維摩經略疏 8.14

8.14

「如盲者見色」者，雖不現見內心思想，罔像欲見，此猶有心也，又方有得見之義。「如入滅定出入息」者，滅定無息，以定力持之不得入出，不妨猶有息法。如氷持魚，氷釋便動。又《攝大乘》明滅定識滅更得起者，以依梨耶得更出入。「如空中鳥跡」者，肉眼不見說言無跡，《鴦掘經》云「天眼之人見空中鳥跡」。「如石女兒」者，此終不生，女報若轉亦可生也。如身子為女、女為身子，一切女身皆無定相。「如化人煩惱」者，此無煩惱化人，有時現三毒之相。「如夢所見已寤」者，寤雖無夢，不妨追憶識所夢事，亦有更夢之理。「如滅度者受身」者，一往羅漢入滅永無生處，而於界外變易受生。「如無因之火」者，若四句破火是則無因，若遇緣能生，豈畢竟無？此等諸句，豈同十九界等畢竟無耶？故知雖空，不同真諦；雖有，不同世諦。非空非有而空有宛然，如無色之色不有而有，諸佛境界不可思議。故知菩薩觀眾生從假入空，徹見三諦成前〈問疾品〉也。

Regarding 'like a blind person seeing colors': although not seeing directly, in their inner mind they think and imagine, vaguely desiring to see; this still has mind, and furthermore there is the principle of coming to see. Regarding 'like inhalation and exhalation in the absorption of cessation': the absorption of cessation has no respiration, held by the power of absorption so that breath cannot enter or exit, which does not prevent there still being the phenomenon of respiration. Just as ice holds a fish, when the ice melts it moves. Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha explains that consciousness ceasing in the absorption of cessation can arise again because, relying on the ālaya, it can enter and exit again. Regarding 'like the tracks of a bird in the sky': the fleshy eye does not see them and says there are no tracks; the Aṅgulimāla Sūtra states: 'A person with the divine eye sees bird tracks in the sky.' Regarding 'like the child of a barren woman': this child ultimately is not born, but if the female retribution is transformed, birth is also possible. Just as Śāriputra became a woman and the woman became Śāriputra, all female bodies lack a fixed characteristic. Regarding 'like the afflictions of a phantom person': this phantom person without afflictions at times displays the characteristics of the three poisons. Regarding 'like what is seen in a dream after having awakened': although after awakening there is no dream, it does not prevent recalling and knowing what was dreamed, and there is also the possibility of dreaming again. Regarding 'like one who has attained extinction receiving a body': at first glance an arhat entering extinction has no rebirth anywhere permanently, yet outside the realms they receive birth through transformation. Regarding 'like fire without a cause': if refuting fire through the four propositions, then it has no cause; yet if encountering conditions it can be born, how could it be completely absent? How could these various phrases be completely non-existent like the nineteenth realm and the like? Therefore we know that although empty, it is not identical with ultimate truth; although existent, it is not identical with worldly truth. Neither empty nor existent, yet emptiness and existence are clearly distinct, like the form of the formless, not existent and yet existent—the realm of buddhas is inconceivable. Thus we know that when a bodhisattva contemplates sentient beings entering emptiness from provisionality, penetrating and perceiving the three truths completes the previous 'Inquiring after the Illness' chapter.