大般涅槃經集解 56
English (machine translation) 56
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56.1
Discerning that cause and effect are neither existent nor non-existent; extensively discerning the meanings of direct cause and contributory cause; extensively discerning the meanings of revealing cause and contributory cause; Siṃhanāda further presents seven rounds of objections challenging the non-existence of buddhadhātu; first, stating that since humans have no fixed nature, a human can become a deva and a deva can become a human, one thus knows there is no [fixed] nature; second, arguing that because icchantikas sever their roots of goodness (kuśalamūla), one thus knows there is no buddhadhātu; third, that because there is an initial arousal of the aspiration, one thus knows there is no buddhadhātu; fourth, that because of retrogression, one thus knows there is no buddhadhātu; fifth, proving that the myriad good qualities are the nature, and apart from the good there is no nature; sixth, that because causes have strength and weakness, one thus knows there is no nature; seventh, that because the bodhicitta was originally absent and is now present, one thus knows there is no buddhadhātu; below, extensively answering the seven objections; extensively discerning the nature of retrogression and non-retrogression; discerning the cultivation of the thirty-two marks, etc.
56.2
Chapter on Siṃhanāda, Part 3
56.3
Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One! [...] speaks of buddhadhātu as being neither internal nor external."
56.4
Sengliang comments: The fourth contemplative approach contemplates that within the cause there is neither existence nor non-existence. The intention of the objection is: if, as stated above, curd is present in milk, or the jewel is in the wrestler's forehead, then it already exists in the cause; how could it be neither existent nor non-existent? Sengzong comments: This is the second major section. Above, having answered the six objections to clarify the principle of the buddhadhātu, its meaning was unmatched; now Siṃhanāda, wishing to establish the previous purport of the middle way, provisionally raises objections assuming definite existence and definite non-existence. The Tathāgata explains that it cannot be definitively existent in one way, nor can it be definitively non-existent in one way; hence it is the meaning of the middle way. The first five raise objections by clinging to existence, and the seven clauses below cling to non-existence. That buddhadhātu is 'not internal' means that at present it does not yet exist. That it is 'not external' means that the fruit does not exist apart from the cause. As for curd in milk and the diamond-wrestler: tracing the principle and examining the teaching, verifying the beginning by determining the end, it would already exist. Baoliang comments: The fourth round contemplates the absence of the fruit in the cause. Now we first open the headings. 'Neither internal nor external' serves as the heading for the absence of the fruit in the cause. Yet it is not a loss or destruction, but serves from afar as the heading for establishing the nature in the cause below in the fifth section. The 'internal' is the direct cause, and the 'external' is the contributory cause. Clarifying that those with conscious spirit all possess the understanding of avoiding suffering and seeking bliss, which functions unchanged from beginning to end; hence it is called 'internal.' The goodness of the contributory cause arises by relying on external conditions, sometimes existing and sometimes absent; hence it is called 'external.' Clarifying that within these two causes there is no fruit at all, it is therefore said to be 'neither internal nor external.' Although there is no fruit within the cause, it is not that the two causes—contributory and direct—do not exist; these two causes will definitely obtain the fruit of buddhahood in the future. Since he is about to clarify that there is no fruit within the cause, Siṃhanāda takes the erroneous clingings of outsiders, alleging that the fruit already exists within the cause, like curd already existing in milk. If curd truly existed in milk, one should know that a Buddha already exists within the bodies of sentient beings. Why is it now said that buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external? Non-Buddhists conceptualise generative causes generating fruits, and therefore that the fruit exists within the cause, their error penetrating into the internal. The reason our meaning is free from error is that we do not say curd already exists in milk; it is only because of the cause that it is spoken of as existing. Clarifying that the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is also like this: it does not already exist immediately within the body. Omniscience (sarvākārajñatā) also has its cause, and therefore it is said that the buddhadhātu of sentient beings exists. If one lacked this innate substance to serve as the master of spiritual understanding, one would never cultivate causes to dispel delusion and seek liberation. Precisely because the path of the spiritual consciousness differs from wood and stone and can be polished, one trains in understanding with an open mind, completely severing the burdens of saṃsāra, and myriad masteries appear before one. Therefore it is the seed for omniscience; how could one say that sentient beings have this dharmatā as their substance such that they immediately possess the fruit, like the non-Buddhists' conception of generative causes generating fruits? Its general purport is just this. Thus below it says: overall five attachments are made. Examining them in detail, there are not merely five, but taking what is essential based on differing matters, they form five distinct ones. This first one straightforwardly clings to the fruit existing within the cause. How is this known? The arising of phenomena for sentient beings each has its season; it is merely that the time of speaking is different, not that it is entirely absent in the cause; hence we know curd is in milk.
56.5
The Buddha said: "Good son! Neither do I say [...] because curd is produced from milk, it is said that curd exists."
56.6
Sengliang comments: The intention of the answer is that it is not without the meaning of arising from it, and therefore it is merely said to exist. Sengzong comments: He does not say that milk already has curd; because the fruit arises from it, it is merely said to exist.
56.7
"World-Honoured One! All produced phenomena each have their season."
56.8
Sengliang comments: If one regards arising from it as existence, butter also arises from milk; why is butter not present immediately after milk? Sengzong comments: The meaning of the objection is that milk and curd are never not co-present, but their times of emergence are before and after.
56.9
"Good son! At the time of milk, there is no curd, nor is there raw butter [...] therefore I say that there is no curd in milk."
56.10
Sengliang comments: Proving that there is curd in milk. Also for the five flavours: one proves it through fact, and one proves it through knowledge. Sengzong comments: Below this, he explains it within principle.
56.11
"If it existed, why could one not obtain [...] and so on up to clarified butter (sarpirmaṇḍa), it is also like this."
56.12
Sengliang comments: If at the time of milk there were curd, there should be two functions and furthermore two names. Baoliang comments: This refutes their clinging for the time being. If there were curd in milk, worldly people should not merely call it milk; it should also have had two names previously.
56.13
"Good son! Causes are of two kinds [...] therefore it is said that in milk there is the nature of curd."
56.14
Sengliang comments: Although the cause contains no fruit, its efficacy has proximity and distance: the distant is called contributory cause, and the proximate is called direct cause; this answers that arising has an order. Sengzong comments: This means that because milk is the direct cause for curd, it is spoken of as existing; it is not that it already exists. Baoliang comments: Having finished refuting the clinging, he returns to the root of the correct meaning, stating that milk is the direct cause, and ferment and warmth act as contributory causes to reveal and bring forth curd.
56.15
Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One! If there is no curd in milk [...] why is it not produced from the horn?"
56.16
Sengliang comments: If what is absent can produce it, the horn also lacks curd; why does it come solely from milk and not from the horn? Baoliang comments: Being equally without curd, the horn should also have it; yet the horn does not produce it, while only milk can produce it, so we know it existed previously.
56.17
"Good son! The horn also produces curd [...] therefore I speak of direct causes and contributory causes."
56.18
Sengliang comments: Revealing the meaning of contributory cause, that it can also produce curd, proving that what is absent can produce. Sengzong comments: Because a person seeking curd must take milk, we know that milk is the direct cause. Baoliang comments: Discussing by concession to clarify it; in principle, this is not the direct answer.
56.19
Siṃhanāda said: "If milk [...] why does it not produce it, since both are equally non-existent?"
56.20
Sengliang comments: Wishing to prove the meaning of having contributory causes, he therefore asks again. Sengzong comments: This merely swaps the metaphor; the meaning is the same as the previous explanation. Baoliang comments: Both are equally non-existent, yet one produces it and one does not; hence it is clear that we know it is definitely pre-existent.
56.21
"Good son! Milk can also produce the āmalaka tree [...] the āmalaka tree is not produced from milk."
56.22
Sengliang comments: Irrigating with water produces it, while irrigating with milk makes it grow rapidly, proving the power of contributory causes, that what is absent can produce. Baoliang comments: Refuting their clinging with two points. The first round concedes that milk can also produce trees; the second round cites the substance of the four great elements, where gold and jade have their roots and cannot be equated; curd and trees naturally each have their own direct cause.
56.23
"World-Honoured One! As the Buddha has said, there are two kinds of causes [...] the contributory cause refers to the six pāramitās."
56.24
Sengliang comments: Beings endowed with consciousness detest suffering and seek bliss; this is the constancy of their nature. Although humans and devas share it, this nature is no different: when mixed with delusion it is called direct cause, when eliminating delusion it is called contributory cause, and when there is no delusion left to eliminate it is called Buddha.
56.25
Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One! I now definitively know [...] therefore, one should know that milk has the nature of curd."
56.26
Sengliang comments: Further taking human knowledge as proof, he broadens the matter. Baoliang comments: The second clinging. A person seeking curd takes milk and does not take water, so one knows it is definitively pre-existent in milk.
56.27
"Good son! It is not as you have asked in this meaning [...] and seeing it grow, this meaning is not so."
56.28
Sengliang comments: He uses the understanding that takes the mirror [or sword] to resolve all objections. Although one takes the blade to reflect one's face, the blade originally has no face in it. How could one, just because one takes milk to make curd, claim that the milk already contains curd? Baoliang comments: Herein are four levels of objections: First, if the visual faculty's light reaches the object and only then sees, then fire should burn the eye. Second, if one sees by reaching the object, doubt should not arise. Third, the visual light is material form (rūpa), and water is also material form; both are obstructive. One should only be able to see the water—how could one see the fish and stones within the water? Fourth, preventing an objection: if one says one sees because it does not reach, why does one not see objects on the other side of a wall?
56.29
"Good son, as you have said, that milk has curd… (and so on, up to) …before it is eaten, food should be life."
56.30
Sengliang comments: He adduces proofs extensively. Baoliang comments: He adduces proximate matters to illustrate the distant principle, verifying that curd is not present in milk beforehand.
56.31
"Good son, all phenomena… (and so on, up to) …that there are phenomena existing in the three periods of time is impossible."
56.32
Sengliang comments: He cites a verse to conclude the explanation. Baoliang comments: He returns to citing the correct doctrine to illuminate the correct principle.
56.33
"Good son, all phenomena arise through causes and conditions… (and so on, up to) …one should already have a Buddha's body, just as I do now."
56.34
Sengliang comments: If it already existed, one should have the functioning of the fruit-Buddha's marks and characteristics, just as I do now.
56.35
"The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is unbreakable and indestructible… (and so on, up to) …few can see it, like a diamond jewel."
56.36
Sengliang comments: This clarifies that the buddhadhātu is permanent. Sentient beings utilize it just as the space within the body enables growth; this is the functioning of space. Space does not belong to the three periods of time; because sentient beings have the element of space, there is the functioning of space. The buddhadhātu also does not belong to the three periods of time, yet sentient beings possess it. Because understanding and delusion obstruct one another, and due to this obstruction, delusion must be extinguished—only when delusion is extinguished is it functioning—it is therefore described as not yet existing.
56.37
"Good son, the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is the realm of the Buddhas… (and so on, up to) …liberated from saṃsāra and attaining mahānirvāṇa."
56.38
Sengliang comments: This proves that it exists, yet cannot be known [by ordinary beings].
56.39
Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One… (and so on, up to) …because space has no nature, it has no contributory cause (pratyaya-hetu)."
56.40
Sengliang comments: Above, he refuted the direct cause (upādāna-hetu); here below, he refutes the contributory cause (pratyaya-hetu). Intending to refute it, he first posits the premise that the direct cause requires a contributory cause. Space has no result, and thus does not rely upon one. Sengzong comments: This is the third turn, proving existence: because it definitely exists, it requires a contributory cause as an illuminating cause (vyañjaka-hetu). Baoliang comments: Because there is a direct cause, it requires a contributory cause; space lacks it, so it lacks these two causes. Therefore, we know it exists.
56.41
The Buddha said: "Good son, if there were definitely a nature within the milk, why would it need a contributory cause?"
56.42
Sengliang comments: If it already existed, why would it need a contributory cause? Sengzong comments: If it already existed, why would it need an illuminating cause? Baoliang comments: He tentatively responds by asking: If it is obtained through reliance on contributory causes, how could it already exist?
56.43
Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One… (and so on, up to) …we definitely know that the nature of curd exists beforehand in the milk."
56.44
Sengliang comments: He adduces the object in the darkness which, although originally existing, is not seen without being illuminated, to prove the function of an illuminating cause; one cannot say that because it already exists, it does not need illumination. Baoliang comments: He adduces an observable phenomenon to rescue his doctrine.
56.45
"Good son, if the nature of curd definitely exists in milk… (and so on, up to) …if it is an illuminating cause, why would it still need to be illuminated?"
56.46
Sengliang comments: Where sweetness predominates, it is milk; where sourness predominates, it is curd. If at the time of milk there is already curd, the sour taste is already complete. The sourness would illuminate itself; why would it need yeast and warmth to illuminate it? Baoliang comments: Previously, it was claimed that because it lacked an illuminating cause, it was milk and not curd. If curd already existed beforehand, it would itself be the illuminating cause; why would it still need to be illuminated? Below, he extensively challenges this doctrine.
56.47
"Good son, if an illuminating cause's nature is to illuminate… (and so on, up to) …if it does not illuminate itself, how could it illuminate another?"
56.48
Sengliang comments: If the nature of sourness cannot illuminate itself, how could it act as an illuminator for another? Sengzong comments: If an illuminating cause cannot illuminate itself and further requires illumination, how can it illuminate another?
56.49
"If you say that an illuminating cause has two kinds of natures… (and so on, up to) …why should the illuminating cause alone have two?"
56.50
Sengliang comments: Conditioned things vary in capacity, each keeping its own portion as its nature. Fire is a single phenomenon; how could it have two [functions]? Furthermore, he means: if fire illuminates itself, the illuminating and the illuminated are different; the illuminating would be the cause, and the illuminated would be the result. How could a single phenomenon have both? Baoliang comments: He continues to refute the non-Buddhists who grasp at a nature as a fixed phenomenon that perpetually maintains a single state and cannot have two functions. That is: you claim that the illuminating cause both illuminates itself and illuminates another. If it illuminates itself and can also illuminate another, then it is not a self-nature. Why? You hold that the illuminating cause is only a single phenomenon; how could it have two functions? If the illuminating cause were dual, milk should also be dual: milk should also illuminate itself and also illuminate curd. If so, why would it need external conditions to become apparent?
56.51
Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One, as worldly people say… (and so on, up to) …the illuminating cause is also like this: it illuminates itself and illuminates another."
56.52
Sengliang comments: Counting is one among the myriad phenomena; one counts oneself and counts others. The illuminating cause is also like this. Baoliang comments: When it counts my portion, it fulfills the count of one person; therefore we know it has two functions. He adduces this to rescue his doctrine.
56.53
The Buddha said: "Good son, if the illuminating cause were like that… (and so on, up to) …it cannot illuminate itself, nor can it illuminate another."
56.54
Sengliang comments: It requires the nature of consciousness to know the counting of one's own and others' forms; form does not count itself. Baoliang comments: The Buddha's intention in answering is that counting is mental deliberation, and therefore can count one's own form and others' forms. Hence he says: What you cling to as the illuminating cause is fundamentally a material phenomenon; how could it have both functions?
56.55
"Good son, sentient beings possessing the buddhadhātu… (and so on, up to) …its being an illuminating cause is already ruined along with the curd."
56.56
Sengliang comments: By "already ruined along with the curd," the idea of self-illumination was already refuted above.
56.57
"If you say that the result definitely exists within the cause… (and so on, up to) …having received it from a master, it gradually increases."
56.58
Sengliang comments: If the result of concentration and wisdom definitely had a fixed nature, it could not increase. Yet, having received it from a master, it gradually increases; thus we know it originally did not exist.
56.59
"If you say that the master's instruction is an illuminating cause… (and so on, up to) …causes precepts, concentration, and wisdom to increase."
56.60
Sengliang comments: At the time of the first proclamation (jñapti), the precepts do not yet exist. Only after the karmavācanā is completed are the precepts accomplished. Thus it must illuminate what did not exist so that it comes to be, rather than illuminating what already existed to make it increase.
56.61
Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One… (and so on, up to) …how can they be named having milk and having curd?"
56.62
Sengliang comments: If curd does not exist in milk, and there is also no illuminating cause, why is it that when there is milk, one responds that there is curd? Sengzong comments: He uses names to prove that it exists. Baoliang comments: This is the fourth clinging. It is observed that people buy curd from one who sells milk; thus we know that milk is itself curd.
56.63
"Good son, in worldly matters, there are generally three kinds of replies to questions… (and so on, up to) …has the buddhadhātu because it will be seen in the future."
56.64
Sengliang comments: This is the principal tenet of the correct doctrine: ultimately, because it definitely will exist, it is spoken of as existing. Baoliang comments: He uses an indirect reply to resolve the objection, clarifying that one speaks of the result within the cause, and therefore says it exists; it is not that it already exists and is thus said to exist.
56.65
Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One, as the Buddha has said… (and so on, up to) …saying that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu?"
56.66
Sengliang comments: Above, he clarified that neither of the two causes contains the result, which seemed to contradict conventional worldly usage; now he wishes to reconcile them. Just as worldly people speak of existence because it is about to exist, he raises this question to prompt and bring this out. Baoliang comments: The past is already extinguished, and the future has not yet arrived; how can it be called existent?
56.67
The Buddha told: "Good son, the past is called existent… (and so on, up to) …all possess the buddhadhātu, truly and not falsely."
56.68
Sengliang comments: There are four analogies in total: the first analogy illustrates past existence; the latter three analogies illustrate future existence. Baoliang comments: Although it once existed or will exist, at present it is non-existent, yet it is also not definitively non-existent. Just as sesame is present and oil is future, cause and result belong to different times; how could the result exist within the cause? Therefore, in our tradition's doctrinal formulations, we always rely on the sūtras to deduce the principle, and often see people make the mistake of claiming the result exists within the cause. The sūtras have explicit statements, which scarcely require explanation. In the previous chapter on the buddhadhātu, it already stated: 'Within the poisonous body there is the wondrous king of medicines.' The so-called buddhadhātu is not a created phenomenon (saṃskṛta-dharma); this does not mean the Buddha is not a created phenomenon. If one were to say that the Buddha is also not a created phenomenon, then within the bodies of sentient beings the fruit would already exist.
56.69
Siṃhanāda said: "All sentient beings… (and so on, up to) …one should know that sentient beings all possess the buddhadhātu."
56.70
Sengliang comments: Above, he separately refuted the two causes and explained that existence refers to the future. Now Siṃhanāda again uses observable facts to prove that it exists beforehand in the cause, wishing to expand upon the faults of those who hold existence. Sengzong comments: The first clinging: using the direct cause to prove the existence of the nature. Baoliang comments: The fifth: he supposes that within the direct cause there must already be a subtle Buddha, which can therefore cause sentient beings to attain the unexcelled path. If there were nothing at all within the direct cause, why would it not be called a contributory cause?
56.71
The Buddha said: "Good son, if you say that within the seed… (and so on, up to) …now it exists, what fault would there be?"
56.72
Sengliang comments: If one says that it is not seen because of the obstruction of subtlety, that means it is obstructed by subtlety, not obstructed by the eight worldly conditions. As for 'it should always not be seen': if it is obstructed by subtlety, the obstruction is always subtle, so it should always be unseen. As for 'it originally lacks coarse characteristics': if its nature is subtle, coarseness is originally non-existent, yet it is always coarse like this. As for 'it originally lacks the nature of being visible': because it is coarse, it can be seen; coarseness is the cause of visibility, but visibility originally lacks an inherent nature. Baoliang comments: If you say it already exists within the direct cause, why is it not seen? Let us discuss it with reference to a tree. Since it does not match the eight worldly conditions for not seeing, one should know that the cause cannot contain the result beforehand.
56.73
Siṃhanāda said: "As the Buddha has said… (and so on, up to) …acting as an illuminating cause, it makes the subtle become coarse."
56.74
Sengliang comments: He rescues his doctrine by saying that the illuminating cause illuminates the subtle and makes it coarse; because it is coarse, it can be seen, so it is not that it is permanently unseen.
56.75
The Buddha said: "Good son, if it originally existed… (and so on, up to) …rock sugar cures heat, and dark honey cures cold."
56.76
Sengliang comments: Regarding 'both are absent': above, it was said that coarseness exists, but coarseness does not need illumination. If coarseness originally did not exist, what would coarseness illuminate? If one says it illuminates non-existence to make it exist, it should also be able to produce it; if a khadira tree originally contained burning, burning could not arise. Regarding 'not simultaneous': he faults the three marks for not functioning simultaneously. Regarding 'dark honey cures cold': this clarifies that phenomena differ according to conditions and have no fixed nature.
56.77
Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One… (and so on, up to) …therefore attains anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi."
56.78
Sengliang comments: He further uses seven objections to argue that the Buddha has no nature, thereby establishing and revealing that the buddhadhātu is not non-existent, establishing the above meaning of being indestructible. First, he uses devas and humans to prove that the buddhadhātu has no accomplishment. Baoliang comments: The fifth turn: examining the positing of nature within the cause. Although there are seven objections, they mostly cling to conditions, arguing so as to eliminate the direct cause. This first objection states: if it originally does not exist in the cause, then there is no direct cause, but only contributory causes, through which one attains Buddhahood.
56.79
"If all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu… (and so on, up to) …if it is not permanent, it is not named the buddhadhātu."
56.80
Sengliang comments: The second objection: if the nature is formed through causes and conditions, and the bodhicitta is the nature, then an icchantika should not sever it; if severed, it is not the nature. Baoliang comments: If the Buddha designates bodhicitta as the buddhadhātu, it is observable that icchantikas sever roots of goodness; in that case, icchantikas lack the buddhadhātu. How can it be said that sentient beings all possess the buddhadhātu?
56.81
"If all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, why is it called the initial arousal of the mind [for enlightenment]?"
56.82
Sengliang states: The third objection: if the nature is permanent, it ought not to have a beginning. Baoliang states: Since there is an initial resolve, then prior to the resolve there is no buddhadhātu. If so, then it is the good of the resolve that serves as the buddhadhātu; why then say that all sentient beings possess it?
56.83
"Why do you say that this is non-retrogression (avinivartanīya) [...] one should know that such a person has no buddhadhātu."
56.84
Sengliang states: The fourth objection: if the nature is permanent, there ought not to be retrogression. Baoliang states: If there is retrogression and non-retrogression, then those who retrogress lack the buddhadhātu; how could it be that all possess it?
56.85
"World-Honoured One! When a bodhisattva-mahāsattva single-mindedly sets forth [...] why should there be a need for these dharmas to serve as contributory causes?"
56.86
Sengliang states: The fifth objection: he adduces that the ten thousand goods are the nature, and apart from good there is no nature. Baoliang states: He briefly raises the contributory cause (pratyaya-hetu), meaning that what can accomplish buddhahood is only this contributory cause; therefore we know there is no direct cause (janma-hetu / kāraṇa) buddhadhātu, but merely contributory causes.
56.87
"World-Honoured One! Just as milk does not rely on conditions and will inevitably become curds [...] one should know that sentient beings completely lack the buddhadhātu."
56.88
Sengliang states: The sixth objection: the five flavours arise from one another, and causes have strengths and weaknesses; because milk is strong, it does not rely on external conditions. Baoliang states: He cites the sūtras as proof. Formerly it was said that the Saṅgha of the three vehicles is permanent; if so, they ought to abide permanently in the rank of the Saṅgha, so how could they attain buddhahood?
56.89
"Just as the Buddha previously taught that the Saṅgha jewel is permanent [...] all sentient beings should lack the buddhadhātu."
56.90
Sengliang states: This is the seventh objection. If the bodhicitta originally did not exist and now exists, the fruit ought to be likewise. Baoliang states: If sentient beings previously lacked sambodhi and now only come to have it, then it is originally non-existent and now existent; hence we know it was previously absent. It differs from the preceding objection merely in [the order of] before and after.
56.91
The Buddha said: "Excellent, excellent, good man! [...] all sentient beings truly possess the buddhadhātu."
56.92
Sengliang states: He answers the first [objection]. The first fruit is accomplished from principle; it is bound to be attained and not lost, so it corresponds to the nature. What is not accomplished from principle is sometimes attained and sometimes lost, and is not the nature. Therefore, the fruits of humans and devas involve delusion and do not exist from the nature; the fruit of buddhahood is without delusion, precisely because it exists from the nature. This answers the first objection. Baoliang states: The states of humans and devas are unfixed, so one might say they lack the nature; the buddhadhātu is not like this. Just as the karma of humans and devas halts only upon reaching the Buddha, without stopping midway, how could there be no direct cause?
56.93
"You said that if sentient beings have the buddhadhātu [...] the mind is impermanent, while the buddhadhātu is permanent."
56.94
Sengliang states: This answers the third objection. The direct cause has no beginning, and because it has no beginning, it is permanent. The resolve is a contributory cause, not the direct cause. Sengzong states: It also answers the seventh section. Baoliang states: Generating the resolve is not the direct-cause buddhadhātu. The buddhadhātu is permanent and the mind is impermanent; therefore the wholesome mind is present at times and absent at times, whereas only the function of the direct-cause nature is permanent and unaltering.
56.95
"You said, 'Why is there a retrogressing mind?' [...] it is because of late attainment that it is named 'retrogression'."
56.96
Sengliang states: This answers the fourth objection. Baoliang states: He explains that the wholesome mind does not retrogress. If the wholesome mind does not arise, that is all; once it has arisen, it does not retrogress. If good could retrogress, how could buddhahood be attained? It is merely because of late attainment that it is termed 'retrogression'.
56.97
"This bodhicitta is truly not the buddhadhātu [...] the mind of bodhi is truly not the buddhadhātu."
56.98
Sengliang states: This answers the fifth objection. Baoliang states: He returns to answering the second question. He explains that the mind of bodhi is truly not the direct cause. When I say 'all possess it', I refer to the direct-cause buddhadhātu. Because one severs the good born from conditions, one is named an icchantika.
56.99
"Good man! You said that if sentient beings have the buddhadhātu [...] one attains the sight of the buddhadhātu, and thereafter one attains buddhahood."
56.100
Sengliang states: This answers the sixth objection. Baoliang states: This answers the fifth objection. He explains that although there is a direct cause, it necessarily requires the assistance of conditions. Just as gold exists within ore, it is obtained only through reliance on manifold conditions.
56.101
"You said that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu [...] samyaksaṃbodhi, like gold extracted from stone."
56.102
Sengliang states: This question did not appear before; I fear [the text] is fragmentary. Sengzong states: The meaning of this question arose [contextually]. In the course of answering the previous question, he simply dispels his perplexity.
56.103
"Good man! You said that the Saṅgha is permanent [...] Therefore I say that the Saṅgha has the buddhadhātu."
56.104
Sengliang states: This answers the seventh objection. Baoliang states: This answers the sixth objection. He explains that when it was previously said that the Saṅgha is permanent, it was because the Saṅgha jewel continuously succeeds itself between former buddhas and later buddhas; how could it mean a static permanence? When it is said that the twelve links of dependent origination are permanent, it means that whether buddhas exist or do not exist, the nature of the direct cause does not alter, and therefore it is called permanent. The seventh objection is identical in meaning to the third, so there is no separate answer.
56.105
"Good man! You said that if sentient beings have the buddhadhātu [...] I shall now distinguish and explain it for you."
56.106
Sengzong states: He answers the fourth question again. From here on, he extensively explains the characteristics of retrogression. Baoliang states: Having finished answering the objections, below he presents three turns to clarify that in truth there is never any retrogression.
56.107
"Good man! A bodhisattva-mahāsattva [...] a non-retrogressing mind is not named the buddhadhātu."
56.108
Sengliang states: If he contemplates with conditions complete, he does not retrogress; if incomplete, he retrogresses. Sengzong states: He explains that because of late attainment it is called retrogression, not that it is permanently lost. Baoliang states: He directly discerns the reason for non-retrogression.
56.109
"Good man! You cannot, because of the existence of a retrogressing mind [...] and icchantikas all possess the buddhadhātu."
56.110
Sengliang states: He provides a simile for those who retrogress and do not advance. Sengzong states: One cannot say that because of retrogression there is no buddhadhātu. Baoliang states: The second turn: those who retrogress and those who do not will equally attain buddhahood in the future.
56.111
Siṃhanāda said: "World-Honoured One! Why do bodhisattvas have retrogression and non-retrogression?"
56.112
Sengliang states: Conditions comprise practice and vows; above he merely expanded upon vows without yet expanding upon their practice, which is why he poses this question.
56.113
"Good man! If there is a bodhisattva who cultivates and gathers the Tathāgata's [...] these four dharmas are all permanent."
56.114
Sengliang states: As for 'these four dharmas are all permanent', the karmic nature of sentient beings—three causes and one fruit—is permanent, and hence it is the seventh inconceivable. Sengzong states: One who can act thus is called non-retrogressing; one who cannot is retrogressing. Baoliang states: He adduces the karma of the thirty-two marks to encourage practice. It is for the sake of this meaning that he extensively clarifies the characteristics of retrogression and non-retrogression.
56.115
"Because they are permanent, they are inconceivable [...] because they do not see it, they do not attain nirvāṇa."
56.116
Sengliang states: Karma and fruit are precisely sentient beings, which are precisely the direct-cause nature. That which is called permanent is called permanent merely on account of afflictions. Regarding the severing of permanent afflictions: above it was said that causes and fruits are all permanent, without yet distinguishing the causes whose permanence has longer or shorter duration. They are permanent on account of defilements and delusions; when defilements and delusions are exhausted, the causes are extinguished. The fruit is permanent because it is without delusion; because it is permanent, it does not alter. Baoliang states: Having completed one exposition, he offers praise, clarifying that the realms, karma, fruit, and buddhadhātu of all sentient beings and all buddhas are entirely inconceivable. Although the four dharmas such as the fruit of buddhahood are permanent, sentient beings give rise to afflictions and are obstructed and covered by karmic hindrances, so they are constantly ignorant and without understanding. How could the coming turn not be permanent? What was said above about the permanence of afflictions is precisely derived from this passage. Because they are eliminated throughout from beginning to end, it is said that severing permanent afflictions is called impermanence.
56.117
Collected Commentaries on the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, Fascicle Fifty-Six
Linked texts (1)
- 大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese