維摩經略疏垂裕記 1.87

1.87

二、約四性斥破，二：初、四執俱非。「眾生對佛」者，合前兩計也。「無因而有土」者，荊溪云：計雖性過，本是理土生佛理，具凡聖一如。計者成過，土體何失？若計成過，性執須破，破性仍是從事以說。破三可見不假別論。從事者，若云一向無有自他，故使所計成無因失。「皆隨性義」者，兩師所執已屬自他，或計共離，豈出性計？故云皆墮。「類前」者，委破四性已在《玄義》。

Second, refuting and breaking them down in terms of the four natures, in two parts: First, the four attachments are all incorrect. "Sentient beings in relation to the Buddha" combines the two previous views. Regarding "there is a land without cause," Jingxi says: Although the assertion has the fault of nature[-attachment], fundamentally it is the land of principle; sentient beings and Buddhas are inherently identical in principle, and ordinary beings and sages are of one suchness. The asserter incurs fault, but what lack is there in the substance of the land? If the assertion incurs fault, attachment to nature must be refuted; yet refuting nature is still spoken from the perspective of phenomena. The refutation of the three [others] can be seen without needing separate discussion. Speaking from phenomena means that if one were to say that self and other are completely non-existent, that would cause the assertion to incur the fault of causelessness. Regarding "all accord with the meaning of nature," the views held by the two masters already belong to self and other; or if they assert both together or separate from both, how could they escape assertions based on nature? Therefore it says they all fall [into error]. "Analogous to the above" means that the detailed refutation of the four natures has already been given in the Profound Meaning.