大般涅槃經義記 10.64

10.64

上來明謗。自下第二舉謗顯信。文別有四：一就菩提反舉其謗。「若說闡提未生善根便得菩提」是一謗也。「若言闡提捨一闡提次於異身則得菩提」是二謗也。二就菩提翻謗明信。「若說闡提生善不斷後得菩提」不名為謗。三就佛性反舉其謗。於中初明說有成謗。謂說「眾生有其報佛果德佛性常樂我淨，不作不生，惱覆不見」，當知是人謗佛法僧。下復明其說無成謗，「說闡提人無法佛性，猶如兔角，從方便生，本無今有、已有還無」是亦名為謗佛法僧。亦可前說眾生身中已有果體所以成謗，後說無因所以成謗。四就佛性翻謗明信，先舉所說、後結不謗。前中四句。初言「非有如虛空」等，簡是異非。解有兩義：一約佛性因果分別。非現有果，如彼虛空；非現無因，如彼兔角一向全無。二約法報二性分別。非現有其報佛體性，如世虛空本來有體；非現無其法佛之性，如彼兔角本來無體。如上文中說法佛性不如虛空不可得見，說報佛性不如兔角不可得生；此中所說與前左右。二「何以」下辨非異是。解亦有二：一約佛性因果分別。虛空常有，不如佛性果非本有；兔角恒無，不如性因非是本無。二約法報二性分別。虛空常有，不如報佛性非本有；兔角恒無，不如法佛性非本無。此前一對。三「是故」下正辨道理。解亦有二：一約佛性因果分別，是前不同虛空等故本來有因而無其果。二約法報二性分別，是前不同虛空等故本來但有法佛性體、無報佛體。四「有故破」下，約是破非。佛性有故，破他說性無如兔角；佛性無故，破他說性有如虛空。此後一對。前舉所說。「如是不謗」結成信義。

The above clarified slander. From this point downward is the second [part], raising slander to reveal faith. In the text there are four distinct sections: First, inversely raising the slander with respect to bodhi. "If one says that an icchantika attains bodhi before having generated wholesome roots" is the first slander. "If one says that an icchantika, having abandoned being an icchantika, immediately attains bodhi in another body" is the second slander. Second, turning around slander to clarify faith with respect to bodhi: "If one says that an icchantika generates goodness without interruption and afterward attains bodhi," this is not called slander. Third, inversely raising slander with respect to buddha-nature. Therein, he first clarifies that asserting existence constitutes slander: stating that "sentient beings possess the buddha-nature of the fruition virtues of the reward-buddha—permanence, bliss, self, and purity—unmade and unproduced, obscured by afflictions and unseen"—one should know that this person slanders the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha. Below, he further clarifies that asserting non-existence constitutes slander: "Saying that an icchantika has no dharma-buddha-nature, like a rabbit's horns, arising from expedient means, originally non-existent and now existing, and having existed then returning to non-existence" is also called slandering the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha. Alternatively, one may say: the former assertion that the fruition substance already exists within the bodies of sentient beings is the reason it constitutes slander, while the latter assertion of no cause is the reason it constitutes slander. Fourth, turning around slander to clarify faith with respect to buddha-nature: first raising what is said, and afterward concluding that it is not slander. In the former, there are four statements: First, saying "It is not existent like empty space," etc., distinguishes what is right from what is wrong. There are two interpretations: one differentiates in terms of the cause and fruition of buddha-nature: the fruit does not exist in the present, like empty space; the cause is not non-existent in the present, like a rabbit's horns, which are wholly and completely non-existent. The second differentiates in terms of the two natures of dharma[-body] and reward[-body]: it does not possess the substance and nature of the reward-buddha in the present, just as worldly empty space originally possesses substance; it does not lack the nature of the dharma-buddha in the present, just as a rabbit's horns originally lack substance. As stated above, the dharma-buddha-nature is not like empty space, which cannot be seen, and the reward-buddha-nature is not like a rabbit's horns, which cannot be produced; what is said here correlates with what preceded. Second, from "Why is this?" downward, he distinguishes the wrong from the right. There are also two interpretations: one differentiates in terms of the cause and fruition of buddha-nature: empty space is permanent and existent, unlike the fruit of buddha-nature, which is not originally existent; a rabbit's horns are constantly non-existent, unlike the nature-cause, which is not originally non-existent. The second differentiates in terms of the two natures of dharma[-body] and reward[-body]: empty space is permanent and existent, unlike the nature of the reward-buddha, which is not originally existent; a rabbit's horns are constantly non-existent, unlike the nature of the dharma-buddha, which is not originally non-existent. This is the first pair. Third, from "Therefore" downward, he directly differentiates the principle. There are also two interpretations: one differentiates in terms of the cause and fruition of buddha-nature: because it differs from empty space and the like as mentioned before, it originally possesses the cause but lacks its fruit. The second differentiates in terms of the two natures of dharma[-body] and reward[-body]: because it differs from empty space and the like as mentioned before, originally there is only the substance of the dharma-buddha-nature, and not the substance of the reward-buddha. Fourth, from "Because it exists, it refutes..." downward, he refutes the wrong by means of the right: because buddha-nature exists, it refutes the other's claim that the nature is non-existent like a rabbit's horns; because buddha-nature is non-existent, it refutes the other's claim that the nature is existent like empty space. This is the latter pair. The former raised what was said; "being such is not slandering" concludes the meaning of faith.