大般涅槃經集解 46

English (machine translation) 46

Language: English

46.1

Vaiḍūryaprabha discusses with the Buddha the meaning of arising and non-arising; distinguishes the meaning of the permanence and impermanence of the four characteristics; sets forth the meaning of being reborn in the Land of Immobility; distinguishes that nirvāṇa is fundamentally existent, citing analogies of the well in darkness, the seven treasures, and so forth; clarifies the meaning of the five kinds of causes, namely: generative cause, harmonious union cause, staying cause, increase cause, and distant cause; distinguishes whether the six pāramitās obtain the name of pāramitā or do not obtain it.

46.2

Chapter on the King of Virtuous Light, Part Two

46.3

At that time, Vaiḍūryaprabha Bodhisattva... [to] ...Having paid his respects, he sat down to one side.

46.4

Sengliang notes: What was previously said about this land being defiled and evil was simply the customary words of practitioners of discipline.

46.5

Then the World-Honoured One asked that bodhisattva: "Good man, did you come by arriving, or did you come by not arriving?"

46.6

Sengliang notes: Above, it was said that that land was pure, so the assembly rejoiced at his coming; the question was posed to dispel their attachment. Sengzong says: This does not differ from Vimalakīrti previously discerning impermanence with Mañjuśrī on the basis of going and coming. Baoliang says: Within the path of nominal designations, there is going and coming between here and there.

46.7

Vaiḍūryaprabha Bodhisattva said: "World-Honoured One... [to] ...if it is impermanent, there is also no coming."

46.8

Sengliang notes: The arising and ceasing of phenomena do not know one another. If one arrives, there is arising here; if one does not arrive, there is ceasing there. The principles of arising and ceasing are separated, and in neither case is there coming. Baoliang says: In the path of the continuity of nominal designations, there is coming and arriving; in the real Dharma, there is none.

46.9

"If a person sees the existence of a nature of sentient beings... [to] ...in permanence, bliss, self, and purity, then there is no going or coming."

46.10

Sengliang notes: Having already explained that phenomena have neither going nor coming, he now clarifies that seeing going and coming is an inversion. Baoliang says: He uses this to reprimand the assembly here at the time, telling them not to seize upon marks and become arrogant, seeing going and coming when listening to the Dharma.

46.11

"World-Honoured One! Let us put this matter aside; I wish to make an inquiry. I only pray you will deign to take pity and grant me a brief hearing."

46.12

Sengliang notes: Going from there to here was precisely to ask about what he did not know, not to display what he himself knew; having finished with the brief reply, he says, 'let us put this aside.'

46.13

The Buddha said: "Good man! Ask whatever you wish... [to] ...Therefore, you should single-mindedly listen and receive it."

46.14

Sengliang notes: There are three points: first, granting the question; second, praising the Dharma as difficult to encounter; third, admonishing him regarding the difficulty of listening to the Dharma.

46.15

Then Vaiḍūryaprabha Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva... [to] ...hears what was not heard from the Mahānirvāṇa Sūtra."

46.16

Daosheng notes: Although it is again without basis, in meeting they travel the same path; therefore he came from afar to make this request. Sengliang says: Having received the permission, he immediately asks his question. Sengzong says: The question is identical to that of the King of Virtuous Light. He only raises the initial question, and does not list the rest.

46.17

Then the Tathāgata praised him, saying: "Excellent, excellent!... [to] ...this is called hearing what was not heard."

46.18

Sengliang notes: Among the various people who came from there, some might not measure up, which is why he gave this admonition. Fearing that those assembled at that time might generate minds of superiority or inferiority, he lodged his words with the Great Being, thereby secretly admonishing the others. Baoliang says: Being able to understand in this way is itself hearing what was not heard.

46.19

"Good man! There is hearing what was not heard, there is not hearing what was not heard, there is not hearing what was heard, and there is hearing what was heard."

46.20

Daosheng notes: When the Buddha speaks and the other listens, hearing is thereby made manifest. He further provides the four propositions to exhaust its excellence. Sengliang notes: This answers the earlier objection concerning 'what exists must determinately exist.' It means that although saṃskṛta dharmas exist, when one cultivates the Path they do not, and when one does not cultivate it they do exist; how could one object that what exists must determinately exist? Having answered the first objection, the five objections are naturally resolved. Sengzong notes: Of these four propositions, two propositions blend dharmas and two determine the principle. Since there is blending and there is determination, how could one cling determinately to a single proposition? As for 'unheard hearing': when sound has not yet arisen, there is non-hearing; when the assembly of conditions meets in the present, this is termed 'now coming to hear the dharma that was previously unheard.' The principle is also like this: although it cannot be heard, it is not that one does not rely on exposition to enter the principle; how could one speak of it determinately? As for 'unheard non-hearing': this proposition returns to determining the principle. As for 'heard non-hearing': this is again a blending proposition. The intention of the previous objection was to make what is determinately heard incapable of being non-heard; hence it says here 'heard non-hearing.' This means that once a sound that has already been heard passes away into the past, it cannot be heard again. As for 'heard hearing': this returns to determining that the verbal teaching can be heard. It means that the preceding sound produces ear-consciousness, and the subsequent sound also produces ear-hearing. Baoliang notes: This directly answers the question. These four propositions are all predicated of nirvāṇa. First, as for 'unheard hearing': 'unheard' refers to nirvāṇa. Before there is capacity and resonance, it is therefore termed 'unheard'; today, when conditions arise, one hears it; hence it is said, 'what was originally unheard is now heard.' As for 'unheard non-hearing': this 'unheard' has the same words as the previous 'unheard' but a different purport. The former raised the essence of nirvāṇa as incapable of being heard; this raises sentient beings' lack of a resonant capacity, so that they do not hear this principle. Another explanation: The former meant that the dharmakāya's extinction is not heard. Hearing and non-hearing only concern sentient beings; it is through delusion that they perceive it, so that although it is heard, it is indeed not heard. As for 'heard non-hearing': because sentient beings have conditional resonance, they temporarily get to hear it. If they do not further advance in virtue, they will not hear it again later; hence it is said 'heard non-hearing.' As for 'heard hearing': because initially there is resonance, one gets to hear it; later, advancing further in virtue, there is the sense of hearing it repeatedly. Zhixiu notes: This comprehensively dispels the objections. Its essence transcends names and marks; it is not a dharma that can be heard. Because relying on the complete gathering of conditions, one gets to hear its name, it is called 'what is unheard is heard.' 'Unheard' is the principle of nirvāṇa, for which those without virtue have no conditions capable of hearing it. 'Heard non-hearing' means that sound is a dharma of hearing, but once it passes away it cannot be heard again. 'Heard hearing' means that dharmas that can be heard depend on conditions, and both previous thought-moments and subsequent thought-moments can be heard.

46.21

"Good son! It is like the unborn being born [up to] the non-arrived not arriving, the arrived not arriving, the arrived arriving."

46.22

Sengliang notes: The meaning of birth is easy to understand, so he adduces it to illustrate hearing. Arriving and not arriving are also like this.

46.23

"World-Honoured One! What is the unborn being born? Good son! [Up to] when first emerging from the womb, this is called the unborn being born."

46.24

Sengliang notes: The saṃskṛta is the conventional truth. Sengzong notes: The five aggregates are the cause, and the practitioner is the fruit; cause and fruit completing each other is 'abiding peacefully.' Baoliang notes: Not yet emerged from the womb is 'unborn'; emerging from the womb is 'born'; hence it says 'the unborn is born.'

46.25

"What is the unborn not being born? Good son! [Up to] this is called the unborn not being born."

46.26

Sengliang notes: Among internal saṃskṛta dharmas, there is none that is unborn; this refers to nirvāṇa. Sengzong notes: Seeking its mark of birth from beginning to end, it is eternally unobtainable.

46.27

"What is the born not being born? Good son! The time of death in conventional truth is called the born not being born."

46.28

Sengliang notes: 'The time of death' is the final thought-moment. The final thought-moment is birth; birth is birth, but past this it is non-birth. Baoliang notes: Originally existing and now non-existent, hence it is said 'the born is not born.'

46.29

"What is the born being born? Good son! [Up to] because of arising from thought-moment to thought-moment, this is called the born being born."

46.30

Sengliang notes: Previous thoughts and subsequent thoughts continue without interruption. Baoliang notes: Being born and born without interruption is the mark of ordinary beings.

46.31

"A bodhisattva of the fourth abode is called the born not being born. Why is this? Because of sovereignty over birth, this is called an internal dharma."

46.32

Sengliang notes: In the third abode, the fetters of seeing the truths are exhausted; in the fourth abode, the fetters of contemplation in the desire realm are exhausted. Regarding birth in the desire realm, although born, they are not born, because of sovereignty over birth. Sengzong notes: They are born through the power of vows, not like the aforementioned 'born being born.' Baoliang notes: In the fourth abode, having completely severed the afflictions of seeing the truths, their birth is a manifested birth, not a birth from actual karma.

46.33

"What are external dharmas' not-yet-born being born, not-yet-born not being born, born not being born, and born being born?"

46.34

Sengliang notes: Why did it previously say 'un-' (不) and here say 'not yet' (未)? Because internally there is nirvāṇa, one can say 'un-'; externally there is no nirvāṇa, so it says 'not yet.' Baoliang notes: The meaning is analogous to the previous one. Only for 'not-yet-born not being born', it would be more convenient to say 'unborn born being born.'

46.35

"Good son! It is like a seed when it has not yet produced a sprout [up to] this is called the born being born of external dharmas."

46.36

Sengliang notes: Having grown into the final body is called the sprout being born; beyond this, it is not; the sprout is what was not yet born. 'Like the sprout growing': the sprout is born but not yet grown; this is called 'the born being born.'

46.37

"Vaiḍūryaprabha Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva [up to] is it permanent or is it impermanent?"

46.38

Sengliang notes: Having already spoken of conventional truth, birth is provisional birth. But outsiders conceptualise four marks, claiming that birth is a real dharma. Now, in order to refute their perverse conceptualisations and establish the meaning of provisional birth, he asks. There are six propositions in the question. Sengzong notes: He further sets forth six objections, which still develop the previous six objections. The Tathāgata just now explained them with four propositions. The first proposition asked about the objection concerning the unheard, borrowing birth to illustrate hearing. Now he transfers the objection from hearing to birth: if one is obstructed regarding the meaning of birth, the meaning of hearing is also blocked; if the meaning of birth is thoroughly explained, the purport of hearing is also explained. Here there are three pairs, forming six across their counterparts. The former objects that the mark of birth cannot give birth to dharmas, and since it does not give birth to dharmas, then dharmas cannot be born, still clinging determinately to complete the previous intent; the middle two objections are the objections on self and other; the latter two are the objections on existence and non-existence. Investigating the continuity of these objections, their intent stems from the Buddha having just explained that unproduced dharmas are non-existent, but present provisional existence arises from causes and conditions. One should know that the principle is unheard, but heard through provisional words. Vaiḍūryaprabha takes up the previous words to raise an objection, now first challenging the essence of birth. 'If birth is permanent' first opens two forks. It means: if the mark of birth is permanent, the defiled should not have birth. Why is this? Since birth is permanent, while the essence of dharmas is impermanent, the two principles are completely opposed. Since they are completely opposed, how could the permanent essence bring about impermanent dharmas? This aims to make the defiled not arise from marks. Baoliang notes: Having above clarified the four propositions such as 'born being born,' those who cling to marks claim that outside defiled dharmas there is a separate mark of birth that comes to produce defiled dharmas; therefore Vaiḍūryaprabha now raises an objection. Now the Buddha harmonises and resolves this: if we speak in terms of principle, precisely when a dharma arises is it called a produced dharma, and when it is absent it is called extinguished; there is no separate mark of birth that comes to produce dharmas. Since his objection's intent is such, below he draws on phenomena to construct three paired objections. One objection opens two forks, thereby becoming six layers. Within one pair, he first posits the premise and then concludes the objection. Positing the first pair, he says: If defiled dharmas have birth, is it because it is permanent that it can produce them? Or is it because it is impermanent that it can produce them? Below he immediately concludes the objection, saying: 'If birth is permanent, defiled dharmas have no birth.' If there were a separate mark of birth that is permanent and produces dharmas, then the produced dharmas would have no birth. If there were a separate mark of birth that is permanent and produces dharmas, then the produced dharmas should also follow the mark of birth in being entirely permanent. Yet now we presently see that defiled dharmas are impermanent from thought-moment to thought-moment; from this we know that these dharmas are not produced by an impermanent mark of birth, and thus defiled dharmas have no mark of birth; hence it is said that defiled dharmas have no birth. Zhixiu notes: The first two propositions raise the objection of permanence and impermanence: if it were permanent, it would be still and unmoving, lacking functional power, so how could it produce dharmas? If it were impermanent, its essence could not establish itself, its power would not reach dharmas, and it could also not produce other things. The next two propositions raise the objection of self-production and producing others. First, he clarifies that as a dharma, birth by principle does not produce itself. If producing others constitutes birth, then undefiled nirvāṇa is not identical to the mark of birth, and is therefore 'other' to birth; why then can it not produce this other? Since it certainly cannot, we know that the sense of the mark of birth producing others as birth is not so. The next two propositions raise the objection regarding original existence and original non-existence. If it produces an already existing dharma, it does not require further production; if it produces a non-existent dharma to make it exist, it should be able to make empty space become existent.

46.39

"If birth is permanent, defiled dharmas have no birth."

46.40

Daosheng notes: Because of perverse arising, there is birth. If birth were permanent, it could not produce the defiled. If the defiled has no birth, whence does it arise? Sengliang notes: The first proposition takes what originally did not exist and now exists as birth. If the defiled has no birth, it is not defiled. The perverse arising of the defiled is called birth; the undefiled does not arise perversely, so it is not birth. The nature of impermanence is extinguished as soon as it is born; birth that is immediately extinguished cannot produce things, so the defiled has no birth; having no birth, it is permanent, and also not defiled. Baoliang notes: If dharmas are not produced by the mark of birth, then defiled dharmas have no mark of birth; if they have no mark of birth, they are not defiled.

46.41

"If birth is impermanent, then the defiled is permanent."

46.42

Daosheng notes: Although it can produce the defiled, impermanence remains in birth and not in the defiled; therefore the defiled is permanent. Sengliang notes: This is the second proposition. Baoliang notes: If it is not marked by the three marks, then by principle defiled dharmas should be permanent.

46.43

"World-Honoured One! If birth can produce itself, birth lacks self-nature."

46.44

Daosheng notes: If it turns into that which is produced, it no longer has self-nature. Sengliang notes: The third proposition. That birth lacks self-nature means: if it produces itself, one entity would have two aspects: first, being that which can produce, and second, receiving production; receiving is not producing, and producing is not receiving, thus losing its nature. Baoliang notes: One should also first posit the objection: it should say, does it produce dharmas by self-nature? Or does it produce by causes and conditions? It now lacks this premise.

46.45

"If it can produce others, by what cause and condition does it not produce the undefiled?"

46.46

Daosheng notes: This is the fourth proposition. The undefiled is other with respect to the defiled; if it has the capacity to produce others, it should also have the capacity to produce the undefiled. Sengzong notes: The undefiled of the ten stages is not without arising through conditions, but this is not spoken with reference to that; it is rather the wondrous essence of spiritual illumination. This wondrous essence transcends existence and non-existence, and is not produced from causes; how could it not know the good?

46.47

"World-Honoured One! If when not yet born there is birth, why only now is it called born?"

46.48

Daosheng notes: It should have been called born early on; why is it so late now? Sengliang notes: The fifth proposition. If when not yet born there is a dharma, and having a dharma is called born, why is it only now called born? Sengzong notes: This objection aims to make dharmas not arise from the mark of birth. Baoliang notes: One should also first posit the premise. This first fork means: if it had already previously obtained the name of born, why only at a later time is it called born?

46.49

"If when not yet born there is no birth, why is empty space not spoken of as born?"

46.50

Daosheng says: Space is also originally non-existent. Sengliang says: This is the sixth proposition. What is not yet born is a non-existent dharma, and space is likewise non-existent. If birth arises from non-existence, why is space not said to be born? Baoliang says: If conditioned dharmas originally lacked characteristics and efficacy of their own, then when that arises this arises, and when that perishes this perishes; they would merely be simultaneous—how could they give birth to dharmas? If both lacked characteristics and efficacy yet could give birth to conditioned dharmas, why is space not said to be born?

46.51

The Buddha said: "Excellent, excellent, good man! That the unborn is born cannot be stated.

46.52

Daosheng says: This answers the sixth proposition. Sengliang says: He first answers the sixth proposition. Birth is a provisional designation; it cannot be stated definitively. What is unborn is non-existence; that birth could give birth to non-existence likewise cannot be stated definitively. Sengzong says: He first answers the sixth objection. The unborn is space. To claim that space is born cannot be stated. Baoliang says: In the latter set there are seven headings, which are explained in sequence below. The first six lines are all indeterminate responses; the last line explains that birth occurs by reason of causes and conditions. 'That the unborn is born cannot be stated' is the first line, showing that there is no fixed unborn nature, nor is there a fixed nature of birth; how could it be stated definitively?

46.53

That the born is born likewise cannot be stated.

46.54

Daosheng says: This answers the fifth proposition. Sengliang says: This is the fifth proposition. Birth already exists; that what already exists is born again likewise cannot be stated definitively. Sengzong says: Next he answers the fifth objection. One cannot speak of birth, for if an already born dharma [were born], there would be the fault of recurring birth. Baoliang says: There is also no single, fixed nature of birth, hence it cannot be stated.

46.55

That the born is unborn likewise cannot be stated.

46.56

Daosheng says: This is addressed to clarify the sixth heading. Sengliang says: The preceding two lines spoke of the existence or non-existence of born dharmas; this speaks of whether the characteristic of birth can give birth to existence or non-existence. The unborn is non-existence; that birth could give birth to non-existence therefore cannot be determined. Sengzong says: Human minds generate doubts one after another. If it is not the case that what has already been born comes to be born, is it then born from that which cannot be born? Now he states that it likewise cannot be spoken of in this way. Baoliang says: There is also no fixed nature of birth or fixed nature of non-birth, hence it cannot be stated.

46.57

That the unborn is unborn likewise cannot be stated.

46.58

Daosheng says: This is addressed to clarify the fifth question. Sengliang says: If what is unborn does not die, that likewise cannot be determined. Sengzong says: He anticipates their intent. The deluded might further think: 'If it is as answered above, then that which can be born is spontaneously born, and that which cannot be born is spontaneously unborn.' Now he states that this also cannot be asserted. Baoliang says: There is also no fixed unborn and fixed unborn; hence he says that because it is attained through cultivating the Path, it cannot be determined.

46.59

Birth likewise cannot be stated.

46.60

Daosheng says: There is again birth and non-birth; now to separate them is likewise impossible. Sengliang says: That apart from the dharma there is a separate characteristic of birth likewise cannot be stated definitively. Sengzong says: He is no longer dispelling delusion; here he separately dispels the substance of birth itself. Borrowing birth to dispel non-birth, how could there be any birth that is graspable? Baoliang says: The preceding four lines dispelled a single grasping, showing that there cannot be said to be any fixed nature. Now these fifth and sixth lines directly dispel the characteristic of birth, showing that one cannot claim there is a separate characteristic of birth apart from the dharma.

46.61

Non-birth likewise cannot be stated.

46.62

Daosheng says: Previously he already set aside birth; now he sets aside non-birth. Sengliang says: If a dharma lacks the characteristic of birth, that likewise cannot be stated definitively. These six lines comprehensively answer the latter two propositions. Sengzong says: Birth originally stands in contrast to non-birth; since birth is ungraspable, how could non-birth be graspable? Baoliang says: One also cannot state definitively that if there were no separate characteristic of birth outside the dharma, this would cause the substance of the dharma to be incapable of being born.

46.63

Because there are causes and conditions, it can also be stated.

46.64

Sengzong says: Causes and conditions mean serving as the other for another. Although a cause does not give birth to itself, it possesses the function of giving birth to another. This answers the fourth and third questions. Birth is giving birth to another; non-birth is the undefiled. Later this is answered separately. Sengzong says: The dispelling becomes increasingly refined. As one enters the ultimate truth, because the ordinary mind becomes bewildered and stifled, he speaks of having causes and conditions. Baoliang says: The preceding six lines show indeterminacy; this seventh line shows that when conditions combine, there is birth, and when they do not combine, there is no birth.

46.65

"Why is it that 'the unborn is born' cannot be stated? [...] For what reason? Because of its birth."

46.66

Daosheng says: This explains and answers the two questions and seven propositions. Since it is called unborn, yet one speaks of its birth, this would mean that the unborn constitutes birth. Sengliang says: Birth is termed arising; non-birth means non-arising. If it is termed birth, then this is arising. For non-arising to constitute arising—how could that be stated? Sengzong says: This reiterates the explanation of the reason. How could it be that from complete non-existence, it suddenly comes to be born? Therefore, we know there is an intelligible principle of that which can be born. Baoliang says: What is unborn is now born; how could one definitively say that what is born is born, or that what is unborn is definitively unborn?

46.67

"Why is it that 'the born is born' cannot be stated? That the born is born because of birth, and that the born is unborn because of birth, likewise cannot be stated."

46.68

Daosheng says: If birth had already occurred prior, it should not be born again now. Sengliang says: 'The born is born because of birth' first establishes the designation of born being born, meaning that by virtue of birth, the born is born. 'Unborn because of birth' means: 'because' refers to the prior birth, and 'unborn' refers to the subsequent birth. Because of the prior birth's arising, the subsequent birth is not born. Sengzong says: The challenger wished to have an already existent dharma arise in the future and at the present time. Now it says 'unborn because of birth' refers to non-birth in the future. 'The born is born because of birth' refers to birth existing in the present. Baoliang says: 'The born is born because of birth'—this single line first establishes the position. Ordinary beings continue from birth to birth, hence it is designated as birth; yet there is no single fixed nature. When it says below 'unborn because of birth', the designation is obtained in contrast with it; where could there be a single, fixed nature of birth?

46.69

"Why is it that 'the born is unborn' cannot be stated? [...] Because birth does not give birth to itself, it cannot be stated."

46.70

Sengliang says: 'Birth is immediately named birth' first establishes the name of birth. 'Birth does not give birth to itself' means that it must give birth to a dharma that can be born, not to a dharma that cannot be born. Sengzong says: The non-existence prior to birth is not like a hare's horn; hence it says 'birth is immediately named birth.' Baoliang says: It is precisely because of the coming together of causes and conditions that it is named birth; when causes and conditions do not meet, it is named non-birth.

46.71

"Why is it that 'the unborn is unborn' cannot be stated? [...] For what reason? Because it is attained through cultivating the Path."

46.72

Sengliang says: Nirvāṇa is unborn, hence it cannot be stated, yet because it can be attained through practice, it is metaphorically called born. Sengzong says: Unborn dharmas do not surpass nirvāṇa; yet it is still attained through cultivating the Path—how could one say that the unborn is completely unborn? Baoliang says: When the myriad goods are complete, nirvāṇa is attained; how could it be stated definitively?

46.73

"Why is it that birth likewise cannot be stated? Because birth is non-existent."

46.74

Sengliang says: Although the resultant dharma exists, birth itself is non-existent. Sengzong says: The preceding four lines answered the objections and finished dispelling attachments; now he directly dispels the substance of birth itself. Baoliang says: This specifically dispels the characteristic of birth.

46.75

"Why is it that non-birth cannot be stated? Because there is attainment."

46.76

Sengliang says: If there is attainment, then there is activity; if there is activity, that is precisely birth. Sengzong says: If there were definitively a non-birth that could be stated, then there would eternally be no birth. Baoliang says: If it is conditioned, then it is born; how could it be stated definitively?

46.77

"Why is it that 'because there are causes and conditions, it can also be stated'? [...] For this reason, it can also be stated."

46.78

Sengliang says: 'Serving as a cause for birth' means that from ignorance up to existence, these ten dharmas serve as causes for birth; this is the meaning of giving birth to another rather than giving birth to oneself. Sengzong says: Within the path of conventional truth, they serve as causes for birth. Baoliang says: When the preceding ten causes pass away and the next dharma of birth arises, it is immediately designated as birth; therefore, it can be stated as birth.

46.79

"Good man! Do not enter into profound emptiness samādhi now. For what reason? Because the great assembly is of dull faculties."

46.80

Sengliang says: 'Profound emptiness samādhi' means that if one seeks the definitive characteristics of dharmas, then emptiness is profound. Sengzong says: He curbs his previous inclination, hence he says 'do not enter into emptiness samādhi.' Baoliang says: What was spoken above drew upon existence to discuss principle; testing them further, he means that they should not think he spoke on this basis.

46.81

"Good man! Of conditioned dharmas, birth is also permanent; because abiding is impermanent, birth is also impermanent.

46.82

Daosheng says: This answers the question on permanence and impermanence. Conditioned phenomena are permanent through continuity; hence he says birth is also permanent. Sengliang says: This answers the first two propositions. As for the appellation of 'conditioned': when discussing their arising and perishing, the conditioned dharma arises from it—this is birth; because of continuity, it abides; because of changing, it differs; because of perishing, it decays. The four characteristics are simultaneous. A present dharma arising is existent and should be permanent, for at the time of arising there is abiding; yet because birth succeeds perishing, abiding is impermanent, and therefore birth is impermanent. Sengzong says: It is not entirely permanent, nor is it entirely impermanent. It is by being both permanent and impermanent that dharmas can be born. Birth succeeds birth in continuity, hence it is called permanent. Baoliang says: Outside the dharma there is no separate characteristic of birth; it is just that at the moment of birth its position does not alter, so it can also be called permanent; because abiding intervenes, it is then named impermanent. The four characteristics in their respective moments are all like this.

46.83

Abiding is also permanent; because birth gives birth, abiding is also impermanent.

46.84

Sengliang says: Abiding is also existent, and existence should also be permanent; yet because of the two births, prior and posterior, abiding is also impermanent. Sengzong says: This abiding has its substance brought into being by birth, so it cannot abide permanently; this is why it is impermanent.

46.85

Difference is also permanent; because the dharma is impermanent, difference is also impermanent.

46.86

Sengliang says: The transformation of a dharma is termed difference. Because the dharma is impermanent, difference must likewise be so. Sengzong says: By analogy with the previous line, it should also say 'difference is permanent; because decay is impermanent, difference is also impermanent.' The phrasing here is mutually complementary. Now, mentioning 'the dharma' indicates that both that which is born and that which can give birth are equally conditioned. Furthermore, earlier it was said: 'If birth is impermanent, then defilement is permanent.' Since the phrasing was interrelated, this line clarifies that the dharma is likewise impermanent.

46.87

Decay is also permanent; because what was originally non-existent is now existent [...] because it can sever and extinguish, it is named impermanent.

46.88

Sengliang says: When a dharma ends in extinction, its substance from beginning to end is complete and can receive the name of existence. This existence is originally non-existent and now existent, and is therefore impermanent. Sengzong says: The nature of being originally non-existent and now existent is not permanent in its meaning; because it is decay, decay is also impermanent.

46.89

"Good man! Before defiled dharmas are born [...] when father and mother unite, there is immediately birth.

46.90

Sengliang says: Having the nature of birth before being born means that committing evil is perverse and will inevitably bring about perverse retribution. The principle of birth already exists before being born; the nature of goodness is not perverse and does not bring about perverse retribution. The undefiled has no principle of birth; this answers the earlier proposition that the undefiled is unborn. Sengzong says: Above it asked why the truth of cessation and the undefiled are not born; now it clarifies that the truth of cessation cannot be born by characteristics, but can only be realized through an illuminating cause. Baoliang says: This comprehensively explains the third proposition and the objections of the following four propositions.

46.91

At that time, Bodhisattva Vaiḍūryaprabha [...] 'I wish again to inquire; may you deign to grant permission.'

46.92

Sengliang says: Expressing understanding, he also asks on behalf of Bodhisattva Abhaya.

46.93

At that time, the World-Honoured One addressed Bodhisattva Abhaya [...] 'Having sharp and swift wisdom, upon hearing he will be able to understand.'

46.94

Baoliang notes: The question has two intentions. First, it asks by what karmic deeds one is born in the pure land. Second, it asks by what karmic deeds those bodhisattvas attained such great awesome virtue.

46.95

At that time, the World-Honoured One spoke verses, saying: […] the secret treasury of all Buddhas is born in the Land of the Immovable.

46.96

Sengliang notes: The reason why the World-Honoured One Full Moon did not answer there was that the matter was manifested here, where eighty-four thousand beings awakened upon hearing it once. It means that the question was understood on its own without waiting for an explanation. The bodhisattvas of that land felt ashamed of their dullness, and inevitably aspired to be born in that pure land; this was why Vaiḍūryaprabhā made the inquiry. Baoliang says: In all, there are twenty-one lines of verse, clarifying that by practicing the ten virtues and abandoning the ten non-virtues one is born in that land. This first answers the first question.

46.97

At that time, the bodhisattva-mahāsattva Fearless […] by the conditions of the deeds performed, attained birth in that land.

46.98

Sengliang notes: This signifies his understanding.

46.99

This Bodhisattva King of High and Noble Virtue Whose Light Shines Everywhere […] kinnaras, mahoragas, and the like.

46.100

Sengliang notes: Since he himself had not yet awakened, following the opportunity of requesting the Dharma, he requested again on behalf of the assembly. Sengzong says: Fearless further restated the question of the Noble Virtue King to request an answer. Baoliang says: The reason why he asked the Buddha to answer the Noble Virtue King's previous question concerning reaching and not reaching is precisely to dispel Fearless's later question; the meaning is revealed below.

46.101

At that time, the World-Honoured One said to King of High and Noble Virtue Whose Light Shines Everywhere: […] for what causes and conditions is it that the not-yet-reached is the not-reached?

46.102

Baoliang notes: The following text explains it in sequence.

46.103

"Good son! What is meant by 'not reaching' is mahānirvāṇa […] due to the cause and condition of the afflictions, it is called 'reaching the reached.'"

46.104

Sengliang notes: For those of dull faculties, whose capability cannot grasp it at once, it requires further explanation. Above, reaching and not reaching were used as a metaphor for hearing and not hearing; now the metaphor is explained first.

46.105

"Good son! Hearing what has not been heard is also like this […] for this reason it is called 'hearing what has not been heard.'"

46.106

Sengliang notes: Having explained the metaphor, he applies it back to the four phrases on hearing and the rest. Among the six objections, these four answer the first objection, and also concurrently answer the second, third, and fourth objections. 'Hearing what has not been heard' explains the second objection. Due to the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, hearing what has not been heard explains the third and fourth objections. The name being hearable explains the fifth and sixth objections. From 'because it is not conditioned' to 'because it is not preached': the three dharmas are not sounds and cannot be heard; prajñā transcends all characteristics and cannot be spoken of in terms of existence or nonexistence; the dharmakāya has no fixed form and cannot be seen by gods or humans; therefore, nirvāṇa cannot be spoken of. As for 'because its name can be heard': although the body and wisdom have no fixed designation and the four names cannot be spoken of as different, the names of permanence and bliss can be heard. Baoliang says: Having finished explaining the meaning, the reason he again raises the phrases on hearing what is heard and the like to conclude is to provide the basis for the subsequent explanation.

46.107

At that time, the Bodhisattva King of High and Noble Virtue Whose Light Shines Everywhere […] how can you say permanence, bliss, self, and purity?

46.108

Sengliang notes: The first objection. If it is attained by severing the afflictions, it must be impermanent. Sengzong says: This objection arises by picking up on the phrasing. There are six objections in total; this first one presents 'originally absent, now existing' as a challenge. Baoliang says: If it was originally absent and now exists, how can it be called permanent?

46.109

"Furthermore, World-Honoured One! Whatever is due to adornment […] because it accomplishes the causes and conditions of nirvāṇa, it is called impermanent."

46.110

Sengliang notes: The second objection. That which is attained through adornment is also impermanent. Baoliang says: In worldly matters, things are accomplished through adornment. If nirvāṇa were also adorned by the myriad practices, how could it be called permanent?

46.111

"Furthermore, World-Honoured One! To have a name is impermanent […] for this reason, it is called impermanent."

46.112

Sengliang notes: The third objection. If it can be attained, then it is impermanent. Baoliang says: All things that exist are impermanent. In the past, the Buddha said, 'If the holy ones of the three vehicles have nirvāṇa...'; by this reasoning, it should be impermanent.

46.113

"Furthermore, World-Honoured One! A phenomenon that can be seen […] then one can sever all afflictions."

46.114

Sengliang notes: The fourth objection. Because it is visible, it is impermanent. Baoliang says: If afflictions are severed by seeing nirvāṇa, it cannot be permanent.

46.115

"Furthermore, World-Honoured One! Just as space […] if it is not so, how can it be called permanent?"

46.116

Sengliang notes: The fifth objection. Because it is not universally shared, it is impermanent. Sengzong says: Since it is not equal, how can it be called permanent? Baoliang says: If it is permanent, it should be like space; yet there is attaining and not attaining, so it should not be permanent.

46.117

"Just as someone who reveres and makes offerings […] if it does not exist, how can it be spoken of?"

46.118

Sengliang notes: The sixth objection. Because it has a name, it is impermanent. Sengzong says: Because it does not escape being named, we know it is impermanent. Baoliang says: If there are distinctions between permanence, bliss, self, and purity, it cannot be called permanent either.

46.119

At that time, the World-Honoured One said to King of High and Noble Virtue Whose Light Shines Everywhere: […] it is not originally absent and now existing; therefore, it is permanent.

46.120

Sengliang notes: Answering the first objection. Nirvana not being originally existent means that nirvāṇa has cessation by nature as its cause, and the body and wisdom have continuous cessation as their cause. The cause is not originally absent, and the fruit is not originally existent. Conditioned causes are impermanent, and their fruits are also impermanent; unconditioned causes are permanent, and their fruits are also permanent. What all Buddhas take as their teacher is the Dharma. Because the Dharma is permanent, all Buddhas are permanent. Sengzong says: Previously there were six objections; now he answers only four, and the remaining last two objections are coarse and therefore not answered. This answers the first objection, stating that nirvāṇa is not originally absent and now existing. Baoliang says: 'Not originally absent and now existing' means that saṃsāra relies on the tathāgatagarbha. Therefore, the doctrine of our school says: the spiritual consciousness has the nature of deliberative awareness, but it is deluded amidst conditions, and thus gives rise to saṃsāra; if awakening arises through conditions of principle, the false perishes and the true remains, possessing the function of the myriad virtues.

46.121

"Good son! Just like a well in a dark room […] one should not say that it is originally absent and now existing."

46.122

Baoliang notes: Because it is covered by ignorance, it is not seen; it is clear that it is not originally absent and now existing.

46.123

"Good son! As to your statement that because of adornment […] adorns oneself, and only then sees it."

46.124

Sengliang notes: Answering the second objection. The place free of afflictions is true nirvāṇa; this place is tranquil and cannot be adorned. You merely adorn yourself in seeking it; it is not that you adorn nirvāṇa. Baoliang says: Because hindrances are eliminated, the true is revealed; it is definitively not that true existence only arises when delusion is exhausted.

46.125

"Good son! Just as underground there is water of eight flavours […] then one obtains it; nirvāṇa is also like this."

46.126

Sengliang notes: Answering the third objection. Baoliang says: Because people do not know of the underground water, they call it non-existent. When they dig, they will certainly see it; how could it be called newly existent? The true substance of nirvāṇa is revealed through practicing goodness; it is not produced by a generative cause—how could it be impermanent?

46.127

"Just as a blind person does not see the sun and the moon […] originally possessed beforehand, not just appearing now."

46.128

Sengliang notes: Answering the fourth objection. Baoliang says: In establishing the name of nirvāṇa, the principle has two pathways: first, establishing the designation in terms of the two functions; second, assigning the name in terms of essence and characteristics. Here it is discussed based on essence. If one explains the function with respect to the true, its myriad virtues are also permanent.

46.129

"Good son! Just as when a guilty man is imprisoned in a jail […] wife, children, and kin; nirvāṇa is also like this."

46.130

Sengliang notes: Answering the fifth objection. Baoliang says: Although the single fifth objection cited three metaphors, this single reply now explains them comprehensively. Like those worldly people: if they are respectful and cautious, they are always safe; but if their conduct deviates, they fall into the net. Yet parents originally and inherently exist; it is only that sentient beings are inverted in saṃsāra—how could nirvāṇa only newly exist?

46.131

"Good son! As to your statement that due to causes and conditions […] can then be called the cause of mahānirvāṇa."

46.132

Sengliang notes: Having already answered them separately, he further returns to explain that the cause of nirvāṇa is a revealing cause and not a productive cause, and is therefore permanent. Baoliang says: He raises the second question again to explain it further. Previously, he said it was not accomplished by adornment; now he says it is manifested from a revealing cause and not generated from a productive cause.

46.133

At that time, the Bodhisattva King of High and Noble Virtue Whose Light Shines Everywhere […] this is nirvāṇa, this is mahānirvāṇa.

46.134

Sengliang notes: Practicing the sūtras and seeing emptiness, one integrates the two truths and can accomplish the six perfections; this is dāna. As for 'this is pāramitā': seeing the ultimate truth means seeing conventional truth. Baoliang says: Following this explanation, the Noble Virtue King asks two further questions: first, why the six perfections are called pāramitā, while some do not receive that name; second, what is nirvāṇa, and what is mahānirvāṇa?

46.135

"Good son! What is giving and not a pāramitā? […] as broadly explained in the Avataṃsaka Sūtra."

46.136

Sengliang notes: Within characteristics there is dāna and non-dāna, without speaking of emptiness; it goes so far as not seeing the giver or the recipient. Baoliang says: This directly answers the first question. The essence of the gates of practice must necessarily transcend conceptual attachment; if one sees that there is a practice to be practiced, discrimination is formed. Therefore, bodhisattvas apply their minds appropriately, not seeing an agent of giving or an object of giving, and not seeing that there is a practice to be practiced, yet they can give greatly, cultivating the cause and attaining the fruit without deviating from the Middle Way. If it is like this, it is called a pāramitā. The reason for this is precisely that bodhisattvas forget the three [wheels], comprehending that all dharmas are empty and provisional, not seeing a giver or a recipient, being completely devoid of nature and characteristics. Without this understanding of emptiness, it cannot be called a pāramitā. Therefore the sūtra says: 'Seeing that there is a beggar and only then giving—this is giving, but not a pāramitā.'"

46.137

Collected Commentaries on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Fascicle Forty-Six

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大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese