維摩經略疏垂裕記 6.13

6.13

二、依章釋義，二：初、約事。荊溪云：事中復云於法等者於食亦等者，事中食者，貧家富家及所得食。事中法者，於家於食悲智之心。食法互形，失一俱喪。故知於食起平等者，於食必懷不二之心。驗知善吉二事咸闕，如何得成淨土之行？於食既爾，諸法亦然。「復次」下，復約二門。約食對法而訶其偏，故於法食示成不等，故知善吉於乞屬非。「菩薩不爾」者，示大而訶空有。空有並是一法界故，故皆可破及不可破。不可破者立一切法，俱可破者破一切法。遍破遍立，安得以之同善吉耶？善吉偏以空破一切，破即非遍，唯立於空。立亦不遍，有能有所有待對故。乞食既壞，自他不成。今大乘人雖以空有而為言端，破立皆遍一切諸法。若能至於食無諍者，向破善吉空不成空，今破無諍翻為有諍。貧富碩異，諍豈過斯？以其不能如菩薩故。「若能至真乞士」者，反其善吉，當如淨名之所說故。

Second, explaining the meaning according to the sections, in two parts: first, regarding phenomena. Jingxi says: "In [the discussion of] phenomena, it is further stated that 'one who is impartial toward dharmas is also impartial toward food.' Food in phenomena refers to poor households, wealthy households, and the food obtained. Dharma in phenomena refers to the mind of compassion and wisdom regarding the households and the food. Food and Dharma mutually delineate one another; if one is lost, both are ruined. Therefore, we know that one who gives rise to impartiality regarding food must harbor an understanding of non-duality regarding food. This proves that Subhūti lacked both, so how could he accomplish the practice of the pure land? Since this is so for food, it is likewise for all dharmas." From "Furthermore" onward, it again relies on the two gates. By juxtaposing food with Dharma, it reproaches his partiality; thus, regarding Dharma and food, it demonstrates that inequality is brought about. Therefore, we know that regarding begging, Subhūti was in the wrong. Regarding "The bodhisattva is not like this," this displays the Great [Vehicle] and reproaches emptiness and existence. Because emptiness and existence are both the single dharmadhātu, they are both refutable and irrefutable. What is irrefutable establishes all dharmas; what is wholly refutable refutes all dharmas. Refuting everywhere and establishing everywhere—how could this be equated with Subhūti? Subhūti was biased in using emptiness to refute everything; his refutation was not pervasive, and he established only emptiness. His establishment was also not pervasive, because there were still agent and object, relying on opposition. Since his begging for food was undermined, neither self nor other was accomplished. Now, although practitioners of the Mahāyāna take emptiness and existence as their starting points, both refutation and establishment are pervasive throughout all dharmas. If one can arrive at 'no dispute regarding food': previously, Subhūti's emptiness was refuted as not constituting [true] emptiness; now, his 'absence of dispute' is refuted as turning out to be dispute. The difference between poor and rich is immense—how could dispute exceed this? It is because he could not be like a bodhisattva. Regarding "If one can arrive at being a true bhikṣu," this inverts Subhūti's position, as it should be according to what Jingming said.