維摩經略疏垂裕記 6.13

6.13

Second, explaining the meaning according to the sections, in two parts: first, regarding phenomena. Jingxi says: "In [the discussion of] phenomena, it is further stated that 'one who is impartial toward dharmas is also impartial toward food.' Food in phenomena refers to poor households, wealthy households, and the food obtained. Dharma in phenomena refers to the mind of compassion and wisdom regarding the households and the food. Food and Dharma mutually delineate one another; if one is lost, both are ruined. Therefore, we know that one who gives rise to impartiality regarding food must harbor an understanding of non-duality regarding food. This proves that Subhūti lacked both, so how could he accomplish the practice of the pure land? Since this is so for food, it is likewise for all dharmas." From "Furthermore" onward, it again relies on the two gates. By juxtaposing food with Dharma, it reproaches his partiality; thus, regarding Dharma and food, it demonstrates that inequality is brought about. Therefore, we know that regarding begging, Subhūti was in the wrong. Regarding "The bodhisattva is not like this," this displays the Great [Vehicle] and reproaches emptiness and existence. Because emptiness and existence are both the single dharmadhātu, they are both refutable and irrefutable. What is irrefutable establishes all dharmas; what is wholly refutable refutes all dharmas. Refuting everywhere and establishing everywhere—how could this be equated with Subhūti? Subhūti was biased in using emptiness to refute everything; his refutation was not pervasive, and he established only emptiness. His establishment was also not pervasive, because there were still agent and object, relying on opposition. Since his begging for food was undermined, neither self nor other was accomplished. Now, although practitioners of the Mahāyāna take emptiness and existence as their starting points, both refutation and establishment are pervasive throughout all dharmas. If one can arrive at 'no dispute regarding food': previously, Subhūti's emptiness was refuted as not constituting [true] emptiness; now, his 'absence of dispute' is refuted as turning out to be dispute. The difference between poor and rich is immense—how could dispute exceed this? It is because he could not be like a bodhisattva. Regarding "If one can arrive at being a true bhikṣu," this inverts Subhūti's position, as it should be according to what Jingming said.