淨名玄論 6.10

6.10

問：真諦之名，為是世諦攝、為真諦攝？為真諦攝邪。若是世諦攝者，則世諦如長還待長、短還因短。若真諦之名為真諦攝無名者，真諦無名，何得攝名？真遂攝名者，則真非絕名。若言真理無名、為真立名遂屬真者，既生屬真，真則有名。若真不可名，亦不可屬矣。故二諦空有無相待義，便是性矣。又真絕不可待，俗是待不可絕，豈非性耶，次別問世諦。世諦中長短相待者，待者為長短成竟而待、為相待竟長短始成，二俱不可。若成竟而待者，凡有二過：一者失待過。既生已成，何須復待？凡論待者，本為令成。今既已成，不應更待。二者若成竟而復待，則成一未待時，已本成二相待竟。復成唯一長拒，即何有二成？若有二成，須有二長拒。

Question: Is the name of paramārtha-satya subsumed under saṃvṛti-satya, or is it subsumed under paramārtha-satya? If it is subsumed under saṃvṛti-satya, then saṃvṛti-satya would be like long depending again on long, or short being caused again by short. If the name of paramārtha-satya is subsumed under paramārtha-satya, which is nameless, then how can that which is nameless subsume a name? If paramārtha indeed subsumes the name, then paramārtha is not transcendent of names. If you say that the principle of truth has no name, but a name established for truth subsequently belongs to truth, then once it belongs to truth, truth possesses a name. If truth cannot be named, it also cannot be possessed. Therefore, if the emptiness and existence of the two truths have no sense of mutual dependence, that is svabhāva. Furthermore, if paramārtha is transcendent and cannot be depended upon, while saṃvṛti is dependent and cannot be transcendent, how is this not svabhāva? Next, we separately interrogate saṃvṛti-satya: Concerning long and short depending on each other in saṃvṛti-satya, do they depend after long and short are already established, or are long and short first established only after they depend on each other? Both are untenable. If they depend after being established, there are two faults: First, the fault of losing dependence. Since they are already established, why must they depend again? Whenever one discusses dependence, it is originally to make them established. Now that they are already established, they should not depend further. Second, if they are already established and depend again, then before they depended, they were already originally established as two, and after depending, they are established again, which means only one long object would have two establishments. How could there be two establishments? If there are two establishments, there must be two long objects.