge and ignorance are also like this […] it turns into sarpirmaṇḍa; the buddhadhātu is also like this."
20.74
Sengzong states: Sentient beings possess the power to invoke the fruit, and the fruit has the function of recompensing the cause; hence darkness can be turned into knowledge. Milk and curd cannot be made into two; how could sentient beings and the Buddha be made into two? From beginning to end there is continuity, provisionally described as one; it can properly be said to arise from conditions.
20.75
"Good son! Sentient beings of slight merit do not see this grass […] then they see the buddhadhātu and achieve the unexcelled path."
20.76
Tanxian states: From here down answers the question of how the bodhisattvas are able to see the difficult-to-see nature. Baoliang states: That 'the buddhadhātu is not a created dharma' means that the primary-cause buddhadhātu is not elicited by good or evil; how could it be manufactured? Therefore we know that the essence of conscious awareness fundamentally has this dharmatā as its source. If it lacked such an inherent quality, the fundamental function of conscious thought would change; but since its function is always thus, we should know it was not newly created. If conscious awareness were exclusively constructed through the causal conditions of karma and did not take this as its essence, how could it now be said that within the poisonous body there is the wondrous king of medicines, namely the buddhadhātu, which is not a created dharma? Thus we know that this is spoken with reference to the primary cause. If it were the nature of the fruit, then in principle it would naturally not exist within the poisonous body. Furthermore, the fruit should not be made to depend on the cause. If the fruit depended on the cause, the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra would have had to say that dependent on saṃsāra there is the tathāgatagarbha; yet it says, 'Dependent on the tathāgatagarbha there is saṃsāra—this is called a good exposition.' Is this not the very meaning of this text? That 'though the great ocean is salty, it also contains the supreme flavor' means that the subtle principle can be relied upon.
20.77
"Just as when thunder rumbles and clouds arise in the sky […] able to repay the Buddha's kindness, a true disciple of the Buddha."
20.78
Sengliang states: The sky symbolizes the Buddha, the thunder symbolizes the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the sprouts symbolize sentient beings, and the flowers symbolize seeing the nature. This means that the buddhadhātu is seen by means of the sūtra. Sengzong states: This is the tenth conclusion.
20.79
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'Extraordinary, World-Honoured One! […] as you have praised, it does not contradict what I have said.'
20.80
Sengliang states: Answering how bodhisattvas can see the difficult-to-see nature is still the cause of long life. Above, the discussion of the three refuges was the beginning of the cause; this question and answer is the culmination of the cause. Fayao states: From 'if I abide' down to the 'Chapter on Letters,' this question is answered. Above, in the three refuges, it was explained that our nature has the buddhadhātu, as if there were a spiritual self nature serving as the buddhadhātu. Therefore it is now extensively explained that the buddhadhātu is neither existent nor non-existent, free from the two extremes and abiding in the Middle Way, having no characteristics to be grasped; if one grasps, one falls into the two views of annihilation and permanence. Its nature is profound and wondrous, beyond the reckoning of the two vehicles; even great beings of the ten abodes are still in obscurity about it. How could it not be difficult to see? Zhixiu states: From here down, the questions and answers have four rounds: first, reverent praise of the buddhadhātu, which the Buddha then endorses; second, raising a question to request an answer, which the Buddha then answers; third, requesting to take a vow, which the Buddha then preaches for them; fourth, Kāśyapa raises a challenge, which the Buddha then answers. This is the first, the reverent praise.
20.81
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'World-Honoured One! Why is the buddhadhātu exceedingly profound, difficult to see, and difficult to enter?'
20.82
Zhixiu states: From here down is the second, raising a question to request an answer. The praise and endorsement being completed, he raises the question again.
20.83
The Buddha said: 'Good son, it is like a hundred blind persons […] only when he showed three fingers did they say they saw a little.'
20.84
Sengliang states: The golden probe symbolizes the teachings of the various sūtras. One finger symbolizes the sūtras of the three vehicles. Preaching three nirvāṇas, they actually intended to reveal the one eternally abiding nirvāṇa. Because the phrasing is concealed and the meaning subtle, it is likened to one finger. Two fingers symbolize the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra dismantling the two nirvāṇas: although the One Vehicle was revealed, the permanent and the self were not yet made clear, so it is likened to two fingers. The three fingers symbolize today's preaching of the buddhadhātu as permanence and bliss. As for 'they immediately saw a little,' having seen it, they reside at the culmination. At the culmination, the principle of invoking the fruit is manifest, so having been spoken to, they immediately see; at the beginning, the matter is subtle and difficult to explain, so although shown, they did not fully understand. Therefore the sūtra states that bodhisattvas of the ten grounds see the end but do not see the beginning. Sengzong states: The blind persons symbolize those from below the tenth ground down who are in saṃsāra. 'A hundred' is merely the ultimate among numbers of tens. Approaching the physician symbolizes the good invoking the sage. Baoliang states: The difficult-to-see nature asked about is the primary-cause nature. Now, in the reply, the contributory cause is explained precisely because on the day one attains the fruit of buddhahood, one clearly recognizes the primary cause for the first time. Not only is the nature of the fruit difficult to recognize, but the nature of the cause is also difficult to know. The text below states: 'The ten grounds know the end but do not know the beginning.' Therefore the question concerned the primary cause, while the answer was given in terms of the contributory cause.
20.85
"Good son! This subtle and wondrous scripture of the Mahānirvāṇa […] once the Tathāgata preached it, they immediately saw a little."
20.86
Fayao states: Bodhisattvas of the ten abodes must hear the Nirvāṇa Sūtra before they can faintly see a little of the buddhadhātu. From here down it explains that although hearing the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, they cannot yet obtain correct faith; they merely have it and that is all. Baoliang states: Seeking the meaning in accordance with the text, this is truly difficult. How could those whose practice has stepped onto the Dharma Cloud still not know that the buddhadhātu exists, needing the Buddha's preaching before they can see it? This refers to the thirty minds prior to the stages: the first ten minds are called the ten abodes, the twentieth mind is called the ten practices, and the thirtieth mind is called the ten dedications. Even if a bodhisattva cultivates austerities for immeasurable kalpas, if they do not hear the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the five roots headed by faith can never be established; the time when the root of faith is established is precisely at the thirtieth mind. This practitioner must have the Buddha preach the nature of cause and effect before they can step into the head of faith. As discussed above, the bodhisattvas of the ten abodes clearly are not those of the Dharma Cloud. Saying they 'see a little' means that after hearing the Buddha's preaching, their faith and wisdom gradually brighten, hence it is called 'seeing a little.'
20.87
"Once these bodhisattva-mahāsattvas have seen it […] could pratyekabuddhas be able to see it?"
20.88
Baoliang states: From here down through 'are still deluded by the wheel of non-self,' previously it explained that bodhisattvas, upon having the nature of cause and effect preached to them, are able to advance to the head of faith with their faculties established, ascending to the initial stage. When they reach the fulfillment of practice on the ten grounds, the hindrances they have abandoned are thin, and only then do they again faintly see the nature's eight masteries and emptiness of self. Although contemplating this emptiness, their minds do not yet sink into total reliance; they revert to the mind of non-self. Because their conviction is not yet resolved, it is said that they are deluded by non-self; it is not that they arbitrarily assume the Buddha-ground to be non-self and are thereby deluded.
20.89
"Furthermore, good son! For example, when observing from afar […] is beyond the reach of any śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha."
20.90
Baoliang states: There are nine metaphors in all, serving as metaphors for being difficult to see.
20.91
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'World-Honoured One! […] regarding the nature of sentient beings, all speak of having a self.'
20.92
Daosheng notes: "The meaning of the question is that if the Buddha alone is the Self and is difficult to see, ordinary persons are separated [from him] as heaven [from earth] and ought not to give rise to the notion of a self. Although the notion of a self is an illusion, it must certainly have a source. If it has a source, then [the Self] is not utterly remote. Why then say that only bodhisattvas of the ten abodes have a dim glimpse of it?" Sengzong notes: "Since the principle is deep and profound, its name should also be exalted. Why then do worldly people also fabricate the names of permanence and bliss themselves and transmit them in the world?" Zhixiu notes: "From here down is the fourth section. Because, although they heard the prior explanation, they did not yet fully understand, and thus took the ordinary person's possessing a self as an objection."
20.93
The Buddha said: "It is, for example, like two men who were close friends... [up to] ...in this way the two men visited each other back and forth."
20.94
Daosheng notes: "Mutual benefit carries the meaning of close friends." Sengliang notes: "The import of the reply is that although there is indeed a source, the principle itself remains separated, as in the simile below. The bodhisattva's path is exalted, compared to a prince; the ordinary person lacks virtue, compared to a poor man. 'Visited each other back and forth' means that the disciple receives learning and the teacher has the merit of transforming him—the meaning of mutual benefit." Fayao notes: "When there is a stimulus going forth, there is a response coming in." Sengzong notes: "'Back and forth' means that the spreader of transformation and the person being transformed are in harmonious accord in mind." Baoliang notes: "The general import of this simile is no different from the prior simile of stealing a cow; it specifically serves as a simile for the four reliances appearing in the world." Zhixiu notes: "Below there are three stages. The first reveals that the Buddha previously spoke of having a self for the sake of sentient beings, and when the conditions ended, he relinquished his teaching, and the principle returned to the realm of the sage. The second uses the simile of sentient beings subsequently clinging erroneously to a deviant self. The third uses the simile of Śākyamuni appearing in the world today to spread the teaching. From here down to 'fled to another country' is the first simile."
20.95
"At that time, the poor man saw that this prince... [up to] ...holding this knife, he fled to another country."
20.96
Daosheng notes: "The true self spoken of can sever sentient beings' delusion of the view of annihilation; it is compared to a knife." Sengliang notes: "That the true self is permanent is called 'one'. That it is sovereign and delightful is called 'fine'. Discerning it severs delusion, which is compared to a knife. That afflictive habit-energies are forever extinguished is called 'pure and bright'. 'Covetous craving in the heart' means that the true self fundamentally has the function of severing poverty, yet upon seeing it, one gives rise to greed, which shows an absence of understanding. 'Holding this knife' means that this true principle can only be spoken of by a bodhisattva. 'Fled to another country' means that the propagation of the transformation was not yet finished, and abandoning what should not be abandoned is called 'fleeing'. Departing here and going there is called 'reaching another country'."
20.97
"Afterward, the poor man lodged in another's house, and while asleep, he talked in his sleep, saying, 'The knife! The knife!'"
20.98
Sengliang notes: "Receiving understanding from a teacher, the principle understood is his place of security, compared to a house. When the teacher departs and he loses understanding, this is compared to another's house. The fundamental cause must necessarily manifest, and staying briefly without remaining long is compared to lodging. Losing understanding and giving rise to delusion is compared to sleep. Speaking of a self with a deluded mind, not arising from true understanding, is compared to talking in one's sleep."
20.99
"Bystanders heard this, seized him, and brought him to the king's place. The king then said: 'The knife you spoke of—you may show it to me.'"
20.100
Daosheng notes: "If one takes the real as real, then it becomes stealing. Taking the unreal as real, one only afterward knows it to be wrong. One should interrogate and seek its real meaning; this is asking to be shown." Sengliang notes: "The bodhisattva having departed, the complete teaching was also concealed. The Hīnayāna used selflessness as its transformation; this one-sided teaching lost the middle, compared to slander. Violating the transformation and incurring guilt is compared to being seized. Having to undergo a judgment is compared to arriving at the king's place. 'You may show it to me': the first fruition has already severed [afflictions], and the self with discernible characteristics is what they understand; now he reproaches and demands the sovereign characteristics of form and color."
First 100 of 128 passages. Read on
Linked texts (1)
- 大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese