大般涅槃經疏 28

English (machine translation) 28

Language: English

28.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

28.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

This was a good initial inquiry, and now wishing to bring it to completion, he requests again. Previously, chapters were titled according to their doctrinal meaning; now the title is established according to the person, hence it is called “Kāśyapa.” Kāśyapa is as explained earlier. Kāishàn uses this to answer the question on the nature of peaceful bliss; Dilun masters treat it as the section on the compassionate light and skillful maintenance; Hexi and Xinghuang both regard it as the gate of buddhadhātu. Now it is explained as the fifth: the function of nirvāṇa. From beginning to end, this sūtra thoroughly discusses the buddhadhātu; what are the similarities and differences between this chapter and the previous one? The differences are briefly five: First is the difference in meaning and function. The previous chapter clarified the meaning of the buddhadhātu of the middle way as the seed of bodhi; the present chapter clarifies the superior function of the buddhadhātu, capable of gathering the most evil icchantikas and biased, heterodox outsiders. Second is the difference in cause and fruit. The previous chapter clarified that the causal nature is in the cause and not in the fruit, and the fruitional nature is in the fruit and not in the cause. This chapter clarifies that all evil aggregates are themselves the buddhadhātu, which is the causal nature; from the evil five aggregates arise the wholesome five aggregates, which is also the fruitional nature. It also says that the buddhadhātu pertains to the three times and does not pertain to the three times; the fruitional nature of the noble ones pervades the three times and does not pervade the three times. Traditionally, the fruitional nature has been explained such that pervading the three times is the buddhadhātu of the response body (nirmāṇakāya), while not pervading the three times is the buddhadhātu of the Dharma body (dharmakāya). This is not correct: it simply says that the fruitional nature pervades both cause and fruit—why must one divide it into the two bodies of response and Dharma? If wholesome, the buddhadhātu of the five aggregates pervades cause and fruit: the buddhadhātu within the cause is subsumed under the three times, while the buddhadhātu of the fruit is not of the three times. Third is the difference in combining and separating. In the previous chapter’s river of saṃsāra, the four fruits were combined and the three vehicles separated; in this chapter’s river of nirvāṇa, the four fruits are separated and the three vehicles combined. Fourth is the difference in general and specific. The previous chapter generally clarified five kinds of buddhadhātu, where celestial, human, and the six destinies all have buddhadhātu; this chapter specifically clarifies the buddhadhātu as direct cause, whereby icchantikas, through the direct cause, regenerate wholesome roots. The previous chapter specifically relied on the revealing-cause buddhadhātu of myriad wholesome qualities; this chapter generally relies on both good and evil being the buddhadhātu, hence it says those with wholesome roots have it and icchantikas lack it, while icchantikas have it and those with wholesome roots lack it. Fifth, the previous chapter addressed one single person, while the present chapter again addresses Kāśyapa. The differences are indeed many. At the beginning of the chapter, it first clarifies the difference in function, and establishing the section based on this initial intent, it is called the function of nirvāṇa.

28.5

Regarding the text, there are two parts: first, explaining the gathering of evil [beings], and second, explaining the gathering of heterodox [beings]. Within the gathering of evil [beings], there are two parts: first, explaining the function of the buddhadhātu, and second, praising the sūtra. The first, explaining the function, also has two parts: first, explaining the severing of good, and second, explaining the generation of good. Because of the power of delusion, good is severed; because of the power of the buddhadhātu, good is generated. An old commentary states: 'The person who commits evil and the person who generates good are two different persons; they alternate and are completely unrelated to one another.' Another master says: 'It is only one person; previously, due to inversions, evil arose, and later, meeting a spiritual friend, good was generated.' We now explain that this is not so: it may be one person, or it may be many persons. Like the seven types [of swimmers] in the river, they are many persons; if it is one person initially submerging and continuing up to attaining buddhahood, then it is one person. The old [view] says: 'The generation of good involves the principle of the "gathered consciousness". Sentient beings, starting from within the cave of ignorance-consciousness beyond the realms, first produce one grade of ignorance and come forth; having not yet produced the four dwellings, if there is a buddha who gathers them up, they immediately attain buddhahood.' This principle presents a great obstacle. Even if such a sūtra existed, it would merely be a temporary condition for transforming evil; if there is no such sūtra, it is entirely unreliable. If it is said that one must inevitably produce all five dwellings before one can transform evil and do good, neither is there any sūtra that definitively makes such a statement; even if there were such a sūtra, it too would only treat this as a temporary condition. If so, and one is left to the extremes of evil and naturally gathered up, why would there be any need to cultivate the Path? How would this differ from attaining the Path [naturally after] eighty thousand kalpas? If it is said that one comes from the cave of consciousness, that means one comes from ignorance; how can one say that one first produces one grade of ignorance? If one had not yet produced afflictions, one ought to have been in another place. If, having come from the cave and first producing one grade, one was gathered up, why were they not gathered up when subsequent grades up to the four dwellings arose? If they were gathered up in the cave of ignorance, why were they not gathered up in the cave of the four dwellings? Therefore, this is difficult to believe. If that were the case, then altogether there would be no need for cultivation. Above, we have repeatedly refuted this doctrine. If by the power of the buddhadhātu one naturally attains bodhi without needing to cultivate, this is precisely what is refuted. The old [view] says: 'Sunakṣatra has no trace of origin; he is a real evil person.' This doctrine is not correct. Although we have not seen it in the sūtra, by doctrinal inference he is a provisional [manifestation]. Why? The Buddha's two younger brothers and two sons each engaged in good and evil: Ānanda did good while Devadatta committed evil, and both were provisional manifestations. Now Rāhula did good while Sunakṣatra committed evil; by analogy, one knows this is also a provisional manifestation.

28.6

The text on severing goodness has three parts: first, clarifying the person who severs goodness; second, clarifying the characteristics of severing goodness; third, clarifying the views that sever goodness. The person who severs goodness is Sunakṣatra. The characteristics of severing goodness are that with an indeterminate faculty nature, hearing the indeterminate teaching, he clings to it and forms a fixed understanding. The views that sever goodness are the discriminating analysis and seeking into the principles of phenomena. First, regarding the person, there are two parts: first the question, next the answer. The question has two parts: first the origin, next the main question. Within the origin, there are two: first, clarifying the Buddha's virtue of being able to transform, and next, clarifying Sunakṣatra's conditions of being transformable. Regarding the Buddha, there are also two: first, possessing friendliness and compassion within, and second, possessing skillful means without. In the first text, 'pity' refers to great friendliness, and 'compassion' refers to great compassion. Next, from 'able to tame the untamed' downward, there are seven phrases, which are the external skillful means. From 'Sunakṣatra the monk' downward is the second part, clarifying that he has the capacity to be transformed, which also has two parts: first, clarifying that he is a son, namely Rāhula's elder half-brother, which means the condition is deep. Next, after leaving household life, he possessed faith and precepts; receiving and upholding the twelve divisions of scriptures is wisdom; destroying the fetters of the desire realm and attaining the four dhyānas is concentration—endowed with the three virtues, how could his cause not be profound? Next, from 'Why did the Tathāgata...' downward is the main question, first presenting two objections, and later making two concluding objections. The first objection asks why he prophesied that this was an evil person, and the second asks why he did not teach the Dharma to him first. The first also has two: first, objecting to why he was prophesied as an icchantika, which is the evil cause; next, objecting to why he would abide in hell for a kalpa, which is the evil fruit. From 'Why did the Tathāgata...' downward is the second objection: having a deep connection with the Buddha, why did he not first teach him the Dharma? From 'Tathāgata, World-Honoured One...' downward concludes the two objections. From 'How can he be said to possess great pity and compassion...' downward concludes the first objection: the Buddha possesses friendliness and compassion, so how can he be called one who abides in the basest state for a kalpa? Since he is in the basest state, one should know that the Buddha lacks friendliness and compassion. Next, from 'having great skillful means...' downward concludes the second objection: since the Buddha did not first teach him the Dharma, how can he be called one of great skillful means? If he had skillful means, he should have taught him the Dharma. In the Buddha's reply, he does not answer the origin, but only answers the two objections and two concluding objections, answering the latter first and the former later. In answering the latter first, there are seven similes in all: the first six similes clarify that because conditions have depth and shallowness, the teachings have an order; the last simile clarifies that the Buddha's mind is equal and impartial, preaching without bias. In the first six similes, there are regularly three elements: first, posing the question via a simile; second, narrating the matter in response; third, matching the simile to form an understanding. Why is there this order of three? It is explained: just as when the Buddha first taught the five human and heavenly precepts for Trapuṣa and Mucilinda the blind dragon, next went to the Deer Park to turn the wheel of the Four Truths for the persons of the two vehicles, and later explained the vaipulya teachings to the bodhisattvas—this is one route that takes the small as the beginning. If it is that upon first attaining the Buddha Path he taught the Rocana teaching, first illuminating the king of mountains and next illuminating the plains, this is another route that takes the great as the beginning. Now the intent of this text encompasses beginning and end, taking the king of mountains as the beginning, Mucilinda as the middle, and the Twin Trees as the end. However, although the third son is extremely evil, because their essence is identical, he must therefore be taught; although the poor field is barren, because it is part of the family estate, it is therefore not abandoned. Although the inferior vessel is broken, it is kept against urgent need; although the severely ill person will surely die, because he is a relative [he is cared for]; although the inferior horse is old, because it spares exhaustion [it is kept]; although the inferior person is lowly, because of equal distribution [he is given to]. In the first six similes, although the answers are differentiated, the meaning concurrently encompasses non-differentiation, yet the intention is still not yet evident. In the seventh simile, the text becomes even clearer, bringing up the lion king who neither values the elephant nor disparages the hare, exerting his full strength equally for both, analogizing the Buddha who neither favors the good nor disdains the evil, equally exercising great compassion. If observed in terms of magnitude, the elephant is insufficient and the hare is in excess; if observed in terms of measuring strength, the elephant requires speed and the hare requires leisure. The king of beasts is not like this: he is equal and uniform, without distinction. Observed in terms of conditions, the teaching for bodhisattvas is profound and subtle, the teaching for śrāvakas is shallow and proximate, the teaching for icchantikas concerns the worldly; yet the Buddha does not have two or three [minds], his great compassion being equal and impartial. From 'Once, when I was residing in the City of the King...' downward is the second, answering after the fact the question concerning prophesying him. The question has two parts: first, answering about the icchantika, and next, answering the intent of the prophecy. First, answering that as an icchantika he claimed to possess faith, wisdom, and concentration: all [these claims] are refuted in the question and are not granted to him. Clarifying his lack of faith also has three parts: first, he did not believe the Buddha was one without fear; from 'Once, when I was in Kāśi...' downward, second, clarifying he did not believe the Buddha was one without false speech; from 'Once, when I was with Sunakṣatra...' downward, third, clarifying he did not believe the Buddha was one without jealousy. The first text means: you said that leaving the household life signified his having faith, but now by three matters his lack of faith is revealed. Second, when the Buddha walked, his feet were four inches above the ground, and the wheel-mark with a thousand spokes was constantly manifest in his footprints; all people wished to see it, but he constantly tried to obliterate it. Having failed to obliterate it, he took a dead earthworm and placed it in the Buddha's footprint to cause countless people to think that the Buddha had trampled and harmed it, and so forth. Regarding the third text: human and ghostly retributions are distinct, yet they clearly saw each other; could replying and conversing back and forth truly be done by a genuine evil person? By this test one knows he was a provisional manifestation, and so forth. From 'Although Sunakṣatra chanted and recited...' downward is the second, clarifying his lack of wisdom: only acquiring the words without understanding their meaning is not wisdom. From 'He associated with evil friends...' downward is the third, clarifying his lack of concentration, which also has two parts: first, clarifying that although he attained it, he later lost it, hence it is said he lacked concentration. Next, from 'falling away from dhyāna...' downward concludes generally the arising of heterodoxy, which was the reason for prophesying him. From 'Good man, if you do not believe...' downward is the second, answering his previous question about the intent of the prophecy, which also has two: first, clarifying the intent of the prophecy, and next, clarifying that he was untreatable. The first text means: because he was certain to fall [into hell], I therefore prophesied it; to display the sign of his certain entry, I therefore went to see him. Seeing the Buddha, evil arose in him and he immediately entered hell, so his certain falling was evident. Regarding going to Sunakṣatra's place, some say this cites a past event, or that by inconceivable power he went there without moving, and so forth. From 'Good man, although Sunakṣatra entered the Buddha-Dharma...' downward is the second, answering regarding the untreatable person: because of his heedlessness he was untreatable, so [the Buddha] merely pitied him. There are the principle, the simile, and the matching. In the matching, there are two rounds, each with two parts: both first match directly, and next match by applying the simile. From 'Since the past, I...' downward is the second, answering his two concluding objections. First, answering the prior concluding objection about lacking a compassionate mind, which also has two: first, answering directly, and next, discrimination. In the direct answer, there are the principle, the simile, and the matching. Second, there are further questions and answers of discrimination, within which are two: first the question, next the answer. Within the answer are two: first the direct answer, and next, from 'Good man' downward, citing the past to reveal the truth. In it, citing Maudgalyāyana's prophecies, it was not that he was entirely inaccurate, but only saw the first two without seeing the subsequent joining, only saw the white head without seeing the swift body, and so forth. The Tathāgata is not like this, and therefore is not dual. From 'The monk Sunakṣatra was constantly surrounded by immeasurable...' downward answers the latter concluding objection concerning skillful means: it clarifies that I kept him constantly by my side and did not let him go far away, fearing he would commit evil—how could this be a lack of skillful means? The fifth power of understanding is precisely the power of aspiration, knowing the aspirations and understandings of sentient beings.

28.7

From "World-Honoured One, as for icchantikas" onwards is the second [section], the characteristics of severing goodness, which consists of three parts: first, directly explaining the severing of goodness; second, explaining that goodness is severed because the faculties and nature are indeterminate; and third, explaining that goodness is severed because the taught doctrine is indeterminate. The first has five rounds of questions and answers. In the first round, there is first a question; then, in the Buddha's reply, because they sever the roots of goodness, there is therefore no goodness. According to the explanation of the masters of the Abhidharma, an icchantika gives rise to evil and wrong [views] that unimpededly sever these roots of goodness, just as the uncontaminated path of unimpeded progress severs afflictions. If so, one should know that goodness would ultimately never arise again; how then could roots of goodness be restored and reborn? This interpretation is incorrect. Within the body of an icchantika there are grave, evil hindrances, and goodness cannot arise alongside them; this is termed the hindered goodness being unable to arise. Later, as evil gradually fades away, goodness can arise again; hence it is said that the roots of goodness are restored and reborn. Question: Does an icchantika have goodness to sever, or no goodness to sever? Answer: Both meanings are present. If one previously performed goodness and later encountered evil companions and severed and destroyed this goodness, this is termed having goodness to sever. As for having no goodness to sever, when performing evil earlier there was no goodness whatsoever, yet as evil karma was about to be extinguished and good karma should have arisen, an obstruction arose again so that goodness could not arise; this is termed having no goodness to sever. The text states that all sentient beings possess the five faculties of faith and so forth, whereas an icchantika completely severs them; traditional explanations say: sentient beings within the principle possess the five faculties of faith and so forth, whereas those outside the principle are inverted and false, hence lacking the five faculties of faith and so forth. This interpretation is incorrect; even those outside the principle possess faith and so forth. Since an icchantika is outside the principle, by giving rise to evil they sever these five faculties. However, since sentient beings who perform evil possess buddhadhātu, the five faculties ought to arise; yet in actual fact they do not yet exist, and it is said conceptually that they ought to exist; hence it says that all sentient beings possess them. The text states that killing an icchantika is without sin, while killing a mosquito or ant incurs sin; this is because the icchantika has grave evil in their person, so killing them is without sin, whereas mosquitoes and ants lack grave evil, so killing them incurs sin. The text states that giving to an animal brings a hundredfold reward, while giving to an icchantika brings a thousandfold reward; this is because an icchantika's human status was elicited by the five precepts in past lives, so giving to them yields heavy merit, whereas an animal's bodily form was elicited by evil karma in previous lives, so giving to them yields light merit. From "World-Honoured One, an icchantika" onwards is the second round of questions and answers. In the question, the thesis is established; the reply can be understood. From "World-Honoured One, all sentient beings" onwards is the third round of questions and answers. In the question, it is explained that since the icchantika does not sever the future, how can it be said that they sever goodness? The Buddha answers that severing is of two kinds: first, extinction in the present; second, obstruction of the future. If evil arises in the present, good dharmas do not arise, hence it is extinction in the present. Having performed evil in the present, it further prevents future goodness from arising, hence severing the future. It also completely severs all three time periods: performing evil in the past without repenting means there is no more goodness; in the future there is also the sense of goodness being reborn, but being weak of itself, it cannot save them. From "World-Honoured One, as for icchantikas" onwards is the fourth round of questions and answers, explaining that buddhadhātu is not severed. Buddhadhātu is good; that this goodness is not severed is termed not severing the nature. Furthermore, buddhadhātu is eternal and indeed cannot be severed. Regarding what is said of the selfhood and buddhadhātu of worldly sentient beings, there are three explanations: The first says that the self of the non-Buddhists is borrowed as an analogy; there is no false self at all, hence it is not subsumed under the three time periods; the true self is eternal and not subsumed under the three time periods. The second says this is not so: it is simply that the selfhood of worldly sentient beings is itself buddhadhātu, and because it is buddhadhātu it is not subsumed under the three time periods. The third says it is precisely the true self, the momentum of the wording implying that buddhadhātu is eternal. The later text says that buddhadhātu belongs to the future, whereas the earlier text says it is not subsumed under the three time periods; these two statements conflict, and now they must be harmonised. What was earlier stated as not being subsumed under the three time periods refers to the essence of buddhadhātu; what is later stated as belonging to the future is in terms of the cultivation of sentient beings. All sentient beings will in the future attain a pure body; hence it is said to belong to the future. From "Kāśyapa said: Buddhadhātu" onwards is the fifth round of questions and answers. First he asks about buddhadhātu; next he asks about the icchantika. The first question: Since buddhadhātu is not subsumed under the three time periods, why is it said to belong to the future? From "If the Tathāgata says" onwards, he next asks about the icchantika: If one says an icchantika completely lacks good dharmas, why do they have minds of love and pity? If they have such a mind, then they possess goodness. From "The Buddha said" onwards is the reply. First he answers the first question, which again has two parts: first answering the question, and next discussing the meaning. In the first answer there are two parts: first praising the question, and next directly answering. The nature does not belong to the three time periods; it is called future in terms of its future attainment, and therefore below an analogy is raised of speaking of the cause as the fruit, and speaking of the fruit as the cause. Buddhadhātu is also like this: saying it is future speaks of the fruit within the cause. Regarding "food and contact": food can be understood; the designations of contact differ: some take consciousness as contact, and some take the sense faculties as contact. Here both meanings are present; hence the treatise says, "Because contact is not fixed, there is no separate dharma." If the mental consciousness is focused on a condition, it is called contact; this contact lies in consciousness. If one speaks of visual consciousness and visual contact, this contact lies in ideation. Now, saying that seeing visible form is called contact means that the conscious mind takes this as contact. Visible form is an external datum capable of producing conscious contact; hence visible form is called contact, which is also speaking of the fruit within the cause.

28.8

From "World-Honoured One" onwards is the second part, discussing the meaning, with first a question and next a reply. Question: If the fruit arises before the cause and its nature does not belong to the three time periods, why say that sentient beings have it? The Buddha replies: Its nature is neither internal nor external, just like space, yet all sentient beings definitely have this nature; the text says that all possess it. From "As you have said" onwards answers the next question: first reiterating the question and refuting it; from "Why?" onwards directly answering, with doctrine, analogy, and application. Doctrinal explanation: Although they have goodness such as filial piety and compassion, the text says these are all perverse activities. Although they have seeing and hearing, these are all indeterminate. Since they lack correct goodness, they are all called perverse and evil. Grasping activity and seeking activity stand in contrast to goodness. Within goodness, good desire arises first, followed by good thought; here, grasping activity corresponds to good desire and seeking activity corresponds to good thought; although both are spoken of as good, they are still indeterminate. Next an analogy is cited, saying that like the harītakī whose taste is purely bitter, its colour and fragrance are not bitter. Yet the previous objection asked: how could an icchantika lack goodness? Having pity and love is termed good. Hence the Buddha replies: they are entirely perverse and evil. Zhuāngyán says: they lack supramundane goodness, but have the goodness of pity and love. Guāngzhái says: even if they have pity and love, both are of an indeterminate nature and not termed of a good nature, just as chess and calligraphy are indeterminate technical skills. Kāishàn says: they sever goodness and commit evil; even if they have pity and love, these entirely belong to evil and perversity; how could there be goodness? Master Guān agrees with Kāishàn, saying: grave evil resides in their person, just as when a bitter gourd is planted, its roots and leaves are all bitter. The application of the analogy is as in the text.

28.9

From "Good son, the Tathāgata possesses fully" onwards is the second [part], explaining that the faculties and nature are indeterminate, being either evil or good. This also has two parts: first, directly explaining the indeterminacy; later, further questions, answers, and discussion of meaning. The first also has two parts: first, explaining indeterminacy; next, severing the roots of goodness. The first, explaining indeterminacy, further has three parts: 1. knowing the indeterminate faculties; 2. setting forth the characteristics of indeterminacy; 3. concluding the indeterminacy. The first is as in the text. As for the next passage: with repeated practice they become sharp, shifting from lower to medium and higher; without practice they become dull, shifting from higher to medium and lower. The third, the conclusion, is as in the text (and so on). From "Because there is no determinacy" onwards is the second [part], explaining that because of indeterminacy the roots of goodness are severed. This also has three parts: first, explaining that indeterminacy severs goodness; next, explaining that if they were determinate it would not be so; third, from "Therefore" onwards, proving indeterminacy. From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onwards is the second, discussing the meaning (and so on). The question can be understood. The Buddha's reply has two parts: first replying regarding Sunakṣatra, and later replying regarding other persons; not only did he know Sunakṣatra's faculties and nature, he also knew the faculties and natures of other persons. The first also has three parts: first, explaining that if he occupied the royal throne he would destroy [the Dharma]. From "If Sunakṣatra had not" onwards is the second, explaining that whether leaving the household or not leaving the household, he would in both cases sever goodness. Leaving the household increased his goodness of respecting elders, recitation, cultivating concentration, and so forth, fully as explained above. From "If I had not permitted" onwards is the third, concluding with the power of knowing faculties. Next, from "The Buddha observes sentient beings" onwards is the reply regarding other persons, which again has two parts: first, explaining indeterminacy; next, discerning ascent and descent. The first also has two parts: severing goodness and generating goodness. The first, severing goodness, again has three parts: 1. directly severing goodness; next, from "Why?" onwards, setting forth the practices of severing goodness; 3. from "By this reason" onwards, concluding his severing of goodness. Next, from "The Tathāgata further knows" onwards is the second, explaining the generation of goodness, which has doctrine, analogy, and application. The doctrine can be understood. In the analogy, the spring illustrates buddhadhātu, the village illustrates the body of the aggregates, burning thirst illustrates the oppression of suffering, wishing to go illustrates the mind seeking happiness, and the wise person at the side illustrates the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. In the application of the analogy there are two parts: first applying it, and next concluding with the power of knowing faculties. From "At that time the World-Honoured One took up a little earth from the ground" onwards is the second, explaining that ascent and descent differ, descent being frequent and ascent rare. This also has three parts: first, raising an event to ask; next, receiving the instruction and respectfully replying; third, applying the analogy, which again has three parts: first applying it in terms of the fruit; next applying it in terms of the cause; third, concluding with the power of knowing faculties.

28.10

From "Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: 'The Tathāgata is possessed of...'" below, third is to explain that the preaching of the teaching is indeterminate. The Buddha illuminates [beings'] differing faculties, so the teachings preached are different. Sentient beings do not understand the differences between faculties and teachings, and cling to them, turning them into disputations, which can sever the roots of goodness. There are two parts: first the question, and next the answer. The first question has three parts: first, explaining knowledge of faculties; second, explaining clinging and disputation; third, concluding with the question of why an indeterminate preaching was made, thereby causing disputes to arise. The first, explaining knowledge of faculties, should also include knowing the past; this is just an abbreviation. From "Such sentient beings..." below, next is explaining clinging and disputation, from which the forms of disputation are broadly set forth. Kāishàn speaks of twenty disputations, and Yěchéng speaks of twenty-one disputations (and so forth). Third, from "If the Tathāgata..." below, is concluding the objection (and so forth). Next, in the answer, the Buddha fully answers the three questions: within this fascicle, he answers the first two questions, and at the beginning of the subsequent fascicle, he answers the third question. Answering the first has two parts: first, directly explaining that the preaching of the teaching is indeterminate; next, broadly explaining indeterminate phenomena. The first text has four parts: first, explaining that the principle is profound and difficult to understand; second, presenting the two kinds of people—foolish and wise; third, explaining the necessity of an indeterminate preaching; fourth, concluding with the power of knowing faculties, which is the intention of the four siddhāntas. First, in saying that the principle is profound: it is not something known by the consciousness of the six ordinary realms, but can only be understood by noble wisdom; therefore, the principle is profound. This is the intention of paramārtha [siddhānta]. Next, in [presenting] the foolish and wise, there are again two parts: first presenting the wise, and next presenting the foolish. First, when a wise person hears of existence, they know non-existence; when they hear of non-existence, they know existence; when they hear of existence and non-existence, they know neither existence nor non-existence; one, two, and so forth are also like this. Next, when a foolish person hears of existence, they cling to existence to reject non-existence; when they hear of non-existence, they take it to be non-existence and not existence; when they hear of both existence and non-existence, they attach to the preservation of both; when they hear of abandoning both, they attach to the renunciation of both. Even hearing it in person was like this; in the latter age it is even more so. This is because they do not understand the intention of the antidotal siddhānta. Third, from "What the Tathāgata has..." below, it is necessary to speak indeterminately. This broadly relies on the indeterminate, having the doctrine, the parable, and the application. In the first, the doctrine: in order to deliver sentient beings, it is necessary to speak indeterminately; the original intent is to cause them to attain benefit, not to cause them to cling to the indeterminate and make disputes. Next, in the parable, just as a physician uses medicine originally to cure illness, he by no means wishes that taking medicine will become an illness. In the application of the parable: because lands and boundaries are different, how could they be uniform? If they were uniform, there would be no benefit. In terms of lands, it is like a very cold country using wool mats and wearing leather boots. In terms of seasons, it is like begging during a famine and receiving only meat. In terms of other speech, it is like the ninth abode saying they do not see, while the tenth abode says they see a little. In terms of persons, it accords with the faculties of persons. This is the intention of the individual [siddhānta]. Fourth, concluding with the power of knowing faculties is the intention of the mundane [siddhānta] (and so forth). There is a sūtra text lacking a conclusion, which should be an omission. From "For one name..." below, second is to broadly present indeterminate phenomena, which also has three parts: first, directly explaining indeterminate phenomena; next, citing proof; third, concluding that it is not what is known by the two vehicles. The first text also has two parts: first, the indeterminacy of names and meanings; second, the indeterminacy of broad and abridged. Under names and meanings, there are two parts: first, listing the headings; next, explaining them. In the first, the listing: three headings are listed, as in the sūtra. If one wished to present them as opposites, there should be six propositions: to 'for one name preaching immeasurable names', one should say 'for immeasurable names preaching one name'; to 'for one meaning preaching immeasurable names', one should say 'for immeasurable meanings preaching one name'; to 'for immeasurable meanings preaching immeasurable names', one should say 'for immeasurable names preaching immeasurable meanings'. Here the text briefly presents only one side. From "What is one name..." below, it explains them, first explaining the three headings, and later re-explaining the second heading. Explaining the first heading: it adduces the single name 'nirvāṇa' as fully containing all names. Dàliàng said: 'Nirvāṇa is the collective name for the eight flavours, and the general appellation of all virtues.' The meaning lies in this. Yet the various masters' diverse translations of nirvāṇa have also given rise to disputes merely because of this. Next, explaining 'for one meaning preaching immeasurable names': it adduces the explanation of Śakra; how does this differ from the previous one? In the re-explanation below, from "Formerly relying on phenomena, later relying on persons...", it again relies on the five skandhas; this relies on resultant phenomena, which are also one meaning with multiple names, distinguishing them in various ways to make them easy to understand. Hexi translates Vāsava as 'adorned with fine garments'—formerly he gave fine clothes in charity, and now in retribution he obtains magnificent attire. Puraṃdara is translated as 'taming the sense faculties', explaining that the heavenly sovereign externally adorns his appearance with magnificent attire, and internally tames his mind with wholesome dharmas. Maghavan is translated as 'invincible', because without fault he transcends all devas. Indra is translated as 'radiance', radiance being supreme. 'Thousand-eyed' means knowing a thousand meanings and deciding a thousand matters simultaneously. 'Vajra' means his bodily marks are firm and indestructible. Third, explaining 'for immeasurable meanings preaching immeasurable names': this is explained with respect to the Tathāgata being replete with myriad virtues, which is immeasurable meanings; one meaning having one name, which is immeasurable names. For the eight wisdoms, there are three explanations: one says it refers to the eight such as permanent and impermanent. The second says that the four noble truths each have dharma[-wisdom] and subsequent[-wisdom], making eight. The Abhidharma masters discuss dharma[-wisdom] regarding the desire realm, and subsequent[-wisdom] regarding the form and formless realms. The treatise masters discuss dharma[-wisdom] regarding the present, and subsequent[-wisdom] regarding the past and future. The third says that the Upāsakaśīla Sūtra has eight wisdoms, seven of which are like the seven wholesome dharmas in the 'Pure Practices' chapter, with the addition of one: knowing faculties. Fourth, from "Furthermore, there is one meaning..." below, re-explaining the second heading. Previously, concerning Śakra, it was only regarding wholesome meanings that there were immeasurable names, where the names did not extend to the unwholesome. To reveal this intention, it again relies on the five skandhas; these are tainted and are also called inversions. The skandhas are the domain of the truth of suffering, observed by the applications of mindfulness. Contemplating form as impure, sensation as suffering, conception and karmic formations as non-self, and consciousness as impermanent, they are also named the four applications of mindfulness. Leaving aside only the form skandha, the remaining four skandhas are precisely the four stations of consciousness. The skandhas extend through internal and external, and are therefore called the four nutriments. That which can lead through is called the path. Relying on real dharmas, there are provisional designations of time, hence it is called time; their essence is signlessness, called paramārtha. The three cultivations are body, precepts, and mind. Defilements reside precisely in the formation skandha. Liberation is conditioned liberation. Being also named the twelve links of dependent origination means taking the five skandhas as the substance of dependent origination. Being also named the three vehicles means they can accomplish the bodies of the three vehicles. The rest can all be understood and will not be explained again (and so forth).

28.11

From "Good sons, the Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One..." below, second is explaining the indeterminacy of broad and abridged, which has three parts: first, listing the four headings; next, from "What is..." below, explaining them; third, concluding. In the explanation, in stating that conventional truth is paramārthasatya: *a* means non-, and *jña* means wisdom, meaning he attained unproduced wisdom; this is preaching paramārthasatya with respect to conventional truth. The rest can be inferred by meaning. Third, from "Therefore, according to the person..." below, the conclusion has two parts: first, concluding indeterminacy; next, from "If I, with respect to..." below, concluding the power of knowing faculties, which also has two parts: first, explaining that the Buddha knows; from "a person of wisdom..." below, explaining that it is not what shallow consciousness can know. Next, from "Why is that?" below, explaining indeterminacy for individual persons. Not preaching the five kinds of dharmas for the five kinds of persons means not using the antidotal [siddhānta], but only using the individual [siddhānta]. Merely teaching a stingy person precepts, forbearance, dhyāna, and wisdom, they will naturally be able to practice charity; causing a person who breaks precepts to cultivate dhyāna and wisdom, they will naturally be able to uphold precepts. From "Therefore, I previously..." below, second is citing proof. From "Preaching the Dharma broadly and abridged..." below, third is concluding that it is not what is known by the two vehicles.

28.12

From “Good son, as you have said” below, secondly, answers the second question concerning clingings and disputes. This also has two parts: first, a brief reply; next, an extensive reply. First, in the brief reply, mentioning the fifth power of comprehension, also called the power of aspiration, means knowing the dharmas that sentient beings desire and understand. When the text also says “these two powers,” it is because the fourth power is called the power of faculties and the fifth is called the power of comprehension, thereby making two powers. From “Good son, if one says that the Tathāgata…” below, secondly, in the extensive reply, it explains that the Buddha tailored his teachings differently to meet various conditions, and sentient beings failed to understand, leading to disputes. There are twenty-one topics in all. The first concerns nirvāṇa or non-nirvāṇa; one must understand the different schools. The Sarvāstivādins, relying on phenomenal facts, explained ultimate nirvāṇa, whereas the Dharmaguptakas and Mahāsāṃghikas, relying on the principle, said it is not ultimate nirvāṇa. Ancients evaluated this by saying: “The Sarvāstivādins are wrong and deficient; the Dharmaguptakas are right and superior.” Both missed the Buddha's meaning. The text states: “If one says that the Tathāgata enters ultimate nirvāṇa or does not enter ultimate nirvāṇa, both are disputes and do not attain my meaning.” Why evaluate them by recklessly judging superiority and deficiency? Héxī said: “Ultimate implies annihilation; not ultimate implies permanence. As for speaking of annihilation and permanence, how could it be annihilation and permanence? It is precisely non-annihilation and non-permanence, able to be annihilation and able to be permanence. Speaking of annihilation does not contradict permanence; speaking of permanence does not contradict annihilation. Annihilation and permanence are not different from each other; annihilation and permanence are both consummate.” Master Guān said: “The Buddha taught in accordance with the capacities [of beings]; how could one judge right or wrong? To do so loses the Buddha’s meaning. Like a physician treating an illness who dispenses different medicines, if the disciples do not understand and cling delusionally, they miss the aim.” This first dispute also has two parts: first, the outline of headings; next, the explanation. Within the explanation there are also two parts: first, explaining the clinging to definite nirvāṇa; next, explaining the clinging to non-definite nirvāṇa. The former text also has two parts: first, the explanation; next, the conclusion. In the first text, the Buddha spoke of nirvāṇa on account of five matters: first, for the ṛṣis; second, for the Mallas; third, for Cunda; fourth, for Subhadra; fifth, for King Ajātaśatru. First, regarding the ṛṣis: these ṛṣis were born on Gandhamādana, and the expression “passing successively” means that from the devas they moved successively to the dwelling place of the ṛṣis on the mountain, and all attained arhatship; there are the provisional and the real; to break their clinging to permanence, he therefore spoke of impermanence. From “Kuśinagara” below, secondly, it is for the Mallas. From “There was a craftsman” below, thirdly, it is for Cunda. From “Rājagṛha” below, fourthly, it is for Subhadra. From “Luóyuèqí” below, fifthly, it is for King Ajātaśatru. Losing his supernormal powers and falling without dying was due to the remaining momentum. King Bimbisāra is also called Píngshā; his country is called Magadha, also called Mojieti. Luóyuèqí translates here as Rājagṛha. The concluding summary afterwards can be understood. From “There are two kinds of bodhisattvas” below, secondly, it explains the clinging to a definitive non-nirvāṇa, which also has two parts: first, the explanation; next, the conclusion. In the first text: for nominal bodhisattvas, he spoke of non-nirvāṇa; real bodhisattvas do not speak of nirvāṇa nor non-nirvāṇa. These bodhisattvas can know that the Tathāgata is neither permanent nor impermanent; how could they one-sidedly construct an understanding of permanence or impermanence? From “Good son, there are sentient beings…” below, the second dispute clarifies self and non-self; one must be skilled in the intentions of the different schools. The abhidharmikas honor the Sarvāstivāda, purely clarifying non-self and refuting the non-Buddhists who speak of a false self. There is no nominal self; they purely clarify non-existence. Although they clarify non-self, in the end through non-self and impermanence they enter the path, which is not the same as non-Buddhists. The treatise masters agree with the Dharmaguptakas in clarifying that there is a provisional self, refuting the non-Buddhists' view of a self identical to the skandhas or separate from the skandhas; there is a continuum-provisional self and a causation-constituted provisional self. They further say that real dharmas perish moment by moment, so there is no longer a nominal continuum-provisional self or causation-constituted provisional self. They also say that because real dharmas perish moment by moment, there is no self, yet because nominal designations continue unbroken, there is a self. They also say that in ultimate truth there is no self, while in conventional truth there is a self. This purely clarifies the meaning of having a self. Yet these two traditions did not attain the Buddha's meaning, and therefore disputes arose. Zhāotí explained: “These two passages clarify self and non-self in order to refute two sicknesses; speaking of having a self refutes the wrong view of non-self without speaking of a provisional self, while speaking of non-self refutes the self identical to or separate [from the skandhas]. Those who hold eternalist views are simply taught non-self, without mentioning 'provisional' either.” Paramārtha challenged this, saying: “If self and non-self are used to refute self and non-self, does this principle hold or not? If in principle one cannot hold self or non-self, one should likewise not be able to use self and non-self to cure sickness. Furthermore, since within saṃsāra self and non-self are used to cure sickness, in nirvāṇa permanence and impermanence should also be used to cure sickness. If in nirvāṇa there is only permanence and there cannot be impermanence, then in saṃsāra there can only be non-self and there cannot be self. As the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'The Buddhas have spoken of a self, and have also taught non-self; within the dharmatā of all dharmas, there is neither self nor non-self.' One should apply this principle to all disputes by analogy.” As for the text, it has two parts: first, clarifying the self; next, clarifying non-self. The first also has two parts: first, clarifying the continuum-provisional self to refute the wrong view of non-self. Next, from “Furthermore, at one time I…” below, clarifying the causation-constituted self, which also has two parts: first, directly clarifying causation-constitution; next, clarifying what is constituted by causation. In the first text, the text says that the self is nature. Traditionally there are two interpretations: one says it is the nature of the buddhadhātu, citing the earlier text: “Is there a self in the twenty-five realms of existence or not?” (and so forth); the second takes the nature of nominal designation as the self-nature. Nature is essence; essence is causation-constitution. Among the three provisionalities, only causation-constitution is the essence, while continuity and relationality are functions; internally it refers to the four skandhas, and externally to the four great elements. The twelve links of dependent origination are the collective name for form and mind; sentient beings are nominal natures. These elements constitute the body; this is causation-constituted provisionality. If one takes it as the meaning of buddhadhātu: sentient beings are fully constituted by the five skandhas, and the buddhadhātu refers precisely to the real dharmatā of the five skandhas within the bodies of sentient beings. The realm of mind is the mind-king among the five skandhas. From “Meritorious deeds and karmic actions” below, secondly, it clarifies what is constituted by causation. Karmic actions are the cause, and the Īśvara heaven is the fruit; by cultivating causes one attains fruits. As for “sovereign” (īśvara), it does not merely designate the Īśvara heaven of the desire realm, but refers generally to all devas who ascend freely. The “world” refers to the other four destinies. From “Again at another time” below, secondly, it clarifies non-self, which also has two parts: first, the Buddha's teaching; later, the arising of clinging. The first has three parts: first, hypothetical questions; second, hypothetical answers; third, gaining benefit from contemplating non-self. The questions are threefold: first, asking about the name: “How is it named 'self'?”; second, asking about the essence: “Who is the self?”; third, asking about the conditions: “By what condition is there a self?” From “I then at that time…” below, second, hypothetical answers. The answers have three parts: first, answering with a general overview; next, answering individually; third, concluding with the lack of benefit. The general overview has two parts: first, presenting the outline heading; next, elaborating on it. From “As you have asked” below, second, answering the three questions individually. If the general overview was already sufficient, why answer individually? While it discussed non-self in general, next it answers regarding individual nominal designation, nominal essence, and nominal conditions. First, in answering about the nominal designation, the text says “appointed time” (qí); Héxī said: “Like a person keeping a rendezvous, arriving at the appointed time is the meaning of conjunction; not arriving at the appointed time is the meaning of non-conjunction. The conjunction of the five skandhas constitutes a nominal designation, so this is the meaning of appointed time.” Next, karmic action is raised to answer the question about essence. Next, craving is raised to answer the question about conditions. Karmic action directly produces results, so it is the essence. Craving is the affliction that moistens rebirth, so in relation to karmic action it is a condition. From “Just as when two hands…” below, third, concluding non-existence, which also has four parts: first, clarifying that it exists due to nominal designation, which is first the analogy, and next the application of the analogy: two hands can produce sound, the sound being analogous to the essence, and the clapping being analogous to craving. From “Monks, all…” below, second, clarifying that both identity and separation are non-existent. From “The non-Buddhists…” below, third, distinguishing [views]. The text says “never separate from the skandhas”; non-Buddhists give rise to calculations of identity or separation. Here it says “there is no basis for being separate from the skandhas”; how is this explained? There are two views: one says that originally they all calculated that the skandhas themselves were the self, and did not calculate a self separate from the skandhas in grass and trees; when the Buddha refuted the identity of the skandhas as non-self, they then calculated a self separate from the skandhas. Here, retaining the refutation, it says that if there is a self separate from the skandhas, there is no such basis. The second view says that in the Hīnayāna of the Buddha-Dharma there was also the calculation of a self identical to the skandhas, and therefore he refuted it, so that one also cannot calculate a self separate from the skandhas. From “All sentient beings” below, fourth, concluding non-self. From “At that time, there were many…” below, third, gaining benefit from contemplating non-self. At that time, when this was taught, it met their capacities and they gained benefit; later, clinging arose and turned into disputes (and so forth).

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese