大般涅槃經集解 52
English (machine translation) 52
- Language
- English
52.1
Broadly explaining that the nature of the mind is fundamentally pure and does not co-arise with greed; four propositions explaining the meaning of greed, including the mind co-arising with greed but not ceasing together with greed, etc.
52.2
Chapter on the Noble King, the Eighth
52.3
"Good son, how does a bodhisattva-mahāsattva […] the mind is well liberated and wisdom is well liberated?"
52.4
Sengliang comments: There are nine dharmas in total, the sequence by which śrāvakas seek buddhahood. The first four dharmas pertain to fragmentary causes and effects, the middle three dharmas pertain to the practice of the Great Vehicle, and the final two dharmas accomplish the affairs of buddhahood. / Baoliang comments: The nine matters are explained in sequence in the text below. The five aggregates are the result and the five views are the cause; because the cause is severed, it says severing the aggregates. / Baoliang comments: The name 'merit' is a designation of praise. And the eighth merit takes the nine collections of dharmas as its substance; it is what initial learners practice and the essential path supporting nirvāṇa. The nine collections broadly discussed do not exceed two intentions: the first two collections clarify what is abandoned; the latter seven collections discuss what is attained. What is abandoned refers to eliminating the five aggregates and the five views. If one describes what is attained, there are seven collections. Within the seven collections, it also does not go beyond one's own practice and transforming others. Therefore, the single matter of guarding and the four immeasurables together serve to benefit beings. Yet these two matters are praised primarily for vast salvation and are classified under transforming others; the remaining five collections, such as the six recollections, are all named based on personal virtue.
52.5
"Good son! How does a bodhisattva sever the five things […] For this reason, by skillful means he causes them to be severed."
52.6
Sengliang states: In the Hīnayāna, one loathes suffering and severs the five aggregates. Baoliang states: Having relied on the six practices, in principle one puts all mental clinging out of mind, and there is also no good that is not planted. Therefore, having taken the mind as teacher across accumulated kalpas, one must rely on this principle and teaching to escape. For this reason, beginners first contemplate the five aggregates as the foundation. Having understood that the body is illusory, they will certainly cultivate good and sever [afflictions]; hence now one begins by contemplating the five aggregates. Regarding the hundred and eight feelings, this is a method of reckoning. Feeling comprises the three feelings, and the three feelings are of two kinds: pure feeling and impure feeling. When classified among the six sense faculties, both feelings apply alike, so within one faculty there are six. If each of the six faculties possesses six, then six times six makes thirty-six. When divided across the three time periods, they become one hundred and eight feelings.
52.7
"How does a bodhisattva distance himself from the five things […] Therefore, the bodhisattva guards against them and does not approach them."
52.8
Sengliang states: If one wishes to extinguish the five aggregates, one must first eliminate the five views. Baoliang states: This is the second group. Views are by nature inquisitiveness; they are the heavy states of heterodox grasping, and based on these five, the sixty-two views are extensively generated. The bodhisattva knows that these are the root of saṃsāra, and for this reason guards against them so that they do not arise.
52.9
"How does a bodhisattva accomplish the six things […] This is called a bodhisattva accomplishing the six things."
52.10
Sengliang states: The view of the Path arises from the Path, so the Path is expounded in sequence. Hearing that cultivating concentration among corpses causes much fear, [the Buddha] instructs them to cultivate the six recollections to remove their fear. Sengzong states: The first three recollections are external recollections; next, precepts and giving are internal practices; the final recollection of devas is the future fruition. Baoliang states: This is the third group. Ever since the Buddha appeared in the world there have been these six; they were already extensively explained in the 'Chapter on Pure Practices'.
52.11
"How does a bodhisattva cultivate and amass the five things […] Therefore, the bodhisattva diligently cultivates and amasses them."
52.12
Sengliang states: Due to recollection, concentration is accomplished. The first four are the dhyānas, and the last one is wisdom. Possessing these four dharmas, one departs from the suffering of fractional [samsāra]. Sengzong states: First, 'knowing-concentration' refers to dhyāna-concentration. From 'using sound as a thorn to arouse the mind of perception' onward, it sequentially explains the various dhyānas. 'Tranquil concentration' means that in the second dhyāna, concentration is steadfast and not disturbed by initial or sustained thought; the various consciousnesses are extinguished, making it tranquil concentration. 'Physical and mental bliss' refers to the fulfillment of the bliss-limb in the third dhyāna. 'Blissless' means that from the fourth dhyāna up to the stage of neither perception nor non-perception, there are no marks of the four feelings. Based on these four concentrations, one can produce the Śūraṅgama [samādhi]. Baoliang states: In the fourth group there are five things: First is called 'knowing-concentration', as concentration in the first dhyāna has not yet avoided initial and sustained thought, hence it receives the name 'knowing'. Second, 'tranquil concentration', is where in the second dhyāna initial and sustained thought have already been extinguished, the mind's thoughts turn quiet, and external conditions are difficult to stir, hence it is called 'tranquil concentration'. Third, 'concentration experiencing bliss', is because the second dhyāna is still carried away by joy, not yet like the third dhyāna where surging joy has already been severed and body and mind are serene and peaceful, hence it receives the name 'experiencing bliss'. Fourth, 'blissless concentration', is where in the fourth dhyāna bliss is extinguished and there are no longer discriminative thoughts, taking neutral feeling as its essence, hence it is called 'blissless concentration'. If one can attain these four concentrations, forget marks amidst conditions, accord with the two truths—the ultimate and the conventional—and exhaust the depths of wisdom and understanding, it is called the Śūraṅgama Samādhi.
52.13
"How does a bodhisattva guard the one thing […] Therefore, the bodhisattva guards the one dharma."
52.14
Sengliang states: This is initially arousing the mind to seek buddhahood. Baoliang states: This is the fifth group, meaning the bodhicitta. Bodhi means the Path; this is the mind initially practiced by the practitioner: first, to seek the Buddha-fruit from afar, and second, to deliver all living beings. If one can guard this mind, one will certainly attain bodhi.
52.15
"How does a bodhisattva draw near to the four things […] Therefore, the bodhisattva focuses his mind and draws near to them."
52.16
Sengliang states: Nurturing bodhi relies on the four immeasurables. Baoliang states: This is the sixth group. Although the arousal of the mind was just explained, if one does not perform practices, then there is no way to attain the fruit. Now, explaining outward conversion, by conferring the four equanimities and three minds, one aspires that both oneself and others be equally at peace. If one cultivates this benevolence to completion, one ascends to the first ground. Although there are four differences, they generally constitute a single benevolence; it is merely explained according to stages from the perspective of a beginner's practice.
52.17
"How does a bodhisattva faithfully accord with the one reality […] Therefore, the bodhisattva faithfully accords and does not go against it."
52.18
Sengliang states: When the four equanimities are accomplished, one is able to enter the Mahāyāna. Baoliang states: This is the seventh group. 'Reality' refers to the Mahāyāna's signless understanding; the bodhisattva knows that grasping at marks is a fault and abandoning marks is the Path; the principle reverts to the one reality, and there is no other path.
52.19
"How does a bodhisattva have a mind well liberated […] and attain now where he had never attained before."
52.20
Sengliang states: Because one enters the Mahāyāna, one thereafter fully possesses the two things. Baoliang states: The remaining eighth and ninth groups are simply differentiated in meaning into two minds. The reason one is not at ease is that craving and attachment serve as obstacles; if inspecting objects and thoughts are clear, it is certainly due to being unobstructed. Now, since defilements are exhausted, there are no delusions that can bind and all dark functioning is eliminated, so it is called liberation of mind. When there was confusion, one was not clear about objects. Now, there is no obstruction that can hinder wisdom, hence it is called liberation through wisdom. Beginners, however, must proceed from the shallow to the deep; therefore, it first takes the aggregates as the beginning and the completion of wisdom as the end.
52.21
At that time, Bodhisattva-Mahāsattva All-Illuminating High and Noble Virtue King […] 'The mind is liberated'—this meaning is not so."
52.22
Sengzong states: This challenges the eighth item above, that the mind should not be liberated. Examining the beginning, it uses substantial entities to raise the objection, broadly setting up analogies to explain that the mind has neither bondage nor liberation. The second objection's intent is that craving also exists; since the mind inherently has the nature of craving, it cannot be liberated. The third says that 'it is only generated after seeing marks', using this to prove that craving is not only in the mind, but craving also exists in the object. Precisely because there is craving in the mind and craving in the object, their nature is inherently like this—how could it be altered? The fourth objection says it is indeterminate. If craving definitely arose toward a single object, then one could definitely eliminate it with the contemplation of impurity. Now, toward a single object, one sometimes generates craving, or sometimes generates anger or delusion; the mind is also indeterminate, sometimes arousing craving, or sometimes arousing anger or delusion. Thus both mind and object are indeterminate. Since they are indeterminate they cannot be severed, and since they cannot be severed there is no liberation. Baoliang states: For those who have not yet penetrated, every encounter with phenomena becomes an attachment; thus they say the mind is inherently free from bondage and should not be called liberated. Therefore, Virtue King now presents the fixed-nature attachments of four schools, requesting the Buddha to explain them, refuting the false and revealing the true. The first school says: When the six consciousnesses initially contact conditions, they occupy the position of mind. However, the arising of the functions of craving and anger must occur before the aggregate of volitional formations; since at the moment of the conscious mind there is not yet craving, how can one speak of bondage? Below, it then adduces eight matters to prove and establish the meaning of the mind having no bondage. The second school grasps the idea that craving also exists, explaining that craving, anger, and even liberation all exist simultaneously, like a bundle of bamboo, but their functioning occurs in sequence, which is why it does not make two kinds of analogies to prove it. The third school grasps from 'like drilling for fire' onward, explaining that among the various conditions, each has a little craving. Just as five conditions generate visual consciousness, and within each single condition there is the nature and function of consciousness, they must assemble together to co-produce craving. The fourth school grasps that the mind is also indeterminate, craving and liberation being inherent natures, neither arising from causes and conditions.
52.23
"Why? The mind is inherently free from bondage […] by what causes and conditions could it be bound?"
52.24
Sengliang states: Above, the practice of attaining the three liberations was explained, attaining the Middle Way's meaning of emptiness. In preparing to expound the Middle Way, [the sūtra] first explains the three views that do not accord with the Middle Way. First, it explains the view that there is no fruit in the cause. The mind inherently being unbound means: just as visual consciousness grasps visible form without yet having defilement, it is not bound by defilement. Sengzong states: Craving and the pure mind arise and cease, never encountering each other; this is what is meant by 'all dharmas do not depend on one another', down to 'they do not abide for a single thought-moment'.
52.25
"Just as a person milking a horn inherently has no mark of milk […] how could the knot of craving bind the mind?"
52.26
Sengliang states: When it is the mind, there is no craving, so it is not the cause of craving; since the cause does not even arise, by what cause could it bind the mind?
52.27
"World-Honoured One! Just as oil cannot be obtained by pressing sand […] how can it be said that the mind attains liberation?"
52.28
Sengliang states: The mind and the stain of craving—the pure and the defiled—do not coexist. 'How could it defile the mind' means: even if craving arises later, the preceding mind has already passed away; one exists and the other does not, so how could it defile the mind?
52.29
"World-Honoured One! Craving also exists. If craving did not exist […] if the mind possessed craving, how could it see marks?"
52.30
Sengzong states: This is the second objection. 'Just as when a person sees a painted woman' guards against and refutes the explanation. Others commonly explain: 'Encountering conditions, craving arises; craving stems from the object, so why must it be in the mind?' If one provides this explanation, now it is refuted again with an analogy. When craving arises toward a painted woman, how could this painting be craving? One should know it is in the mind.
52.31
"Only then does it arise; one who does not see marks […] why do they not arise for the buddhas and bodhisattvas?"
52.32
Sengliang states: The second explains that craving exists inherently, taking craving as its nature, and there is also no liberation. This clarifies that it does not exist solely in the mind, but also in the conditions. Sengzong states: This is the third passage. If there is craving in the object, and the mind also has a nature of craving, the two places assist each other and its nature is heavy, thus causing one to fall into the evil destinies.
52.33
"World-Honoured One! The mind is also indeterminate. If the mind were determinate […] cultivating the Great Nirvāṇa, the mind attains liberation."
52.34
Sengliang states: The third is the indeterminate approach. It clarifies that if the mind is determinate, there is no craving; if it is indeterminate, there is no mind; in both cases there is no liberation. The rest below are analogous. Sengzong states: This is the fourth objection.
52.35
At that time, the World-Honoured One said to All-Illuminating […] because all dharmas are without self-nature.
52.36
Sengliang states: The preceding three objections sought a determinate characteristic of phenomena; seeking determinacy, all are found to be non-existent, so [the text] praises one's ability to understand this. Sengzong says: This answers the first objection. 'Neither bound by greed': in actual phenomena there is no bondage. 'Nor unbound': in terms of conventional designations there is bondage; liberation and non-liberation are likewise so. 'Neither existent nor non-existent': actual phenomena spontaneously cease in their own moment, hence they are not existent as something enduring through time without cessation; yet spoken of in terms of their continuity they are not non-existent, for they form a single phenomenon from start to finish. 'Not past': it is not that bondage and liberation, down to being seen and subdued, exist exclusively in the past; the future is likewise so. Speaking of conventional continuity extending across the three periods of time, one may say that there is original bondage and present liberation. Precisely by aligning with the principle of conventional and real, the first objection is resolved. Baoliang says: Intending to refute what they grasp, he first briefly explains the correct principle and afterwards refutes their grasping minds. 'Neither bound by the fetter of greed': because greed has not yet arisen in the prior conscious mind, it is said to be not bound. 'Nor unbound': these words have two senses: first, explaining bondage within the real account; second, clarifying bondage within conventional continuity. If greed has previously arisen in a single thought-moment and the antidote has not yet arrived to overturn it, one may say that the mind is constantly bound; this is bondage in the real account. If spoken in terms of the continuum, its function is engaged only when the subsequent arrives and binds the prior, whereupon greed arises in the mind. It requires the subsequent mind to give rise to greed and defile the prior, hence it is also not unbound. 'Nor is it liberated': when the mind of the path arises, there are no delusions to be severed, hence it is not liberated. Having originally been deluded and now being enlightened, it is also not unliberated. If causes and conditions have not yet converged, it is said to be not existent; when conditions converge and it immediately arises, it is said to be not non-existent. 'Not of the three times': this clarifies that within the three times their very substance immediately ceases—the past is already gone, the future has not yet arisen, and the present does not abide; how could there be greed? Why is this? Because phenomena have no self-nature.
52.37
"Good sons! There are heterodox paths who make such statements: [...] form has the meaning of attachment, and the mind has a nature of greed."
52.38
Baoliang states: Next, he refutes the false attachments of the heterodox paths. He begins by refuting the third school up to the first, and afterwards refutes the fourth school. Refuting the third school, he says that the heterodox lack wisdom, asserting that each within the aggregates has a nature of greed; all of this is false attachment.
52.39
"They further say that the ordinary person's mind has a nature of greed: [...] Although they make this statement, this meaning is not so."
52.40
Sengliang states: This establishes their biased view, refuting the fault of those who previously claimed existence. 'Completely devoid of fruit' establishes the fault of claiming non-existence. Sengzong says: What the correct principle clarifies is that all phenomena lack determinacy; when conditions converge, they exist; when conditions separate, they do not exist. Because there is no determinacy, those two objections naturally dissolve. Baoliang says: Next, he refutes the second school.
52.41
"There are ordinary persons who further make this statement: [...] because the coarse is impermanent, the fruit is also impermanent."
52.42
Baoliang states: This refutes the attachment of the first school, which claims that the subtle and pervasive is permanent while the coarse is impermanent, just as the conscious mind has no greed, and only in the fourth [aggregate] is there greed.
52.43
"Good sons! There are ordinary persons who further make this statement: [...] transmigrating through the six destinies and undergoing birth and death in full."
52.44
Baoliang states: This refutes the fourth school. Conditioned phenomena of arising and cessation all arise from conditions, and therefore do not exist spontaneously of themselves.
52.45
"Good sons! Just as, for instance, a collared dog tied to a post [...] falling back from the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception into the three bad destinies."
52.46
Sengliang states: Regarding 'the subtle is permanent and the coarse is impermanent': when fine dust particles unite they form conditions, and when they disperse they return to the original substance. The particles are permanent while the conditions are impermanent, yet the particles themselves have no conditions. 'Unable to know the causes and conditions of the mind': clinging to the existence or non-existence of causes and fruits, they fail to understand the causes and conditions of the mind. Baoliang says: He uses six similes to broadly rebuke the schemes of the heterodox paths.
52.47
"Good sons! The Buddhas and bodhisattvas never definitively say [...] a fruit that is neither existent nor non-existent."
52.48
Sengliang states: Having explained the bias of those positing existence or non-existence, he intends to clarify that none of the four attachments accords with the middle path, answering the third objection regarding indeterminacy. Sengzong says: This answers the fourth objection. Existence and non-existence cannot be definitively stated; but when there is existence, it arises through manifold conditions. From a single object arise three and up to immeasurable [mental states]; what objection could there be to this? One need only recognize the conditions of understanding and delusion. Baoliang says: From here below he explains the correct principle. Intending to clarify the middle path, he first brings forward the false doctrines. If one definitively constructs these four propositions—conceiving that there is a fruit in the cause, that there is no fruit in the cause, that it is half-existent and half-non-existent, or that it is neither existent nor non-existent—in none of these cases does one escape birth and death; one will inevitably be bound to demonic doctrines. If one remains at ease, accords with the middle path, does not deviate from the correct principle, and harbors no attachments in mind, this is called the middle path. Although the Buddhas and bodhisattvas speak of the Dharma as neither existent nor non-existent, they also do not definitively assert existence. If it were existent, one could definitively state it, but existence is not existence, nor is non-existence something that can be non-existent; how could it be definitive? Just as visual consciousness is produced by five conditions: if one condition is missing, the consciousness does not arise. Yet this consciousness does not definitively belong to any single condition, nor is it produced in the interval between them; when conditions are complete it manifests, being neither existent nor non-existent. Because it arises from causes and conditions, it is called existent; because its substance lacks self-nature, it is described as non-existent. If one explains it in this way, comprehending that the ten thousand phenomena are empty and free from both existence and non-existence, this is called the correct principle.
52.49
"If one says that the fruit definitely pre-exists in the cause [...] they do not know the characteristics of mind or the characteristics of greed."
52.50
Sengliang states: This explains why he does not state the faults of those who hold such views. Baoliang says: Having already briefly clarified that conditioned phenomena are neither definitively existent nor definitively non-existent, below he brings forth the substance of delusion to contrast with it. Arising from conditions, it is therefore not non-existent; greed lacks self-nature, it is therefore not existent. Both greed and liberation lack self-nature.
52.51
"Good sons! The Buddhas and bodhisattvas reveal the middle path [...] neither existent nor non-existent, yet not definitive."
52.52
Sengliang states: Being neither non-existent nor biased, it is therefore called 'middle'. Although the name 'middle' is the same, the meanings of 'middle' differ, hence he says 'not definitive'.
52.53
"Why is this? Due to the eye, due to form, due to light, due to mind, and due to attention, consciousness is able to arise."
52.54
Sengliang states: Consciousness is not non-existent in relation to the four causes.
52.55
"This consciousness is definitively not in the eye, not in form, not in the mind, not in attention, nor is it in the middle."
52.56
Sengliang states: The nature of consciousness is singular; seeking it in these five places it cannot be found, and therefore it is not existent.
52.57
"Being neither existent nor non-existent, because it arises from conditions [...] they say that all phenomena are neither existent nor non-existent."
52.58
Sengliang states: He matches the name to explain the meaning. The mind being neither existent nor non-existent within causes is the middle path of the conventional truth. Discussing the nature of the mind itself: because it arises from conditions it is existent, and because it does not arise from itself it is non-existent; this is the middle path of the ultimate and conventional. If spoken of from the perspective of the root of emptiness: this existence is also non-existent, and this non-existence is also non-existent; this is the middle path of the ultimate truth.
52.59
"Good sons! The Buddhas and bodhisattvas never definitively say [...] because originally there is no nature of greed, they say it is not existent."
52.60
Sengliang states: Having explained the middle path, he can then properly discuss the indeterminacy of the mind's nature.
52.61
"Good sons! Due to causes and conditions, greed arises in the mind [...] the second is following mahānirvāṇa."
52.62
Sengliang states: Since the mind is indeterminate, bondage and liberation arise from conditions.
52.63
"Good sons! Due to causes and conditions, the mind arises together with greed [...] does not arise together with greed and does not cease together with greed."
52.64
Sengliang states: Opening this into four propositions clarifies that in terms of the great principle it applies to all minds. The first proposition states that the mind arises together with greed and ceases together with greed; these words must not be taken narrowly. If taken strictly according to the text, it seems as if the practitioner gives rise to greed and it passes through the three characteristics to perish, existing at the time of arising, and having ceased at the time of abiding and ceasing. Fearing that this meaning cannot be so, one master explains: one must take it in a slightly broader sense. If a practitioner gives rise to a single thought of greed, regardless of whether its nature ceases across time, one may say he is constantly deluded. Why is this? Since dharmatā is used as the master of conscious understanding in birth and death, on the conventional truth side of function there may well be the three characteristics. But taking it from the side of the ultimate truth, the sense of delusion is constantly present here. Since it is a function that overturns the truth, if no understanding arrives to dispel it, how could it already be gone? Hence the subsequent text says that defilements are also permanent, and the severing of permanent defilements is termed impermanent. Therefore, the sūtra teachings of the four periods had not yet brought forth the wondrous substance of the conscious spirit, but discussed it only from the side of birth and death, merely saying that upon giving rise to a single thought of delusion, it immediately passes and perishes through the three characteristics. Hence they designated this as 'acquisition' without explaining what it belongs to. Yet in proclaiming this 'acquisition', the intent lay in the ultimate side; only in the present teaching is this intent revealed, and therefore it proclaims that defilements are permanent. One comes to know that after greed arises, down through time before obtaining the path of the antidote, it is deluded at the time of the characteristic of arising, and also deluded at the time of abiding and ceasing; hence it is said to arise together with greed and cease only together with greed. The second proposition, 'arising together with greed but not ceasing together with greed': if after giving rise to delusion one has not yet obtained the path of the antidote, it constantly arises together with greed. Here it is clarified that from the contemplation of the four foundations of mindfulness onward, until obtaining the uncontaminated state, it is never again accompanied by greed. Thus when subsequent understanding manifests, the original delusion no longer exists; hence it does not cease together with greed, nor is this spoken in terms of the dharma of the arising and ceasing of the three characteristics. The third proposition, 'not arising together with greed but ceasing together with greed': if a bodhisattva has already attained true understanding and no longer has greed, yet manifests the appearance of having greed in order to guide sentient beings, and if this enables the mind of the path to be realized, this is termed not arising together with greed but ceasing together with greed. The fourth proposition, 'not arising together with greed and not ceasing together with greed': this refers to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas on the immoveable stage. From arhats and pratyekabuddhas downward, their correct contemplation manifests before them, and they are never again accompanied by greed.
52.65
"How does the mind arise together with greed and cease together with greed? [...] the mind arises together with greed and does not cease together with greed."
52.66
Sengliang states: Arising together and ceasing together accords with death. Arising together and not ceasing together accords with both birth and death, and nirvāṇa.
52.67
"How does it not arise together with greed and cease together with greed? [...] The nature of the mind is originally pure; its nature is originally impure."
52.68
Baoliang states: These two propositions pertain only to nirvāṇa. 'Excluding the immoveable stage': because at the initial immoveable stage there is that which arises together with greed but does not cease together with greed, it is therefore excluded.
52.69
"Good sons! This mind does not combine with the fetter of greed, nor does it combine with anger or delusion."
52.70
Sengliang states: Above it was said to arise together, so people might think that mind and greed combine simultaneously. Now it is clarified that this is not so. Baoliang says: This fixes their status. If the mind were located here and greed resided over there, the two could be brought together to unite. Since the principle is not so, how could they combine? Nor are they uncombined: meeting an object, [greed] immediately arises, but there is no separate combining phenomenon to be found. If a pure mind engages conditions, it is called good; if an impure mind engages objects, it is called evil. Therefore, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas have completely destroyed greed and desire, having no further obstacles of delusion, and so their minds attain liberation. Ordinary persons possess all the fetters of greed and desire, tangled by defilements, and constantly dwell in their midst.
52.71
"Good sons! Just as, for instance, although the sun and moon are obscured by smoke and dust [...] due to causes and conditions, the mind attains liberation."
52.72
Sengliang states: People think that because they are not simultaneous, greed cannot obstruct the mind. Using smoke and clouds as an analogy, though distant, they can obstruct. Baoliang says: The various similes from here below clarify that heterodox practitioners, ordinary persons, and the Demon King all delight in the five desires of birth and death, with no time of escape; their application follows below.
52.73
"Good sons! Just as, for instance, on the precipitous cliffs of the Snow Mountains [...] catching and binding the monkey, and carrying it home on his back."
52.74
Sengliang states: The Snow Mountains are used as an analogy for bondage and liberation. Neither being able to go serves as an analogy for liberation. Humans being unable to go serves as an analogy for being bound first and liberated later. Both being able to go serves as an analogy for arising together and ceasing together in birth and death.
52.75
"Good sons! Just as, for instance, when a king abides securely in his own territory [...] the mind that is bound to Māra is not pure."
52.76
Sengliang comments: Overall, the parable illustrates that failing to accord with principle is bondage, while according with principle is liberation; it broadly illuminates bondage and liberation.
52.77
"Furthermore, good sons! If one sees that phenomena [...] fully perfects the eighth merit."
52.78
Sengliang comments: This reveals the delusion of seeing phenomena [as substantial], which is a failure to accord with principle. Regarding the views, there are three types: first, broadly explaining the views of annihilationism and eternalism; second, merely explaining existence; and third, explaining that the view of self is the root.
52.79
Collected Commentaries on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Fascicle 52
Linked texts (1)
- 大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese