維摩經略疏垂裕記 6

English (machine translation) 6

Language: English

6.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Zhiyuan of Qiantang

Second, explaining the function of food. Jingxi says: As for 'giving one meal to all,' etc., although the meaning applies to the cause, this is stated in terms of persons of the fruit who are able to use food; to reproach Kāśyapa for lacking this capacity, he cites Gandhakūṭa as an authentic precedent. If one discusses its intention, although it lies in the fruit's function, the fruit must arise from the cause; by examining this we know that Kāśyapa's initial practice was also one-sided. Both cause and fruit being flawed, he therefore incurred reproach. As for 'relying on the inconceivable up to roaming both two truths': because of attaining the middle, he is able to illuminate both. 'Mundane and supramundane': the mundane refers to the food of the impure land and human realm used for giving. The supramundane refers to the various sense objects beyond the realm, as in the example of Gandhakūṭa, which is the middle way.

6.3

Second, reiterating the explanation has two [parts]: first, dividing the sections; second, commenting on them accordingly, which has two [parts]: first, explaining the substance of food, which has three [parts]: first, according to principle; second, according to phenomena. As for 'Question: Previously the substance of food was shown with phenomena first and principle second': Jingxi says, 'Previously, in explaining the substance, it was divided into two: first phenomena, second principle. Now this refers to the previous commentary's explanation according to the heterodox and orthodox of phenomena and principle. Compared to the present sūtra text, principle first and phenomena second raises a doubt.' Third, general explanation of phenomena and principle.

6.4

Second, explaining the function of food. Regarding 'the bodhisattva's supreme cause of food': Jingxi says, 'When a person of the perfect gate generates the mind to contemplate food, whether receiving or giving, the dharmadhātu is equal; only then is he competent to serve as the causal food for all, hence it is called supreme. This is precisely reproaching Kāśyapa by reproaching the small with the perfect. Thus, whenever giving and receiving obtain great benefit as a cause, both are harmed or benefited. "Harm and benefit" means that going to the poor benefits both, while going to the rich harms both; their mind being slighting and his practice being abandoned, both are harmed. As for "not making a loss upon a loss": Jingxi says: The hexagram Sun in the Book of Changes says, "Lose it and lose it again, until there is nothing lost." Now, citing this intention does not take "nothing lost," but merely borrows for a time the words "lose it again." Having eliminated defilements, one has already attained [nirvāṇa] with remainder; eliminating birth and death again, one enters [nirvāṇa] without remainder. For a bodhisattva it is not so; therefore it is not an example.'

6.5

Fourth, concluding exhortation. As for 'non-definitive meaning,' etc.: Jingxi says, 'According to this meaning, if one compares the five periods of the [Buddha's] entire teaching, only the Lotus Sūtra can be called definitive; therefore, it is granted that the śrāvaka can attain this gradual [path]. If discussing within this text itself, all persons of the Great Vehicle have a portion of the definitive, only with accompanying elements.'

6.6

Third, bowing in respect. Jingxi says: The sūtra says 'this householder has renown': "this" means here; it refers to a layman. The sūtra says 'From that time on, I,' etc.: he was ashamed of the small. Therefore we know that at that time, although admiring it, he could not take it; at this time, although ashamed of it, he could not abandon it. Thus there was only covert support and no overt benefit. Directly using reproach can also attain the name of overt; looking at the intention of the reproach, it is therefore called covert.

6.7

Fourth, concluding that he is not up to the task.

6.8

Fourth, instructing Subhūti has two [parts]: first, dividing the sections and narrating the intent. Second, from 'Subhūti' downward, commenting on the meaning following the text, which has two [parts]: first, instructing to inquire after the illness. Regarding 'seeing emptiness and attaining the path': Jingxi says, 'That is precisely the liberation gate of emptiness, because he attained liberation by relying on the gate of emptiness.'

6.9

Second, declining as not up to the task has two [parts]: first, dividing the sections; second, commenting on them accordingly, in four [parts]: first, directly declining as not up to the task. Second, narrating the reasons for not being up to the task. As for 'none dared to peer at his gate': "to peer" (闚) is pronounced with the fanqie qu-sui, meaning to glance. In the text it is written as "to look" (視), which is an error. Jingxi says: As for 'none dared to peer at his gate': could it be that the ten virtues and five hundred, the four great [disciples] and eight thousand, had none ever visited his house? It is spoken to show that Subhūti's relying on emptiness was extremely flawed. As for 'those who cling to existence,' etc.: this narrates that Subhūti considered all persons of the Small Vehicle and all bodhisattvas to be persons who cling to existence, and thus considered that none approached his gate. [He thought:] Since I understand emptiness, what fear have I in going straight there?

6.10

Third, explaining the matter of not being up to the task has two [parts]: first, dividing the sections; second, commenting on them accordingly, in five [parts]: first, taking the bowl and filling it with food. Jingxi says, 'If it expresses principle: what it expresses has many meanings; let us temporarily provide one approach as the formula of reproach. Using the rice of subtle existence to fill the bowl of mere emptiness shows and causes him to know that emptiness is precisely non-emptiness. If so, was he at that time already seeking non-emptiness and attaining non-emptiness? Answer: This is indeed seeking, this is indeed attaining. Why? The mental characteristics and mutual trust entered and exited without difficulty; because of hearing the great teaching, it precisely matched his capacity. It is also called covert seeking and covert attainment. However, his covert benefit showed that he still retained emptiness; therefore, at the house, his mind still abided in the small.'

6.11

Second, directly narrating the reproach has two [parts]: first, dividing the sections and prefacing the indication, which has two [parts]: first, dividing the sections and determining the teaching. Second, from 'therefore' downward, prefacing and narrating the doctrinal intention. As for 'content to be equal with māras and outsiders': "content" (愜) means yielding. Jingxi says: However, Subhūti and Kāśyapa both failed to match the supreme field because of begging for food. In terms of the reproached aspect, the two were distinct and each had their own emphasis. But Kāśyapa followed the poor, his mind still being humble. Subhūti relied on his understanding of emptiness as superior to others, and moreover went in person directly to his house, appearing to be defiant and not protecting people's minds; he had to be humbled in both compassion and respect according to suitability. Furthermore, although the actions of these two men were different, in principle they were largely the same. Why? If one is worthy to be a field of respect, only then may one take food; this is identical to Kāśyapa's path and cessation mind being flawed, regarding himself as a true field and generating mistaken understanding. His mind already being deviant, entering a village must have been improper; regarding food, etc., this is identical to Kāśyapa having no proper method of eating. Bringing him low to be equal with a field of compassion was also reproaching him for having only suffering and origination. Bodhisattvas constantly manifest bodies in the five destinies; hearing that he was equal to a field of compassion, his feelings were not yet content. It was like drifting with non-Buddhists and heavenly māras, while wishing to call himself a supreme bhikṣu. A bhikṣu must be a field of merit for sentient beings; unskilled in a single matter, where is the field of merit? Originally not understanding the equal principle-nature of compassion and respect, hearing this suppression, he set down his bowl in fluster, again like Kāśyapa being rebuked and belittling himself. Grasping two and abandoning two share the same flaw in meaning; both incurred the humbling by the four truths, and thus it is roughly the same in main intent as Kāśyapa. The rest were not begging for food, and varied according to the matter.

6.12

Second, from 'first asking' downward, commenting on the meaning following the text, has two [parts]: first, asking in terms of the field of respect, which has two [parts]: first, dividing the sections; second, commenting on them accordingly, which has two [parts]: first, asking whether he knows the noble Dharma, which has two [parts]: first, generally indicating and dividing the chapters. Jingxi says: 'Because the Dharma is able to perfect the person: if one is clear about the Dharma, why must one ask about the person? Asking further about the person below is truly due to being ignorant of the Dharma.'

6.13

Second, explaining the meaning according to the sections, in two parts: first, regarding phenomena. Jingxi says: "In [the discussion of] phenomena, it is further stated that 'one who is impartial toward dharmas is also impartial toward food.' Food in phenomena refers to poor households, wealthy households, and the food obtained. Dharma in phenomena refers to the mind of compassion and wisdom regarding the households and the food. Food and Dharma mutually delineate one another; if one is lost, both are ruined. Therefore, we know that one who gives rise to impartiality regarding food must harbor an understanding of non-duality regarding food. This proves that Subhūti lacked both, so how could he accomplish the practice of the pure land? Since this is so for food, it is likewise for all dharmas." From "Furthermore" onward, it again relies on the two gates. By juxtaposing food with Dharma, it reproaches his partiality; thus, regarding Dharma and food, it demonstrates that inequality is brought about. Therefore, we know that regarding begging, Subhūti was in the wrong. Regarding "The bodhisattva is not like this," this displays the Great [Vehicle] and reproaches emptiness and existence. Because emptiness and existence are both the single dharmadhātu, they are both refutable and irrefutable. What is irrefutable establishes all dharmas; what is wholly refutable refutes all dharmas. Refuting everywhere and establishing everywhere—how could this be equated with Subhūti? Subhūti was biased in using emptiness to refute everything; his refutation was not pervasive, and he established only emptiness. His establishment was also not pervasive, because there were still agent and object, relying on opposition. Since his begging for food was undermined, neither self nor other was accomplished. Now, although practitioners of the Mahāyāna take emptiness and existence as their starting points, both refutation and establishment are pervasive throughout all dharmas. If one can arrive at 'no dispute regarding food': previously, Subhūti's emptiness was refuted as not constituting [true] emptiness; now, his 'absence of dispute' is refuted as turning out to be dispute. The difference between poor and rich is immense—how could dispute exceed this? It is because he could not be like a bodhisattva. Regarding "If one can arrive at being a true bhikṣu," this inverts Subhūti's position, as it should be according to what Jingming said.

6.14

Second, regarding principle. Jingxi says: "Establishing contemplation with respect to practice is still called phenomena; here, it only discusses the dharmadhātu of begging for food." The text has two parts: first, citing the text to demonstrate directly. From "The Large Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra... down to... not an inclination," this can be understood in correspondence to the three truths. Second, from "Furthermore, all..." onward, traversing all categories. Previously, principle was clarified in terms of taste: within the five aggregates it is merely the form aggregate; within the twelve sense bases it is merely the taste base; within the eighteen elements it is also merely the taste element; therefore, it traverses all three categories. Arriving at the knowledge of all modes, the single mind pervasively encompasses them, all being identical with the three truths; when there are no objects outside the mind, who discusses poor and rich? Regarding "the three characteristics in a single kṣaṇa," they are arising, abiding, and ceasing. Change is identical with ceasing, so it only speaks of three. Jingxi says: "Here, the three characteristics are borrowed as an analogy for the simultaneous three truths; only with the three truths is it called being impartial regarding the principle of dharmas."

6.15

Second, from "Furthermore, regarding..." onward, in terms of being a field of respect. "Being able to know in this manner is knowing the holy Dharma": knowing is merely illumination, and the holy Dharma is the three truths. Because the threefold contemplation in a single mind illuminates the three truths in a single mind, one knows the holy Dharma; thus there are knowledges of nominal designation, contemplative practice, resemblance, and partial reality, all of which are fields of respect. From "Since not..." onward: since one is deluded about one's own nature, this is pitiable, which is precisely the field of compassion. Regarding "From here on, it mostly refers to contemplating the mind": our school's commentaries have altogether two purposes in establishing explanations of contemplating the mind: first, for those who have not yet practiced contemplation, so they avoid the fault of clinging to the text and getting stuck in phenomena, and understand the intent of initiating practice based on understanding; second, for those who have already practiced contemplation, so that upon hearing a single phrase they subsume phenomena into principle and do not forget their fundamental training. Now, although the text is being explained, it mostly addresses contemplating the truths; how could clinging and obstruction arise? Moreover, this conforms to fundamental training, so how could it wait for another explanation of contemplating the mind? One should know that beginners who read through and roughly understand the general meaning, if they truly wish to practice, must rely on the ten spheres and ten vehicles of Great Cessation and Contemplation to arrive anywhere. If they rigidly insist that one can cultivate and realize through mere texts, they will obscure the great principle and ruin our school. Please examine your own mind; why indulge in empty talk? What our school teaches is brighter than the sun and moon; whoever has eyes can see it simply by looking up. What more need I say?

6.16

Second, asking whether he is a noble person or not, in two parts: first, explaining the intent and dividing the sections. From "If one is a noble person... down to... take [food]," Jingxi says: "Previously, the Dharma was examined through the person; now, the person is measured through the Dharma. When person and Dharma are mutually absent, they are mutually [negated]; therefore, we know that since previously there was no Dharma, it was already known there was no person; thus, to re-examine him, it was still necessary to rely on the Dharma." Regarding "Fearing that thoughts arise... down to... taking food from the field of respect," previously, in Kāśyapa's section, he was challenged through the lesser four truths to make him incur loss regarding the Mahāyāna; now, in this section, he is challenged through the greater four truths to make him incur error regarding attachment to the lesser; thus, he is challenged through the four truths generally and specifically. Therefore, we know that Subhūti took the lesser four truths as what he realized, while Jingming used the greater four truths to utter reproaches. The Great and Lesser are eternally contrary; how could he respond?

6.17

Second, from "The first text..." onward, explaining the meaning according to the text, in three parts: first, examining and questioning by traversing the four truths individually, in two parts: first, dividing the sections. "Differentiating and showing the sequence of cause and effect": this is because both worldly and transworldly [domains] proceed from cause to effect. Second, from "If Subhūti..." onward, explaining the meaning according to the text, in four parts: first, origination. Jingxi says: "From 'If an ordinary person' downward, mind is the mental king, constantly accompanying poisons. Below this, one should also differentiate using four propositions. Here there are only three propositions, because cutting off while still accompanying has no such principle. If established conceptually, it would refer to all externalists of eternalism who, having cut off afflictions, are entirely accompanied by views; in principle, this is also admissible. Now, the second proposition is precisely what is reproached, and the subsequent third proposition is precisely what reproaches." Regarding "Bodhisattvas" and so forth, what is clarified here is the middle way Buddha-nature, which is the true nature. Next, from "penetrating" downward, this is real wisdom. "Seeing all dharmas" is expedient means. Second, regarding "If the two vehicles contemplate the suffering truth of active production" and so forth, the Lesser Vehicle is understood. Regarding "Bodhisattvas contemplate the suffering truth of non-production," the phrasing "non-production" also encompasses the Shared Teaching. Jingxi says: "Here, one should also fully construct four propositions, to comprehensively match real existence with destroying and not destroying. The present text omits the Distinct [Teaching], having only the Tripiṭaka, Shared, and Perfect. First, it uses the Tripiṭaka and Shared to discuss destroying and not destroying in contrast to the Perfect truth; thus, the Shared text does not speak of 'not destroying' because it would be confused with the Perfect, and so is not established. It does not mention the Distinct because a practitioner of the Distinct Teaching first destroys and then conforms, which would be confused with the Tripiṭaka. Although there are four propositions, they only form two propositions, namely: destroying and conforming, and not destroying and conforming, because both inside and outside the realms there are destroying and not destroying. If one were to fulfill the meaning of the four propositions: destroying the body and not conforming corresponds to ascetic externalists; not destroying and not conforming corresponds to eternalist externalists. Furthermore, the text of the Shared Teaching also says 'not destroying and conforming,' but that is not the intention of the present sūtra." Regarding "The three paths are merely contemplated... down to... the eight liberations," this realizes origination and takes it as the path of non-production. Although the name 'sentient beings' belongs to the effect, the name 'bodhi' applies to the cause. Furthermore, they are brought together, precisely in the following line, proving the present meaning of the path. Sentient beings are suffering. The eight erroneous views are origination. Regarding "traveling both together" and so forth, Jingxi says: "Because principle and nature are mutually identical, it is called traveling both together. How could retaining both light and darkness in phenomena be called traveling both together? Now, because this text follows the function of the fruit, it can say traveling both together. Spontaneously, realizing that darkness is identical with light, light can manifest darkness, and darkness is constantly light; only in this way can it be called traveling both together. How could ignorance that obstructs wisdom still remain unrefuted, and yet be called the mutual identity of light and darkness? Here, it applies throughout the stages of cause and effect; phenomena and principle are mutually identical without impeding one another; thus, for the practitioner of contemplation, the principle is also mutually identical—how could one ascribe this efficacy solely to the noble person? Therefore, we know that practitioners constantly abide in phenomena to contemplate the light and darkness of principle; when darkness is exhausted and light is achieved, there is also nothing extinguished. Thus, one should illuminate the light and darkness of principle within the light and darkness of phenomena, and in contemplative practice it is also called traveling both together. Thus, darkness in phenomena is not darkness, and light in principle is not light; although the stages of phenomena and principle differ, they are also said not to obstruct one another, because traveling both together in the cause results in traveling both together in the fruit. Practicing non-paths is also like this in principle; therefore, it can testify to the aforementioned traveling both together. Then the three thousand worlds are all called non-paths, and demonstrated delusion and attachment do not depart from emptiness; only when the principles of light and darkness are identical is it called the Buddha Path; thus, phenomena and principle, cause and effect, are both non-dual."

6.18

Question: Why are the [three] clarities and [eight] liberations taken as the truth of the path? Answer: The three clarities fully possess both the direct and auxiliary paths: the undefiled is direct, while the past and future are auxiliary. The truth of the path does not exceed direct and auxiliary practices. Alternatively, the three clarities are direct, and the eight liberations are auxiliary. Furthermore, regarding the eight liberations: if one penetrates the principle of true reality within phenomenal dhyānas and can apply it for transformation, true principle is direct, and transformative application is auxiliary. Only when regarding such [practices] is it called the truth of the path.

6.19

Fourth, cessation. Regarding "The sūtra says: 'Neither liberated nor bound,'" Jingxi says: "For the character 解 (jiě/xiè), some pronounce it gǔ mǎi fan (jiè). How could this not be applicable? However, in contrasting it with the preceding liberation (xiètuō), it should not be said. Why? If one is actively exerting effort, the upper [character] can be pronounced gǔ mǎi fan (jiè), and the lower chǐ huó fan (tuō). When the effort succeeds, the upper should be pronounced hù jiǎ fan (xiè), and the lower tú huó fan (duó). The character 'bound' (縛) does not have two pronunciations; its meaning truly extends to both, so when it is pronounced, it is still simply called bound." Regarding "The śrāvaka teaching... down to... is precisely the truth of cessation," the present intent is that the truth of cessation takes its name from being liberated from the five heinous crimes; the five heinous crimes are precisely the causes of extreme suffering, and the cause must incur the effect, so suffering is extinguished; therefore, in the Lesser Vehicle they are the thirteen obstacles. Precepts do not arise, and concentration and wisdom are not accomplished. If concentration and wisdom are not accomplished, there is no sense of obtaining the fruit. Now, the Mahāyāna teaching thoroughly understands the nature of mind as being liberation itself; what obstacle could there be? If so, why do the seven heinous crimes constitute impediments in the Brahmā Net Sūtra? Answer: The lesser impediments obstruct the precepts and further obstruct the fruit; the greater, although obstructing the precepts, do not impede progressing on the path. Therefore, Ajātaśatru attained rootless faith, and Aṅgulimāla obtained the patience of non-arising. If so, why does the Great [Vehicle] need precepts? Answer: If one knows for oneself that one has the vehicle from past lives, though there be impediments, one still attains the Dharma. If one is newly entering in this life and has weak assistance for future lives, the seeds of the vehicle are faint, and impediments will drag one into evil destinies; one truly relies on both vehicle and precepts to encounter the Buddha as a human or heavenly being. Furthermore, Mahāyāna obstacles differ from the Lesser's eternal abandonment in a single lifetime, because the Mahāyāna permits repenting heinous crimes. In this land, the ritual practices extensively use this school; relying on the Great to repent transgressions, one returns to abide by the Lesser's scrutiny, so how much more can fundamental Mahāyāna learning repent grave offenses without hindrance? The Brahmā Net clarifies impediments for those who have not yet repented, as fully explained below regarding Upāli. How could a wise person avoid precepts to pursue the vehicle, yet still cling to deep impediments and seek the ultimate path?

6.20

Regarding "Like Devadatta" and so forth, this must be explained from the aspect of expedient traces: abiding in transgression while always compliant, compliance not obstructing opposition, reproaching the Lesser for not understanding, taking non-paths as the path. In accordance with principle, one should say that realizing transgression enters cessation; only after realizing that transgression is extinguished does it match true practice. Regarding "Otherwise, both are negated," Subhūti did not see non-production; since he was not a noble person of partial reality, nor was he an unsurpassed field of respect, it says 'both are negated.' Jingxi says: "This further adduces the fruit to reproach the fruit. Citing the expedient Devadatta has the same intent, because the expedient trace is precisely the function of the fruition stage."

6.21

Second, the comprehensive explanation in terms of the four truths with repeated analysis, in two parts: first, setting forth the intent; second, from "not seeing" downward, explaining in detail, which has four parts: first, in terms of the truths. In the initial explanation of mutual negation, it first explains in terms of the Dharma, and second, explains in terms of persons. Jingxi says: "In the first [part] in terms of the Dharma, it tentatively analyzes the sūtra text, because the uncreated truth excludes the two extremes." As for "If one says not seeing," etc., it is also feared that Subhūti might internally raise an objection, saying: "If the created is refuted, is there utterly nothing?" Therefore, it is shown: "Could the uncreated four truths also be non-existent?" Hence, it responds using what was stated above, [showing that] there is only the Great and no Small. What need is there to harbor doubts? Next, from "It is also explained" downward, explaining in terms of persons: it is simply because, differing from ordinary beings and the two vehicles, the Mahāyāna inherently possesses the uncreated truth. Although there are two explanations, the one in terms of the Dharma has somewhat stronger reasoning; [yet] since the Dharma comprehensively pertains to persons, explaining both is without fault. Next, in terms of rejecting and accepting: it merely uses the three teachings to reproach the one.

6.22

Question: In the passage on rejecting and accepting, rejecting the one and accepting the three, does it use the three teachings to reproach Subhūti? Answer: The contrast between the Small and the Mahāyāna will be precisely determined as in the text below.

6.23

Regarding "the outsider's fault": the treatise master says that if one refutes all phenomena, pointing out the treatise master's fault and conversely claiming that the treatise master refutes all phenomena, [saying,] "You are refuting all four kinds of four truths." This is the non-Buddhist measuring others by himself; one should know that this is a great and fearsome point. As for "the treatise master cross-examines": he turns this view back against the non-Buddhist, [saying,] "Your calculating this view destroys all causes and effects. Now although I speak of refutation, though not exhausting expression, simultaneous with refutation there is establishment: just as in what I refute, I refute the Small and establish the Great, and even universally establish all causes and effects, with both the Small and the Great standing together; therefore it is said to be 'vividly present.'" Regarding "cross-examines" (fanzhi): zhi means to question, and also means to establish.

6.24

Third, in terms of the four ineffables: Jingxi says: "Question: If reproaching the Hīnayāna, one ought only to use the Mahāyāna, yet why say that the four ineffables constitute 'not seeing the truths'? When Subhūti correctly attains the principle of the cessation of the created, it is also called 'not seeing'; how can this be called a reproach? It is not that he does not see the truths; [the sūtra] also points to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra's [statement that] there is an explanation through causes and conditions. Subhūti has already received the teaching of arising and ceasing and is also able to speak of it; how can this be called a reproach? Answer: The preceding passage first completed the explanation of mutual negation, which already pertained to the uncreated. Further, the explanation of rejecting and accepting again employed the approach of contrasting the Small with the Great to reproach [him], thereby clarifying that Subhūti not only fails to see the uncreated four truths, but the intent reveals that among the Mahāyāna [teachings] he fails to see all three. Now citing the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra's four ineffables and four effables, it clarifies that the four kinds of four truths are all noble dharmas inherent within the single mind; seeing this inherent principle, one is able to explain them completely: whether refuting or establishing, all are spoken of yet eliminated. But since Subhūti lacks this realization and function, both are lost to him; how could he be called a noble field [of merit]?"

6.25

Second, in terms of the fruit: Jingxi says: "From 'only the two vehicles' downward, it further refutes the lesser fruit. Now the intent of this reproach is that, because the preceding text on rejecting and accepting the four truths is general, it further establishes the perfect culmination as that which negates. Only one who is like this is called 'having attained the fruit'; outside of this, down from 'destroying the conjured city', the text completely runs through the four teachings, still regarding the equal enlightenment of the perfect teaching as not having attained the fruit. Who is Subhūti, that he should claim to have attained it himself?" As for the words "having already destroyed the conjured city": although he has dwelt in the thatched hut of grass, going in and out without difficulty, the meaning already secretly corresponds to destroying the conjured city. Regarding "The separate teaching up to realizing the fruit": Question: According to both the perfect and separate teachings, one should regard the rank of equal enlightenment as not having attained the fruit; why does it merely say "the ten stages are not yet complete"? Answer: This is because whether the rank of equal enlightenment exists is indeterminate, and because equal enlightenment is taken to be the Buddha of equal enlightenment. This is stated in terms of not establishing the rank of equal enlightenment: within the separate teaching, the ten stages correspond in meaning to the culmination of the bodhisattva rank; if viewed from the perspective of the perfect stages, they still belong to the [ten] abodes, hence it says "not yet complete." As for "the text below," etc.: although one has already accomplished the Buddha path in the first abode, it is still not the attainment of the ultimate Buddha fruit.

6.26

Third, in terms of ordinary beings: Regarding "not separated from ordinary beings," etc., Jingxi says: "Comparing through successive stages, it is also only with the Buddha fruit that one is called 'non-ordinary.' Citing the treatise on the five ordinary beings also proves that all are ordinary, and only the Buddha is noble. The 'five ordinary' refer to faith, abode, practice, dedication, and stage."

6.27

Fourth, in terms of sages: Regarding "still not seeing up to the noble person": since there is not even the Dharma that is realized, how could there be the person who realizes it?

6.28

Third, concluding the refutation: Jingxi says: "Regarding 'separated from up to attachment': the four kinds of four truths are merely the provisional and the real; the rational nature of the four kinds of cause and effect is solely the equal dharmadhātu, hence it says 'not grasping or attaching.'" Regarding "being the middle way up to adorned with concentration and wisdom": samādhi is concentration; the three wisdoms are wisdom. The truth is merely the object, which is the dharmakāya! Concentration and wisdom adorn the dharmakāya; therefore we know that here the three virtues are complete. Regarding "Dharma-attachment does not arise": if Dharma-attachment arises, one remains in [the stage of] resemblance; not advancing to higher ranks is called 'falling from the summit.' The Dazhidulun, scroll 30, says: 'Question: What is falling from the summit? Answer: Being unable to ascend to the bodhisattva rank, yet not falling into the stage of the two vehicles; harboring attachment to all virtues and grasping marks through discrimination—this is the bodhisattva falling from the summit.'"

6.29

Second, the inquiry in terms of the field of compassion, in two parts: first, generally discussing the essential principle, in two parts: first, a general indication; second, from "this text" downward, specific explanations, in two parts: first, reproaching the ancients. Regarding "The old explanations are inappropriate": the meanings explained by the two masters both do not accord with the principle, hence they are generally reproached as inappropriate. Regarding "bending [him] to be the same as the six teachers": making him turn away from dependent origination.

6.30

Second, from "Now clarifying" downward, revealing the present [view].

6.31

Second, directly explaining following the text, in two parts: first, the inquiry that fits with being identical to heterodox persons, in two parts: first, dividing the sections; second, explaining in detail, in three parts: first, in terms of not seeing the Buddha and not hearing the Dharma. Regarding "Asking about not hearing the three kinds of four truths of the Mahāyāna teachings": Jingxi says that although the reproaching intent of this text mostly lies in the common and perfect [teachings], in citing the aspect of not hearing, it must speak of three. Therefore, we know that if he has not even heard the common and separate, how much less the perfect? Regarding "dwelling up to vessel of excrement": this is in the Deer Park. When hearing the Mahāyāna in the Vaipulya [period], they still dwell in the lesser fruit; therefore the sūtra sets up the analogy, saying they 'still dwell.' One must know that when pointing to being in the Deer Park, the correct conditions and the noble path both point to the Mahāyāna gate. Regarding "analogous to non-Buddhists": the Hīnayāna does not see the principle of the middle, analogous to non-Buddhists not seeing the true principle; it does not mean that the Hīnayāna is simply heterodox and external.

6.32

Second, the inquiry in terms of being identical to the six teachers, in three parts: first, generally clarifying the essential principle. Regarding "Therefore up to receiving instruction": Jingxi says: "The preceding [statement on] not seeing and so on was already an extreme inquiry. Since not seeing the Buddha constitutes a person of wrong view, although this was a general inquiry, it was still feared that Subhūti would procrastinate, make excuses, and not accept it, vaguely saying, 'I personally see the Buddha; how can you say I do not see him?' Therefore, it points directly to the fact that one who does not see the Buddha must see the six teachers. Hence we know that since the six teachers neither see the Buddha nor hear the Buddha's Dharma, Subhūti is likewise so; how does he differ from them?" From "How is this known?" onward, it is verified through phenomena: taking the time when Subhūti understood emptiness, and looking back to the days when the six teachers originally studied, the six teachers were before him, and Subhūti saw them first. As for the word "later practiced": xi means to learn. As for "model of a master": the Fayan says, 'A master is a person's model and standard.'"

6.33

Second, specifically demonstrating the categorization as identical, in two parts: first, directly explaining the six teachers. Regarding "All dharmas neither arise nor cease": this means all dharmas are like empty space. Master Sengzhao says: "That person gave rise to wrong views, claiming that all dharmas are annihilated and inherently empty, lacking the ways of ruler and minister, father and son, loyalty and filial piety." Regarding "Gauśālī is the mother": he was born of her, hence called Maskarī Gośālīputra. Those below called "-putra" are all like this. Regarding "Spontaneously attaining the path when the time is ripe": this means the path need not be sought; passing through kalpas of birth and death, when suffering is exhausted one naturally attains it. Regarding "like a thread," etc.: like rolling a ball of thread down a high mountain, when the thread runs out it naturally stops; what need is there to seek it? Under "It is also said": that person attained supernormal powers and saw future events, but only up to eighty thousand kalpas; beyond that, being completely ignorant, he claimed that suffering was exhausted. Regarding "kambala means coarse clothing": Master Sengzhao says: "This is the name for worn clothing. Some say it is weaving animal hair into clothing." Regarding "Now with up to joy": this means in this life one undergoes all suffering together, and in future lives one constantly experiences joy. Regarding "The general name for renunciant non-Buddhists": Master Zhao says: "Just as in the Buddha-Dharma renunciants are generally called śramaṇas." Regarding "Cannot be altered," etc.: this means suffering and joy, offense and merit have their own fixed causes, which one must inevitably receive; they cannot be severed by practicing the path. A detailed clarification of the doctrines of the six teachers is as in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra.

6.34

Second, from "Now the Great" downward, showing the categorization as identical to the Hīnayāna, in two parts: first, indicating the intent through analogy; second, from "The word appearance" downward, directly clarifying the categorization as identical, in two parts: first, categorization as identical to the six teachers, in two parts: first, clarifying that non-Buddhists resemble the Hīnayāna. Regarding "Destroying the cause but not the fruit": the absence of a creator is destroying the cause; everything being spontaneous is the fruit. Regarding "As calculated by Zhuang Zhou": this takes this land as an analogy. Zhuangzi was a man of Meng named Zhou, a fellow student of King Hui of Liang. He composed a book of more than one hundred thousand words, all of which are allegories. Today, this former Mengcheng in Songzhou is that place; there currently exists Qiyuan township, where he wrote his works, hence he is sometimes called Meng Zhuang, having once served as an official of Qiyuan. Regarding "Sañjaya up to not yet clear": he calculated that one spontaneously attains the path when the time is ripe, which is either a heterodox cause and condition or causeless; not daring to make a definite judgment, it therefore says "not yet clear." "Kātyāyana" is the fifth person mentioned earlier. As for "the remaining two": these are the fourth, Kambala, and the sixth, Nirgrantha. Stating that one ought to receive painful retribution, and saying that all is determined by karma, both belong to the gate of existence.

6.35

Second, from "Śrāvaka" downward, clarifying that the Hīnayāna resembles non-Buddhists. Regarding "Past up to fixed numbers": Krakucchanda appeared in the world when human lifespan was sixty thousand years, Kanakamuni at forty thousand, Kāśyapa at twenty thousand, and Śākyamuni appeared at one hundred years. When Śākyamuni first taught, five persons realized the fruit and eighty thousand obtained forbearance. Coming down to Maitreya's three assemblies of Dharma preaching, the people are all of a fixed number, as explained in the Sūtra on Maitreya's Attaining Buddhahood. Regarding "At other times they cannot": this means that aside from the lifespans of sixty, forty, twenty thousand, and one hundred, they do not appear at other times, because there is no capacity for attaining the path.

6.36

Question: In the various Mahāyāna texts, all speak identically to this; coming down to the Lotus Sūtra conferring predictions upon disciples, all determine the kalpas, lands, lifespans, disciples to be converted, and so forth; why is this unique to the Hīnayāna? Answer: What the Mahāyāna discusses is that Buddha and Buddha are equal in their path, appearing in response according to capacities; although it may sometimes speak identically to the Small, how could there be a fixed attachment? For example, the Lotus Sūtra clarifies that repeatedly one proclaims arising and ceasing, in the ten directions there are emanation bodies, there is constantly the Vulture Peak, and in other lands he again becomes a Buddha. Also, as the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra explains, in the west there is the land Aparājitā, adorned like Sukhāvatī, where Śākyamuni appeared. The Śūraṅgamasamādhi Sūtra states that a lifespan of seven hundred asaṃkhyeyas is an alternate name of Śākyamuni. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra discusses the Buddha's lifespan, [saying] empty space, the earth, mountains, and oceans cannot serve as an analogy. The Dazhidulun clarifies that Śākyamuni also has a pure land, just like Amitābha. In the present sūtra, the Brahmā king sees it as like the Paranirmitavaśavartin Heaven. In all these sūtras and treatises, how could it be like the Hīnayāna asserting that a lifespan of one hundred years in a defiled land is definitively Śākyamuni? Since one Buddha is immeasurable, all Buddhas are likewise so. One ought to reflect upon their essential tenet, and not let the Great and the Small be confounded.

6.37

Regarding "committing a heavy violation of the vinaya and being expelled": The Four-Division Vinaya states: "If a bhikṣu or bhikṣuṇī has committed a pārājika and has no mind of concealment, let them repent according to the Dharma." The Vinayamātṛkā-śāstra states: "Having performed the ritual of fourfold karmavācanā repentance, it is termed purely maintaining the precepts. However, in this single lifetime they cannot transcend birth and death, though it prevents falling into hell." The Four-Division Vinaya states: "If [the offense is] heavy, the violator is permanently expelled." "And the various offenses that obstruct the path" refers to the saṃghāvaśeṣas and below.

6.38

Second, classifying and assimilating the three kinds has two [parts]: first, explaining how the non-Buddhists resemble the Hīnayāna. Regarding "if one attains dhyāna-concentration": Jingxi says: the four dhyānas and four formless concentrations. Regarding "stopping the river" and so forth: The Great Treatise, fascicle 35, states that various non-Buddhists came and spoke to King Prasenajit, saying: "Great King! Who makes the waxing and waning of this moon? Who made the saltiness of the great sea and Mount Malaya? Is it not our fellow brāhmaṇas? Has the Great King not heard that the ṛṣi Agastya held the waters of the Ganges River in his ear for twelve years? The ṛṣi Gautama performed a great transformation: for twelve years he transformed into Śakra's body, and he made Śakra's body into the body of a ram, creating a thousand female organs on Śakra's body. The ṛṣi Jātūkarṇa in a single day drank the water of the ocean, making the great earth dry. The ṛṣi Vasu made three eyes for Maheśvara. The ṛṣi Rāra transformed Kapilavastu into barren saline earth." "Three luminaries" refers to the sun, moon, and stars. The "four Vedas" are as explained previously. Regarding "medical prescriptions": The Wenxin Diaolong says: "A fāng (prescription) is a corner (yú)." Medicinal remedies attacking illness each have their primary focus, specializing in one single corner; thus medicine and acupuncture are termed fāng (prescriptions). As for the "sixteen great kingdoms," their names derive from the Dīrgha-āgama: first, Aṅga; second, Magadha; third, Kāśi; fourth, Kosala; fifth, Vṛji; sixth, Malla; seventh, Ceti; eighth, Vatsa; ninth, Kuru; tenth, Pāñcāla; eleventh, Aśvaka; twelfth, Śūrasena; thirteenth, Matsya; fourteenth, Gandhāra; fifteenth, Kamboja; sixteenth, Avanti.

6.39

Second, from "Tripiṭaka" onward, explains how the Hīnayāna resembles non-Buddhists. Third, from "therefore" onward, reveals the intention behind the reproach. Regarding "whose minds operate outside the principle": the two teachings abandon birth-and-death to seek nirvāṇa, and the distinct teaching abandons the two extremes to seek the middle way; being unable to instantly know their original nature, these are all termed "minds operating outside the principle." From "from this" onward is the speech of self-narration by Kumāra-Kāśyapa in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. Even the person of the distinct teaching is heterodox; how then could the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings be correct? Because neither of them is the unconditioned perfection and integration. If the shared and distinct teachings are still like this, how could the Tripiṭaka teaching be superior? Rebuking them as equivalent to the six teachers is truly justified.

6.40

Third, concluding with the command to take the food. Regarding "though distinct... do not see the Buddha-nature": Jingxi says: the meaning of birth-and-death is identical, and losing the path and principle are the same.

6.41

Second, the query regarding possessing heterodox dharmas has three [parts]: first, narrating the intent and dividing the sections. Jingxi says: Why does one still possess view and thought [defilements]? They are also reproached on the grounds that the substance is different while the name is the same. Subhūti possesses the vile evils outside the realm. Vile evils are thieves; how can this be called "slaying the thief"? It is inevitably birth, hence not "unborn." Since it is a thief, it must be subject to birth; how is he fit to receive offerings? Lacking these three virtues, the arhat is not accomplished.

6.42

Second, from "first, in terms of" onward, explains the text according to its phrasing, in three [parts]: first, reproaching in terms of slaying the thief, which has two [parts]: first, narrating the intent and dividing the sections. Second, from "if in accordance with" onward, explains the text according to its phrasing, in two [parts]: first, reproaching the view of existence as entering the eight difficulties, which has two [parts]: first, explaining the delusion of the view of existence. Regarding "as for the heterodox view, what kind of view is it?": Jingxi says: raising a query and explaining it. If it were heterodoxy within the realm, it would be easy to know. Heterodoxy outside the realm is difficult to recognize, which refers directly to Subhūti. Therefore, to explain it, one must first raise the query and then explain. If taken as combining into [the conventional], it is subsumed under the view of non-existence. The intent is to clarify that this heterodoxy is still included within the two truths and the three truths: the two [truths] refer to the conventional as existence, and the three [truths] refer to the ultimate as non-existence. Although subsumed by the heterodoxies of the two truths and three truths, none of them see the middle, and thus belong to the heterodox views outside the realm. If within the realm, they are entirely subsumed by the conventional of the two and the three. Hence we know that internal and external heterodox views are permanently distinct. Now, because within the realm one does not yet see the middle and possesses ignorance and the birth-and-death of change, the meaning of being able to destroy thieves within the realm still stands. Regarding "containing the middle": among the seven levels, the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings are devoid of the middle; when the two truths of the shared teaching are connected to the distinct and perfect teachings, it is called "containing the middle." The distinct teaching is "revealing the middle"; revealing the middle sometimes also points to the perfect. The Commentary on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra also designates the seven levels as the single and complex conventional and ultimate two truths. Now, in this sense, it clarifies that within the two truths there is the middle way; when the middle way is combined with the ultimate to form the ultimate truth, it is called "containing the middle." If it reveals the middle, it also belongs to the distinct teaching and the two truths of entering the distinct from the perfect. Therefore, according to the present meaning, "containing" can also be termed "revealing." Regarding "the ultimate truth combines with the conventional": that is, the ultimate truth of the two vehicles is combined into the conventional. The conventional is also termed "existence," hence it is called "the view of existence." If separated into three, the ultimate truth of the two vehicles can also be called non-existence, hence it is said that it is subsumed under non-existence. Corresponding to the above, since combining with the conventional is called the view of existence, separating into three belongs to non-existence, which is just the view of non-existence—the text merely omits the word "view." Because not seeing the middle is entirely called a "view," being a view, it is called heterodox. Since among the five kinds, those entering the shared from the distinct and perfect directly refute the ultimate, how could they speak of connecting with the ultimate? Therefore, among the five kinds, only the perfect is not a view; the rest are still called views. From "therefore the Great Sūtra" onward, it adduces proof that the two belong to heterodoxy. From "why is this?" onward, it explains that assimilating to non-Buddhists belongs to heterodoxy.

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維摩經略疏垂裕記 — Classical Chinese