大般涅槃經疏 23

English (machine translation) 23

Language: English

23.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

23.2

Re-edited by the Śramaṇa Zhànrán of Tiāntái under the Tang

23.3

Chapter on the Noble King of Virtue, Part Six

Beginning the fascicle with the ninth virtue. Kāishàn says: From the first to the sixth, beginning with hearing what was unheard and reaching the adamantine mind; the seventh and eighth begin with good friends and reach wisdom-liberation; the ninth and tenth begin with the mind of faith and reach the thirty-seven factors [of awakening]; this fascicle is thus the third cycle. Another master says: It is not so; rather, these ten virtues adorn the preceding five practices in pairs, now shallow and now deep. Now, neither is correct: the preceding five practices are cultivation, whereas the present ten virtues are realization, and within realization the depth and shallowness of virtues are not of one kind. If so, why are the earlier ones deep and the later ones shallow? Answer: There is also this meaning. For instance, the first virtue already states that it is not shared with śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; the last mentions the thirty-seven factors, and hearing the name of the factors of the path one thinks they are initial and shallow, but discussing their doctrinal principles, they transcend the two vehicles (and so forth). Within this there is first a statement, next an explanation, and thirdly a conclusion. The initial statement is as in the text. In the following explanation there are two: first, clarifying the five matters; next, discussing the doctrine. The first also has three: first, listing; second, explaining; third, praising. In the first text there are two: first, inquiring; next, listing the names: faith arises from within, enabling one to see the noble nature; being upright arises from the inner mind, not relying on external conditions; precepts are accomplished through faith; the friend is fully endowed with bodhi; and hearing what is unspoken. These five matters are mostly explained with reference to principle; how could one say they are shallow? It can be seen in the text.

23.5

From "What is faith?" onwards is the second [part], the explanation, which forms five chapters. The first, on faith, also has three: first, presenting the essence of faith; next, explaining the virtues of faith; third, concluding. As for the initial essence of faith, in what dharmas does one have faith? In total, five kinds are adduced: first, faith in the Three Jewels; second, faith in cause and effect; third, faith in the two truths; fourth, faith in the one vehicle; fifth, faith in the three truths. One master says: Faith in the paramārthasatya is faith in the ultimate; faith in wholesome expedients is faith in the conventional. Another master says: The two truths have already been discussed earlier; how could they be repeated? Relying on the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, it says, "When praising a bodhisattva, they are called the two wisdoms; when praising a Buddha, they are called the two bodies; they are merely one essence whose latency and manifestation differ." Some say: Paramārthasatya and wholesome expedients are simply the two bodies and also the two wisdoms. We now clarify that this text itself refers to paramārthasatya; how could one change 'truth' to 'wisdom' and again change it to 'body'? We now treat them as the three truths, which naturally differ from the two truths, not constituting a repetition. Furthermore, the text relies on the one vehicle to reveal the meaning of its faith: for the sake of sentient beings, three are distinguished and taught, but knowing there is no other destination, therefore one is taught. Following this single case, it applies by analogy to all four dharmas. The Three Jewels are also like this: for the sake of sentient beings, two essences are distinguished, but knowing that they return to the ultimate, therefore one essence is taught. Cause and effect are also like this: for the sake of sentient beings, causes leading to effects are taught, but upon reaching the other shore, there is neither giving nor receiving. The two truths and three truths are also like this. Next, from "Such faith" onwards explains the virtues of faith. The explanation contains four meanings that follow sequentially. This faith is solid and unbreakable by anyone; why is it unbreakable? It takes attaining the noble nature as its foundation, which is faith born of seeing the nature, deeply rooted and difficult to uproot. Because its roots are deep, it can grow, approaching the great nirvāṇa and accomplishing the precepts and so forth. Initially, all dharmas derive from the noble nature; approaching the great nirvāṇa is vertical height, while precepts, hearing, wisdom, and so forth are horizontal breadth. Although there are differences of horizontal and vertical, depth and breadth, one also does not perceive the characteristics of horizontal and vertical; the more prominent they are, the more they vanish. Faith being explained like this, how could one call it shallow? The third, the conclusion, is as in the text. What is an upright mind? Explaining the second matter also has three: statement, explanation, conclusion. The initial statement is as in the text. In the following explanation, the text has two: first, taking freedom from flattery as uprightness; later, taking repentance as uprightness. In first clarifying freedom from flattery, there are two: first, the explanation; next, discussing the doctrine. In the first there are two: first, the direct explanation; next, dispelling doubts. As for the first text, because of understanding causes and conditions, one is free from flattery. Next, from "Although seeing evil" onwards dispels doubts, explaining it from both sides: first, seeing evil and not speaking of it; later, seeing good and praising it. The doubter says: Seeing evil, one ought to speak of it, yet not speaking of it is not being upright; how can this be called an upright mind? It is then explained: fearing that it would generate afflictions. Then they doubt again: since seeing evil one does not speak of it, seeing good one ought also not to speak of it, and only then would it be an upright mind. Next it clarifies that this is not so, explaining: because praising the buddhadhātu enables them to attain bodhi. Next, in discussing the doctrine there are questions and answers. Initially there are six questions, forming three pairs: the first two arise from the current illness, where three and five kinds of sick persons were explained; the next two arise from the first virtue; the last two arise from this text. Within the first two, the first one also has three: first, rejecting the Buddha's purport; next, recollecting what was taught at the initial opening of the sūtra; from "If one says whether encountering or not encountering" onwards, thirdly, directly raising the objection: since one can spontaneously generate the mind of bodhi, why is it necessary to praise the buddhadhātu to enable them to attain bodhi? This takes the third sick person to raise the objection. In the first [pair], the second also has two: first, recollecting the purport and reverently questioning it; next, directly raising the objection, clarifying that an icchantika should also generate the mind. Why is that? Since they possess the nature, they should spontaneously generate the mind; why wait for praise? This takes the second sick person to raise the objection. From "As the Buddha has taught" onwards are the second two objections, arising from the first virtue. In the twentieth fascicle, five objections were explained: the first two objections were based on the four kinds of sinful persons, the middle two objections were based on the icchantika, and the latter one was based on the indeterminate. In the Buddha's reply, it was explained that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external, neither permanent nor impermanent, which is why it is not severed. Now, another question arises from this: first, recollecting the purport and reverently questioning it; next, directly raising the objection. If you directly state that the buddhadhātu is not severed, why do you say that roots of goodness are severed? This very buddhadhātu is precisely the roots of goodness; since good is severed, the buddhadhātu is severed. Why do you also say that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external? From "As the Buddha in the past" onwards is the later objection: If the buddhadhātu is not severed, why did it not prevent one from falling into hell? Since the buddhadhātu is not severed and only roots of goodness are severed, by virtue of having the buddhadhātu it should be able to prevent evil. Because the answer was not exhaustive, the doctrine is discussed further. From "If because of the buddhadhātu" onwards is the third [pair], having two further objections: closely arising from this, if praising the buddhadhātu causes one to generate the mind, why is it necessary to preach the twelve divisions of scriptures further? Simply praising the buddhadhātu would naturally be sufficient in meaning. There is the doctrine, and there is the simile and its application. From "The Buddhas, Tathāgatas" onwards is the later objection. Arising from the eighth virtue, the Buddha replied that the lustful mind is neither existent nor non-existent, neither cause nor fruit, or that the fruit is present within the cause, or that the fruit is absent within the cause. Now this is again taken up to raise an objection: If so, milk should lack curds, and a seed should lack a tree of fifty feet. If milk has curds and a seed has a tree of fifty feet, one should know that the fruit is present within the cause, and one cannot vaguely state that it may be absent.

23.6

From "At that time the World-Honoured One" onwards, the Buddha's reply has two parts: first praise, and next the answer. The first part also has two sections: first he praises the question, and next he adduces five phrases to praise its function. The first part speaks of six pairs of two persons, praising their capacity to open and develop the great assembly and enable them to attain understanding, not only dispelling the doubts of those who see this world, but also making future generations free of obstructions; this is truly rare, and therefore he praises them. The first two persons: one originally does not create evil, and the second is able to repent after having done so; these are the former two healthy men. The second pair know kindness and repay kindness: others show kindness to me, and I in turn must repay it. The third pair: one listens to and accepts new teachings, and the second directly reviews the old without forgetting. As the [Confucian] text says: "Reviewing the old and thereby knowing the new, one may be a teacher." The fourth pair: one creates anew what is good, and the second repairs what has decayed. The fifth pair: one delights in speaking, and the other delights in listening. If there were no speaker, what would the listener hear? If there were no listener, for whom would the speaker speak? The sixth pair: one is able to raise difficulties, and the other is able to answer; the primary intention lies in these two persons. The previous five pairs serve merely as a preliminary display. "The good questioner is your person; the good respondent is me. Were it not for your precise questions, how could I give good explanations? Were it not for my skillful answers, how could you be capable of questioning?" There are people whose persons are adept on both the left and the right, with fluent eloquence, able to act as both host and guest; there are also people who specialize in one role without doing both. Formerly under Master Zhuāngyán was Dharma Master Jìngzàng, who was only capable of posing continuous difficulties, but could offer no coherent answer. There was another who was skilled at explaining but not adept at debate, namely Master Zhèng of Péngchéng (and so on). Now, inferring from the former six pairs, they establish the latter five phrases. Being able to ask and answer, and being able to listen and speak, establish the subsequent phrase on turning the wheel of the Dharma. Creating the new and repairing the old establish withering the great tree of the twelve links of dependent origination. Grasping and existence are the new, while ignorance is the old; non-birth and birth are the new, while death in conventional truth is the old. Using the new to break the new is called "creating the new"; using the old to break the old is called "repairing the old." Conferring kindness and being mindful of kindness establish the phrase on crossing the sea: worldly kindness is for others, and being mindful of kindness is the boat; steering the boat by oneself thus establishes the phrase on crossing the sea. Not doing evil and repenting of evil establish the phrase on destroying the banner of Māra: Māra takes evil as his banner, and now one is able to topple it, and also able to erect one's own, so the former and latter accomplish each other. Praising the arising of good constitutes the first phrase; praising the destruction of evil constitutes the latter four phrases. Since it is said that relying on this good question one can turn the unexcelled wheel of the Dharma, how could this not be the arising of good? The latter four phrases are again divided into two: the first two phrases praise being able to extinguish evil, and the subsequent two phrases praise crushing evil. In the first two phrases there are again two: the upper phrase praises withering the great tree of the twelve links of dependent origination; the dense and towering branches and twigs of the twelve links of dependent origination are likened to a great tree, and now this tree is withered so that its flowers and leaves do not grow. Being able to cross the boundless great sea of birth and death: in this sea of birth and death, the surging waves are fearsome; now crossing this, one is forever free from terror and dread, with nothing more to fear. Being able to do battle with King Māra: this explains the beginning. Crushing the banner of victory erected by Pāpīyas: this explains the end, adducing the end to subsume the beginning. In foreign lands, when they win a battle they also erect a banner and standard, and those who do not win topple this standard; now that Māra has been defeated in battle, his banner is crushed.

23.7

Next, with regard to the reply, he answers the three pairs of six questions in succession. First he answers the previous two questions concerning the three types of patients; next he answers the two questions concerning the initial virtue; and finally he answers the two questions raised here. However, in answering the first two questions he does not answer them in sequence; he directly finishes explaining the three types of patients, which completes the answer to the first two questions. According to reason, he should only have explained the first and last of the three types of patients, but now he also explains the middle one; this is not used as the answer, but only brought up because it was raised in the middle. Now he returns to explain them in succession; had the other party not brought it up, he would not now explain it. From "Icchā means faith" onwards, secondly, he answers the third difficulty. Previously it was said that if the buddhadhātu is not severed, the roots of goodness should also not be severed, because the roots of goodness are just the buddhadhātu and the buddhadhātu is just the roots of goodness. Now he answers that the buddhadhātu is the middle way and is not the same as the roots of goodness. Why? "Icchā" means faith, and "tika" means incomplete; the buddhadhātu is neither faith nor completeness, so how could it be severed? The buddhadhātu is neither good nor evil; the icchantika can only sever the good, so how could he sever the nature? The various phrases therein are all analogous to this. From antiquity it has been said: the icchantika completely possesses all evils. Its exact translation is unknown. Only Héxī translated it as "extreme desire," meaning the extremity of evil desire. This is to take one matter from within total evil as the translation. For example, the name nirvāṇa contains all virtues, and also has no exact translation, yet translating it as "extinction and deliverance" is likewise taking this one matter from within the whole as a translation. Furthermore, good dharmas are called "attained upon birth." According to the Abhidharma masters' meaning, there are two kinds of good: first, innate good; second, skillful good. Worldly kindness and filial piety are called innate good; the icchantika lacks even these, hence it is said they are already severed. From "As you have said" onwards, he answers the fourth difficulty. The previous difficulty asked why [the Buddha] did not prevent him from falling. Now he cites the question to formulate an answer, clarifying that the buddhadhātu of an icchantika is neither existent nor non-existent: if sought in concrete phenomena it is completely unattainable, hence it is non-existent; yet because this principle exists, it is not non-existent. Furthermore, with skillful means it is not non-existent, while without skillful means it is non-existent. Therefore he adduces the harp to illustrate this existence and non-existence, first with a simile and next with the application. What is called the king in the initial simile illustrates sentient beings; the harp illustrates the body of sentient beings; the sound illustrates the buddhadhātu; the great minister illustrates the buddhas and bodhisattvas who are able to explain it skillfully; severing the strings illustrates reaching the end of life with respect to this body; splitting the skin and wood illustrates searching for it with the five sense faculties and four great elements and finding it completely unattainable, which means that without skillful means it is non-existent. Applying the simile: the buddhadhātu has no abiding place, which is "non-existent"; because it can be seen through skillful means, this is "not non-existent." From "As you have said, if milk lacks curd" onwards, thirdly, he answers the fifth and sixth difficulties, clarifying that there should be a determinate nature. The intent of the answer is that the nature is not determinately existent, but exists due to causes and conditions. If milk determinately had curd, it should arise on its own without relying on the juice of the *phala* tree; since it relies on conditions, one should know that there is no effect in the cause. However, previously six difficulties were raised, so why does he now only cite one to scold? Answer: granting and taking away at the appropriate time are both for benefit. Precisely because this difficulty posits an inherent nature, which is the same as the non-Buddhists, he relies on the correct to scold the heterodox, calling him a foolish man; he does not actually scold the King of Virtuous Power. This answer also concurrently answers the fifth difficulty: praising goodness as self-sufficient, why need the twelvefold scriptures be preached? Now he clarifies that since there is no determinate nature, but it exists through causes and conditions, it is necessary to preach the twelve divisions as conditions. Next, clarifying the straightforward mind through repentance: if one has faults and does not repent, it is not a straightforward mind; revealing one's transgressions is called a straightforward mind. The text has three parts: first, from "Supposing there is a fault" onwards, the actual repentance; next, from "Before the teacher and fellow students" onwards, the disclosure; third, from "ashamed and blaming oneself" onwards, severing the continuous mind. The conclusion is as in the text.

23.8

From "How is morality cultivated?" onwards, thirdly, he explains morality, and the text has two parts: first, the morality of abandoning evil, namely [the vows of] cows, dogs, and the like, all grasping at their marks and keeping them. Non-Buddhists who attained supernormal powers saw that cows, dogs, and the like were reborn in heaven after death, and thereupon emulated their conduct in the hope of attaining rebirth in heaven; the rest are all analogous to this. Next is attaining good morality, as in the text.

23.9

From "How does a bodhisattva draw near [to good friends]?" onwards, fourthly, he explains the good friend, which has four parts: first, distinguishing what is correct; second, distinguishing what is not; third, corroborating what is not; fourth, corroborating what is correct. The first, clarifying what is correct, has two parts: first, bodhisattvas are correct; second, the Tathāgata is correct. For "Cunda seeing the Buddha was able to be reborn in heaven," there are two explanations. The Abhidharma meaning: one must have higher dhyāna to attain rebirth in heaven; now, seeing the Buddha's power stimulated the dhyāna he had formerly cultivated, so he was able to be reborn in heaven. The second says: merely causing the evil of the lower realm to be subdued, any accompanying scattered goodness enables rebirth in heaven. From "Although having Śāriputra" onwards, secondly, he clarifies what is not correct. Since [Śāriputra] did not yet recognize the capacity of the faculties and could not match conditions, it is therefore said not to be correct. The Tathāgata matches conditions, knowing the illness and recognizing the medicine, and is therefore called correct. From "Formerly when I dwelt in" onwards, thirdly, he corroborates what is not correct. Contemplating white bones is the meditation of the [eight] liberations, while counting breaths is the fundamental meditation. An old explanation says: the son of a goldsmith was skilled at observing the colour of fire, so he should have been taught breath-counting. Now it is clarified that this is not so: the son of a goldsmith was skilled at regulating the mallet, so his habit should have been supported, and therefore he was taught breath-counting. Personally, I note: according to the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, it says: "Skilled at the bellows, he was well aware of the marks of breath. A fuller of clothes was skilled at grasping marks of purity, and was therefore taught bone contemplation." Now it is clarified that this is not so: the fuller was disgusted with defilement, making it easy to practice the [eight] liberations. From "If sentient beings" onwards, fourthly, he corroborates what is correct, as in the text.

23.10

From "How is having heard much fulfilled?" onwards, he explains the fifth chapter, and the text has five parts: the first is based on the text and words, and the latter four are based on the doctrinal principles. The twelve divisions of scripture have many words while their meanings are diffuse; the Buddha's summary has few words while its meaning is essential, and because the meaning is essential, it constitutes having heard much. Furthermore, removing the twelve divisions, leaving only this nirvāṇa, does not mean that the principle of nirvāṇa lies outside the twelve; it precisely means that the text and words of the twelve are vast and extensive, and setting aside the broad to take up the concise preserves the principle within, which is precisely having heard much—why must it reside in words? Therefore, further setting aside the entirety, one takes only four verses; again setting aside the four verses, one takes only the permanently abiding; and again setting aside the permanently abiding, one takes quiescence. Hence we know that diminishing it and further diminishing it leads ultimately to the unconditioned; one merely values its principle as having heard much, not taking extensive words as having heard much.

23.11

From "Next, good son, if there is" onwards, thirdly, he praises it, which again has two parts: first, praise through Dharma explanations; second, through similes. Praise through Dharma explanations has two parts: first, proclaiming the three chapter headings; second, explaining them. The explanation has two parts: first, explaining the three matters; second, not remaining attached, as in the text. The similes have three parts: first, making a simile for what is difficult to give, which also has an application; next, making a simile for what is difficult to endure and difficult to do, which also has an application; third, making a simile for non-attachment, which has the Dharma, simile, and application.

23.12

From "At that time Guangming" onwards, secondly, he discusses the doctrine in two rounds of questions and answers. The first question also has two parts: first, two determinations; next, two difficulties. The first two determinations are: first, determining self-emptiness; second, determining the emptiness of emptiness. If the nature is by itself empty, this concludes the first determination as one difficulty. If the nature is by itself not empty, this concludes the latter determination as one difficulty. From "Good son" onwards, the reply has two parts: first he replies to the first determination, that the nature is originally empty of itself. From "Why?" onwards, he clarifies that all dharmas are unattainable. Since they are unattainable, how could they not be empty? Next he replies to the second determination, that one must also cultivate emptiness and only then see emptiness. Yet its fundamental nature in principle is originally empty; it is merely that one cannot see it, and one must cultivate emptiness only after which one sees emptiness. Having answered the two determinations, the two difficulties are naturally dispelled. In answering the first determination there are three parts: first, a brief indication; next, from "Why?" onwards, a broad explanation; third, from "Similar and continuous" onwards, he adduces gains and losses to formulate the conclusion, within which there are again three parts: first, adducing the loss of ordinary beings; next, the gain of bodhisattvas; third, once more scolding the loss of ordinary beings. From "Good son, all dharmas" onwards, he answers the second determination. The intention is to clarify that although fundamentally empty, one must again cultivate and practice, and only then see it. Because there is an impermanent nature, cessation can extinguish it; because there is an empty nature, cultivating emptiness attains emptiness; one should know it is fundamentally empty. It is fully equipped with Dharma, simile, and application. The simile has two parts: first, from "Just as all dharmas" onwards, adducing internal dharmas as a simile; from "Just as salt" onwards, adducing external dharmas as a simile. From "A bodhisattva cultivating emptiness" onwards, it is the application.

23.13

From "Guāngmíng" downwards is the second round of doctrinal debate. It again raises questions based on the salt metaphor, divided into two: first, questioning whether contemplating emptiness is inverted. Why? If things are originally not empty and one cultivates emptiness and sees emptiness, this is seeing emptiness in what is not empty—how could this not be an inversion? This is like seeing impermanence in what is truly permanent, or seeing permanence in what is impermanent; both are inversions. There are also a metaphor and a correlation, turning the salt metaphor around to serve as the metaphor here. Second, questioning: since emptiness is non-existence, what is there to be seen? If there is something that can be seen, then it is not emptiness; if there is nothing that can be seen, one should not speak of "seeing." The Buddha answers the two questions in two sections. The answer to the first has three parts: first, a general statement; second, an extensive explanation; third, a reiterative conclusion. In the initial general statement, there are doctrine, metaphor, and correlation. The purport of the Buddha's answer says: seeing phenomena that are not empty and being able to make them empty is not an inversion. But speaking in terms of principle, there is nothing that is not empty; yet to sentient beings, they are indeed not empty. It merely extinguishes their conceptualized attachments; hence it says "being able to make what is not empty into emptiness," and therefore it is not an inversion. From "Good man, greed has the nature of existence" downwards is the second part, the extensive explanation, which again has two parts: first, extensively explaining making what is not empty into emptiness; second, extensively explaining that this is not an inversion. In the first text, "what is not empty" means that in relation to conditions, it exists. This also has two parts: first, clarifying that covetous desire exists for them; next, clarifying that the nature of form exists for them. If it were not existent, how could there be greedy attachment? Now saying that what is not empty is made empty means that these phenomena are all empty. From "For this reason" downwards is the second part, extensively explaining that it is not an inversion, which also has two parts: first, stating that it is not an inversion. From "All ordinary persons" downwards is the actual extensive explanation, which again has two parts: first, because marks of greed do not arise, it is not an inversion; next, because one sees the buddhadhātu, it is not an inversion. Question: When entering the first bhūmi, one is already able to see emptiness. Why does this text say that those dwelling in the ninth bhūmi see phenomena as having existence? Explanation: The meaning is clarified in terms of the two tolerances (kṣānti). From the first bhūmi to the tenth bhūmi is the tolerance of non-arising (anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti); only the Buddha-bhūmi is the tolerance of complete cessation (vyupaśama-kṣānti). Now, in terms of these two tolerances, when the ninth bhūmi is viewed against the Buddha's complete cessation, one still sees phenomena as having existence. Although compared to the Buddha it is not ultimate emptiness, it also possesses a portion of emptiness. Therefore the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "A bodhisattva of the seventh bhūmi can enter complete cessation." Complete cessation is precisely emptiness; differing explanations are given according to conditions, so one should not be deluded or attached. From "All buddhas and bodhisattvas" downwards is the third part, the reiterative conclusion. The Buddha also sometimes speaks of existence and sometimes of non-existence; one should know that this is for the sake of conditions, and therefore he now explains them all as being empty. From "Good man, regarding what you said about seeing emptiness" downwards is the second part, answering the latter objection, which also has two parts: first, reiterating the question; from "Good man" downwards is the second part, the direct answer. The direct answer also has two parts: first, the direct answer; next, citing past evidence. In the first text, taking non-seeing as seeing is, for example, like prajñā having no knowing and yet having nothing it does not know. From "Therefore I..." downwards extensively cites past evidence as in the text.

23.14

Next, clarifying the tenth virtue, which is also first stated and then explained. In the explanation, the past [masters] took the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment as the essence. Master Xīnghuáng said: Nirvāṇa and the buddhadhātu are the essence. The past [masters held that] as the bodhisattva practices the causes, and the aids to enlightenment are the causes, they therefore took the preceding text as the essence. Xīnghuáng said: The preceding virtues did not take nirvāṇa as their essence, but the final meaning is deep, and therefore he took the subsequent text as the essence. Question: Why are the six pāramitās not used here, but rather the aids to enlightenment? One explanation says: It is merely an abbreviation. Another explanation says: The Commentary (*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa) says, "The six pāramitās are the distant cause, and the aids to enlightenment are the proximate cause." Now it is clarified that this is not so: the aids to enlightenment subsume the pāramitās; the factor of enlightenment of equanimity subsumes dāna, and the rest can all be seen accordingly. The text of the *Vibhāṣā subsumes the aids to enlightenment under eleven factors; these eleven correspond in name and essence to the six [pāramitās], with only the remaining two mindfulnesses extending through all the pāramitās. Coming to the text, there are two parts: first, clarifying the virtue; next, doctrinal debate. The first also has two parts: first, clarifying that the aids to enlightenment lead into nirvāṇa; next, distinguishing gains and losses: those who have faith attain gain, while those who do not have faith suffer loss. The first virtue says that "hearing what has not been heard" means that the eternally abiding secret treasury is precisely the middle way. "Hearing what has not been heard" regarding the non-Buddhist scriptures and vyākaraṇa treatises is the conventional truth; "hearing what has not been heard" regarding the eleven divisions of scriptures is the ultimate truth. Within the three truths in one mind, one hears what has not been heard; the tenth virtue now is also like this. The thirty-seven aids to enlightenment are the ultimate truth; entering great nirvāṇa is the middle way; analyzing and expounding for the sake of sentient beings is the conventional truth. This is also the three truths in one mind, not different from beginning to end. If one is able to believe, one enters great nirvāṇa; the meaning is that this interpretation alone comes close to the principle (and so forth). Xīnghuáng took nirvāṇa as the essence of the final virtue, but the ninth and above were not like this. This interpretation has great faults, as already refuted earlier. The doctrinal debate has two parts: first, questions; second, answers. The answers have two parts: first, citing evil persons as an admonition; next, citing good persons as an encouragement. The evil persons have three parts: first, a doctrinal explanation; next, giving five metaphors; third, correlating back to the five metaphors, first correlating them individually and then correlating them collectively. The first metaphor of trading sandalwood for ordinary wood: two carts were loaded together, one with charcoal and one with sandalwood. Meeting winter with charcoal [in demand], the one selling sandalwood thereupon burned the incense into charcoal; although he made an easy sale, it was worth nothing. A precept-keeper who is cold, poor, hungry, and thirsty, seeing a precept-breaker wealthy, well-nourished, and feasting, violates the precepts and craves food and drink; what is gained is negligible, but what is lost is immense. In the next metaphor of exchanging gold for brass: in ancient times a man rode a horse wearing a gold belt around his waist, and saw one riding a donkey wearing a donkey-girth belt. He then asked him: "What item is expensive in the market?" The other replied: "Donkey girths are very expensive." He immediately exchanged it. For someone to abandon the true Dharma for sights and sounds is just like this. The remaining three metaphors are as in the text. The individual correlations are as in the text. From "Good man, at that time" downwards is the second part, citing good persons.

23.15

Next, the acknowledgment of understanding from "Guāngmíng" downwards is the second section of acknowledgment of understanding within the chapter, as in the text.

23.16

Third, from "This is called" downwards is the general conclusion.

23.17

Siṃhanāda Chapter, Part One of Two (First Half)

23.18

The masters all say: This chapter takes its name as a metaphor for the one capable of questioning; it is not that this is not so, but it is not exclusively so. This serves as a metaphor for both the one capable of questioning and the one capable of answering, titling the chapter with both in mind. Why? Both the bodhisattva and the Buddha possess the two adornments. In the text below there are the lion king and the lion cub; if the lion cub completes three full years, it can roar. Furthermore, if one can roar the siṃhanāda praising great compassion, one can roar immeasurable lion roars. Examining the text and relying on the principle, both are jointly clarified; why should an expositor offer only a single interpretation? The confused person says: The title only names the "Siṃhanāda Bodhisattva Chapter"; why make a forced dual interpretation of it? Answer: Relying strictly on the title loses the text; relying on the text does not lose the title, as the extensive can encompass the abridged. "Lion" corresponds to the king, "bodhisattva" corresponds to the cub, and "roar" applies to both places; the two meanings are luminous and clear, so what further confusion could there be? Furthermore, the graph for shī (師, master/lion) has the component for encircling on its own side; residing on the left position, principle and phenomena are both encircled (complete), meaning one's own practice is consummate. Moreover, the word shī is glossed as shuài (commander/lead); a master has the capacity to transform others, so it is clear that shī corresponds to the Buddha. The graph zǐ (cub/disciple) is glossed as zī (dependent/student); the etiquette of a disciple is to receive instruction from the master, and if one follows the master one renews daily and gains monthly; therefore it is clear that the graph zǐ corresponds to the bodhisattva. As for "roar" applying to both places: a roar is the mystery of speech, which encompasses six positions (and so forth). Now it is clarified that the ultimate roar and the partial roar apply to both places; the mysteries of body, speech, and mind all possess the six positions. The mystery of speech encompassing the six corresponds to the worldly [siddhānta]. Interpreting it with regard to the cub follows the individual [siddhānta]. Interpreting it with regard to the roar follows the therapeutic [siddhānta]. Interpreting it with regard to the master follows the primary truth [siddhānta]. Therefore the title contains many meanings. The masters of the Daśabhūmika school call this chapter the division of entering realization. Kāishàn says: It answers the question on the nature of peaceful bliss. Héxī and Xīnghuáng alike take it as the gateway of the buddhadhātu. Now none of these are adopted. If it were entering realization, in entering realization there is no preaching; if it preaches entering realization, it would not be a bodhisattva's preaching. If it answers the question on the nature of peaceful bliss, whose question was the question on the nature of peaceful bliss that this chapter would now answer it? If it clarifies the buddhadhātu, who preached the buddhadhātu that this chapter would designate the speaker? These various explanations are contradictory, so none are adopted. Now it is clarified that this chapter is the fourth question-and-answer on the meaning of nirvāṇa; it is the lion cub questioning and the lion king answering. If following its text, one should say questions and answers on the meaning of the buddhadhātu. Since the preceding sections all referred to nirvāṇa, it follows along and is called the meaning of nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is simply the buddhadhātu, and the buddhadhātu is simply nirvāṇa; "nirvāṇa" is the general name and "buddhadhātu" is the specific name, the general subsuming the specific.

23.19

Regarding the chapter, it is again divided into two: first, explaining buddhadhātu; later, praising the sūtra. The first text is again divided into four: first, explaining buddhadhātu; second, explaining the middle way; third, explaining bondage and liberation; fourth, explaining the cultivation of the path. Buddhadhātu is the fundamental basis: because of buddhadhātu, one will penetrate the middle; not recognizing it, there is bondage; recognizing it, there is liberation. Wishing to attain liberation from bondage, one must cultivate and practice. The first text contains questions and answers. The questions are divided into four: first, encouraging the asking of questions; second, requesting to ask questions; third, granting permission to ask questions; fourth, the formal asking of questions. Within encouraging the asking of questions, the various Dharma gates are first cited, and afterwards comes the formal encouragement. The initial citation of the various Dharmas contains six gates: first, citing the Three Jewels; next, citing the Four Truths; third, citing the real truth; fourth, citing the four virtues; fifth, citing the five buddhadhātus; sixth, citing cause and effect, and so forth. Having a vehicle and having no vehicle is citing the nature of the revealing cause (vyaktā-hetu-svabhāva). Why? Because the myriad goods and the One Vehicle all pertain to the revealing cause. Having nature and lacking nature is citing the nature of fruition and the nature of fruition of fruition. Sentient beings existing and sentient beings not existing is citing the nature of the direct cause. Existence and non-existence, reality and non-reality cite the nature of the cognitive sphere. Why? The two truths are the spheres cognized by wisdom, and the sphere in turn generates wisdom; therefore, it is the nature of the cognitive sphere. Having causes and lacking causes all cited cause and effect. One explanation says: the first two lines explain the cause and effect of habituated causes, and the next three lines explain the cause and effect of retributive causes. Having karma and lacking karma are causes of afflictions, and karma is not affliction; these are the karmic retributions of good and bad, which are the karmic fruits of afflictions. A second explanation says: the upper two lines explain supramundane cause and effect, and the lower three lines explain mundane cause and effect. Furthermore, regarding the encouragement by citing Dharma gates: generally speaking, it cites the Dharma gates of the two truths; having a Buddha is the conventional truth, and having no Buddha is the ultimate truth, up to having retribution being the conventional truth, and having no retribution being the ultimate truth. The text mentions only the two truths, but if we follow [the phrase] 'ask as you please,' would it only be the two truths? All dharmas such as the two gates and four gates—how could they stop at just the two truths? For the moment, they penetrate the three truths and even the four gates. Penetrating the three truths: having a Buddha is conventional, having no Buddha is ultimate, neither having a Buddha nor lacking a Buddha is the middle way; and it is likewise up to retribution. Penetrating the two gates: having a Buddha is the gate of existence, having no Buddha is the gate of emptiness; having retribution and lacking retribution are also likewise. If following 'ask as you please,' there should be four gates: the two gates are as above; both having a Buddha and lacking a Buddha is the gate of both; neither having a Buddha nor lacking a Buddha is the gate of neither; up to both having retribution and lacking retribution, neither having retribution nor lacking retribution, being also likewise. Question: Since the Buddha encouraged asking about the various Dharma gates, why not follow what the Buddha encouraged and instead separately ask about buddhadhātu? Answer: Although the various Dharma gates are distinct, they universally enter buddhadhātu. If one asks about buddhadhātu, the general can subsume the specific. Why? Following the encouragement in the five lines on having a vehicle and having no vehicle is precisely asking about the five kinds of buddhadhātu. Again, following the Three Jewels is asking what is the fruit of buddhadhātu. Following the two truths of suffering and origin is asking about buddhadhātu as the cognitive sphere. Following the path and cessation is asking about conditions and revealing [causes]. Following real and unreal is asking about the direct nature. Following cause and effect is asking about causal nature, cause-of-cause nature, fruit nature, and fruit-of-fruit nature. Following action and non-action is asking about causal nature. Following karma and non-karma is asking about conditional nature. Furthermore, following having a vehicle and having no vehicle is asking what is the essence of buddhadhātu. Following retribution, the Three Jewels, the Four Truths, and so on is asking by what meaning it is named buddhadhātu. Following the four virtues is asking why it is named buddhadhātu. Following having causes and lacking causes is asking with what eye the bodhisattva sees unclearly. Following having fruition and lacking fruition is asking with what eye the Buddha can see clearly. Following the two lines on having action and lacking action and so on is asking why sentient beings do not see it. Following retribution and no retribution is asking about the direct nature. The Buddha has eighteen items of encouragement; the bodhisattva, based on these gates of encouragement, raises six kinds of questions; their similarities and differences are like this, yet people do not see it. Personally, I consider: Encouraging specifically and asking specifically indeed accords with the Buddha's words, but does not yet grasp the full intention. Encouraging generally and asking specifically does not gather dharmas comprehensively, and does not grasp the full intention. Encouraging generally and asking generally also accords with the Buddha's intention, but it is feared that the assembly at that time would not understand the specifics within the general; therefore, the Buddha encouraged specifically and [Siṃhanāda] formulated a general question, profoundly grasping the Buddha's aim and allowing the contemporary gathering to understand easily; that the Buddha encouraged specifically while Siṃhanāda asked generally is truly for this reason.

23.20

From 'Now I permit you to ask' onward is the formal encouragement. Within the formal encouragement, there is the formal encouragement and the earnest encouragement: the Buddha was earnest in order to cause the assembly to attain benefit.

23.21

From 'At that time, in the assembly' onward is the second part, requesting to ask questions: first the sūtra compiler narrates, and next comes the formal utterance. The character *liǎn* [restrain] is also written as *jiǎn* [check]; both are appearances of respect. Next is the formal utterance. From 'At that time the Buddha told' onward is the third part, granting permission to ask questions: first encouraging offerings, and next formally granting permission. Within the initial encouragement, there are three: first, the formal encouragement; next, the explanation; third, the conclusion. Within the initial encouragement of offerings, the three karmas are fully urged: respect pertains to the mind, praise pertains to the mouth, and welcoming and escorting pertain to the body. From 'Why is this?' onward is the second, explaining the encouragement; the text has the teaching, the metaphor, and the application. In the teaching, it first clarifies past virtues, and next clarifies present virtues. From 'Good son, just as a lion' onward is the metaphorical explanation, which is again twofold: first making a metaphor for the Buddha, and next making a metaphor for the bodhisattva. Within the metaphor for the Buddha, it first compares the dharmakāya, and next compares the responsive traces. The dharmakāya is again divided into three: first general, next specific, and finally the conclusion. The initial sentence is the general metaphor. From 'Knowing his own physical strength' onward, the five sentences are the specific metaphors: the body of various virtues is the six pāramitās; the strength is the ten powers; the teeth are wisdom, severing afflictions; the four feet are the four bases of psychic power; the ground is śīla; the mountain cavern is dhyāna-concentration; the tail is great compassion—bending down to save is like the tail hanging down; the sound is preaching the Dharma with the eight tones of voice. Third, from 'If there is one who can possess' onward, is the general conclusion. From 'Emerging from the cavern at dawn' onward is the second part, clarifying the skillful means of the responsive body, which is again threefold: first, the formal response—dawn is the end of darkness and the beginning of light, an analogy for the disposition where evil is extinguished and goodness arises, which he can respond to; next, emerging from the cavern is arising from the dharmakāya; stretching is extinguishing evil, yawning is generating goodness, looking in four directions is the four unobstructed knowledges, and roaring is preaching the Dharma—there are eleven matters; third, from 'all birds and beasts' onward is sentient beings attaining the path—water-dwellers symbolize the defiled attachment of ordinary people, land-walkers symbolize the high plateau of the two vehicles, flying creatures symbolize subduing the hosts of Māra, and the fragrant elephant symbolizes suppressing non-Buddhists. From 'Just as that jackal' onward is the second part, making a metaphor for the bodhisattva. Regarding the jackal: first it cites what it is not, and next clarifies what it is. The three years symbolize the three practices; however, in the subsequent application text, these three are briefly explained among the five practices. Furthermore, pure conduct (brahmacarya) is transforming others: within transforming others, sharing their severing of delusions is the practice of illness; sharing their generation of goodness is the infant practice; pure conduct incorporates them, so they are not stated in full. From 'The Tathāgata, the Fully Enlightened One' onward is the application of the metaphor: first applying the Buddha's metaphor, and next applying the bodhisattva's metaphor. The first text is twofold: first applying the marvelous origin for sentient beings, and next applying the responsive traces. The application of the first is slightly out of sequence, but fully applies the eleven matters: applying the previous 'wishing to destroy what is not truly a lion but deceitfully acting as a lion,' the application says 'roaring the lion's roar for all sentient beings'; the previous text said 'wishing to test his physical strength,' and the application says 'demonstrating the ten powers to the assembly' (and so forth). From 'noble practice' onward is the second, applying the response, but it does not apply the dawn. From 'The lion's roar is' onward is the third, applying sentient beings' attainment of benefit previously mentioned. Previously there were four sentences; now the application directly says 'definitive preaching,' which is why it subdues Māra and suppresses non-Buddhists, concurrently explaining the meaning of 'lion's roar.' Next, from 'śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas' onward applies the bodhisattva's metaphor, also first applying the citation of what it is not, and next applying the clarification of what it is, as in the text. Opening the metaphor and applying the metaphor clarifies both the Buddha and the bodhisattva, two meanings distinctly manifest; how could one interpret the chapter title as referring to only one? From 'All good sons' onward is the third, concluding the encouragement of offerings.

First 21 of 27 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese