大般涅槃經疏 32.9

32.9

From "Vāsiṣṭha" onwards is the second person; this is a disciple of Ulūka Sāṃkhya. The text also has two parts: first, debating the meaning; and second, explaining his conversion and submission. The debate on the meaning has four rounds. The first two parts each have questions and answers, which can be examined. However, when he asked the Buddha, "Is nirvāṇa permanent?" the Buddha also answered, saying, "It is so." When it comes to the ultimate discussion of nirvāṇa, how could it ever be definitively permanent? He further asked, "Is the absence of afflictions nirvāṇa?" The Buddha also answered, "It is so." When did the Buddha ever say that the absence of afflictions is nirvāṇa? The earlier text did not say that having severed afflictions is nirvāṇa, but only that the non-arising of afflictions is nirvāṇa. Now, in addressing this non-Buddhist, it was appropriate to make this statement, because he was someone who harbored the view of annihilationism. However, regarding the four kinds of non-existence raised in the third round, his intention was to pose a challenge based on non-existence through destruction: if phenomena are non-existent through destruction, how could there still be permanence and bliss? What has not yet arisen is non-existence in the future; non-existence through destruction is non-existence in the past. The Buddha answered that it is the same as mutual non-existence; this was also spoken to address the non-Buddhist. If we discuss the correct principle, it is not completely mutual non-existence. Why is this? Originally, the mutual absence of an ox and a horse is termed "mutual non-existence"; now, explaining that within saṃsāra there is originally nirvāṇa, the correct principle is therefore not completely mutual non-existence. In the fourth round, he still raised another challenge: "If it is mutual non-existence, it should also be impermanent. Although within an ox there is no horse, one says there is a horse [elsewhere], and within a horse there is no ox likewise; an ox and a horse are ultimately non-existent originally and existent now. Nirvāṇa is also like this: if within nirvāṇa there is no saṃsāra and yet there is nirvāṇa, then it is non-existent originally and existent now, and is also impermanent." Now, the Buddha broke this down: although it is the same as mutual non-existence, it is also different, because within distinct non-existence there are three kinds of non-existence: first is mutual non-existence, second is non-existence prior and existence later, and third is returning to non-existence after already existing. One should know that nirvāṇa, while being distinct non-existence, lacks these three things; therefore it is permanent and blissful. In the text there are three parts: first, this explanation through doctrine; next, citing three illnesses and three medicines as an analogy; and third, citing an analogy to clarify the fruition. Next, the text says, "Honey can treat cold [illnesses]"; according to what physicians say, the nature of honey is actually cold. This is due to differences in local appropriateness; it is not necessarily always so. Furthermore, the analogy says that within the three kinds of illness there are not the three kinds of medicine, and within the three kinds of medicine there are not the three kinds of illness; previously, this text was used to prove that they do not share the same essence. If within wisdom there could be ignorance, then the medicine would possess the illness, which contradicts this statement. However, according to the old explanation of Zhuāngyán, it explains that within the uncontaminated there really is the delusion of existence and non-existence; what is said to be "non-existent" here is merely the delusion of grasping marks and the like. According to the explanation of Zhāotí: because the true uncontaminated really does not receive retribution, there is no need to speak of ignorance entering the essence of understanding. And when the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra speaks of "the ground of the entrenchment of ignorance being conditioned by uncontaminated karma as a cause," this speaks of resembling uncontaminatedness and guided uncontaminatedness; it does not speak of true uncontaminatedness. From "Vāsiṣṭha said, 'The Tathāgata has explained for me permanence and impermanence'" onwards is the second part, his conversion and submission. His text says, "Form is impermanent; the form of liberation is permanent." There are two explanations: first, since form is impermanent, my form of liberation then has no further form, and therefore it is permanent. The second says that liberation is itself form, and form is itself permanent; thus the earlier text says, "attaining the permanent form of liberation." The latter explanation is superior. Here, through Kauṇḍinya, the text of repentance is presented. Regarding the words "nǐ / mí Gautama clan": formerly it was read with the sound nǐ, meaning that he called you nǐ, hence saying "nǐ Gautama clan." Now, relying on the Western Chamber of Yěchéng, according to the Dharma Master, it should be read with the sound nǐ (苨). However, the translation of this was in the north, and northerners mostly say nǐ (苨), or also the sound of nǐ / wǒ. In the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra this character is also used, where in that sūtra it is written with the person radical beside ěr (你). The text says "Gautama clan": if disciples of the Buddha address the Buddha as Gautama—as in the verse in the previous "Chapter on Manifesting Illness," which says, "Gautama of great holy virtue, we pray you arise and expound the Dharma"—this is an expression of praise. It clarifies that although for seven generations the Buddha belonged to the royal lineage of the Śākya clan, his original family arose from the great Gautama clan, whose lineage was exceedingly distant and did not begin today. If non-Buddhists intend to address him as Gautama, this does not consider his virtue, but merely speaks of his clan name; this is what is called slighting and disrespecting. Just as in worldly speech, when one does not address a person by rank but merely by clan name, it becomes slighting and disrespectful. It also says, "I also cannot long remain in this poisonous body; I now wish to enter extinction": this means that having original supernormal powers, he immediately attained the holy fruition; using the knowledge of the ultimate limit (prāntakoṭijñāna), he therefore entered nirvāṇa. The earlier text says that upon attaining arhatship, he was bestowed the three robes; by principle, having attained arhatship, one is already fully equipped with robes and bowl. Now, when it says he lacked them: if one is an "ehi" arhat, then one immediately has the three robes; since he attained arhatship on his own, he therefore required robes. Furthermore, this person was originally a renounced non-Buddhist, so he did not wait to have his hair shaved. How is this known? The earlier text said Jāti was a brāhmaṇa, whereas now Vāsiṣṭha is merely called a brahmacārin (fan-zhi); a brahmacārin is a renounced non-Buddhist, which is why it was further necessary to bestow the vessel of response (alms bowl) upon him.